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1 Introduction
1.1 The European Convention on Human Rights and ‘hard power’
In Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights,1 the High Contract-
ing Parties undertake to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms’ defined in its Articles 2-11 and, by extension, in the Protocols to the Con-
vention. This very phrasing makes it clear that the primary responsibility to protect 
human rights rests with the High Contracting Parties themselves. The role of the 
European Court of Human Rights,2 defined in Article 19 of the Convention, is es-
sentially supervisory.
In ordinary circumstances the Parties to the Convention expect to entrust compli-
ance with human rights standards to a competent administration faithfully applying 
domestic law. Contentious human-rights issues will nonetheless arise; these will be 
dealt with the domestic courts, which in so doing will also apply rules of domestic 
law subject as necessary to rules of international human rights law. At the same time 
citizens expect the State to protect them against the violence of others. It is for that 
reason that the State enjoys a monopoly on the use of force3 – or, to use an expression 
that we will introduce presently, ‘hard power’.4
The armed forces of our countries also protect human rights. This they do at the 
most basic level possible. Individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law5 
would not survive for long unless defended by the credible threat – and if necessary, 
the actual use – of military force: put differently, the exercise of ‘hard power’ on be-
half of the State.6
In recent years the European Court of Human Rights has been called to pass judg-
ment on the actions of servicemen doing their duty towards the countries they served. 
In several such cases the Court has had to find breaches of the Convention. Such 
findings have sometimes met with a frosty reception from respondent governments. 
The defence minister of one of the Convention’s Contracting States, for example, has 
gone on record stating that ‘the cumulative effect of some of Strasbourg’s decisions on 
the freedom to conduct military operations raises serious challenges which need to be 
1 Hereafter “the Convention”.
2 Hereafter “the Court”.
3 Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 325, ECHR 2007-II.
4 See 1.2.3 below.
5 Preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe, third paragraph.
6 See generally Dwight Raymond, “Military Means of Preventing Mass Atrocities”, in Reconstruct-
ing Atrocity Prevention (Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, Alex Zucker, eds.), Cambridge University 
Press 2016, pp. 295-318.
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addressed’.7 In the same country, a member of parliament (a former soldier) has pub-
lished an article in the press arguing that the ‘imposition’ of ‘complex human rights 
law’ designed, as he sees it, solely for application in peacetime ‘changes the conditions 
of service and hampers the ability of soldiers to fight, because human rights law does 
not accept that there is anything unique about a military operation’.8
Closer to home, the Court has on occasion had to find fault with use of force law-
ful in terms of domestic law to eliminate a terrorist threat or put an end to a terror-
ist attack. The public, and especially some sectors of the press, have sometimes been 
dismissive of such findings.9
It is easy to dismiss statements of politicians as mere politics, and the rants of jour-
nalists as facile; but even the most ardent human rights defender must at least make 
an effort to understand the frustration of governments, not to mention their military 
forces, at being taken to task for having violated the human rights of an often ruthless 
enemy. One cannot but sympathise with the bewildered soldier and his or her politi-
cal superiors. Likewise, the view that it is justified to use lethal force to keep the public 
safe from terrorism is hardly incomprehensible. Even so, it is submitted that those 
who argue that the European Convention on Human Rights imposes unreasonable 
constraints on the meaningful use of ‘hard power’ are wrong.
The first basic supposition defended in this work is that the Convention itself 
makes sufficient provision for the legitimate use of ‘hard power’ in difficult situa-
tions. It should not be forgotten that the Convention itself was created only a few 
short years after the Second World War, the bloodiest conflict in human history so 
far, and after two colonial empires – British India and the Netherlands East Indies – 
had wrested themselves free from European overlordship: the first of many.10 Actual 
drafting took place even as new conflicts threatened to tear Europe apart. NATO, the 
7 The Rt Hon Sir Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, 
speaking at the Policy Exchange seminar ‘Clearing the “Fog of Law”’ on 8 December 2014. See 
also Haijer, F.A. & Ryngaert, C.M.J., “Reflections on Jaloud v. the Netherlands – Jurisdictional 
Consequences and Resonance in Dutch Society”, Journal of International Peacekeeping 19 (2015), 
pp. 174-189, p. 185.
8 Tom Tugendhat MP, “Human rights lawyers now present a real threat to British troops at war”, 
The Telegraph, 19 September 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/19/human-
rights-lawyers-now-present-a-real-threat-to-british-troops/.
9 For example, “European Court of Killers’ Rights; EXCLUSIVE: Third of cases won by terrorists, 
murderers and lags”, The Sun, 17 August 2015, updated 5 April 2016, https://www.thesun.co.uk/
archives/politics/204465/european-court-of-killers-rights/ (accessed on 24 August 2018). For 
a discussion of the phenomenon, see Egbert Myjer, “About court jesters: Freedom of expression 
and duties and responsibilities of journalists”, in Freedom of expression: Essays in honour of Nicolas 
Bratza, Wolf Legal Publishers 2012, p. 111.
10 British India gained independence as two new states, Pakistan (14 August 1947) and India 
(15 August 1947); the independence of the Netherlands East Indies (minus Netherlands New 
Guinea) as the Republic of Indonesia was recognised by the Netherlands on 27 December 1949 
(in 2005 the Netherlands retrospectively accepted the Indonesian declaration of independence 
of 17 August 1945).
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was created on 24 August 194911 in response to 
the perception of a new threat to peace from the Soviet Union. European troops were 
in transit to Korea to fight with the blessing of the newly-created Security Council of 
the United Nations.12 The founding fathers of the Convention were no strangers to 
the reality of their day; they read the newspapers just as other responsible citizens did. 
We shall see that they strove to accommodate the need for ‘hard power’, even active 
war, more effectively than the United Nations did in their later Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.13
Of course, even an observer who recognises that the use of ‘hard power’ may be in-
escapable even for the most well-intentioned of political leaders is bound to recognise 
that the protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the name of 
their citizens, or even in a more abstract sense the protection of the international legal 
order, is hardly the only motive for States resort to the threat or use of force in their 
domestic and international relations. Whatever the reasons for which the political de-
cision is taken to resort to military force, for the serviceman ordered into action they 
are of importance only in so far as they may define his operational goals: otherwise, 
at his level, they matter little, and in so far as the legality of the use of force concerns 
him it will be at the level of ius in bello rather than ius ad bellum. These reasons are 
however relevant to domestic and international courts in that they may engage the 
State’s responsibility for the actions of its servicemen and in some cases the individual 
criminal responsibility of political decision-makers.
This takes us to the second basic supposition of this work. Human rights law, in-
cluding the law of the European Convention on Human Rights, is a subdivision of 
international law. Other such subdivisions include the law of international organisa-
tions, most notably the United Nations Organization or UN, and international hu-
manitarian law, also known as the international law of armed conflict or, more tradi-
tionally, the laws of war.14 It is our position that in terms of ius ad bellum the law of the 
United Nations, and in particular Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
while it does not justify or condone violations of human rights, qualifies the way in 
which the European Convention on Human Rights applies in situations of armed 
conflict.15 International humanitarian law is relevant to the Convention applied as 
ius in bello.16
11 The date of the entry into force of the North Atlantic Treaty (“Washington Treaty”), signed on 
4 April 1949.
12 S/Res/83, 27 June 1950, Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea; S/Res/84, 7 July 
1950, Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea.
13 See 3.2 below.
14 The expression “international humanitarian law”, which has much the same meaning as “laws of 
war” or “law of armed conflict”, has gained currency in recent decades.
15 See 4.3 and 8.4.5.2 below.
16 See 4.9, 4.11 and 6.7 below.
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1.2 Understanding of ‘hard power’ for purposes of this study
Since the purpose of this study is to identify the parameters within which the Con-
vention allows States to exercise ‘hard power’, we must first define our understanding 
of that concept.
1.2.1 Armed conflict
The classical use of ‘hard power’ involves the use of military force in an armed conflict.
A Vice-President of the Court, speaking in 2015, has used the expression ‘conflict’ in 
noting that the Court has had to address in one way or another all instances of the use 
of military force that have occurred on the continent, at least since 1990. The examples 
he mentions include the situations in Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria, the dis-
pute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the events of 2008 in 
northern Georgia, the dissolution of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugo-
slavia and its aftermath, and the NATO intervention in Kosovo. He also refers to the 
involvement of European Contracting States, as members of the American-led force, 
in events in Iraq.17 He is right; and we shall come across all of these ‘conflicts’ below.
The Convention nowhere uses the expression ‘conflict’. The word ‘war’ appears in 
only one Article of the Convention – namely, in Article 15 (derogation in time of 
emergency) – and in no other Protocols than Protocols Nos. 6 and 13, which concern 
the abolition of the death penalty. We will discuss the meaning of the expression ‘war’ 
as used in that particular context when we come to derogations from Convention 
rights.18
The Convention was first drawn up in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War. A field of international law intended to rid warfare of the worst excesses 
of inhumanity existed already then, in the form of a body of treaty law that largely 
codified the customary ‘laws of war’ – the best known of the treaties being the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1929 that had served the 
world as well as they could during the Second World War, and most recently the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The understanding of ‘conflict’ that then prevailed 
was kinetic warfare of the classic kind – ‘set-piece’19 or open-field battles, perhaps 
guerrilla – between the armed forces of opposing states.20
17 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “The European Court of Human Rights at a time of crisis in Europe”, 
SEDI/ESIL Lecture, European Court of Human Rights, 16 October 2015, p. 10.
18 See 4.3 below.
19 An expression apparently first used by Lieutenant General Sir John Monash in The Australian 
Victories in France (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1920), p. 226: “[An operation or a battle] is a 
‘set-piece’ because the stage is elaborately set, parts are written for all the performers, and care-
fully rehearsed by many of them. The whole performance is controlled by a time-table, and, so 
long as all goes according to plan, there is no likelihood of unexpected happenings, or of interest-
ing developments.”
20 Marko Milanovic, “Extraterritorial Derogations from Treaties in Armed Conflict”, in The Fron-
tiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and its Challenges, Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law, vol. XXIV/1, p. 55-88 at p. 66-67.
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This understanding of ‘conflict’ has not lost its relevance; neither have the classic 
laws of war. However, other forms of violence have arisen that cannot be understood 
in terms of direct confrontation between the armed forces of two or more States but 
that do not comfortably fit the paradigm of ordinary law enforcement either. For 
these, a new legal category has been created: the ‘non-international armed conflict’. 
This new category, although foreshadowed by the common Article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, has obtained recognition in the second of two Proto-
cols added to those Conventions in 1977. The classical interstate conflict is now digni-
fied by a category of its own: that of ‘international armed conflict’.21
Non-international armed conflicts are now much more common than classi-
cal international armed conflicts. The War Report 2017, a paper published by the 
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Geneva 
Academy),22 lists six situations in 2017 that could be considered ‘international armed 
conflicts’ in the classical sense (some of them short-lived); seventeen cases of ‘bel-
ligerent occupation’; and no fewer than fifty-five ‘non-international armed conflicts’ 
(some unfortunate countries hosted a plurality of such conflicts simultaneously).23
States Parties to the Convention are concerned by conflicts in all these categories. 
For example, the situations identified by the Geneva Academy as arguably active ‘in-
ternational armed conflicts’ include Ukraine v. Russia and the international coalition 
v. Syria – the ‘international coalition’ being comprised of (in addition to non-Euro-
pean states) European NATO members Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Turkey. Of the ten ‘belligerent occupations’ identified by the 
Geneva Academy, five are to be found on the territory of Convention States: Armenia 
v. Azerbaijan, Turkey v. Cyprus, Russia v. Georgia, Russia v. Moldova, and Russia v. 
Ukraine. The Falkland Islands are alleged by Argentina to be under belligerent occu-
pation by the United Kingdom.24
Of the thirty-eight ‘non-international armed conflicts’ identified as such by the 
Geneva Academy in 2017, two are on the territory of Convention States: that be-
21 See generally Sten Verhoeven, “International and non-international armed conflicts”, in Armed 
Conflicts and the Law, Jan Wouters, Philip De Man, Nele Verlinden (eds.), Intersentia, 2016, 
pp. 151-185 at pp. 156-17 1.
22 Annysa Bellal, The War Report 2017, https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/doc-
man-files/The%20War%20Report%202017.pdf (accessed on 11 August 2018), pp. 29-30 (up from 
three, ten and thirty-five the previous year: see Annyssa Bellal, The War Report 2016, https://
armedgroupsinternationallaw.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/the-war-report-2016.pdf (accessed 
on 27 May 2017).
23 The present study does not take any position on the classification in international law of any of 
these alleged conflicts.
24 The War Report 2016, p. 28. The General Court of the European Union has held the ‘actions and 
policies of the Russian Government destabilising Ukraine’ to constitute ‘war or serious interna-
tional tension constituting threat of war’ within the meaning of Article 99(1)(d) of the Agree-
ment on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Com-
munities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, 
Official Journal of the European Communities L 327, 28 November 1997: see General Court, 
judgment of 15 June 2017, Case T-262/15, Kiselev v. Council, § 33 and passim.
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tween Ukraine on the one hand and the breakaway ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and 
‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ on the other (it is not necessary for our purposes to take 
a position on whether this is one conflict or two), and that between Turkey and the 
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, ‘PKK’). The others are all 
to be found outside Europe, mainly in Africa and the Middle East; but Convention 
States take part in some of them as contributors to United Nations forces (at the time 
of writing, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au 
Mali, MINUSMA) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations unies 
pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO)).25
No mention is made in the Geneva Academy’s report of the strife in the parts of the 
northern Caucasus that are under Russian sovereignty. This is not generally consid-
ered in terms of ‘non-international armed conflict’; that expression is not used by the 
Russian Government to describe it.26
Even so, the sheer scale of the separatist violence in that area – and elsewhere in 
Russia: the separatists have taken it to Moscow itself27 – has made its mark, includ-
ing on the case-law of the Court, which draws a distinction between ‘routine police 
operations’ and ‘situations of large-scale anti-terrorist operations’.28 It is accordingly of 
interest to us for purposes of this study.
No Convention State is understood currently to deploy military force in Iraq; but 
several have in the recent past, and the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights has had to develop accordingly. Similarly, the involvement of Convention 
States in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-95 war and its aftermath and in 
Kosovo during and after the events of 1999 is of interest from our standpoint. So, 
potentially, is the military operation briefly undertaken by Turkish forces in the Afrin 
25 The War Report 2017, pp. 30-31.
26 In a judgment of 31 July 1995 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation proceeded on 
the implicit recognition that Additional Protocol II was applicable to the conflict which was at 
that time being fought in Chechnya (later to be known as the First Chechen War), and that its 
provisions were “binding on both parties to the armed conflict”. Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation, Judgment of 31 July 1995 on the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees 
and the Resolutions of the Federal Government concerning the situation in Chechnya (transla-
tion by Federal News Service Group, Washington D.C., published by the Venice Commission 
on 10 January 1996 as CDL-INF (96) 1). See Bowring, Bill (2008) – “How will the European 
Court of Human Rights deal with the UK in Iraq?: lessons from Turkey and Russia” – p. 9. Lon-
don: Birkbeck ePrints. Available at: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/859. Large-scale fighting between 
Chechen insurgents and Russian (and Russian-backed) armed forces, often referred to as the 
“Second Chechen War”, occurred between August 1999 and April 2009. A low-level insurgency 
continues to the present day. The Russian Federation ratified the Convention (and Protocols 
Nos. 1, 4, 7 and 11) on 5 May 1998.
27 Finogenov and Others v. Russia, nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03, ECHR 2011.
28 Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 51313/08, 21294/11 
and 37096/11, § 595, 13 April 2017.
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district of Syria in January 2018, which we mention in passing since it has yet to give 
rise to Strasbourg case-law.
An ‘armed attack’ creating for the State under attack the right to defend itself was 
once thought to be possible only if occurring at the hand of another State. However, 
as we shall see below,29 al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack on New York and Washington was suf-
ficient for the NATO members for the first time in history to activate Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty, according to which ‘an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all’, and 
activate the right to collective self-defence, no less, under Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations.30 As is well known, forces of the United States and their allies 
ran the al-Qaeda leadership to earth in Afghanistan; even today no fewer than thirty-
seven Convention States are contributing to the Resolute Support mission in that 
country.31
1.2.2 Other exercise of ‘ hard power’ relevant to this study
Armed conflict in the sense of kinetic military action against another political actor 
does not exhaust the scope of the expression ‘hard power’ as used for purposes of this 
study.
The threat of terrorist attack, and indeed actual terrorist attacks, by al-Qaeda and 
groups with a similar ideological motivation have induced several European NATO 
members to allow American intelligence services to undertake covert action on their 
territory. The measures taken against al-Qaeda and its ideological successors do not fit 
neatly into any category of armed conflict, whether international in character or not. 
Even so, politicians and journalists have sometimes been led to dignify them by the 
expression ‘war’. Already by reason of their sheer scale, they are of interest to us – even 
though the expression ‘war’ by any conventional legal definition is inappropriate.32
The same may be said, a fortiori, about the suppression of widespread organised 
crime. The kind of widespread violence committed by criminal armed groups, as seen 
in some parts of Latin America, is at the present time not to be found in Europe; but 
piracy, a similar phenomenon, does concern European States. Like terrorism of the al-
Qaeda type, neither is conventionally viewed in terms of international or non-inter-
29 See 4.5 below.
30 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd edition 2015), 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 296-97. 
31 Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Geor-
gia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monte-
negro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom (The War Report 2016, fn. 4 on p. 15).
32 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd edition 2015), 
Cambridge University Press, p. 2, fn. 3 and pp. 296-97; Luc Reydams and Jan Wouters, “A la 
guerre comme à la guerre”, in Armed Conflicts and the Law, Jan Wouters, Philip De Man, Nele 
Verlinden (eds.), Intersentia, 2016, pp. 1-27 at pp. 22-24. 
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national armed conflict.33 Nevertheless, combating piracy requires the use of armed 
force; indeed, it is the traditional preserve of naval forces of the State. Piracy too is 
therefore worth examining in the present context.
Finally, it is conceivable that States – or rather, Governments – may resort to the 
covert use of lethal means to further their interests. This study touches briefly on such 
phenomena, which for present purposes must be treated as relevant though hypo-
thetical.34
1.2.3 Defining ‘ hard power’
1.2.3.1 Background to the concept
It is convenient for our purposes to use the expression ‘hard power’ as a holdall term 
to cover all instances of the use of force referred to above. The concept is borrowed 
from the study of international relations. 
The definition of ‘hard power’ used by diplomatists is usually in terms such as
The coercive use of military or economic means to influence the behaviour or 
interests of political players35
distinguishing it from ‘soft power’, which is the use of diplomacy, foreign aid and cul-
tural relations to the same end,36 and ‘smart power’, which is the judicious use of ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ power combined.37
The use of economic means of coercion – boycotts, economic sanctions imposed 
by a state on another political actor – has rarely been the object of a judgment or deci-
sion of the Court or a decision or report of the Commission; there have been only a 
33 Duffy (2018), p. 21.
34 Hypothetical because there is a case pending before the Court that concerns such an allegation 
and on which the Court has yet to pronounce. See 6.4.6.3 below.
35 Adviesraad internationale vraagstukken (Advisory Council on International Affairs), Azië in op-
mars: Strategische betekenis en gevolgen (Asia on the rise: Strategic significance and implications), 
no. 86, December 2013, appendix 3; compare House of Lords, Select Committee on Soft Power 
and the UK’s Influence - First Report: Persuasion and Power in the Modern World (ordered by 
the House of Lords to be printed on 11 March 2014), Chapter 3, paragraph 40, ‘… getting what 
one wants by using coercion or inducement to force other countries to do what one wants – “hard 
power”, which includes the threat or use of military coercion or of economic coercion through 
sanctions or boycotts …’
36 Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, ibid.; compare House of Lords, Select Committee on 
Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, ibid.: ‘… getting what one wants by influencing other coun-
tries (via their governments and publics) to want the same thing, through the forces of attraction, 
persuasion and co-option …’.
37 House of Lords, Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, loc. cit., § 61. For more 
extensive discussion of these three concepts, see Ernest J. Wilson, III, “Hard Power, Soft Power, 
Smart Power” in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2008; 616; 
p. 110-24, passim, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Hard, Soft, and Smart Power’, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Modern Diplomacy (Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, eds.), Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2013, pp. 559-574.
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few such cases.38 The coercive use of military means is more frequently found in Stras-
bourg case-law. States Parties to the Convention have taken part in armed conflicts, in 
some cases on their own territory, in some cases abroad; they have used military force, 
either to exercise ‘hard power’ in the above sense themselves or to resist attempts of 
other political actors to do so. 
However, the opponent against whom coercive force is directed is not necessarily a 
‘political player’ in any conventional sense of the word: pirates, for example, are gen-
erally viewed as common criminals. Our understanding of ‘hard power’ is accordingly 
wider than that of the student of international diplomacy inasmuch as we must also 
touch on situations of this nature.
1.2.3.2 ‘Hard power’: a definition
For our purposes, accordingly, ‘hard power’ means:
– Firstly, the deliberate projection by a Government of coercive force outside the 
territory of the State, whether the situation concerned constitutes an armed 
conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law or not;
– Secondly, the deliberate use (or conscious acceptance) by a Government of coer-
cive force within the State’s own borders on a scale necessitating the application 
either of military force or of non-military force in excess of the requirements 
of ordinary law enforcement to overcome opposition, whether the situation 
concerned is admitted by that Government to be an armed conflict within the 
meaning of international humanitarian law or not;
– Thirdly, the application by a Government of economic sanctions in the interna-
tional relations of the State.
Such a definition encompasses situations which, from the standpoint of international 
humanitarian law, would in most cases be seen as law enforcement rather than armed 
conflict, including counter-insurgency operations, antiterrorist action going beyond 
ordinary policing, and the suppression of piracy whether in home or international 
waters.
The above definition is autonomous: it does not depend on any admission or dec-
laration by the Government. Thus, the assumption by the Government of emergency 
powers is not a part of it.
1.2.4 Problems of applying the Convention to the use of ‘ hard power’
1.2.4.1 Perception of inapplicability of human rights law to armed conflict
No one denies the applicability of human rights law to policing, or law enforcement. 
In contrast, until recently there was a tendency on the part of decision-makers both 
military and civilian to pay scant attention to human rights law, Convention law in 
particular, in relation to ‘conflict’, whether international or non-international. The 
38 See 8.4.5.1 and 8.4.5.2.4 below.
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writing had been on the wall since 1996 at the latest,39 but even so their assumption 
tended to be that human rights law was meant to govern law enforcement only and 
had little if any relevance to the conduct of hostilities, that being a matter to consider 
exclusively in terms of international humanitarian law. This can explain, for example, 
that the Dutch manual on military law (Handboek Militair Recht) mentions the Con-
vention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only in passing, 
in one brief paragraph, and in its index refers to them not at all.40 The discovery that 
the Convention was not merely relevant but applicable to the actions of the armed 
forces not merely on home territory but also on foreign soil and even at sea41 would 
have come as a rude shock.
Military lawyers who take the trouble to study the interaction between human 
rights law and the law governing the use of ‘hard power’ – however defined – take the 
perspective of the confused serviceman trying to predict what the courts will think 
of next to complicate his life’s work; Pouw’s dissertation, which explores the ‘outer 
operational limits’ of targeting and detention in a counterinsurgency setting, is an 
excellent example.42
The fact is, however, that international human rights law – for our purposes, the 
Convention – applies also to the actions of service personnel, even, as we shall see, 
when they are conducting hostilities. Service personnel are entitled to guidance to 
help them navigate its tortuous channels.
1.2.4.2 Legal interoperability
In military parlance, ‘interoperability’ defines 
39 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226 at § 25; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 176 at § 106; 
and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 242-43 at § 216. The latter judgment is of 
particular interest in that the International Court of Justice finds Uganda responsible for viola-
tions of (inter alia) the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a regional treaty like the 
Convention, committed on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (pp. 243-44 
at § 217-220). See also D. Murray, Practitioner’s Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict 
(Chatham House/Oxford University Press 2016), pp. v-vi (Foreword by Lord Phillips of Worth 
Maltravers) and pp. 12-13.
40 Handboek Militair Recht (P.J.J. van der Kruit, ed.), published by Nederlandse Defensie Academie 
(Netherlands Defence Academy), 2nd edition 2009, pp. 35-36.
41 See Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, ECHR 2011; Al-Skeini and Others v. 
the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 
no. 27765/09, ECHR 2012; Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 47708/08, ECHR 2014.
42 Eric Pouw, International Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Context of 
Counterinsurgency - With a Particular Focus on Targeting and Operational Detention (diss. UvA 
2013), p. 7.
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The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services 
from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so exchanged to en-
able them to operate effectively together.43
Thus defined, it may refer to the capability of diverse military units – formations of 
land forces, ships, aircraft – to act to a common purpose in the conduct of hostili-
ties. The concept is however not limited to weapons systems and military personnel: 
the hardware, communications systems and command structures must be compatible, 
but so must the rulebooks. This may be referred to as ‘legal interoperability’.
A problem perceived by at least one military lawyer, the Canadian Colonel Kirby 
Abbott from whom we borrow the expression, is a loss of legal interoperability within 
NATO between on the one hand the European NATO members, all of which are 
parties to the Convention, and the North American NATO members, the United 
States and Canada, which are not and cannot be. He notes a growing divergence in 
legal doctrine between the two groups arising from the case-law of the Court. He sees 
the former increasingly constrained by the restrictive law enforcement paradigm that 
governs the Convention, whereas the latter remain bound only by the more permis-
sive standards of international humanitarian law. In his words,
… there is a real and currently emerging potential for the transatlantic link of 
legal interoperability between North American and European NATO Member 
States to be strained or severed, and for divergence among NATO’s European 
members, due to the influence of litigation arising from the European Court 
of Human Rights (…). This litigation, in turn, is redefining, and has the poten-
tial to further redefine, NATO’s use of force doctrine and Rules of Engagement 
(ROE), targeting and detention frameworks. It also has the potential to impact 
on how NATO Member States, as a matter of law and policy, view the overall 
relationship between IHL (i.e. international humanitarian law) and IHRL (i.e. 
international human rights law).
This perception, which is not Colonel Abbott’s alone, has to be taken seriously. The is-
sue is not limited to the interaction between NATO member States. The armed forces 
of NATO members take part in military operations together with non-NATO States, 
often but not always in an ad hoc framework such as United Nations peacekeeping, and 
indeed so do the armed forces of European States that are not members of NATO.44
43 Hura, Myron, Gary W. McLeod, Eric V. Larson, James Schneider, Dan Gonzales, Daniel M. 
Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin M. O’Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, and Lewis Jamison, 
Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2000, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235.html (accessed 
on 22 August 2018).
44 Cordula Droege and Louise Arimatsu, “The European Convention on Human Rights and in-
ternational humanitarian law: Conference report”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
volume 12 – 2009 – pp. 435-449 at pp. 446-449.
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It seems likely that considerations of interoperability in this sense may have had 
some influence on the position of some Contracting States that the Convention 
should not apply extraterritorially to military action (and hence on their failure to 
make use of Article 15 to derogate from their obligations under the Convention in 
respect of such action).
It is our belief that the Convention was never intended to stand in the way of the 
effective operation of any military alliance to which its Contracting States might be 
parties – indeed, such an aim would be inexplicable in the light of the drafting history 
of the Convention as briefly described above45 – and that it need not have that effect 
either.
1.3 Object of this study
1.3.1 Research question
Since as we have briefly mentioned in 1.2.4.1 above the Convention can, and does, 
continue to protect human rights in the direst of circumstances, even in wartime, the 
question arises whether the Convention leaves Contracting States the latitude needed 
to deal with situations in which a legitimate need to resort to the use of ‘hard power’ 
in the sense corresponding to our definition may arise.
Our assumption is that the latitude available to Contracting States will be suffi-
cient if despite the obligations which they have assumed upon ratifying the Conven-
tion States retain access to means enabling them to pursue policy objectives that are 
legitimate in terms of international law.
1.3.2 Method and approach
To answer the above question, this study investigates precisely what latitude Con-
tracting States have to tailor their Convention obligations to the situation in which 
the need to exercise ‘hard power’ presents itself to them. To that end, it identifies the 
limits both of the applicability of the Convention and of attribution of the use of 
‘hard power’ to Contracting States. 
It is important to reiterate in this connection that – quite contrary to the supposi-
tions of the domestic politicians cited above46 and perhaps others – the Convention is 
not to be applied only in times of peace: it has relevance also to situations of conflict, 
even international armed conflict. As we will see,47 this was actually envisaged from 
the very outset by the drafters of the Convention; the Strasbourg institutions – the 
European Commission and Court of Human Rights – recognised it in their practice 
and case-law and strove from a very early date to accommodate the various compet-
45 See 1.1.
46 Notes 7 and 8 above.
47 See 4.3.1 below.
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ing interests. More recently the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Human 
Rights has recognised the Court’s role in this domain as ‘pivotal’.48 
This study is essentially a survey of the relevant case-law of the Court and the Com-
mission with a view to identifying the resulting jurisprudential principles. Our inten-
tion is to state the law (as it stands in December 2018) as comprehensively as possible. 
The Court and Commission case-law cited is all accessible through the Court’s own 
searchable database HUDOC. 
The case-law considered relevant is that in which the Court was called upon to 
determine whether the use of ‘hard power’ was in breach of the Convention. Ad-
ditionally, cases are analysed where the Court developed general principles or inter-
pretations with the potential to have a bearing on such cases in the future. It will 
be attempted to relate this case-law to other fields of international law, international 
humanitarian law and general international law in particular. This will require us to 
examine a variety of treaties other than the Convention; judgments and decisions of 
treaty bodies other than the Court and the Commission; documents from a variety of 
international bodies; domestic legislation and judicial decisions and other domestic 
legal documents; and finally, selected writings of learned authors.
The perspective of an individual applicant before the Court is necessarily that of 
an aggrieved victim who feels entitled to redress. As in all litigation, the terms of the 
dispute are dictated by the party with whom the initiative lies.
The perspective chosen for this study is the opposite: that of the respondent Con-
tracting State. This is the most obvious choice, since only States (and then only Mem-
bers of the Council of Europe) are Parties to the Convention49 and within the legal 
space of the Convention50 only they may lawfully resort to the use of force.
The extent to which non-State actors may be bound by human rights law is an 
interesting one,51 but from our perspective it is of little relevance since they cannot 
be respondents before the Court. Moreover, even though they may have the potential 
to violate human rights on a scale comparable to that of a Contracting State, as many 
armed groups now do, none have so far committed themselves to abide by Conven-
tion standards of human rights. A non-governmental structure (of the Geneva Call 
48 Council of Europe, The longer-term future of the system of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Report of the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) adopted on 11 December 
2015, p. 52; Alice Donald and Philip Leach, “A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Why the Draft Copen-
hagen Declaration Must be Rewritten”, EJIL:Talk!, 21 February 2018.
49 Article 59 of the Convention. The European Union may accede, but has yet to do so.
50 The space within which Contracting States enjoy territorial and quasi-territorial jurisdiction. See 
Chapter 5.1-5.4 below.
51 See generally Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in Internation-
al Law, Cambridge University Press 2002, and Katharine Fortin, The Accountability of Armed 
Groups under Human Rights Law, diss. Utrecht 2015.
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type)52 that would make it possible for them to register such a commitment, and per-
haps enhance their legitimacy, does not exist at this time.
Nonetheless, the position of applicants cannot and will not be overlooked: it takes 
two, at least, to litigate, and for applicants (whether Contracting States themselves – 
in interstate cases –, individuals or groups of individuals, or strategic litigators) it is 
of interest to study possible defences precisely to overcome them. In the European 
Court of Human Rights as in any other court, the way in which a case is introduced 
can decide its fate at the outset.
The method chosen is to identify the basic types of legal argument that a respond-
ent Government may make before the Court when it is faced with complaints under 
the Convention arising from the use of ‘hard power’. Since the perspective chosen 
is the defensive position of the respondent Contracting State they may also be de-
scribed as ‘defences’, if one will:
– Once the facts have been established, the first line of defence is to argue that no 
violation can be found on the facts of the case; in other words, that there has 
been no violation of the Convention in the first place. This is the most obvious 
solution: it amounts to persuading the Court that the Contracting Party has 
remained in compliance with the obligations which it took upon itself in rati-
fying the Convention. Much of the relevant case-law has been developed over 
the years in situations of normality; the principles developed, however, are of 
general application. Its relevance to situations involving the use of ‘hard power’ 
will be the subject of Chapter 2.
– Reliance on a prior derogation under Article 15 of the Convention is a special 
sub-type of the first type of defence; it depends on a prior choice to recognise 
publicly that a problem exists that is insuperable as long as ordinary Conven-
tion standards are maintained. This will be discussed in Chapter 4. However, 
since, as is apparent from its very wording, Article 15 is of particular relevance to 
situations of ‘war’, an understanding of the interrelation between human rights 
law – for our purposes, Convention law in particular – and international hu-
manitarian law is necessary before we can enter into the subject of derogation. 
This will be examined in Chapter 3.
– The second defence is that the matters complained of fall outside the ‘jurisdic-
tion’ of the Contracting Party within the meaning of Article 1 of the Conven-
tion. This will be the object of Chapter 5, which explores the limits of what we 
will term Article 1 jurisdiction, and Chapter 6, which studies its actual exercise 
in situations of the use of ‘hard power’.
52 https://genevacall.org/. According to its mission statement, ‘Geneva Call is a neutral and impar-
tial non-governmental organization dedicated to promoting respect by armed non-State actors 
(ANSAs) for international humanitarian norms in armed conflict and other situations of vio-
lence, in particular those related to the protection of civilians’.
15introduction
– The third defence is that the matters complained of fall outside the competence 
of the European Court of Human Rights itself. This will be considered in Chap-
ter 7.
– The fourth defence is that the matters complained of are not attributable to the 
Contracting Party but to some other State or entity if to anyone at all. This will 
be the focus of in Chapter 8.
All have been considered by the Commission and the Court at various times. Some-
times they have been argued by a respondent. Sometimes the Commission and Court 
have applied them of their own motion and declared applications inadmissible de 
plano. In the latter situation it is, strictly speaking, more appropriate to use the expres-
sion ‘ground of inadmissibility’ than ‘defence’; but this distinction, which goes to the 
subtleties of Convention procedure, is not relevant to the purpose of this study.
Some ‘defences’ have been accepted by the Court in certain conditions; some have 
not. The interest of this study lies in the supposition that much has been said on these 
subjects but by no means all; that new problems will arise to which existing case-law 
may be applied; that the possibilities of presenting new positions have not yet been 
exhausted; and even, perhaps to the surprise of some, that the Convention itself ac-
tually has a role to play in furthering the very aims pursued by Contracting States in 
their use of ‘hard power’ – as a help, not a hindrance.

2 Problems of substantive Convention law in 
relation to ‘hard power’
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned, the most obvious defence available to a respondent is to persuade the 
Court that there is no substantive violation of the Convention at all. Let us therefore 
first examine the types of cases that experience shows are most liable to give rise to a 
finding of violation in our particular field of interest.
In times of normality, it is the police who exercise the State’s monopoly on the use 
of force, not the military. On the whole, the Commission and the Court have devel-
oped the applicable jurisprudential standards on the basis of unspectacular cases: the 
kind of issues that can and will arise even in a society at peace – the arrest, questioning 
and detention of criminal suspects; the fairness and length of judicial proceedings; 
the enforcement of domestic decisions and judgments; conditions of detention in 
police stations and prisons; and so on.
Since the latter decades of the twentieth century, applications complaining about 
Government measures to combat terrorism and even armed insurgency have in-
creased in absolute numbers (though not necessarily as a proportion of the Court’s 
case-load). Previously, cases of this nature arose almost invariably from the actions of 
the United Kingdom, first in Cyprus (a British colony at the time) and later in North-
ern Ireland; but the United Kingdom has been joined by Turkey, which seeks to assert 
its sovereignty in the south-eastern parts of its territory, and Russia, whose central 
Government as we have seen is opposed by separatist forces in parts of the Northern 
Caucasus under its sovereignty.
More recently applications have reached Strasbourg arising from the exercise of 
‘hard power’ in situations that cannot be seen in terms of terrorism or insurgency, 
to which the expression ‘international armed conflict’ is more appropriate. Events of 
such a nature have taken place in Iraq and Syria, in the former Yugoslavia, in Moldova, 
in the Caucasus, and on the island of Cyprus after it achieved statehood.
The challenge was, and is, to apply the substantive standards developed over the 
years to the use of ‘hard power’ in a way that neither diminishes the protection of the 
rights of the individual nor prevents Contracting States from acting effectively.
The case-law that has developed is extensive and detailed. Since the main focus of 
this work is elsewhere, we will confine ourselves to a selection of the most important 
cases that have arisen under substantive Convention law, concentrating on their rel-
evance to the legal questions here in issue. We will revisit many of them later on.
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2.2 Article 2, right to life
The use of lethal force by Government operatives, be they military or police, is cov-
ered by Article 2 of the Convention.53
2.2.1 Substantive obligations
2.2.1.1 Active deprivation of life
It can happen that forces on the ground are faced with a situation in which they see 
no alternative to the use of force. The European Convention on Human Rights does 
not prevent the use of force in all circumstances: it makes express provision for the use 
of lethal force where such is absolutely necessary for law enforcement purposes.54 On 
the whole the Court will try to avoid second-guessing the actions of the law enforcer 
on the spot as long as there is a proper regulatory framework in place, the planning 
and control of the operation are designed to avoid the use of lethal force, the actual 
decision to use force is reasonable and the force used is not disproportionate. This 
is apparent from McCann and Others, the case of the shooting dead in Gibraltar of 
Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army – ‘IRA’) operatives by the British Special 
Air Service (SAS),55 and confirmed by the multitude of judgments and decisions in 
which the Court has had to consider the use of lethal force by police. The Court is 
prepared to make allowances for mistakes made in good faith.56 It is comparatively 
rare for the Court to find a violation on account of the actual use of force in a genuine 
violent confrontation unless there is evidence of bad faith or of serious deficiencies in 
planning and control.57
The test, as required by the words ‘absolutely necessary’, is one of strict proportion-
ality to the achievement of the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c) of 
Article 2.58 It is therefore required that there be an appropriate legal and administra-
tive framework defining the limited circumstances in which law enforcement officials 
may use force and firearms, in the light of the relevant international standards. In line 
53 The second sentence of Article 2 § 1, which permits the execution of the death penalty, is now a 
dead letter (see Protocols 6 and 13 and 4.7.5 below). 
54 Article 2 § 2 of the Convention.
55 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 18984/91, §§ 192-193, Series A no. 324.
56 See, for example, McCann and Others, § 200; Bubbins v. the United Kingdom, no. 50196/99, § 139, 
ECHR 2005-II; and Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, §§ 178-179, ECHR 2011.
57 See, for example, Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 288, ECHR 
2007-II; Mulder-van Schalkwijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 26814/09, §§ 107-114, 7 June 2011; 
and Finogenov and Others v. Russia, nos. 18299/03 27311/03, §§ 226 and 235. For examples of vio-
lation, see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, §§ 99-109, ECHR 
2005-VII, and Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 
51313/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11, §§ 540-611, 13 April 2017. See generally Clare Ovey, “Applica-
tion of the ECHR during International Armed Conflicts”, in The UK and European Human 
Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks and Loveday Hodson, eds.), 
Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 225-245 at pp. 233-237.
58 See McCann and Others, § 149; more recently and among many other examples, Giuliani and 
Gaggio v. Italy (GC), no. 23458/02, § 176, ECHR 2011.
19Problems of substantive Convention law in relation to ‘hard power’
with the principle of strict proportionality, the national legal framework must make 
recourse to firearms dependent on a careful assessment of the situation. Furthermore, 
the national law regulating policing operations must secure a system of adequate and 
effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force and even against avoid-
able accident. The Court sees these requirements as part and parcel of the ‘primary 
duty on the State to secure the right to life’.59
2.2.1.2 Positive obligations
The Court has interpreted the first sentence of Article 2 § 1, which states simply that 
‘[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law’, to require the State not only to 
refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate 
steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. The State’s obligation in 
this respect involves putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the 
commission of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery 
for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions and 
may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the au-
thorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life 
is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.60 It cannot however be required 
that the State provide absolute safety: inevitably, there are operational choices to be 
made in terms of priorities and resources, and there is a trade-off in terms of due pro-
cess and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of police 
action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including the guarantees 
contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention. An applicant complaining of a lack 
of adequate protection must satisfy the Court that the authorities knew or ought to 
have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that 
they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reason-
ably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. This is a stricter test than one of 
‘gross negligence or wilful disregard’ of the right to life.61
It has been rightly pointed out that while this positive obligation imposes a duty 
on the State to protect the public against possible terrorist acts, States are not allowed 
to combat international terrorism at all costs. They must not resort to methods which 
undermine the very values they seek to protect.62
2.2.2 Procedural obligations 
It does not end there. The obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2, read 
in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to 
59 Giuliani and Gaggio, § 209.
60 Osman v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 23452/94, §§ 115-16, Reports 1998-VIII.
61 Osman, §§ 115-116.
62 Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008, concurring opinion of Judge Myjer, joined by 
Judge Zagrebelski.
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‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] 
Convention’, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective of-
ficial investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force 
by, inter alios, agents of the State.63 The State must therefore ensure, by all means at 
its disposal, an adequate response – judicial or otherwise – so that the legislative and 
administrative framework set up to protect the right to life is properly implemented 
and any breaches of that right are repressed and punished.64 Moreover, where there 
has been a use of force by State agents, the investigation must also be effective in the 
sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or 
was not justified in the circumstances. An effective enquiry is one that is:65
– adequate: that is, it must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts 
and, where appropriate, the identification and punishment of those responsible. 
This means decent police work: all reasonable efforts must be made to collect 
the evidence needed, and the evidence must be properly assessed. In particular, 
the investigation’s conclusions must be based on thorough, objective and impar-
tial analysis of all relevant elements;
– independent: that is, from anyone implicated or likely to be implicated in the 
events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but 
also a practical independence;
– accessible: that is, to the victim’s family and to public scrutiny. This does not 
mean that the victim’s family and the public should have access to the investiga-
tion file whenever they like, but it does mean that there should be a procedure 
for them to be properly informed and for their interests to be properly protected.
What is at stake here is nothing less than public confidence in the State’s monopoly 
on the use of force.66 
It should be added that the circumstances of the case may dictate an investigation 
into possible nefarious motives that may have led to the use of unnecessary or exces-
sive force, racist sentiment for example.67
63 McCann and Others, § 161.
64 Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 5878/08, § 230, ECHR 2016.
65 Useful summaries are given in Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey, no. 24014/05, §§ 171-182, 
25 June 2013, and Armani da Silva v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 5878/08, §§ 231-239, ECHR 
2016. See generally D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E.P. Bates and C.M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edition Oxford University 
Press 2014, pp. 214-218; Clare Ovey, “Application of the ECHR during International Armed 
Conflicts”, in The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Katja S Ziegler, 
Elizabeth Wicks and Loveday Hodson, eds.), Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 225-245 at pp. 237-239; 
and Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey, C., Jacobs, White, and Ovey, The Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, 7th edition Oxford University Press 2017, pp. 168-177.
66 Ramsahai and Others, § 325; Armani da Silva, § 232.
67 Nachova, § 164. For a critical appraisal of the Court’s case-law on the distribution of the bur-
den of proof in this case and similar ones see Jasmina Mačkić, “Het onzichtbare bewijzen: Over 
de mogelijkheden om de bewijslast te verschuiven van klager naar de verwerende staat in zaken 
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One writer, Olga Chernishova, reminds us that the procedural requirement of Ar-
ticle 2 should be placed against the background not merely of repression and preven-
tion, but also against that of the right of surviving kin to know the truth about what 
happened to their loved ones.68
It is worth mentioning here that the Government of the United Kingdom has cre-
ated an organisation, Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT), to review allegations 
of abuse of Iraqi civilians by UK armed forces personnel in Iraq during the period 
of 2003 to July 2009. The alleged offences range from ‘murder to low-level violence’ 
from the start of the military campaign in Iraq, in March 2003, through the major 
combat operations of April 2003 and the following years spent maintaining security 
as part of the Multi-National Force and mentoring and training Iraqi security forces. 
The Ministry of Defence funded the IHAT, ‘consistent with its obligations to ensure 
that allegations were investigated in compliance with the European Convention of 
Human Rights’. Of the approximately 3,400 complaints received, some 1,400 have 
been or are being investigated.69
If an application is presented in Strasbourg, the Court usually avoids second-
guessing the domestic investigating authorities. That said, experience shows that this 
is where in practice violations of Article 2 have proved to be the most likely.
Thus, in al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, the military police investiga-
tors reported to the commanding officer of the suspects instead of directly to the 
prosecutors. The criminal investigation was therefore not independent.70 The case 
concerned a number of fatal shootings by British servicemen in Iraq.
In Jaloud v. the Netherlands, another case arising from a fatal shooting in Iraq (this 
time involving the Dutch Royal Army), it turned out that there were documents that 
had gone missing from the investigation file; the Dutch soldier suspected of having 
fired at least some of the fatal shots had not been kept separate from other witnesses 
(not that there was any appearance of collusion, but as a safety measure his separa-
tion would have been necessary); the autopsy had been carried out by an Iraqi doctor 
whose qualifications were unknown; the report of the autopsy was very flimsy indeed; 
and the bullet fragments taken from the body of the deceased had been allowed to 
van discriminatoir geweld voor het Europese Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens”, NTM/NJCM-
bulletin jrg. 42 [2017], nr. 4, pp. 477-494.
68 Olga Chernishova, “Right to the truth in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
in in The Right to Life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Twenty 
Years of Legal Developments since McCann v. the United Kingdom (In honour of Michael O’Boyle), 
pp. 145-160.
69 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/iraq-historic-allegations-team-ihat (accessed 4 Sep-
tember 2018). See also the paper “De Britse reactie op claims van mensenrechtenschendingen 
door Britse militairen gedurende de militaire aanwezigheid in Irak: een analyse van het Iraq 
Historic Allegations Team” (The British reaction to claims of human rights violations by Brit-
ish military personnel during the military presence in Iraq: an analysis of the Iraq Historic Al-
legations Team), published by the Dutch Ministry of Defence, http://puc.overheid.nl/doc/
PUC_88361_11 (accessed on 4 September 2018).
70 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, §§ 172-174, ECHR 2011.
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disappear.71 On the subject of the autopsy, the Court suggested that if the Dutch 
armed forces had not the facilities in Iraq then perhaps it ought to have been carried 
out by another of the Coalition powers.
It has been suggested that the standards resulting from Jaloud would not impose 
too onerous a burden on a peacekeeping force.72 However, a minority of the Grand 
Chamber thought the majority judgment too harsh on the merits, especially in rela-
tion to the autopsy.73 
An example worth mentioning of compliance with investigative obligations under 
Article 2 is the case of Mustafić-Mujić and Others. The case concerned attempts by sur-
viving kin of some of the victims of the Srebrenica massacre to have the leadership of 
the Dutch peacekeeping force prosecuted as alleged accomplices of the Bosnian Serb 
perpetrators. The Dutch court refused to order any prosecution, finding the facts to 
be such that convictions were highly unlikely to result.
In dismissing the applicants’ complaints against this refusal, the Court found that 
it was ‘not possible for the Court to find that the investigations [had been] ineffective 
or inadequate’. The information available included a report on the Srebrenica massa-
cre by the Secretary General of the United Nations; several judgments of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugosla-
via since 1991 (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “ICTY”) 
convicting Bosnian Serb accused; a report of debriefing of all returning Dutch mili-
tary personnel who had lived through the events; a parliamentary enquiry; an exten-
sive and detailed report by an independent domestic body, the NIOD Institute for 
War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, running to thousands of pages; and evidence 
produced by the applicants themselves in parallel civil proceedings.74 This decision 
illustrates that an investigation satisfying the procedural requirements of Article 2 
does not have to be carried out under the sole responsibility of the authorities of the 
Convention Party concerned: it is acceptable to rely on information obtained by a 
competent international body. Nor does it have to be specifically criminal in nature, 
as long as it is independent and thorough and yields the necessary facts.
The mass murder at Srebrenica has aroused horror in many parts of the world, 
not least in the Netherlands owing precisely to the presence of Dutch peacekeeping 
troops. The existence of extensive and well-researched domestic material is therefore 
not surprising.
71 Jaloud v. the Netherlands (GC), no. 47708/08, §§ 203, 208, 211, 213-15 and 219, ECHR 2014.
72 Jane M. Rooney, “Extraterritorial derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights 
in the United Kingdom”, E.H.R.L.R. 2016, 6, pp. 656-663, at pp. 657-58 and passim.
73 Jaloud, joint concurring opinion of Judges Casadevall, Berro-Lefèvre, Šikuta, Hirvelä, López 
Guerra, Sajó and Silvis.
74 Mustafić-Mujić and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 49037/15, §§ 103-06, 30 August 2016.
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2.3 Article 3, prohibition of torture
2.3.1 Substantive obligations
2.3.1.1 ‘Inhuman or degrading treatment’ and ‘torture’
Article 3 of the Convention, which in the present redaction of the Convention bears 
the title ‘prohibition of torture’, in actual fact is wider in scope than that: it forbids 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court’s classical for-
mulation, frequently repeated, is that any recourse to physical force which has not 
been made strictly necessary by the victim’s own conduct diminishes human dignity 
and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Conven-
tion.75 
The fact that the victim is in possession of information that he or she refuses to 
disclose does not constitute ‘conduct’ justifying the use or threat of force. In Gäfgen v. 
Germany the Court reinforced the absolute nature of Article 3 to the point of finding 
that it prevented the use of torture even when human life was at stake.76 The case was 
one in which police subjected a suspected kidnapper to treatment contrary to that 
provision in the sincere but mistaken belief that his victim, a young child, was still 
alive and forcing him to divulge the child’s whereabouts might save the child’s life. 
On occasion the Court has held that the use of a confession or a witness statement 
extracted under torture to ground a criminal conviction constitutes a violation of Ar-
ticle 6 of the Convention.77
The protection of Article 3 is equally absolute in expulsion cases. In Chahal the 
Court, invited by the Government of the United Kingdom to permit the handover 
of a suspected terrorist to India, held, although well aware of ‘the immense difficulties 
faced by States in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist vio-
lence’, that the activities of the individual in question, ‘however undesirable or danger-
ous’, could ‘not be a material consideration’.78
Physical violence does not exhaust the applicability of Article 3. Even in the ab-
sence of actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering, where treatment 
humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his 
or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of 
breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as de-
75 See, among many other authorities, Ribitsch v. Austria, no. 18896/91, § 38, Series A no. 336; 
Selmouni v. France (GC), no. 25803/94, § 99, ECHR 1999-V; El-Masri v. “the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia” (GC), no. 39630/09, § 207, ECHR 2012; and Bouyid v. Belgium (GC), 
no. 23380/09, § 88, ECHR 2015.
76 Gäfgen v. Germany (GC), no. 22978/05, § 107, ECHR 2010.
77 Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 36549/03, § 65, ECHR 2007-III; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the 
United Kingdom, no. 8139/09, § 267, ECHR 2012.
78 Chahal v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 22414/93, § 80, Reports 1996-V. For a detailed state-
ment of the Court’s approach to cases of this type, see Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United King-
dom, no. 8139/09, §§ 183-89, ECHR 2012 (extracts).
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grading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 3. It may well suffice 
that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others.79
In the context of this study, issues under Article 3 are most likely to arise in rela-
tion to the interrogation of captives, terrorist suspects or prisoners of war for exam-
ple. Interrogation techniques found to have violated that provision have included the 
‘five techniques’ used by the United Kingdom authorities in Northern Ireland in the 
1970s, during a particularly troubled period: these were the use of stress positions, 
sensory deprivation, white noise, deprivation of sleep and deprivation of food and 
drink,80 which were designed to keep the victim in a prolonged state of state of an-
guish and stress by means other than bodily assault.81
The distinction between actual torture and ‘mere’ inhuman or degrading treat-
ment is stated by the Court as follows:
In order to determine whether any particular form of ill-treatment should be 
classified as torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction drawn in Ar-
ticle 3 between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. This 
distinction would appear to have been embodied in the Convention to allow 
the special stigma of “torture” to attach only to deliberate inhuman treatment 
causing very serious and cruel suffering (see [Aksoy v. Turkey, no. 21987/93, 
§ 62, Reports 1996-VI]). In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is 
a purposive element, as recognised in the United Nations Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
which came into force on 26 June 1987, which defines torture in terms of the in-
tentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtain-
ing information, inflicting punishment or intimidating (Article 1 of the United 
Nations Convention) (see İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 85, ECHR 
2000-VII; and [El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 
no. 39630/09, § 197, ECHR 2012]).82
Acts found by the Court to have amounted to actual torture have included, among 
others, ‘Palestinian hanging’, the victim being stripped naked, with his arms tied 
together behind his back, and suspended by his arms;83 rape;84 severe beating and 
79 Bouyid, § 87.
80 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1971, §§ 96 and 167, Series A no. 25. Judg-
ment of 20 March 2018, revision request dismissed; referral request dismissed on 10 September 
2018.
81 El-Masri, § 202.
82 Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, § 56, 24 July 2014; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, 
no. 7511/13, § 500, 24 July 2014.
83 Aksoy v. Turkey, no. 21987/93, § 64, Reports 1996-VI.
84 Aydın v. Turkey, no. 23178/94, § 86, Reports 1997-VI. 
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sodomy with an object;85 and the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ by the 
American CIA including the now-infamous waterboarding.86
2.3.1.2 Positive obligations
As in the case of Article 2, States are required to take measures designed to ensure 
that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, including ill-treatment administered by private 
individuals. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to 
State protection, in the form of effective deterrence.87 The mere fact that a victim (or 
potential victim) withdraws a criminal complaint against the perpetrator does not 
relieve public authority of its duties to act effectively and prevent recurrence.88
2.3.2 Procedural obligations
As in the case of Article 2, where an individual raises an arguable claim that he or she 
has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully 
and in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general 
duty under Article 1, requires by implication that there should be an effective official 
investigation. The principles are, to all intents and purposes, the same as those govern-
ing the procedural aspect of Article 2 and need not be repeated.89 
2.4 Article 5, right to liberty and security
2.4.1 Substantive obligations
2.4.1.1 Deprivation of liberty
Short of the use of force, it may be necessary to arrest and detain people. Arrest and 
detention are covered by Article 5 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to 
liberty and security of person. The first paragraph of the Article provides that no one 
may be deprived of their liberty save in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law, and on the grounds specified. It was for a long time held that the enumeration 
of permitted grounds of detention – which covers all conceivable cases in which de-
tention may be used for purposes of law enforcement – was exhaustive;90 however, 
since Hassan v. the United Kingdom, it would appear that an exception now exists for 
85 El-Masri, §§ 205 and 211. 
86 Al Nashiri v. Poland, §§ 401 and 516; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, §§ 416 and 511. On the 
CIA rendition programme as a violation of the ius cogens prohibition of torture, see generally 
Vincent Charles Keating, “The anti-torture norm and cooperation in the CIA black site pro-
gramme”, The International Journal of Human Rights, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 7, 935–955.
87 Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, § 159, ECHR 2009.
88 Opuz, § 168.
89 See, among other authorities, Mocanu and Others v. Romania (GC), nos. 10865/09, 45886/07 
and 32431/08, §§ 314-325 and 2.2.1.2 above.
90 Among many other authorities, Del Río Prada v. Spain (GC), no. 42750/09, § 123, ECHR 2013.
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the detention of prisoners of war, in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention, 
and the detention of persons whose internment is necessary for imperative reasons 
of security, in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention, in the event of an 
international armed conflict.91 We will consider this particular judgment in greater 
depth below, as part of our discussion of the interrelation of the Convention and 
international humanitarian law.92 
The Court has developed a vast body of case-law under this Article, some of which 
is directly relevant to our subject.
For anyone arrested and detained, here should normally be access to family or 
some other support network. There should be supervision by a judge or a similarly 
qualified functionary who has the power to order release. Habeas corpus is basic to 
every civilised detention system, but supervision by a judge also helps to prevent, for 
example, torture. So does access to a doctor or a lawyer. Both were found lacking in 
Aksoy v. Turkey, the first case in fact in which the Court found that there had been 
torture as distinct from ‘ordinary’ inhuman or degrading treatment.93
The Court’s judgment in Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom, although it 
concerned a case decided under Article 6 not Article 5, strongly suggests that hold-
ing a detainee incommunicado – denying them contact with their support network 
and even legal advice – may be justified only in exceptional circumstances amount-
ing to ‘compelling reasons’ and for the briefest of periods, and must be based on an 
individual assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. The existence of ‘an 
urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for life, liberty or physical integrity 
in a given case’ could amount to ‘compelling reasons’.94
The dangers of incommunicado detention are well illustrated by the El-Masri case, 
which we will examine in greater depth later. The applicant in that case was taken 
prisoner in the territory of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and held in 
unacknowledged detention in a hotel room for three weeks of brutal questioning. He 
was then handed over to American CIA agents who whisked him off to Afghanistan 
for four more months of unsavoury treatment. Had not the country’s Minister of the 
Interior of the day, who was later to become its Prime Minister, had the courage to 
break his silence, the Court would have had to rely entirely on the applicant’s own 
statement backed up only by circumstantial evidence.95
91 Hassan v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 29750/09, ECHR 2014; see also Merabishvili v. Georgia 
(GC), no. 72508/13, § 298, ECHR 2017 (extracts). The statement that the list of exceptions set 
out in Article 5 § 1 is an exhaustive one reappears, however, in Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 
no. 13237/17, § 123, 20 March 2018, and Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, no. 16538/17, § 102, 20 March 2018.
92 See 3.4.2 below.
93 Aksoy, §§ 64 and 83-84.
94 Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC), nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 
40351/09, §§ 258-259, ECHR 2016.
95 El-Masri, §§ 161-164. See also Helen Duffy and Stephen A. Kostas, “‘Extraordinary Rendition’: 
A Challenge for the Rule of Law”, in Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Ana 
María de Frías, Katja L.H. Samuel, Nigel D. White, eds.), Oxford University Press 2011 p. 539 at 
pp. pp. p48-556 and pp. 564-566.
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Worse still, of course, is when people are arrested and then disappear without trace. 
Kurt v. Turkey 96 and Bazorkina v. Russia97 are both cases in which the applicant was 
the mother of a young man last seen surrounded by soldiers.
In Al-Jedda the applicant was kept in internment by British forces in Iraq for three 
years. The United Kingdom Government tried to argue that they were duty bound 
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 to exercise their power of 
detention where this was necessary for imperative reasons of security. The Court re-
stated its own case-law according to which Article 5 of the Convention does not au-
thorise preventive detention without charge (in fact, this is a rule stated by the Court 
in the very first case decided by it, back in 1961: Lawless v. Ireland).98 It then took a 
close look at the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1546. According to 
the first Article of the Charter, the United Nations existed to maintain peace and 
security, but also to ‘achieve international cooperation in ... promoting and encourag-
ing respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms’. That being so, the Court 
found a presumption that the Security Council Resolution had to be interpreted so as 
to avoid conflict with obligations under human rights law. Since there was nothing in 
Resolution 1546 to suggest that the Security Council intended the United Kingdom 
to violate the European Convention on Human Rights or any other human rights 
document, it followed that there was no justification for failing to comply with Ar-
ticle 5.99
In Hassan v. the United Kingdom the Court was prepared to follow the argument 
of the respondent Party that in situations of international armed conflict the guaran-
tees of Article 5 should be read in the light of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conven-
tions. This takes us outside the safe enclosure of Convention law and into a minefield 
that we will enter warily.100
2.4.1.2 Positive obligations
In Storck v. Germany, the Court held that Article 5 § 1, first sentence, of the Conven-
tion must be construed as laying down a positive obligation on the State to protect 
the liberty of its citizens. The case concerned the detention of a person in a private 
psychiatric clinic without a judicial decision and without her consent.101 It goes with-
out saying that this obligation applies all the more when the threat emanates from 
terrorists or other criminals.
96 Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, Reports 1998-III.
97 Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, 27 July 2006.
98 Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3.
99 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, §§ 99-110, ECHR 2011; see also 8.4.5.2.3 
below. See also Clare Ovey, “Application of the ECHR during International Armed Conflicts”, in 
The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks 
and Loveday Hodson, eds.), Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 225-245 at pp. 240-41.
100 See 3.4.2 below.
101 Storck v. Germany, no. 61603/00, § 102, ECHR 2005-V.
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As we will see, it also applies when the threat emanates from foreign governments 
and when the victims are foreign nationals, as in the CIA rendition cases.102
With the deradicalisation of jihadist fighters returning from the Middle East be-
coming a concern in some countries,103 it is worth drawing attention briefly to the 
judgment Riera Blume and Others v. Spain. The applicants in that case were believed 
to have been brainwashed by a religious or pseudo-religious sect; at the behest of their 
families and with the assistance of the police, they had been taken to a hotel where 
they had been held against their will for ‘deprogramming’. The Court found that the 
applicants had been detained without any legal basis. Although direct responsibility 
lay with private actors (the applicants’ families and a private association), Spain had 
violated Article 5 of the Convention by dint of the active support lent by its authori-
ties.104
2.4.2 Procedural obligations
Article 5 itself lays down procedural obligations. A right ‘to take proceedings by 
which the lawfulness of [one’s] detention shall be decided speedily by a court and 
[one’s] release ordered if detention is not lawful’ – often referred to by the mediaeval 
Latin phrase of English law habeas corpus – is to be found in Article 5 § 4.
The fifth paragraph of Article 5 provides that anyone arrested or detained in con-
travention of the provisions of Article 5 shall have an enforceable right to compensa-
tion.
2.5 Protection of home and property
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protects property rights. In the situations relevant to our 
study, complaints about violations of this provision frequently coincide with com-
plaints under Article 8, right to respect for one’s home, because they concern homes 
and real estate.
The Court has received many applications from Greek Cypriots turned out of their 
homes in Northern Cyprus.105 There has also been an interstate case before the Court, 
in addition to three before the Commission, brought by the Cyprus Government 
102 See 6.3 below.
103 The United Kingdom, for example. The Daily Telegraph, 1 September 2014, “British jihadists to 
be forced to attend deradicalisation programmes, says Cameron”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11068878/British-jihadists-to-be-forced-to-attend-deradi-
calisation-programmes-says-Cameron.html (accessed 26 August 2017)
104 Riera Blume and Others v. Spain, no. 37680/97, §§ 31-35, ECHR 1999-VII.
105 Among many others, Loizidou and Xenides-Arestis, note 5 above.
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against Turkey.106 The Turkish Government has had to pay large amounts in compen-
sation.107
Other aspects of the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus include the isolation 
of the Karpas peninsula and its inhabitants. This too has resulted in awards totalling 
a considerable sum of money.108
The problems encountered by persons wishing to regain possession of homes from 
which they have been driven by military action are at the core of Chiragov and Oth-
ers and Sargsyan. The cases are each other’s mirror image: both arise from the con-
flict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, but Armenia is the 
respondent in the former and Azerbaijan in the latter. Substantive violations were 
found of both Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.109 The ap-
plicants’ claims for restitution and compensation for damage were decided in separate 
judgments on what the Convention terms ‘just satisfaction’ (Article 41).110
Beyond the immediate scope of direct application of the Convention (and of the 
jurisdiction of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights) the impor-
tance of the rights guaranteed by Articles 8 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 1, 
as they relate to housing, are well illustrated by the wars that raged in the former 
component republics of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia between early 
1992 and the end of 1995. Millions of people were driven from their homes – over 
2.2 million persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone – by ‘ethnic cleansing’ or gener-
alised violence. Most fled to areas controlled by their own ethnic group; their homes 
were quickly taken over by others who had been forced to flee from elsewhere.111 After 
the end of the hostilities, most wished to return to their original homes.112 Many who 
sought to return to their pre-war properties found them occupied by others who, 
displaced themselves, had nowhere to return to. Others, wishing to sell their original 
dwellings to finance a new home in a different location, were unable to because oc-
cupancy, and in many cases title, had been transferred to someone else while they 
were displaced. There followed a flurry of litigation that carried on until well after the 
106 Cyprus v. Turkey (merits) (GC), no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV.
107 For example, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (just satisfaction), no. 46347/99, §§ 42 and 48 and op-
erative provision no. 1, 7 December 2006 (800,000 euros for pecuniary damage, 50,000 for 
non-pecuniary damage, plus costs and expenses); Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction) (GC), 
no. 25781/94, §§ 58 and operative provisions nos. 4 and 5, ECHR 2014 (a total of 90 million 
euros for non-pecuniary damage).
108 Cyprus v. Turkey (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 25781/94, § 58 and operative provision no. 5, 
ECHR 2014 (sixty million euros).
109 Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (GC), no. 13216/05, ECHR 2015; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (GC), 
no. 40167/06, ECHR 2015.
110 Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (just satisfaction) (GC), no. 13216/05, 12 December 2017; Sarg-
syan v. Azerbaijan (just satisfaction) (GC), no. 40167/06, 12 December 2017.
111 Đokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 6518/04, § 7, 27 May 2010.
112 Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees and United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Return, Local Integration and Property Rights (Sarajevo, No-
vember 1999), http://www.unhcr.org/3c3c42794.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017).
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various former Yugoslav republics had been admitted to the Council of Europe and 
joined the Convention and continues even to the present day.113
The most thorough attempt to remedy this situation at the domestic level by en-
capsulating the standards of the Convention in domestic law was made in the armi-
stice agreement that put an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (or to give it its official title, the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina), which entered into force on 14 December 1995. 
Annexed to it was an ‘Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons’ (Annex 7), 
which in the first paragraph of its first Article provided that
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes 
of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which 
they were; deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated 
for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees 
and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the return 
of such persons who have left their territory, including those who have been ac-
corded temporary protection by third countries.
The reality was that many were prevented shortly after the end of the war from mak-
ing use of this right. The Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons 
and Refugees set up under Annex 7 could recognise title but not enforce it;114 for 
that, other bodies had to be created. Most notable among these, for our purposes, 
were the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, set up under the new 
Constitution (Annex 4 to the Dayton Peace Agreement)115 and the Commission on 
Human Rights, consisting of an Ombudsperson and a Human Rights Chamber, set 
up under the Agreement on Human Rights, Annex 6.116 We will address the func-
tioning of these externally-imposed quasi-indigenous institutions later.117 The remit 
of both the Constitutional Court and the Commission on Human Rights included 
the Convention and its Protocols as their primary source of substantive law,118 which 
were thus fully applied for over six and a half years before Bosnia and Herzegovina 
became a party to the Convention on 12 July 2002.
113 See, for example, Blečić v. Croatia (GC), no. 59532/00, ECHR 2006-III; Brezovec v. Croatia, 
no.  13488/07, 29 March 2011; Mago and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 12959/05, 
11706/09, 19724/05, 47860/06, 8367/08 and 9872/09, 3 May 2012.
114 Antoine Buyse, Post-Conflict Housing Restitution: The European human rights perspective, with a 
case study on Bosnia and Herzegovina (diss. Leiden 2008), Intersentia, 2008, pp. 275-281; see also 
Janković v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), no. 5172/03, 16 May 2006.
115 Buyse (2008), pp. 281-284.
116 Buyse (2008), pp. 284-301.
117 See 8.5.5.2 below.
118 Article II (2) of Annex 4; Article I of Annex 6.
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The pattern is the same after all wars. When the fighting stops, ordinary people 
tend to want to resume normal life and leave quarrelling to the politicians. Their or-
der of priorities is well described by Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs: once their 
immediate physiological needs are met, their next priorities are their homes and their 
livelihoods.
2.6 Article 13
As we mentioned right at the outset,119 it is in the first place the responsibility of the 
Contracting States to secure the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention and 
its Protocols. It is therefore no surprise to find that Article 13 of the Convention pro-
vides that ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity’.
The existence of an actual violation has never been a prerequisite for the applicabil-
ity of Article 13. It has long been recognised that ‘a person cannot establish a “viola-
tion” before a national authority unless he is first able to lodge with such an authority 
a complaint to that effect’; rather, ‘Article 13 requires that where an individual consid-
ers himself to have been prejudiced by a measure allegedly in breach of the Conven-
tion, he should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have his 
claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress’.120 However, the Court does not 
interpret Article 13 so as to require a remedy in domestic law in respect of any sup-
posed grievance under the Convention that an individual may have, no matter how 
unmeritorious his complaint may be: the grievance must be an arguable one in terms 
of the Convention.121
In many if not most cases of the actual exercise of ‘hard power’ it will be difficult 
for aggrieved individuals to prove their case without the assistance of an official in-
quiry of some sort. The significance of the procedural requirements of Articles 2 and 
3, as outlined above, is therefore wider than merely to satisfy the need for a criminal 
remedy: it is also to enable use to be made of other remedies, such as a claim for com-
pensation.122
119 See 1.1 above.
120 Klass and Others v. Germany, no. 5029/71, § 64, Series A no. 28.
121 Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, § 52, Series A no. 131.
122 Taş v. Turkey, no. 24396/94, § 93, 14 November 2000; Aktaş v. Turkey, no. 24351/94, §§ 329-333, 
ECHR 2003-V (extracts).
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2.7 The problem of proof
Regardless of the context of the case, it is standing case-law of the Court that par-
ties must substantiate their factual arguments before it by providing the necessary 
evidence.123
In cases of the types here in issue it will often be difficult for the applicant to prove 
the facts underlying his complaint. The Court has accordingly developed evidentiary 
principles in its case-law under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention to the effect that, 
as summarised in El-Masri:
In cases in which there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably 
confronted when establishing the facts with the same difficulties as those faced 
by any first-instance court. It reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has adopted 
the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. However, it has never been 
its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that 
standard. Its role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Con-
tracting States’ responsibility under the Convention. The specificity of its task 
under Article 19 of the Convention – to ensure the observance by the Contract-
ing States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Convention – conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof. In the 
proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibil-
ity of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts the con-
clusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, in-
cluding such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties’ submissions. 
According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence 
of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted 
presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching 
a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden 
of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the 
allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive 
to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated 
fundamental rights (…).124
That said,
where the events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, 
as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of 
fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. 
The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authori-
123 See, for example, Lisnyy and Others v. Ukraine and Russia (dec.), nos. 5355/15, 44913/15 and 
50853/15, 5 July 2016.
124 El-Masri, § 151.
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ties to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation. In the absence of such 
explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the 
Government.125
The Jaloud judgment illustrates the difficulties that may be involved in arguing on the 
facts that there is no substantive violation. We have seen that the failings in the au-
topsy proceedings were found by a majority of the Grand Chamber to have violated 
Article 2 under its procedural head. The Dutch Government had in fact submitted 
that the Dutch Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee, military po-
lice) had been compelled to entrust the body to the care of the Iraqi authorities, and 
it was they who had prevented any Dutch officials from attending the autopsy; in ad-
dition, Iraqi nationals in attendance had threatened to take Dutch personnel hostage, 
forcing them to leave.126 
No finding that Royal Military Constabulary personnel were excluded from the 
autopsy and threatened with capture is to be found in the judgment. Brief statements 
to this effect appear in the Government’s written memorial, unsupported by any of-
ficial record or other evidence of any description; the applicant’s counsel, speaking 
at the hearing, stated that the applicant and his family had been present but denied 
that any attempt was made to prevent the autopsy from going ahead.127 As so often in 
judicial practice, the question was who must shoulder the burden of proof:128 while 
one can understand how the majority judgment might appear unreasonable to the 
serviceman whose duty it is to create a semblance of law and order in a plainly hostile 
environment,129 in fairness to the majority it needs to be pointed out that like every 
other court of law in the world the Court must apply the law to established fact.130 
2.8 Conclusion
Even in ordinary times, there is scope aplenty for any person wielding the powers 
of the State to violate the Convention rights of the individual. Such however is the 
125 El-Masri, § 152; see also Helen Duffy and Stephen A. Kostas, “‘Extraordinary Rendition’: A Chal-
lenge for the Rule of Law”, in Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Ana MarÍa de 
FrÍas, Katja L.H. Samuel, Nigel D. White, eds.), Oxford University Press 2011 p. 539 at p. 574.
126 Joint concurring opinion of Judges Casadevall, Berro-Lefèvre, Šikuta, Hirvelä, López Guerra, 
Sajó and Silvis, § 6.
127 Government’s memorial, §§ 51 and 59; see also the webcast of the hearing, available on the Court’s 
web site.
128 Compare, for example, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic (GC), no. 57325/00, § 179, ECHR 
2007-IV.
129 See, for example, Francoise J. Hampson, “Article 2 of the Convention and military operations 
during armed conflict”, in The Right to Life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Twenty Years of Legal Developments since McCann v. the United Kingdom (In honour of 
Michael O’Boyle), p. 191 at p. 207.
130 Jaloud, § 223.
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nature of ‘hard power’ that its exercise only makes violations more likely. That said, 
even in situations of armed conflict, the serviceman on the ground remains no less 
duty bound than his political leaders to be aware of the human rights obligations of 
his State: any failure to comply with them is likely to engage the responsibility of the 
State which he serves.
It is possible, albeit within limits, for the State to adapt its liabilities under the 
Convention to the possibilities which it has to meet them. First, however, we must 
turn to the interrelation between the Convention and international humanitarian 
law in general.
3 Interplay between the Convention and 
international humanitarian law
3.1 Introduction
If one considers only the text itself of the Convention, the applicability of interna-
tional humanitarian law passes through Article 15, where it refers to the Contracting 
State’s ‘other obligations under international law’ – an expression that, as we will see 
in the following chapter, refers specifically to international humanitarian law inas-
much as Article 15 provides for derogation ‘in time of war’.131 For that reason, and 
even though Article 15 is not limited to ‘war’, we should at this point touch briefly 
on the way in which the Convention and international humanitarian law interact in 
general before turning to the narrower subject of derogation.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no equivalent reference to interna-
tional humanitarian law in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
This means, in our submission, that the interrelation between international humani-
tarian law and international human rights law is necessarily different if the question is 
considered under the Covenant rather than the Convention.132
We will first consider how this difference came to be. As we shall see, it was not 
an oversight on the part of one group of drafters as compared to the other: the two 
groups were working from very different premises.
We will then examine the interrelation between international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law as developed in case-law and doctrine.
3.2 Drafting history
An interesting insight into the thinking of the drafters of the Convention is offered in 
the travaux préparatoires of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The Secretary General of the United Nations, in an annotation to the draft of that 
document published in 1955, differentiated between ‘war’ and ‘instances of extraordi-
nary peril or crisis, not in time of war’, in which measures derogating from the rights 
131 See 4.3 below; see also Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme 
et le droit international humanitaire : une ouverture progressive”, in Human Rights in a Global 
World: Essays in honour of Judge Luis López Guerra (Guido Raimondi, Iulia Motoc, Pere Pastor 
Vilanova, Carmen Morte Gómez, eds.; Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), pp. 373-386 at p. 376.
132 The American Convention on Human Rights includes a derogation provision similar to Article 15 
of the Convention. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights does not provide for 
derogation. To clarify our point, it is sufficient for present purposes to compare the Convention 
and the Covenant.
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guaranteed in normal times might be required.133 It may be assumed that the drafters 
of the Covenant primarily had in mind the cataclysmic kind of conflict that wars on 
European or North American territory had been in modern times: the Napoleonic 
Wars, the American Civil War, the First and Second World Wars, and others. Eventu-
ally, as we know, Article 4 § 1 of the United Nations Covenant came to provide for 
derogation ‘in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and 
the existence of which is officially proclaimed’. It appears from the above-mentioned 
annotation of 1955, which reflects the drafting history of the Covenant, that its draft-
ers were unwilling to envisage, even by implication, the possibility of war, that being 
a phenomenon which the United Nations was intended above all else to prevent.134
In stark contrast, the drafters of the Convention seem to have had no such inhibi-
tions. In 1950 the memory of the Second World War, the bloodiest conflict in hu-
man history, was still fresh; in addition, many of them had seen active service in the 
First World War (René Cassin, for example, won the Croix de Guerre in the trenches 
in 1914). Presumably, therefore, they had fewer qualms about calling war by its ugly 
name and differentiating it from a mere ‘public emergency’. It can accordingly be as-
sumed that they intended derogation to be possible in the event of any war, since all 
major European wars in living memory – the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the two 
world wars, indeed the Spanish Civil War – had constituted an existential threat to 
some nation or other.
In making provision for the eventuality of ‘war’, the drafters of the Convention 
were adopting a practical approach appropriate to the reality of warlike Europe. The 
drafters of the Covenant were engaged on a different, more idealistic quest: the Cov-
enant was to be part of a global experiment under the umbrella of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which purported to ban war altogether.135
3.3 Lex specialis?
3.3.1 Is international humanitarian law lex specialis in relation to human 
rights law?
When it is argued on the subject of the interplay between international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law that in relation to the former, the latter is the 
133 Travaux préparatoires of the Convention, DH (56) 4, Annex I: Extract from the annotations 
on the draft International Covenants prepared by the United Nations Secretary-General (Doc. 
A/2929, pp. 65-69, at §§ 37 and 39).
134 Annotations on the draft International Covenants prepared by the United Nations Secretary-
General (Doc. A/2929), § 39; Marko Milanovic, “Extraterritorial Derogations from Treaties in 
Armed Conflict”, in The Frontiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and its Challenges, Col-
lected Courses of the Academy of European Law, vol. XXIV/1, p. 55-88 at p. 63. It has also been 
suggested that the Covenant’s drafters believed that during armed conflict the Covenant should 
not apply at all: see Christian Tomuschat, “Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law”, 
EJIL (2010), Vo. 21 No. 1 15-23 at p. 16.
135 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble and Article 2 §§ 3 and 4.
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lex specialis applicable in situations of armed conflict, what is meant is probably that 
if in case of armed conflict international human rights law imposes greater restrictions 
on the State than international humanitarian law, then the burdensome constraints 
of human rights law should be left aside, defined as they are to fit a ‘law enforcement 
paradigm’, and the more broadly permissive provisions of humanitarian law should 
prevail.136 That position has been defended by at least one Government before the 
Court, to wit, the United Kingdom Government in Hassan.137
A suggestion to this effect appears in a dissenting opinion attached to the Commis-
sion’s report in the first Cyprus v. Turkey case;138 but as we will see below,139 a consider-
able majority of the Commission preferred the way of formal derogation.
The International Court of Justice famously held in its advisory opinion on the Le-
gality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that the protection of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did not cease in time of war, except in so far as 
particular provisions might be derogated from under Article 4 of the Covenant. Next 
noting that under the Covenant the right to life was non-derogable, it stated that the 
right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applied also in hostilities. The test of 
what constituted an arbitrary deprivation of life then fell, however, to be determined 
by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which 
[was] designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.140 
In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory it identified three different ways in which IHL and hu-
man rights law might interrelate:
… some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; 
others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be mat-
ters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question 
put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
136 Kirby Abbott, “A brief overview of legal interoperability challenges for NATO arising from 
the interrelationship between IHL and IHRL in light of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 96, no. 893, pp. 107-37 at p. 115.
137 See 3.4.2 below.
138 Cyprus v. Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission report of 10 July 1976, Dissenting 
opinion of Mr G. Sperduti, joined by Mr S. Trechsel, on Article 15 of the Convention (pp. 168-
71); see also Jean-Paul Costa and Michael O’Boyle, “The European Court of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law”, in The European Convention on Human Rights, a living instru-
ment, Essays in Honour of Christos L. Rozakis (Bruylant, 2011), p. 107 at p. 120.
139 See 4.10 below.
140 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226 at § 25.
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international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law.141
That begs the question precisely what it means that international humanitarian law 
is a lex specialis in relation to international human rights law. In Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo the International Court of Justice quoted the above passage 
word for word, then went on to find Uganda internationally responsible for viola-
tions of both human rights instruments and international humanitarian law instru-
ments concurrently – which is no answer.142
For all that the Latin in which the expression lex specialis derogat legi generali is cast 
suggests a venerable rule of Roman law, it is not. The origins of the adage have actually 
been traced to mediaeval canon law. Whether in contemporary legal practice it is a 
rule of conflict avoidance (a legal principle) or a rule of interpretation, and in either 
case, in what situation it is applicable is open to debate.143 It is absent from any basic 
international legal text.144 The Court has never resorted to it in relation to interna-
tional humanitarian law, although applicant and respondent parties have sometimes 
invoked it.145
As a matter of logic, it must be so that the lex specialis properly governs a circum-
scribed part of the lex generalis. In any system of civil law, for example, the specific 
rules that govern the relationship between seller and purchaser, or between landlord 
and tenant, or between employer and employee, constitute leges speciales in relation 
to the general law of contract. This is also the way in which the Court has used the 
expression lex specialis, as when defining the relationship between Article 5 §§ 4 and 
5 and Article 6 (under its criminal head) on the one hand and Article 13 on the other: 
there is a more precise definition of the right to an effective remedy in particular situ-
ations.146
141 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 176 at § 106.
142 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judg-
ment, 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 242-45 at §§ 216-20.
143 Vincent Correia, “L’adage lex specialis derogat generali : Réflexions générales sur sa nature, sa rai-
son d’être et ses conditions d’application”, https://www.academia.edu/25191057/L_adage_lex_
specialis_derogat_generali_R%C3%A9flexions_g%C3%A9n%C3%A9rales_sur_sa_nature_
sa_raison_d_%C3%AAtre_et_ses_conditions_d_application (accessed on 13 August 2018); 
Milanovic (2011/13), p. 250.
144 Unlike the basic lex posterior derogat legi priori: see Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.
145 Including the Russian Federation in an interstate case brought by Georgia: see Georgia v. Russia 
(II) (dec.), no. 38263/08, § 69, 13 December 2011, and the United Kingdom in Hassan (see 3.4.2 
below).
146 See, among many other examples, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 3455/05, § 202, 
ECHR 2009 (Article 5 § 4); Kolanis v. the United Kingdom, no. 517/02, § 88, ECHR 2005-V 
(Article 5 §§ 4 and 5); Yankov v. Bulgaria, no. 39084/97, § 150, ECHR 2003-XII (extracts).
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There is no such relationship of specificity between the Convention, or any other 
system of international human rights law, and international humanitarian law.147 It 
is not enough simply to point out that human rights law applies all the time, even in 
‘a context of armed conflict’148 (subject to derogation in time of ‘war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation’),149 whereas international humanitarian 
law is limited to cases of international or non-international armed conflict and is not 
needed in peacetime.
To begin with, the two were never conceived of as interrelated in the sense that one 
was a subdivision of the other. Rather, they were thought of as entirely separate from 
each other. International humanitarian law had its origins in general international law 
and developed as a subdivision of that, from the nineteenth century onwards if not 
much earlier; it imposed duties on states vis-à-vis each other (and later, in non-inter-
national armed conflicts, on non-state organised armed groups). In modern times, 
its guardian was the International Committee of the Red Cross – a non-political pri-
vate organisation. In contrast, human rights law as we know it came into being only 
after the Second World War; it was intended from the very outset as a catalogue of 
rights enjoyed by the individual vis-à-vis the state simply by virtue of the fact of being 
human. Its guardians were the United Nations, an intensely political international 
intergovernmental organisation, and regional organisations such as the Council of 
Europe.150 The two converged only gradually, starting in 1968 when the International 
Conference on Human Rights and later the General Assembly of the United Nations 
adopted resolutions on ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflicts’.151
For another thing, the vexed question of jurisdiction is central to human rights law 
in that, to enjoy its protection, any potential victim must be within the ‘jurisdiction’ 
of the Contracting State concerned; conversely, the question of ‘jurisdiction’ does not 
arise in international humanitarian law, since the authority of the state over its armed 
147 Milanovic (2011/13), p. 251. 
148 Al-Skeini, § 164.
149 Article 15 of the Convention. Compare Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
150 Louise Doswald-Beck and Silvain Vité, “International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, 30 April 1993, no. 293; Robert Kolb, “The relation-
ship between international humanitarian law and human rights law: A brief history of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions”, International Re-
view of the Red Cross, September 1998, no. 324, pp. 409-419, passim; Cordula Droege, “Elective 
affinities? Human rights and humanitarian law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Septem-
ber 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 501-547 at pp. 503-04; Cordula Droege and Louise Arimatsu, 
“The European Convention on Human Rights and international humanitarian law: Conference 
report”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law volume 12 – 2009 – pp. 435-449 at pp. 436-
438; Robert Kolb, “Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2012).
151 Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Resolution XXIII adopted by the International Conference 
on Human Rights, Teheran, 12 May 1968; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2444 
(XIII), Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 19 December 1968.
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forces is a given and its duty to ensure their compliance with the applicable standards 
exists without limitation in any international or non-international armed conflict.152
Accordingly, even though the basic aims of the two – at least in relation to armed 
conflict – are arguably the same, namely to attenuate the barbarism of war, the differ-
ences remain and they cannot coherently merge into a single body of law.
So, how then is international humanitarian law a lex specialis in relation to human 
rights law? Hampson, writing in 2008, suggests that the International Court of Jus-
tice meant to say, firstly, that where both international humanitarian law and human 
rights law applied, priority should be given to international humanitarian law, and 
secondly, a human rights body should in such cases make a finding based on interna-
tional humanitarian law and expressed in the language of international human rights 
law.153 That, however, raises as many problems as it solves, as Hampson also notes. 
One way to understand this suggestion is in the sense that international humani-
tarian law should displace human rights law when the two are at variance. This cannot 
in all logic have been the International Court of Justice’s intention, given its explicit 
ruling that human rights law continued to apply except in so far as derogated from.154
A second possibility might be that international humanitarian law would take 
precedence where it contained an express provision which addressed a similar field 
to that of a norm of human rights law. In practical terms, this might mean that the 
limitation clauses attached to certain rights – Articles 18 § 3; Article 19 § 3; Article 21, 
second sentence; Article 22 § 2 of the Covenant155 – would be interpreted in the light 
of international humanitarian law governing the exercise of the rights concerned. Ar-
ticle 6 of the Covenant, for example, limits the right to life only in that it forbids 
‘arbitrary’ killing and provides for the penalty of death; in an armed conflict properly 
so called, whether a killing was ‘arbitrary’ would depend on the interpretation of in-
ternational humanitarian law.156
152 Article 3 of Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; Com-
mon Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (I)-(IV); Article 91 of the Additional Protocol 
(I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (both taken alone and, in relation to non-international armed 
conflict, read in conjunction with common Article 3).
153 Françoise Hampson, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 549-572 at p. 559.
154 Cordula Droege, “Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian law”, International Review 
of the Red Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 501-547 at p. 507; Françoise Hampson, 
“The relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law from the per-
spective of a human rights treaty body”, International Review of the Red Cross, September 2008, 
vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 549-572 at pp. 559-62.
155 The equivalent provisions of the Convention would be the ‘paragraphs 2’ of Articles 8, 9, 10 and 
11 of the Convention, and the limitation clauses of certain rights defined in the Protocols. 
156 Françoise Hampson, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 549-572 at p. 560.
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A third solution might be to let the applicability of international humanitarian 
law or international human rights law depend on the issue at stake. This might mean, 
however, that international human rights law – with its far more detailed provisions 
on certain matters, such as fair trial guarantees – would add guarantees to interna-
tional humanitarian law, in some cases turning international human rights law into a 
lex specialis in relation to international humanitarian law.157
True it is that the lex specialis relationship between international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law was originally developed by the International 
Court of Justice in the context of the right to life:
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant on Civ-
il and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of 
Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in 
a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such 
a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life ap-
plies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, how-
ever, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law 
applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostili-
ties. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in 
warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 
of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed 
conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.158
– the point being that the right to life is non-derogable, under Article 4 § 2 of the 
Covenant as under Article 15 § 2 of the Convention, but that unlike Article 15 § 2 of 
the Convention the Covenant does not make any exception for deaths resulting from 
‘lawful acts of war’.159 Although, as mentioned, in the Palestinian Wall opinion the 
International Court of Justice broadened the scope of lex specialis to include other 
157 Françoise Hampson, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 549-572 at pp. 561-62.
158 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226 at § 25.
159 On the interrelation generally between international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law, see Terry D. Gill, “Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between International Hu-
manitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: A Plea for Mutual Respect and a Com-
mon-Sense Approach”, in [2013] 16 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law p. 251 ff., and 
Fortin, pp. 38-42.
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rights, it has been suggested that the International Court of Justice has abandoned 
this approach since.160
3.3.2 If not lex specialis, then what?
It is very difficult to give a coherent theoretical answer to how international humani-
tarian law is a lex specialis in relation to human rights law; and in our submission, the 
inclusion of ‘war’ in Article 15 of the Convention makes it unnecessary for our pur-
poses as long as Contracting States are prepared actually to make use of that Article.
In contrast, in terms of the Covenant, the problems raised by the dual applica-
bility of the two regimes are insoluble: the absence of any provision for war in the 
Covenant, even a ‘war’ that would be lawful in ius ad bellum terms under the Char-
ter of the United Nations, is an omission that has not only the International Court 
of Justice but also practitioners of military law tying themselves in knots. Attempts 
have been made, prompted by the difficulties inherent in the lex specialis approach, 
to develop theories of ‘complementarity’ and ‘systematic integration’;161 the Human 
Rights Committee, for example, has stated that ‘while, in respect of certain Covenant 
rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant 
for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are 
complementary, not mutually exclusive’.162
The Leuven Manual on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations, a 
practical work aimed primarily at civilian and military decision-makers and their ad-
visers, puts it as follows:
It suffices for the purposes of the present Manual therefore to note that, ac-
cording to current legal interpretations, if a Peace Force becomes involved in an 
armed conflict, IHRL [international human rights law] and IHL [international 
humanitarian law] should be viewed as complementary bodies of law. In deter-
mining which particular rules of law will apply to specific activities associated 
with the armed conflict, it should be recognised that some situations will call 
for the exclusive application of law of armed conflict rules, some will require 
the exclusive application of human rights norms, and some will be regulated by 
a combination of the two. In the latter case, it will need to be determined how 
IHL and IHRL rules interact when they both apply. In principle, the more spe-
160 Tanja Fachataller, “Hassan v. United Kingdom and the Interplay Between International Hu-
manitarian Law and Human Rights Law in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights”, EYIL 2016 p. 345 at p. 346, referring to International Court of Justice, Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Re-
ports 2005, p. 168, § 216.
161 For a brief overview, see Vito Todeschini, ‘The ICCPR in Armed Conflict: An Appraisal of 
the `Human Rights Committee’s Engagement with International Humanitarian Law’, in Nordic 
Journal of Human Rights (2017) Vol. 35, Issue 3.
162 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obliga-
tion Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, § 11.
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cific rule will prevail (lex specialis) but there may also be cases where the more 
recent rule will prevail.163
Interestingly, the Leuven Manual uses the expression ‘lex specialis’ to refer to ‘the 
more specific rule’ – which may be a rule of international human rights law – but 
again, this is not enough to guide us out of the quagmire.
Duffy, citing Murray (2016), evokes a form of ‘weighted co-applicability’ of the 
two fields of law in which the first question asked would be whether the conduct in is-
sue falls within an ‘armed hostilities’ or a ‘security operations’ framework. The former 
would be ‘primarily’ guided by international humanitarian law, the latter primarily by 
international human rights law. In general, the closer to ‘active hostilities’, the greater 
the weight afforded to international humanitarian law; the further from them, the 
greater the emphasis given to international human rights law. However, as Duffy is 
careful to point out, while this approach is a well-intentioned attempt to avoid the 
blunt instrument that is the lex specialis approach described in the previous section, it 
may be no easy matter to situate the conduct in issue on the sliding scale between the 
two extremes; nor is it clear precisely how conflicts between permissions under inter-
national humanitarian law and duties under human rights law would be resolved.164
A solution was suggested, ‘by way of bold assertion’, by Hampson at an ICRC ex-
pert meeting in January 2012:
– Where IHL is applicable but a State denies its applicability and/or does 
not invoke it, a human rights body should confirm its applicability as a matter 
of law but state that the respondent State has chosen to be judged by a higher 
standard and should then apply human rights law, with the benefit of derogation 
if applicable;
– Where the victim was, at the time of death, in detention or in the physical 
control of State agents, a human rights body should apply human rights law. It 
can reinforce its analysis by reference to IHL;
– Where the killing occurred in the context of ordinary policing, even if 
against the background of an armed conflict, a human rights body should ap-
ply human rights law. When applying necessity and proportionality, the human 
rights body can take account of the context of conflict (not the same as applying 
IHL);
– Where the killing occurred in the context of a military operation but the 
intensity of the fighting is not such as to cross the threshold of applicability of 
163 Leuven Manual on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations (Terry D. Gill, Dieter 
Fleck, William H. Boothby and Alfons Vanheusden, general eds; Marco Benatar and Remy 
Jorritsma, assistant eds.), Cambridge University Press 2017, pp. 89-90. Elsewhere, the Manual 
advises States to “consider derogations from human rights obligations to the extent that this is 
considered necessary to achieve the mandate.” (p. 87; see also the following chapter).
164 Duffy (2018), pp. 63-64 and 86.
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Additional Protocol II, a human rights body should apply both human rights 
law and IHL prohibitions but not IHL permissions;
– Only where a killing occurs in a military operation in a non-international 
armed conflict which would satisfy the substantive conditions of applicability 
of Additional Protocol II should a human rights body only find a violation of 
human rights law if there is a violation of IHL;
– In the case of killings during military operations (i.e. not policing opera-
tions) during an international armed conflict, a human rights body should only 
find a violation of human rights law where there would be a violation of IHL.165
Such a formula might provide a practical way out in many if not most cases. The fact 
remains that the two bodies of law are not ‘complementary’ in the sense that they fit 
neatly together so that each covers gaps left by the other. They may clash, most incon-
veniently when core human rights such as the right to life and the right to liberty and 
security of person are in issue. When they do, the choice is either to apply interna-
tional human rights law – which is notably stricter especially in relation to the right 
to life – or to choose the expedient solution and apply the generally more permissive 
standards of international humanitarian law. If the latter, then whatever the name 
given to it there is no other practical way to proceed than simply to allow interna-
tional humanitarian law to override human rights law – perhaps least objectionably, 
in accordance with a ‘rule of the road’ such as that proposed by Hampson – and let 
the theory take care of itself.
3.4 Case-law of the Court
The Court itself has said relatively little about the interplay between Convention 
law and international humanitarian law.166 That is only to be expected. The Court 
is a specialised jurisdictional body, whose task is ‘[t]o ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and 
the Protocols thereto’167 and whose competence ratione materiae is limited to ‘all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto’.168 True, the Court has the power itself to decide the limits of its 
165 Written statement by Françoise Hampson, in The use of force in armed conflicts: interplay between 
the conduct of hostilities and law enforcement paradigms, Expert meeting held in 2012, ICRC, 
November 2013, pp. 69-80 at p. 79.
166 Larissa van den Herik and Helen Duffy, Human Rights bodies and International Humanitarian 
Law: Common but Differentiated Approaches, Grotius Centre Working Paper 2014/020-IHL, 
pp. 17-21. Writing before the delivery of the Hassan judgment, they describe the Court’s approach 
to international humanitarian law as “myopic, or at least opaque”.
167 Article 19 of the Convention.
168 Article 32 § 1 of the Convention. See also Evangelia Vasalou, “Les rapports normatifs entre le 
droit international humanitaire et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme : Le droit 
international humanitaire, une lex specialis par rapport a la Convention européenne des droits 
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jurisdiction,169 but that does not free the Court from the constraints imposed by its 
governing text which remains the Convention.
Depending on the demands of a particular case before it, the Court may inter-
pret the Convention in the light of another body of international law.170 Even then, 
the Court will be applying the Convention alone. It will not apply international hu-
manitarian law directly.171 This applies even where a Contracting State makes use of 
Article 15 and derogates in response to a situation that can reasonably be described as 
an ‘armed conflict’, be it international or non-international.
Only on a few occasions has the Court resorted to international humanitarian law 
actually to interpret the Convention.
3.4.1 Article 2
Although the exceptions provided for by Article 2 are written for a law enforcement 
paradigm rather than an armed conflict paradigm,172 the Court has, in Varnava and 
Others, made it clear that international humanitarian law has its role to play: 
Article 2 must be interpreted in so far as possible in light of the general prin-
ciples of international law, including the rules of international humanitarian 
law which play an indispensable and universally accepted role in mitigating the 
savagery and inhumanity of armed conflict (see [Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 
§ 43, Reports 1996-VI]). The Court therefore concurs with the reasoning of the 
Chamber in holding that in a zone of international conflict Contracting States 
are under obligation to protect the lives of those not, or no longer, engaged in 
de l’homme ?”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (112/2017), pp. 953-987 at p. 972 and 
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international 
humanitaire : une ouverture progressive”, in Human Rights in a Global World: Essays in honour of 
Judge Luis López Guerra (Guido Raimondi, Iulia Motoc, Pere Pastor Vilanova, Carmen Morte 
Gómez, eds.; Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), pp. 373-386 at p. 374-375.
169 Article 32 § 2 of the Convention.
170 For example, the law of the United Nations: see Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. 
France, Germany and Norway (dec.) (GC), nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, 2 May 2007; or the law 
of the sea: see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, ECHR 2012; or the law of 
State immunity: see, for example, Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 35763/97, ECHR 
2001-XI, and Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC), nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, 
ECHR 2014.
171 Evangelia Vasalou, “Les rapports normatifs entre le droit international humanitaire et la Conven-
tion européenne des droits de l’homme : Le droit international humanitaire, une lex specialis par 
rapport a la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme ?”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme (112/2017), pp. 953-987 at p. 965; Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “La Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme et le droit international humanitaire : une ouverture progressive”, in Human 
Rights in a Global World: Essays in honour of Judge Luis López Guerra (Guido Raimondi, Iulia 
Motoc, Pere Pastor Vilanova, Carmen Morte Gómez, eds.; Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), pp. 373-
386 at p. 377.
172 Françoise Hampson, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 549-572 at p. 564.
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hostilities. This would also extend to the provision of medical assistance to the 
wounded; where combatants have died, or succumbed to wounds, the need for 
accountability would necessitate proper disposal of remains and require the au-
thorities to collect and provide information about the identity and fate of those 
concerned, or permit bodies such as the ICRC to do so.’173
– quite regardless of whether or not Article 15 has been invoked. As Sicilianos 
points out, this is a situation in which Convention law and IHL converge.174
This, incidentally, is not a finding that international humanitarian law reduces or 
limits the guarantees offered by the Convention. Rather, it specifies and refines the 
modalities of the exercise, in situations of international armed conflict, of certain du-
ties that Article 2 imposes on Contracting States. That said, the Court has shown 
itself willing on occasion to take account of the practical difficulties that may be en-
countered in a post-conflict situation, as in Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.175
3.4.2 Article 5
In one case thus far, Hassan v. the United Kingdom, has the Court given a radically 
novel interpretation of the Convention in the light of international humanitarian law 
with the practical effect of limiting the protection offered by the Convention.
The case derives from the arrest and detention, by United Kingdom forces in Iraq, 
of the brother of a high-ranking Ba’ath party member in circumstances that ordinar-
ily would presumably have engaged the responsibility of the United Kingdom under 
Article 5. As we will see when we come to discuss the issue of ‘jurisdiction’, the Court 
found the United Kingdom to have had jurisdiction (in the sense of Article 1) by 
virtue of the actual detention – the ‘physical power and control’ exercised over the 
victim, that is to say, ‘State agent authority and control’.176
The United Kingdom Government argued that ‘[w]here provisions of the Con-
vention fell to be applied in the context of an international armed conflict, and in 
particular the active phase of such a conflict, the application had to take account of 
international humanitarian law, which applied as the lex specialis, and might operate 
to modify or even displace [emphasis added] a given provision of the Convention’. It 
could not be, and it was not so, that a Contracting State, when its armed forces were 
173 Varnava and Others v. Turkey (GC), nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90 
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 185, ECHR 2009 (with a footnote referring, for 
an understanding of ‘international humanitarian law’, to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
their three Protocols); see also Georgia v. Russia (II) (dec.), no. 38263/08, § 72, 13 December 2011.
174 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international 
humanitaire : une ouverture progressive”, in Human Rights in a Global World: Essays in honour of 
Judge Luis López Guerra (Guido Raimondi, Iulia Motoc, Pere Pastor Vilanova, Carmen Morte 
Gómez, eds.; Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), pp. 373-386 at p. 377.
175 Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 4704/04, 15 February 2011, judgment and joint partly dis-
senting opinion of Judges Bratza and Vehabović. The case did not concern the application of 
international humanitarian law.
176 Hassan, § 76.
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engaged in active hostilities in an armed conflict outside its own territory, had to 
afford the procedural safeguards of Article 5 to enemy combatants whom it took as 
prisoners of war, or suspected enemy combatants whom it detained pending determi-
nation of whether they were entitled to such status, nor to civilians whose detention 
was ‘absolutely necessary’ for security reasons, in accordance with Article 42 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. In the alternative, if the Court were to find that Article 5 
applied and was not displaced or modified in situations of armed conflict, the Gov-
ernment submitted that the list in Article 5 § 1 of permissible purposes of detention 
had to be interpreted in such a way that it took account of and was compatible with 
the applicable lex specialis, namely international humanitarian law. The taking of pris-
oners of war pursuant to the Third Geneva Convention, and the detention of civilians 
pursuant to the Fourth Geneva Convention, had to be a lawful category of detention 
under Article 5 § 1; it fell most readily as a ‘lawful detention’ within Article 5 § 1 (c). 
In this special context, the concept of ‘offence’ within that provision could correctly 
be interpreted to include participation as an enemy combatant and/or challenging 
the security of the Detaining Power within Article 42 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention. On this premise, the United Kingdom Government argued that there had 
been no need for the United Kingdom to derogate under Article 15. The inclusion of 
Article 15 in the Convention ‘in no sense indicated that, in time of war or public emer-
gency threatening the life of the nation, obligations under the Convention would at 
all times be interpreted in exactly the same way as in peacetime’.177
The Court did not find that ‘detention under the powers provided for in the Third 
and Fourth Geneva Conventions [was] congruent with any of the categories set out 
in subparagraphs (a) to (f )’. Article 5 § 1 (c), relied on by the Government, was inap-
posite already because ‘there [did] not need to be any correlation between security 
internment and suspicion of having committed an offence or risk of the commission 
of a criminal offence’; with particular regard to enemy combatants, the Court pointed 
out that they committed no crime by taking part in hostilities.178
The Court took as its starting point Article 31 § 3 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, according to which there shall, in interpreting treaties, be taken into 
account (‘together with the context’) ‘[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of 
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’ 
(sub-paragraph (b)), and ‘[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ (sub-paragraph (c)).179 It then noted that while there 
had been a number of military missions involving Contracting States acting extra-ter-
ritorially after ratifying the Convention, the practice of the States Party to the Con-
vention was ‘not to derogate [under Article 15] from their obligations under Article 5 
in order to detain persons on the basis of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions 
177 Hassan, §§ 87-90.
178 Hassan, § 97.
179 Hassan, § 100.
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during international armed conflicts’. This practice was mirrored by State practice un-
der the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: in the Court’s words,
[a]lthough many States have interned persons pursuant to powers under the 
Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions in the context of international armed 
conflicts subsequent to ratifying the Covenant, no State has explicitly derogated 
under Article 4 of the Covenant in respect of such detention (see paragraph 42 
above), even subsequent to the advisory opinions and judgment referred to 
above, where the International Court of Justice made it clear that States’ obliga-
tions under the international human rights instruments to which they were par-
ties continued to apply in situations of international armed conflict’180
The Court then reiterated that ‘the Convention must be interpreted in harmony with 
other rules of international law of which it forms part’ – including international hu-
manitarian law. Having held in Varnava and Others that Article 2 should ‘be interpret-
ed in so far as possible in light of the general principles of international law, including 
the rules of international humanitarian law which play an indispensable and univer-
sally-accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity of armed conflict’,181 it 
then considered that ‘these observations apply equally in relation to Article 5’. Refer-
ring to case-law of the International Court of Justice, according to which ‘some rights 
[might] be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others [might] be 
exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others [might] be matters of both these 
branches of international law’, it concluded that it ‘must endeavour to interpret and 
apply the Convention in a manner which is consistent with the framework under 
international law delineated by the International Court of Justice’.182
The Court was thus led to accept the Government’s argument that the lack of a 
formal derogation under Article 15 did not prevent the Court from taking account of 
the context and the provisions of international humanitarian law when interpreting 
and applying Article 5 in this particular case.183 It continued:
Nonetheless, and consistently with the case-law of the International Court of 
Justice, the Court considers that, even in situations of international armed con-
flict, the safeguards under the Convention continue to apply, albeit interpreted 
against the background of the provisions of international humanitarian law. By 
reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by international humani-
tarian law and by the Convention in time of armed conflict, the grounds of per-
mitted deprivation of liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f ) of that provision 
180 Hassan, § 101.
181 Varnava and Others, § 185.
182 Hassan, § 102, referring to International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p.168, § 216.
183 Hassan, § 103.
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should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking of prisoners of war 
and the detention of civilians who pose a risk to security under the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions. The Court is mindful of the fact that internment 
in peacetime does not fall within the scheme of deprivation of liberty governed 
by Article 5 of the Convention without the exercise of the power of derogation 
under Article 15 (…). It can only be in cases of international armed conflict, where 
the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a threat to se-
curity are accepted features of international humanitarian law, that Article 5 could 
be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such broad powers.184 (emphasis added).
Taking the view that ‘the detention must comply with the rules of international hu-
manitarian law and, most importantly, that it should be in keeping with the funda-
mental purpose of Article 5 § 1, which is to protect the individual from arbitrariness’, 
the Court was satisfied that the procedural guarantees available under the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions sufficed for purposes of Article 5 §§ 2 and 4.185
However, the court added a caveat:
Finally, although, for the reasons explained above, the Court does not consider 
it necessary for a formal derogation to be lodged, the provisions of Article 5 will 
be interpreted and applied in the light of the relevant provisions of international 
humanitarian law only where this is specifically pleaded by the respondent State. It 
is not for the Court to assume that a State intends to modify the commitments 
which it has undertaken by ratifying the Convention in the absence of a clear 
indication to that effect.186 (emphasis added)
This in effect allows States to choose post factum the legal standard by which they 
wish to be judged: the more permissive one of Article 5 of the Convention in the 
light of international humanitarian law or the stricter one of Article 5 in its classical 
interpretation.
For extensively-reasoned criticism of the Hassan judgment one need look no fur-
ther than the powerful dissent of Judge Robert Spano, which is joined by Judges 
Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjieva.187 
Spano starts by pointing out the scope of the powers granted the Detaining Power 
under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. Once the status of prisoners of 
war has been determined in accordance with Article 5 of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, they can be detained under the Third Geneva Convention for the duration of 
hostilities without any review of their detention. Civilians detained (or assigned to a 
184 Hassan, § 104.
185 Hassan, §§ 105-106.
186 Hassan, § 107.
187 Hassan, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku and 
Kalaydjieva.
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particular residence) for security purposes under the Fourth Geneva Convention are 
entitled to twice-yearly review, it is true, but the sole test is the security of the Detain-
ing Power (Articles 42 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and detention can 
be prolonged indefinitely. This Spano finds impossible to subsume under any of the 
exceptions provided for by Article 5 § 1 (a)-(f ) of the Convention. Next, he adds that 
this ‘novel understanding of the exhaustive grounds of detention under Article 5 § 1’ 
cannot be confined to acts on the territory of States not Parties to the Convention in 
circumstances in which a Contracting State exercises jurisdiction under Article 1, but 
must, ‘conceptually and in principle’, also apply in an international armed conflict tak-
ing place within the Convention’s legal space – including in an international armed 
conflict between two Contracting Parties. In such a situation, effectively, the bellig-
erents would have the right to detain persons indefinitely without going through the 
‘openly transparent and arduous process of lodging a derogation from Article 5 § 1, 
the scope and legality of which is then subject to review by the domestic courts, and 
if necessary, by this Court under Article 15.’
Spano continues:
8.  The Convention applies equally in both peacetime and wartime. That is the 
whole point of the mechanism of derogation provided by Article 15 of the Conven-
tion. There would have been no reason to include this structural feature if, when 
war rages, the Convention’s fundamental guarantees automatically became si-
lent or were displaced in substance, by granting the Member States additional 
and unwritten grounds for limiting fundamental rights based solely on other 
applicable norms of international law. Nothing in the wording of that provision, 
when taking its purpose into account, excludes its application when the Mem-
ber States engage in armed conflict, either within the Convention’s legal space or 
on the territory of a State not Party to the Convention. The extra-jurisdictional 
reach of the Convention under Article 1 must necessarily go hand in hand with 
the scope of Article 15 (see Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others [GC], 
no. 52207/99, § 62, 12 December 2001).
9.  It follows that if the United Kingdom considered it likely that it would 
be “required by the exigencies of the situation” during the invasion of Iraq to 
detain prisoners of war or civilians posing a threat to security under the rules 
of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, a derogation under Article 15 was 
the only legally available mechanism for that State to apply the rules on intern-
ment under international humanitarian law without the Member State violating 
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. It bears reiterating that a derogation under Arti-
cle 15 will not be considered lawful under the first paragraph of that provision if 
the measures implemented by the Member State are “inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law”. In reviewing the legality of a declaration 
lodged by a Member State to the Convention within the context of an interna-
tional armed conflict, the domestic courts, and, if need be, this Court, must thus 
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examine whether the measures in question are in conformity with the State’s 
obligations under international humanitarian law. (emphasis added)
Spano dismisses the argument based on State practice subsequent to ratification of 
the Convention. In the first place, he argues that the practice of not lodging notices of 
derogation has hitherto been predicated on the fundamental assumption that Article 1 
jurisdiction cannot arise in extra-territorial situations – an assumption that has been 
shown to be incorrect in a series of judgments including Al-Skeini, Al-Saadoon and 
Mufdhi and Medvedyev and Others. Secondly, the said practice is not ‘common to all 
Parties’, nor is it ‘concordant, common and consistent’. More importantly in his view, 
he identifies a fundamental distinction between ‘on the one hand, … a State practice 
clearly manifesting a concordant, common and consistent will of the Member States 
to collectively modify the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention, towards 
a more expansive or generous understanding of their scope than originally envisaged, and, 
on the other, a State practice that limits or restricts those rights, as in the present case, 
in direct contravention of an exhaustive and narrowly tailored limitation clause of the 
Convention protecting a fundamental right.’ In the third place, derogation from Ar-
ticle 5 of the Convention is fundamentally different from derogation from Article 9 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in application of its Arti-
cle 4: Article 9 of the Covenant does not, like Article 5 of the Convention, set out an 
exhaustive list of permitted grounds of detention, but only sets out a general prohibi-
tion of ‘arbitrary arrest or detention’.
Spano dismisses the possibility of applying international human rights law and in-
ternational humanitarian law on an equal footing, arguing that they ‘exhibit quite 
extensive differences both methodologically and structurally’. Although the positive 
obligation under Article 2 to protect life is ‘flexible enough to take account of the rel-
evant rules of international humanitarian law so as to create a more robust and coher-
ent regime of protection under the Convention’, international humanitarian law does 
not provide safeguards comparable to those set out in Article 5 § 1: ‘On the contrary, 
indefinite and preventive internment in wartime flatly contradicts the very nature of 
the grounds found in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f ) … ’ .
The method chosen to ‘accommodate’ the grounds of detention permitted by 
Article 5 § 1 with the powers of internment under international humanitarian law, 
while intended to avoid ‘disapplying’ Article 5 in the absence of a valid derogation 
under Article 15, is in Spano’s assessment a novelty in the Court’s case-law and an 
undesirable one at that. Not only does it create uncertainty as to the interpretation 
of Article 5 § 1, but its effect actually is to disapply or displace the fundamental safe-
guards underlying that Convention provision.
Spano concludes:
19. In conclusion, on the facts of this case, the powers of internment under 
the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, relied on by the Government as a 
permitted ground for the capture and detention of Tarek Hassan, are in direct 
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conflict with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The Court does not have any legiti-
mate tools at its disposal, as a court of law, to remedy this clash of norms. It must 
therefore give priority to the Convention, as its role is limited under Article 19 
to “[ensuring] the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Con-
tracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto”. By attempting to 
reconcile the irreconcilable, the majority’s finding today does not, with respect, 
reflect an accurate understanding of the scope and substance of the fundamental 
right to liberty under the Convention, as reflected in its purpose and its histori-
cal origins in the atrocities of the international armed conflicts of the Second 
World War.
With a few exceptions,188 the reception given to the Hassan judgment by commen-
tators has, on the whole, been lukewarm at best. Most note, with thinly-disguised 
disapproval, the audacity of the United Kingdom in suggesting that the Court disap-
ply Article 5 of the Convention altogether – a first in the history of the Court – and 
express satisfaction at the Court’s dismissal of it.
Some congratulate the Court for not holding international humanitarian law to 
displace human rights law as lex specialis in cases of armed conflict.189 One, Cedric De 
Koker, offers limited defence to the judgment for coming up with a ‘nuanced, well-
balanced solution to an old and heavily disputed issue’ – the interrelation between 
human rights law and international humanitarian law.190 A similar view is expressed 
by Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, who recognises that the Court has reduced the stand-
ard of protection offered by the Convention for reasons of expediency:
On notera que – tout comme la CIJ dans l’Affaire des activités armées sur le ter-
ritoire du Congo – la Cour évite de se référer au DIH en tant que lex specialis, 
les ambiguïtés de ce terme n’échappant à personne. Elle préfère procéder à une 
application simultanée de la Convention et du droit humanitaire. Elle s’assure 
que l’objectif primordial de l’article 5 de la Convention est atteint. Elle exige 
également que l’Etat défendeur invoque explicitement le DIH. En même temps, 
la Cour fait preuve de pragmatisme en acceptant de baisser quelque peu le stand-
ard de protection prévue par la Convention pour tenir compte de la situation 
qui prévaut dans le contexte d’un conflit armé international.191 
188 Sir Daniel Bethlehem, “When is an act of war lawful?”, in The Right to Life under Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Twenty Years of Legal Developments since McCann v. the 
United Kingdom (In honour of Michael O’Boyle), p. 231, passim.
189 Marko Milanovic, “A Few Thoughts on Hassan v. United Kingdom”, Ejil:talk! 22 October 
2014; Cedric De Koker, “Hassan v United Kingdom: The Interaction of Human Rights Law 
and International Humanitarian Law with regard to the Deprivation of Liberty in Armed Con-
flicts”, Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, http://www.utrechtjournal.org/arti-
cle/10.5334/ujiel.db/.
190 Cedric De Koker, ibid.
191 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international 
humanitaire : une ouverture progressive”, in Human Rights in a Global World: Essays in honour of 
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Criticism, however, predominates in academic circles. Philip Czech states that ‘[t]he 
Court’s modification of the obligations under the ECHR through state practice 
amounts to allowing member states to lower the standards of human rights protec-
tion through simply disobeying them’ and the judgment as a whole as ‘an attempt to 
avoid a norm conflict at any price’.192 Silvia Borelli calls the Hassan solution ‘no more 
and no less than an exercise in contra legem interpretation’.193 Dario Rossi d’Ambrosio 
is of the opinion that ‘the right to liberty has suffered a severe blow in the context of 
IACs [international armed conflicts]’.194 Beatrice Pastre-Belda considers that ‘Bien 
que limitant cette interprétation de l’article 5 aux « cas de conflit armé internation-
al » (…), la Cour offre malgré tout aux Etats la possibilité de contourner le mécanisme 
de dérogation en temps de crise spécialement prévu à l’article 15, § 1, de la Convention 
EDH …’195 – a point also made by Tanja Fachataller.196 Philippe Frumer goes further 
still, boldly stating that Article 15 has been ‘rendu inopérante’ in cases of international 
armed conflict197 while suggesting that the Court might have adopted a ‘constructive 
and dynamic interpretation’ of Article 15.198 Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne feels ‘left with 
the question of whether the alternative approach, of demanding the Contracting Par-
ties to derogate in order to access rights under IHL that the text of the Convention 
does not appear to permit, might eventually have been accepted by States and created 
a more robust mechanism for protecting rights’.199
More than one commentator has obliquely suggested that the Court was cowed 
into an accommodating attitude by the outspoken directness of the United Kingdom 
Government in this case, which takes on all its meaning if seen in the light of the vo-
cal, even hostile, opposition to the Court’s supervision sometimes expressed in the 
United Kingdom.200
Judge Luis López Guerra (Guido Raimondi, Iulia Motoc, Pere Pastor Vilanova, Carmen Morte 
Gómez, eds.; Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), pp. 373-386 at p. 86. A judge of the Court as well as an 
academic, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos was not a member of the Grand Chamber that delivered 
the Hassan judgment.
192 Philip Czech, “European Human Rights in International Military Operations”, 15 European Year-
book on Human Rights (2015) p. 391 at p. 402
193 Silvia Borelli, “Jaloud v. Netherlands and Hassan v. United Kingdom: Time for a principled ap-
proach in the application of the ECHR to military action abroad”, QIL, Zoom-in 16 (2015) 25-43 
at p. 39.
194 Dario Rossi d‘Ambrosio, Hassan v. the United Kingdom, 23 European Human Rights Advocacy 
Centre Bulletin (Summer 2015) p. 4 at p. 5; 
195 Beatrice Pastre-Belda, « L’interprétation surprenante de l’article 5 a la lumière du droit interna-
tional humanitaire », La semaine juridique 2014, page 1796.
196 Tanja Fachataller, op. cit. at pp. 355-56.
197 Philippe Frumer, « Quand droits de l’homme et droit international humanitaire s’emmêlent – 
Un regard critique sur l’arrêt Hassan c. Royaume-Uni », Rev. tr. d.h. 102/2015 p. 481 at p. 506.
198 Frumer, op. cit. at p. 501.
199 Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, “The Grand Chamber Judgment in Hassan v UK”, Ejil:talk! 16 Sep-
tember 2016.
200 See, in particular, Philippe Frumer, op. cit., at p. 506; Nicolas Hervieu, « La jurisprudence eu-
ropéenne sur les opérations militaires à l’épreuve du feu », La Revue des droites de l’homme (en 
ligne), §§ 89-90, placed online on 20 October 2014, accessed 22 May 2016.
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As it is, the Court itself has acknowledged in a later judgment, Merabishvili v. 
Georgia, that the enumeration given in Article 5 § 1 (a)-(f ) of aims capable of justify-
ing detention, hitherto exhaustive,201 has been expanded by one additional ground 
created by its case-law (case-law references omitted):
The list of situations in which Article 5 § 1 of the Convention permits depriva-
tion of liberty is likewise exhaustive (…), except when it is being applied, in the 
context of an international armed conflict, to the detention of prisoners of war 
or of civilians who pose a threat to security (see Hassan v. the United Kingdom 
[GC], no. 29750/09, § 104, ECHR 2014).202
What consequences this may have remains to be seen. For example, the Court has 
until now condemned incommunicado detention as contrary to Article 5 of the Con-
vention even when applied in a counterterrorism context.203 In the light of Hassan as 
construed by the Court itself in Merabishvili, the provision in Article 5 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, which permits a spy or a saboteur in occupied territory to be re-
garded as ‘having forfeited rights of communication under [that] Convention’, might 
require this case-law to be revisited.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has relied on Hassan 
as authority to find that a resolution of the United Nations Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the Charter can modify Article 5 § 1 of the Convention to justify de-
tention in a non-international armed conflict.204
3.4.3 Article 7
There have been a few cases in which the Court has had to assess the facts constitu-
tive of a criminal charge in light of international humanitarian law. So it was in Kor-
bely v. Hungary, which concerned the prosecution of a former Hungarian serviceman 
who in 1956 had killed an insurgent who at the time was taking an active part in the 
uprising;205 in Kononov v. Latvia, which concerned the prosecution of a Red Partisan 
who in 1944 had taken part in an attack on a village whose inhabitants were suspected 
of collaboration with the Nazi German occupying forces;206 and in Van Anraat v. the 
Netherlands, which concerned the prosecution of a Dutch businessman who had sold 
201 See, for example, Del Río Prada, § 123, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (GC), no. 16483/12, § 88, 
ECHR 2016, and see also 2.4.1.1 above.
202 Merabishvili, § 298.
203 Aksoy, § 84; El-Masri §§ 236-37; and 2.4.1.1 above.
204 United Kingdom Supreme Court, Abd Ali Hameed Al-Waheed (Appellant) v Ministry of Defence 
(Respondent) and Serdar Mohammed (Respondent) v Ministry of Defence (Appellant) (per Lord 
Sumption), 17 January 2017, [2017] UKSC 2. For a critical appraisal, see Admas Habteslasie, 
“Detention in times of war: Article 5 of the ECHR, UN Security Council Resolutions and the 
Supreme Court decision in Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence”, E.H.R.L.R. 2017, 2, 
180-191.
205 Korbely v. Hungary (GC), no. 9174/02, §§ 78-94, ECHR 2008.
206 Kononov v. Latvia (GC), no. 36376/04, §§ 196-227, ECHR 2010. 
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an ingredient of a chemical weapon to the Iraqi regime during the Iraq-Iran War, 
eventually becoming the regime’s sole supplier of the substance.207
Stricto sensu these were not cases in which the interpretation of international hu-
manitarian law was central to the interpretation of the Convention itself. Rather, the 
assessment of whether international humanitarian law had been correctly applied was 
relevant to the validity of the interpretation of the definition of the ‘criminal offence’ 
by the domestic courts.208
3.4.4 Article 4 of Protocol No. 7
In one judgment, Marguš v. Croatia, the Court has relied on international humani-
tarian law to clarify a duty to prosecute that already existed under Convention law. 
The case was one that fell to be decided under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 – the ne 
bis in idem Article – which in its second paragraph makes provision for the reopen-
ing of criminal cases ‘if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there 
has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the 
outcome of the case’.
In late 1991, shortly after the outbreak of fighting in Croatia following that coun-
try’s declaration of independence, the applicant in that case killed, maltreated and 
robbed civilians, for which after the closure of hostilities he was prosecuted under 
ordinary criminal law. He was however allowed to benefit from an amnesty by the 
domestic criminal courts in 1997. In 2006 he was indicted afresh on the same charg-
es, this time defined as war crimes contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
Additional Protocol No. 1, and in 2007 he was convicted. The conviction survived an 
appeal to the Supreme Court and a complaint to the Constitutional Court to become 
final in 2009.
The Court pointed out the following:
The possibility for a State to grant an amnesty in respect of grave breaches of hu-
man rights may be circumscribed by treaties to which the State is a party. There 
are several international conventions that provide for a duty to prosecute crimes 
defined therein (see the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of Vic-
tims of Armed Conflicts and their Additional Protocols, in particular common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; Articles 49 and 50 of the Convention 
(I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field; Articles 50 and 51 of the Convention (II) for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea; Articles 129 and 130 of the Convention (III) relative to the Treat-
207 Van Anraat v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65389/09, 6 July 2010.
208 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international 
humanitaire : une ouverture progressive”, in Human Rights in a Global World: Essays in honour of 
Judge Luis López Guerra (Guido Raimondi, Iulia Motoc, Pere Pastor Vilanova, Carmen Morte 
Gómez, eds.; Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), pp. 373-386 at pp. 378-380.
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ment of Prisoners of War; and Articles 146 and 147 of the Convention (IV) rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. See also Articles 4 and 
13 of the Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions (1977), relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts; Article 5 of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; 
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment).209
We have seen above210 that the State’s procedural obligations under Article 2 of the 
Convention include the duty to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an adequate re-
sponse – judicial or otherwise – so that the legislative and administrative framework 
set up to protect the right to life is properly implemented and any breaches of that 
right are repressed and punished – in other words, in the case of a violation of the 
right to life, to bring the perpetrators to justice.211 As we shall see below, no deroga-
tion from Article 2 is possible except in respect of deaths resulting from ‘lawful acts 
of war’212 – which the murder of civilians plainly is not – and no derogation from 
Article 3 is possible at all.213 Thus the Court was able to hold that
… by bringing a fresh indictment against the applicant and convicting him of 
war crimes against the civilian population, the Croatian authorities acted in 
compliance with the requirements of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and in 
a manner consistent with the requirements and recommendations of the above-
mentioned international mechanisms and instruments214
– effectively using international humanitarian law to reinforce the protection of 
those two Articles.215
3.5 Conclusion
The Court has held in its admissibility decision in Georgia v. Russia II that ‘the ques-
tion of the interplay of the provisions of the Convention with the rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law in the context of an armed conflict belongs in principle to 
the merits stage of the procedure’;216 presumably, therefore, the definitive word on 
209 Marguš v. Croatia (GC), no. 4455/10, § 132, ECHR 2014.
210 See 2.2.2 above.
211 See 2.2.2 above.
212 See 4.7.1 below.
213 See 4.7.2 below.
214 Marguš § 140.
215 Duffy (2018), pp. 80-81, takes the opposite view that the Court’s interpretation of the Conven-
tion “lent weight to the existence of [a duty to prosecute]” under international humanitarian law.
216 Georgia v. Russia (II) (dec.), § 71.
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the subject – if there can ever be one – will only be spoken when the Grand Chamber 
seized of that case delivers its judgment.
We would conclude, provisionally, that international humanitarian law and the 
Convention are conceptually distinct. It is submitted that neither is a lex specialis to 
the other. Even in Hassan the Court has eschewed such a finding.
Although on its facts and reasoning Hassan only concerns Article 5, the question 
is whether the approach it introduces is capable of application to other Convention 
Articles guaranteeing substantive rights – most notably Article 2. At least one au-
thor has suggested that future case-law might develop in that direction.217 We would 
submit that whatever flexibility may be possible under other provisions of the Con-
vention and Protocols, most notably the Articles with open-ended limitation clauses 
such as Articles 8-11, it would be difficult to justify interpreting Article 2 ‘in the light 
of international humanitarian law’ without jurisprudentially transferring the ‘lawful 
acts of war’ clause from Article 15 § 2 to Article 2, effectively turning it into a fourth 
sub-paragraph of Article 2 § 2, and effectively removing the need to derogate in time 
of war altogether.218
What is safe to say at this point is that the Convention, through its requirement 
of a domestic remedy and especially its own procedure before the European Court 
of Human Rights, offers protection additional to that provided by international hu-
manitarian law in that individual victims are expressly given standing before a treaty 
body invested with the power to give binding judgments on the merits.219
It goes without saying that such protection will be most effective if Convention 
standards are not allowed to be eroded by the exigencies of what may admittedly be a 
disastrous situation. In our view, this was precisely the purpose of the drafters of the 
217 Francoise J. Hampson, “Article 2 of the Convention and military operations during armed con-
flict”, in The Right to Life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Twenty 
Years of Legal Developments since McCann v. the United Kingdom (In honour of Michael O’Boyle), 
p. 191 at p. 195.
218 This consequence is accepted by Sir Daniel Bethlehem. As he puts it: “If the Convention is to 
apply in armed conflict, and is not to be fundamentally at odds with IHL [i.e. international hu-
manitarian law], an armed conflict exception to the Article 2 § 1 prohibition must be located in 
Article 15 § 2. Although Article 15 § 2 is cast as a derogation provision, it should properly be read 
as an exception to the Article 2 § 1 prohibition, beyond the exceptions contained in Article 2 § 2.” 
See Sir Daniel Bethlehem, “When is an act of war lawful?”, in The Right to Life under Article 2 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights: Twenty Years of Legal Developments since McCann 
v. the United Kingdom (In honour of Michael O’Boyle), p. 231 at p. 237. See also Daragh Murray, 
Practitioner’s Guide to Human Rights Law in International Armed Conflict, (Chatham House/
Oxford University Press 2016, p. 105: “The Court stated [in Hassan] that it would permit such 
reliance on the law of armed conflict, in the absence of a derogation, only in the case of interna-
tional armed conflicts. Derogation was not required in light of the existence of explicit law of 
armed conflict rules, designed for the situation under consideration. The reasoning underpin-
ning this conclusion would appear to apply more broadly in international armed conflict, and 
should include, for example, permissive rules relating to the use of force.”
219 Cordula Droege, “Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian law”, International Review 
of the Red Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 501-547 at pp. 545-46.
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Convention in making express provision for derogation in time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation – and as we shall see in the next chapter, 
subject always to the supervision of the Court.
4 Derogation220
4.1 Introduction221
The State may be faced with a situation in which it is not possible fully to secure the 
rights and freedoms which it guarantees – not even using the limitation clauses which 
the Convention itself attaches to a number of its provisions.222 The Convention itself 
recognises this and therefore offers its High Contracting Parties a certain latitude to 
reduce the level of protection they have bound themselves to guarantee if such a situ-
ation arises.
This latitude must be circumscribed: emergency powers of all kind lend themselves 
to abuse if they are not subordinated to democratic or judicial review. In the words 
of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (‘Venice Commission’):
The security of the State and of its democratic institutions, and the safety of 
its officials and population, are vital public and private interests that deserve 
protection and may lead to a temporary derogation from certain human rights 
and to an extraordinary division of powers. However, emergency powers have 
been abused by authoritarian governments to stay in power, to silence the op-
position and to restrict human rights in general. Strict limits on the duration, 
circumstance and scope of such powers is [sic] therefore essential. State security 
and public safety can only be effectively secured in a democracy which fully re-
spects the Rule of Law. This requires parliamentary control and judicial review 
of the existence and duration of a declared emergency situation in order to avoid 
abuse.223
With particular reference to the Convention, one might add that its very nature as a 
human rights instrument marrying a catalogue of rights to supervision by an interna-
tional organism dictates a restrictive approach.
The terms and conditions setting out the extent of the latitude left to the State as 
well as its exercise are set out in Article 15, which reads as follows:
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations 
220 An earlier version of this part was published separately as a monograph entitled Thoughts on 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2017.
221 See generally Derogation in time of emergency, factsheet by the Press Unit of the Court’s Registry, 
July 2016.
222 J.P. Loof, Mensenrechten en staatsveiligheid: verenigbare grootheden? (diss. Leiden 2005), Wolf 
Legal Publishers, p. 379
223 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Rule of Law Check-
list, CDL-AD(2016)007, § 51.
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under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obliga-
tions under international law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from 
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under 
this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation 
shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the 
measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to 
operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
This part set out by exploring the limits of the very concept of ‘derogation’.
It next suggests a Convention-relevant definition of ‘war’, an expression that has 
never been given any construction in the case-law of the Court and the Commission, 
and examining the circumstances in which a Convention State may be entitled to 
invoke the existence of a ‘war’ in support of derogating measures. The suggestion is 
that the definition of ‘war’ for the purposes of Article 15 should be tied to the concept 
of ‘armed conflict’, as that expression is used in fields of international law other than 
international human rights law.
It continues by examining the cases in which the Commission and the Court have 
been required to review States’ use of Article 15, all of which occurred in the context 
of a claimed ‘public emergency’. 
It studies the limitations on measures derogating from particular Convention 
rights – the so-called non-derogable rights – and the substantive, legal and formal 
requirements to which derogation is subject.
It briefly considers one case (Hassan v. the United Kingdom, which we examined in 
depth in the previous chapter) in which the Court was faced with the consequences 
of a Contracting State’s spectacular failure to make use of Article 15, devoting some 
thought to what might have been if the understanding of Article 15 here suggested 
had been prevalent from the outset and the Contracting State concerned had acted 
accordingly.
4.2 The nature of derogation
The basic principle is that the Convention remains fully applicable even in time of 
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. That much is clear 
from the very structure of Article 15 § 1: should such a dire eventuality materialise, 
Contracting Parties are permitted, subject to certain conditions, to take measures 
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derogating from their obligations. Nonetheless their obligations remain unaffected 
unless and until they do.224
As used in legal parlance, the meaning of ‘to derogate’ is ‘to repeal or abrogate in 
part (a law etc.); destroy or impair the force, effect, or authority of ’.225
It is therefore implicit in the expression ‘derogation’ that Contracting States are 
given a measure of latitude, in certain circumstances, to limit the exercise of substan-
tive rights guaranteed by the Convention. 
On a substantive level, the conditions governing derogation under Article 15 are 
the following:
– Firstly, derogation under Article 15 is only permitted in time of ‘war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation’.
– Secondly, there are rights from which derogation is not permitted in even the 
direst of circumstances (usually referred to as the ‘non-derogable rights’). 
– Thirdly, any measures taken must be ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation’.
– Fourthly, they must not be inconsistent with the State’s other obligations under 
international law.
There is in addition a formality to be observed, namely notification to the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe – a ‘formal and public act’ which is a necessary 
requirement for any Article 15 derogation to be valid.226 
It should be noted already at this point that derogation under Article 15 does not 
dispense the Court from considering whether or not the measure complained of was 
per se permissible under the Convention. Only if it is not will the Court consider 
whether the derogation invoked by the respondent Government is, firstly, valid, and 
secondly, sufficient to restore to that measure its acceptability.227 Moreover, the Court 
will not examine the application of Article 15 of its own motion if the parties them-
selves do not ask it to.228
The effect of Article 15 derogation is thus not to limit the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Indeed, the latter would sit ill with Article 32 of the Convention, which extends the 
Court’s jurisdiction to ‘all matters concerning the interpretation of the Convention 
224 Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (Oxford University 
Press 2011) p. 5; Eric Pouw, International Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict in 
the Context of Counterinsurgency - With a Particular Focus on Targeting and Operational Deten-
tion (diss. UvA 2013), pp. 71-72; see also International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226 at § 25 (although strictly 
speaking this passage concerns Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the reasoning is directly transposable to Article 15 of the Convention).
225 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993 ed.).
226 Cyprus v. Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission report of 10 July 1976, § 528; see also 
Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 8007/77, Commission report of 4 October 1983, §§ 67-68.
227 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, § 191; A and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 3455/05, 
§ 161, ECHR 2009.
228 Georgia v. Russia (II) (dec.), §§ 72-73; Khlebik v. Ukraine, no. 2945/16, § 82, 25 July 2017.
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and the Protocols thereto’, including the question whether the Court has jurisdiction 
at all. Already for this reason a Government cannot use Article 15 to ‘switch off ’ the 
powers of the Court when they become an inconvenience, as some writers and at least 
one Government seem to have suggested.229
Nor does derogation limit the rights derogated from as such, but only the protec-
tion of their exercise. In the words of Loof, if a Convention State makes use of the 
possibility to derogate from certain of its obligations under the Convention, all that 
is excluded is State liability for the failure fully to meet those obligations.230 This is 
illustrated by the fact that States may lodge notices of derogation but are not for that 
reason obliged to make full use of the possibilities offered – and indeed, sometimes 
they have not.231
However grave the crisis, an obligation to make use of the possibilities offered by 
Article 15 does not exist. For example, the Russian Federation has been locked in a bit-
ter struggle against a murderous foe in the Northern Causasus. The weapons resorted 
to by the Russian armed forces have included Sukhoi SU-24M and SU-25 attack air-
craft armed with large numbers of 250-270 kg bombs. Even so, the Russian Govern-
ment have not seen fit to lodge a notice of derogation. Consequently, the Convention 
remains fully applicable and is fully applied by the Court – the only restriction being 
defined by the reservation made by the Russian Federation at the time of ratification 
(which relates to Article 5 §§ 3 and 4).232
229 Richard Ekins, Jonathan Morgan, Tom Tugendhat, Clearing the Fog of Law: Saving our armed 
forces from defeat by judicial diktat, Policy Exchange, 30 March 2015, available on http://www.
policyexchange.org.uk; Gov.uk, “Government to protect Armed Forces from persistent legal 
claims in future overseas operations”, 4 October 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
government-to-protect-armed-forces-from-persistent-legal-claims-in-future-overseas-opera-
tions (accessed 29 August 2018). For the contrary view, see “UK Armed Forces Personnel and the 
Legal Framework For Future Operations”, Written Evidence from Dr Aurel Sari, Lecturer in Law 
University of Exeter, submitted to the House of Commons (Session 2013-2014), http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/futureops/law10.htm (ac-
cessed 16 February 2016).
230 Loof, pp. 347-358.
231 For examples, see Loof, fn. 10 on p. 358.
232 See, in particular, Isayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, 24 Feb-
ruary 2005; Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, 24 February 2005; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, 
nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00; Khamzayev and Others v. Russia, no. 1503/02, 3 May 2011; and 
Kerimova and Others v. Russia, nos. 17170/04, 20792/04, 22448/04, 23360/04, 5681/05 and 
5684/05, 3 May 2011; all of which note the absence of any derogation under Article 15. For the 
text of the reservation, see the web site of the Council of Europe Treaty Office. See also Cordula 
Droege, “Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian law”, International Review of the 
Red Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 501-547 at p. 507; Françoise J. Hampson, “The 
relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law from the perspective 
of a human rights treaty body”, International Review of the Red Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, 
no. 871, pp. 549-572 at p. 563; Anne-Marie Baldovin, “Impact de la jurisprudence récente de la 
Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme sur la planification et l’exécution des opérations mili-
taires à venir : Application extraterritoriale de la Convention, imputabilité des faits des troupes 
et fragmentation du droit international”, in Military Law and the Law of War Review 50/3-4 
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4.3 War
It has become clear that the age of armed conflict, whether international or not, is 
not yet behind us. The question what constitutes ‘war’ for purposes of Article 15, and 
what the significance of the use of that expression should be, has therefore lost none 
of its importance.
It is submitted that, for our purposes, the expression ‘war’ makes no sense divorced 
from its ordinary meaning in international humanitarian law – that is, if it does not 
mean either an international armed conflict or an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character between a State and a non-State armed group but reaching the 
minimum intensity needed to trigger the applicability of international humanitarian 
law.233
4.3.1 Defining a ‘war’
Article 1 of the Hague Convention (III) on the Opening of Hostilities (1907) requires 
‘previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or 
of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war’ before hostilities are permitted 
to commence.234 Since 1941 there has been no declaration of war in such terms,235 
although as all the world knows there have been serious and violent conflicts between 
States involving the deliberate use of force by one to overcome resistance by another.
If one conveniently overlooks the Greek law of 1940 declaring war on Albania, 
which created a state of war that apparently continues to the present day (much to 
the embarrassment of all concerned),236 then probably the closest to a declaration of 
war in the classical sense by a Convention State was the United Kingdom’s declara-
tion with effect from 12 April 1982, in response to the Argentinian invasion of the 
Falkland Islands, of a ‘Maritime Exclusion Zone’ two hundred miles wide around a 
point defined in the centre of that territory. Within this zone, Argentinian warships 
and naval auxiliaries would be treated as hostile and liable to attack by British forces. 
Towards the end of April this zone became a ‘Total Exclusion Zone’, from which Ar-
gentinian aircraft both military and civil were excluded in addition to naval forces. 
(2011), pp. 369-418 at p. 405; and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “La Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme et le droit international humanitaire : une ouverture progressive”, in Human Rights in a 
Global World: Essays in honour of Judge Luis López Guerra (Guido Raimondi, Iulia Motoc, Pere 
Pastor Vilanova, Carmen Morte Gómez, eds.; Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), pp. 373-386 at p. 375.
233 See also Sir Daniel Bethlehem, “When is an act of war lawful?”, in The Right to Life under Article 2 
of the European Convention on Human Rights: Twenty Years of Legal Developments since McCann 
v. the United Kingdom (In honour of Michael O’Boyle), p. 231 at p. 236.
234 Hague Convention (III) of 1907 on the Opening of Hostilities, Article 1.
235 The Georgian declaration of a ‘state of war’ of 9 August 2008 applied in the territory of Georgia 
and for fifteen days only: see Georgia v. Russia (II) (dec.) (GC), no. 38263/08, § 1, 13 December 
2011.
236 Balkan Insight, 22 March 2016, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-and-greece-
agree-to-abolish-the-war-law-03-22-2016 (retrieved 6 November 2016); Tirana Times, 25 March 
2016. It would appear that the state of war still exists at the time of writing.
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On 7 May 1982 the zone was extended to cover all Argentinian military vessels and 
aircraft found more than twelve miles from the Argentinian coast – in other words, 
units of the Argentinian navy and air force might be attacked without warning any-
where in the world beyond the outer limits of the Argentinian territorial sea. Argen-
tina followed suit by declaring comparable zones of her own.237 Both States however 
stopped short of taking the conflict to each other’s home land territory.
Nevertheless, while in terms of classical law of war hostilities between States are 
only permitted following a declaration of war (whether conditional or not), permis-
sibility is not a prerequisite to the existence of a state of war.
To begin with, the expression ‘war’ has never been limited to conflicts between 
sovereign States. Already Hugo Grotius, in De iure belli ac pacis, reminds us that wars 
may be ‘public, private or mixed’ depending on the nature of the parties:
Publicum bellum est quod auctore eo geritur qui iurisdictionem habet; priva-
tum, quod aliter; mixtum, quod una ex parte est publicum, ex altera privatum.238
To define a contemporary understanding of the concept of war, one that is appropri-
ate to international human rights law, it would appear sensible to turn to the field of 
international law that actually regulates its conduct – namely, international humani-
tarian law, also referred to as the law of armed conflict, or the law of war (the terms 
are synonymous).239
Modern international humanitarian law is based on the same understanding of war 
as that of Grotius. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, for example, apply to
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not rec-
ognized by one of them240
– thus making it clear that a state of ‘armed conflict’ relevant to those Conventions 
does not depend on a formal declaration of war – and to
all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 
Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance241
as well as to
237 Commander Timothy C. Young, Maritime Exclusion Zones: A Tool for the Operational Com-
mander?, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA, 18 May 1992, pp. 6-7 and Appen-
dix II.
238 Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (1625), Book I, Chapter III, paragraph 1.
239 Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the waging of war: an introduction to inter-
national humanitarian law (fourth edition), Cambridge University Press/ICRC 2011, p. 1.
240 Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, first paragraph
241 ibid., second paragraph
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armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties242
– which by definition, if the conflict is not to be international, implies either that 
the High Contracting Party concerned is in conflict with at least one non-State or-
ganised armed group or that non-State organised armed groups are fighting each oth-
er.243
Article 1 of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions develops and 
supplements common Article 3, rendering the Protocol applicable to armed conflicts
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, un-
der responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol244
while specifically excluding
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and spo-
radic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed con-
flicts245
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia gives the following 
definition of ‘armed conflict’:
An “armed conflict” is said to exist “whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities 
and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State.”246
– which definition 
focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the or-
ganization of the parties to the conflict. In an armed conflict of an internal or 
242 Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
243 How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion Paper, March 2008, page 1, https://www.icrc.
org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (accessed 19 August 2015.
244 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Article 1 § 1.
245 ibid., Article 1 § 2.
246 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Appeals Chamber, Prosecu-
tor v. Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, Cases Nos. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, judgment, 12 June 2002, 
§ 56.
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mixed character, these closely related criteria are used solely for the purpose, as a 
minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and 
short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to interna-
tional humanitarian law.247
The International Committee of the Red Cross, in an Opinion Paper of March 2008, 
summarises the distinction between an armed conflict not of an international char-
acter (Non-International Armed Conflict, ‘NIAC’) and ‘mere’ internal disturbances 
and tensions, riots or acts of banditry, in the following terms:
First, the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity. This may be the 
case, for example, when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the 
government is obliged to use military force against the insurgents, instead of 
mere police forces.
Second, non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered 
as “parties to the conflict”, meaning that they possess organized armed forces. 
This means for example that these forces have to be under a certain command 
structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations.248
In its 2016 Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) describes an ‘armed conflict not of an international 
character’ as follows:
A situation of violence that crosses the threshold of an “armed conflict not of an 
international character” is a situation in which organized Parties confront one 
another with violence of a certain degree of intensity. It is a determination made 
based on the facts.249
It is submitted that the understanding of the expression ‘armed conflict’ as used in 
the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, whether of an interna-
tional character or not, is equally appropriate to the understanding of the expression 
‘war’ for purposes of Article 15 of the Convention, it being understood that in the 
case of an armed conflict not of an international character one of the protagonists 
must be the State; in other words, that the expressions ‘war’ and ‘armed conflict’ are 
interchangeable.250
247 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1-T, judgment, 7 May 1997, § 561.
248 How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion Paper, March 2008, page 3.
249 International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Commentary of 2016, § 387.
250 Kalshoven and Zegveld, supra note 239, ibid.; see generally Marko Milanović and Vidan Hadži-
Vidanović, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict ( January 20, 2012). Research Handbook on International 
Conflict and Security Law, Nigel White, Christian Henderson, eds., Edward Elgar, 2012. p. 256.
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4.3.2 Use of the expression ‘war’ in practice
4.3.2.1 International armed conflict
The classical understanding of ‘war’ as a legal concept encompasses only armed con-
flict between two or more states (or alliances). It is to this concept that the classical 
laws of armed conflict, or laws of war, are applicable – the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907 including their protocols and all the Geneva Conventions entered into 
between 1864 and 1949.
To date Article 15 has never been invoked in response to a ‘war’ between States, 
however defined. In its notice of derogation of 5 June 2015, Ukraine refers to the ‘an-
nexation and temporary occupation by the Russian Federation of the integral part 
of Ukraine – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol’ as the 
result of ‘armed aggression against Ukraine’ involving ‘both regular Armed Forces 
of the Russian Federation and illegal armed groups guided, controlled and financed 
by the Russian Federation’, but shrinks from using the expression ‘war’. Although the 
military occupation of part of the territory of a State by a neighbouring State (or 
by irregular forces under the latter’s control), as posited by Ukraine, is surely casus 
belli – and the Ukrainian note verbale does mention Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter – Ukraine describes the situation as ‘a public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation’ and its response as ‘an anti-terrorist operation’. Interestingly, however, 
reference is made to ‘war crimes and crimes against humanity’ allegedly committed by 
Russian regular armed forces and by irregulars under Russia’s control.251
Neither, in Strasbourg case-law, has the expression ‘war’ been applied to military 
operations involving Contracting States acting extra-territorially, as in Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or the Middle East.252 In Banković253 and Hassan,254 
the Court notes that ‘although there have been a number of military missions involv-
ing Contracting States acting extra-territorially since their ratification of the Conven-
tion, no State has ever made a derogation pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention in 
respect of these activities’. 
However, in Varnava and Others the Court implicitly recognised that an inter-
national armed conflict had existed between Cyprus and Turkey at the time of the 
disappearance of the victims of the violation found (although this fell outside the 
Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis).255
251 Note verbale from the Ukrainian Permanent Representative to the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe, 5 June 2015, Council of Europe treaty office web site, http://www.coe.int/
en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/declarations?p_auth=oM51wfc3. An 
identical document was lodged with the Secretary General of the United Nations under Article 
4 § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the same day (UN Doc. 
C.N.416.2015.TREATIES-IV.4). See also Marko Milanović, “Ukraine Derogates from the IC-
CPR and the ECHR, Files Fourth Interstate Application against Russia”, EJIL:Talk!, 5 Octo-
ber 2015.
252 Hassan v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 29750/09, § 42, ECHR 2014.
253 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) (GC), no. 52207/99, § 62, ECHR 2001-XI
254 Hassan, § 101.
255 Varnava and Others § 185.
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On the one occasion when a Contracting State relied on the existence of an ‘in-
ternational armed conflict’ in a context relevant to Article 15 of the Convention – 
Hassan – the Court deferred to the Government’s view256 rather than follow that of 
the applicant, who considered the conflict to be a non-international one fought on 
foreign territory.257
4.3.2.2 Non-international armed conflict
As we have seen, there are situations on the continent that arguably constitute ‘non-
international armed conflicts’258 and accordingly, for our purposes, ‘wars’; but Article 
15 has never been invoked in respect of these either. 
The expression ‘war’ is rarely, if ever, used by States in relation to internal conflicts 
on their own territory. It has been suggested, not implausibly, that Governments may 
be reluctant to admit that a non-state organised armed group has acquired the poten-
tial to challenge their monopoly on the use of force, and especially to recognise that 
the situation of violence has reached the high threshold of application of Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.259 The latter in particular, despite its reassur-
ing recognition of the State’s right to strive to reimpose its rule,260 implies recognition 
that the armed group is not merely organised, but under responsible command and 
exercises control over territory allowing it to conduct sustained and concerted mili-
tary operations261 – an admission of weakness, on the part of the State, that can fairly 
be described as a testimonium paupertatis262 – and enjoins the State to vouchsafe to 
its opponents, whom it would otherwise be entitled to try as rebels or traitors, the 
‘widest possible amnesty’.263 Worse still, conferring any such degree of legitimacy on 
an armed group might amount to constructive recognition of the latter as a ‘libera-
256 Hassan, passim.
257 Hassan, passim.
258 See 1.2.1 above.
259 On the interpretation of the expression “non-international armed conflict”, see generally 
Milanović and Hadži-Vidanović, pp. 282 et seq.
260 Article 3 of the 1977 Additional Protocol.
261 Article 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocol.
262 Françoise J. Hampson, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and human 
rights law from the perspective of a human rights treaty body”, International Review of the Red 
Cross, September 2008, vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 549-572 at p. 556; Anna Austin, Contribution to a 
seminar held at the University of Toulouse in March 2016. See also Harris, O’Boyle and War-
brick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn. 
2014), p.825.
263 Article 6 § 5 of the 1977 Second Additional Protocol. As the term ‘amnesty’ indicates, the exist-
ence of a non-international armed conflict does not of itself prevent States from bringing pros-
ecutions under ordinary criminal law: see, for example, Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge 
Raad), judgment of 7 May 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AF6988, also published in NJ 2007/276 
with an annotation by A.H. Klip; and Supreme Court of the Netherlands, judgments of 4 April 
2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:574, also published in NJ 2018/106, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:574, also 
published in NJ 2018/107, and ECLI:NL:HR:2017:577, also published in NJ 2018/108, with an 
annotation by E. van Sliedregt after NJ 2018/2018.
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tion movement’ possessed of rights of its own under international law, including the 
right of a disgruntled ethnic minority to ‘self-determination’ or to the protection of a 
foreign power invested with a corresponding ‘responsibility to protect’.264 
An expression more frequently applied to armed non-state opponents of Govern-
ment – with the active or tacit endorsement of the Court – is ‘terrorist’, even when 
the opponents pose a significant armed threat and expressly intend to wrest control 
over part of the territory of the state from the Government.265 It is submitted that as 
a legal categorisation of armed opponents use of this expression is unsatisfactory. The 
word terrorism describes a tactic that can be loosely defined as ‘criminal acts intended 
or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or 
particular persons for political purposes’266 and that may be resorted to not only by 
renegades and religious fanatics but also by Government forces.267 On this view, the 
so-called ‘war on terror’ declared by the Bush Administration in the USA is not a 
‘war’ properly so-called; the paradigm is one of law enforcement, not armed conflict, 
whether international or non-international.268
In a judgment of 10 January 1996 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federa-
tion proceeded on the implicit recognition that Additional Protocol II was applicable 
to the conflict which was at that time being fought in Chechnya (later to be known as 
the First Chechen War), and that its provisions were ‘binding on both parties to the 
armed conflict’.269 However, Russia became a party to the Convention only on 5 May 
1998, by which time the First Chechen War had been over for nearly two years.
264 Elizabeth Chadwick, Self-Determination, Terrorism and the International Humanitarian Law of 
Armed Conflict, Martinus Nijhoff 1996, pp. 41-42 and 82.
265 See, among many other examples, Sakık and Others v. Turkey, nos. 23878/94, 23879/94, 23880/94, 
23881/94, 23882/94 and 23883/94, Reports 19978-VII; Öcalan v. Turkey (GC), no. 46221/99, 
ECHR 2005-IV; and Finogenov and Others v. Russia, nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03, ECHR 2011.
266 Working definition taken from the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures 
to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/RES/51/210, 16 January 1997. Compare Article 2 § 1 (b) 
of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 10 January 
2000: (in addition to acts which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in specific 
named treaties), ‘Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel 
a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.’
267 See generally Jelena Pejic, “Armed Conflict and Terrorism: There Is A (Big) Difference”, in Coun-
ter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Ana María de Frías, Katja L.H. Samuel, Nigel D. 
White, eds.), Oxford University Press 2011 p. 171.
268 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd edition 2015), 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 566-567.
269 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Judgment of 31 July 1995 on the constitutional-
ity of the Presidential Decrees and the Resolutions of the Federal Government concerning the 
situation in Chechnya (translation by Federal News Service Group, Washington D.C., published 
by the Venice Commission on 10 January 1996 as CDL-INF (96) 1). See Bowring, Bill (2008) – 
“How will the European Court of Human Rights deal with the UK in Iraq?: lessons from Turkey 
and Russia” - London: Birkbeck ePrints. Available at: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/859 at p. 9.
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Korbely v. Hungary remains to date the only case in the Court’s history in which 
the Government of a State Party to the Convention has recognised a situation on its 
own territory as amounting to a non-international armed conflict.270 The situation 
was, in fact, the 1956 uprising against Soviet-imposed Communist rule, which the 
post-Communist Government of Hungary could safely recognise as legitimate.
4.3.3 Must a ‘war’ constitute a ‘threat to the life of the nation’ for derogation 
under Article 15 to be possible?
4.3.3.1 Why it matters
It does not follow as night follows day that ‘the life of the nation’ will be ‘threatened’ 
by the existence of a conflict, whether of an international character or not.271 A limit-
ed war fought far away on foreign soil, for example, need not constitute a vital danger. 
Many (though not all) conflicts fought against non-European indigenous peoples 
during the colonial period served the establishment of a European State’s power and 
influence beyond its borders but were not a response to any direct existential threat 
to the State concerned. Similarly, the question may well be asked to what extent the 
armed extraterritorial operations that have taken place since 2001 constituted a re-
sponse to a genuine threat to the ‘life of the nation’.272
The question is therefore whether such a ‘threat’ should be required for Article 15 
derogation to be permissible in time of ‘war’, as distinct from a mere ‘public emer-
gency’ – in other words, whether (and if so, to what extent) the words ‘threatening 
the life of the nation’ qualify ‘war’ as they do the words ‘other public emergency’. The 
retrospective assessment to be made under the Convention of wartime acts and deci-
sions depends on it.
4.3.3.2 On the territory of the home country
The first question is what constitutes the territory of the Convention State. Undoubt-
edly the secession of Algeria (1954-62) was felt in metropolitan France as a ‘war’ on 
French soil, and one that threatened the life of the nation at that. Nonetheless, it has 
to be said that the French Republic has survived, magnificently, despite the loss of 
the Algerian départements. Be that as it may, the Convention could not apply to that 
particular conflict: France ratified it only in 1974. Moreover, the guerre d’Algérie was 
only officially declared to have been a ‘war’ post factum, in 1999.273
270 Korbely § 61.
271 Jean-Paul Costa and Michael O’Boyle, “The European Court of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law”, in The European Convention on Human Rights, a living instrument, Essays in 
Honour of Christos L. Rozakis (Bruylant, 2011), p. 107 at p. 116.
272 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd edition 2015), 
Cambridge University Press, p. 587. 
273 “Guerre d’Algérie” (Algerian war) is now the expression approved by law; formerly the official ap-
pellation was “operations carried out in North Africa” (Loi no 99-882 du 18 octobre 1999 relative 
à la substitution, à l’expression « aux opérations effectuées en Afrique du Nord », de l’expression 
« à la guerre d’Algérie ou aux combats en Tunisie et au Maroc », Journal officiel no. 244, 20 Oc-
tober 1999).
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While the expression ‘war’ will not be as quickly resorted to by Governments (or 
courts, whether domestic or international) as by journalists, the question whether a 
conflict worthy of that name must also constitute a threat to ‘the life of the nation’ be-
fore Article 15 can be brought into play is, in our submission, pointless if the conflict 
results from a conventional kinetic conflict on the home territory of a Convention 
State. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which an actual ‘war’ being fought on 
home territory does not also constitute an ‘emergency threatening the life of the na-
tion’; most likely, therefore, the very intensity of the conflict will provide the answer.
The right of a Contracting State to fight a defensive war against a foreign attacker 
on its home territory pending action by the United Nations Security Council will be 
governed, in principle, by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. We do not 
doubt that such a Contracting State would be entitled to avail itself of Article 15 in 
any case.
4.3.3.3 Hybrid warfare
The question whether a conflict is international in character or not, and if not, suf-
ficient to justify the expression ‘war’ is of great practical importance when considered 
in the context of what is now called hybrid warfare. A definition of ‘hybrid warfare’ 
appears not to exist, but until now the expression has been used to describe a com-
bination of conventional kinetic warfare and unconventional tactics such as cyber-
attacks and the covert use of irregulars who may have been recruited from among the 
population of the State under attack (members, perhaps, of a minority of the same 
ethnicity as the population of the attacking state). Typically the attacker is expected 
to limit the intensity of the conflict and make it appear non-international, so as to 
reduce the likelihood of triggering a military response by an existing military alli-
ance – such as NATO, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – and create a fait 
accompli.274
The leaders of the State under attack will need both the perception to identify the 
threat as coming from abroad and the courage to say so in public – for only thus can 
they be sure that a low-intensity conflict that, to a superficial observer, may appear to 
be a mere internal disturbance that offers no particular threat to the life of the nation 
274 “Hybrid war – does it even exist?”, NATO review, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/
Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/index.htm (accessed 7 June 
2016). The closest NATO has come appears to be paragraph of the Wales Summit Declaration 
of 5 September 2014: “We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific chal-
lenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramili-
tary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design. …” NATO press release 
(20014)120, 5 September 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.
htm (accessed on 27 November 2017). See generally Andres B. Munoz Mosquera and Sascha 
Dov Bachmann, “Lawfare in Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century Warfare”, in Journal of International 
Humanitarian Legal Studies 7 (2016) 63-87. See also Martin Murphy, Frank G. Hoffman, Gary 
Schaub, Jr., Hybrid Maritime Warfare and the Baltic Sea Region, University of Copenhagen, Cen-
tre for Military Studies, November 2016, p. 3.
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will entitle them to invoke Article 15 of the Convention (not to mention, in the case 
of NATO members, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty).275
4.3.3.4 Outside the territory of the home country
It has been suggested that a Contracting State acting extraterritorially, as several have 
done in Iraq and Afghanistan, should not be allowed to derogate from the Conven-
tion under Article 15; but conversely, the Court’s observation that the United King-
dom ‘did not purport to derogate under Article 15’, which appears in Hassan276 but 
also in Al-Jedda,277 has been construed a contrario by at least one author as suggesting 
that it would have been possible for the United Kingdom to derogate in respect of its 
operations in Iraq.278
We consider that since – as we will see below279 – the Convention is capable of 
applying extraterritorially to the use of ‘hard power’, the corresponding availability of 
Article 15 is a necessary corollary.
We would however add the caveat that the position on whether a ‘war’ must also 
threaten the ‘life of the nation’ for Article 15 to apply may well be different if a State 
Party to the Convention engages in a ‘war’ outside its own home territory rather than 
on its home territory in self-defence.
4.3.3.4.1 Colonies and dependencies
Between 1947 and 1949 the Netherlands embarked on ‘policing operations’ – coun-
ter-guerrilla offensives – in its East Indies, and later, in 1962, defeated an Indonesian 
naval attack on Netherlands New Guinea; in the 1950s the United Kingdom sup-
pressed uprisings in northern Borneo, Kenya and elsewhere;280 and until 1975 Portu-
gal fought bitterly to retain control of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. 
275 With regard to cyber-attacks, see Jack Goldsmith, “How Cyber Changes the Laws of War”, EJIL 
(2013), Vol. 24 No. 1, 129-138 at pp. 133-34; Lieutenant Ken M. Jones, USN, Cyber War: The Next 
Frontier For NATO, Progressive Management, 2016, pp. 20-23; Christian Henderson, “The use 
of cyber force: Is the jus ad bellum ready?”, in QIL, Zoom-in 27 (2016), pp. 3-11 at p. 7; and Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Commentary of 2016, § 254. See also Mili-
tary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, § 195.
276 § 98.
277 § 100.
278 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd edition 2015), 
Cambridge University Press, p. 587.
279 See Chapter 6 below.
280 The United Kingdom derogated under Article 15 in respect of these; the derogations were either 
withdrawn eventually or came to an end when the territory concerned gained independence. 
Information available from the web site of the Council of Europe Treaty Office. See also Bart 
van der Sloot, “Is All Fair in Love and War? An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 ECHR”, 
in Military Law and the law of War Review 53/2 (2014), pp. 319-358 at p. 344, who considers it 
“highly questionable whether it [was] in the interest of the rebelling indigenous population … to 
limit their rights and freedoms by invoking the state of necessity.” 
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Colonial wars eventually went out with colonialism; and as France weathered the loss 
of Algeria, so also European colonial powers overcame the loss of possessions that 
had often been sources of prosperity for centuries. It may therefore be argued that the 
secession of overseas territories did not, in retrospect, affect the home country to the 
point of ‘threatening the life of the nation’. Nevertheless, just as the United Kingdom 
was permitted to invoke Article 15 in respect of a mere ‘emergency’ in Cyprus – then 
still one of its remaining Crown Colonies – the mother country would surely have 
been entitled to make use of Article 15. It was, after all, the life of the colony or terri-
tory itself, as an integral part of the State, which was threatened. 
It is worth noting in this connection that the Convention does not comprise any 
provision that can be construed as permitting territorial or ethnic entities to secede. 
In particular, it has no provision comparable to, for example, Article 1 § 1 of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which recognises to ‘all peoples’ a 
right of ‘self-determination’. This is perhaps just as well, since the ‘self-determination’ 
argument can be wielded in support of diametrically opposed interests even within 
the jurisdiction of a single Contracting State.281 In any event, it is by no means certain 
that ‘outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation, the international law of self-determina-
tion confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to separate from 
that State’.282
The availability of Article 15 in the event of a foreign attack on an overseas colony 
(or other non-self-governing territory) is a matter on which there can be no contro-
versy. Had the Convention applied in 1942, no right-thinking person would have 
thought ill of the United Kingdom Government for derogating under Article 15 in 
respect of Hong Kong or British Malaya, or of the Dutch Government (then in exile 
in London) for doing so in respect of the Netherlands East Indies.
Even so, the Argentinian attack on the Falkland Islands in 1982 did not induce 
the United Kingdom Government to invoke Article 15. In an opinion submitted to 
the British House of Commons a legal scholar states, though he does not explain, 
that in the Falklands crisis ‘the legal conditions for invoking Article 15 were undoubt-
edly satisfied’.283 Indeed, if the British claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is 
valid in international law (and it has never been called into question in the case-law of 
either the Commission or the Court), it is difficult to argue that the United Kingdom 
281 Contrast Cyprus v. Turkey, § 69, with Öcalan, § 78.
282 X v. Germany, no. 6742/94, Commission decision of 10 July 1974, p. 98 at p. 101; International 
Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010 p. 403, §§ 82-83; see also Crawford 
(2012), pp. 141-142. For a contrary view, see Bart van der Sloot, “Is All Fair in Love and War? An 
Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 ECHR”, in Military Law and the law of War Review 53/2 
(2014), pp. 319-358 at p. 344.
283 Sari, supra note 229.
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was not entitled to rely on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations – as in fact 
the United Kingdom did throughout the conflict.284
4.3.3.4.2 A historical example: the Korean War
In terms of international law, the Korean War (1950-1953) was a conflict unlike any 
other. It remains, so far, the only ‘war’ dignified by that name fought with the prior 
authorisation of the Security Council of the United Nations.285 Since therefore, in 
strictly formal terms, there can be little doubt as to its legality, there would be little 
point in posing any requirement that it constitute a direct threat to the life of the na-
tion – which indeed, remote as the conflict was from Europe, it arguably did not for 
the European States that took part under the flag of the United Nations.286 It would 
however have been incongruous to deny the availability of Article 15 had the Conven-
tion been in force at the time.
4.3.3.4.3 Contemporary practice: peace operations
More Contracting States now participate in peace operations on foreign soil than 
take part in international or non-international armed conflicts as belligerents in their 
own name. Peace operations may be based on the consent of the host State, or they 
may be mandated by the Security Council287 – peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the 
United Nations Charter, or peace enforcing under Chapter VII288 – or both.
A peace operation is not necessarily an armed conflict, whether international or 
non-international; but even if it does not start out as one, it may degenerate into 
one, either because an already tense situation escalates or because the peacekeepers or 
peace enforcers are dragged into a conflict between others. Such may be the case, for 
example, when peacekeepers are attacked by insurgents or when they intervene on the 
side of one or other of the parties to an existing conflict.289 Whether there is an armed 
conflict, international or not, is a matter to be assessed in the light of the relevant cri-
teria of international humanitarian law discussed above;290 but when such a situation 
develops, there is a ‘war’ for purposes of Article 15 of the Convention.
Until now, Contracting States have not derogated under Article 15 in respect of 
such operations. There is, however, no reason why they should not be entitled to. It 
284 Young, supra note 237, Appendix II.
285 UNSC Resolutions 83 (1950), 27 June 1950, and 84 (1950), 7 July 1950 (Complaint of aggression 
upon the Republic of Korea).
286 Principally Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom (Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden sent humanitarian aid but not combat forces). 
287 Leuven Manual on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations, p. 27.
288 A distinction made by Tristan Ferraro in “The applicability and application of international 
humanitarian law to multinational forces”, in International Review of the Red Cross (2013), 95 
(891/892), pp. 561-612 at p. 565.
289 For an overview, see Ferraro, loc. cit., pp. 561-612.
290 See 4.3.1 above.
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is in the logic of things that the right, in principle, to make use of Article 15 should 
follow the existence of Article 1 jurisdiction.291
The question arises in particular in respect of peace operations that are not sub-
sidiary organs of the United Nations. With a few early exceptions, peace operations 
mandated by the Security Council have been its subsidiary organs;292 such operations 
are subject to a regime of their own, which may preclude attribution of violations of 
the Convention altogether.293
4.3.3.4.4 Responsibility to protect
In recent years, the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ has emerged.294 First formu-
lated in a report of an expert body set up by the Canadian Government to attempt to 
identify principles governing ‘humanitarian intervention’295 – an idea that was, and 
remains, controversial as it is perceived by some as difficult to reconcile with State 
sovereignty and by others as a contradiction in terms296 – it found its first expression 
in an official legal text in 2005, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the outcome of the World Summit:
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the respon-
sibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, 
in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
291 Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers, Cambridge 
University Press 2012, pp. 312-13.
292 Articles 7 § 2 and 29 of the Charter of the United Nations. See also Lotten Paulsson, Delegation 
of powers to United Nations Subsidiary organs (Master’s thesis, Lund 2004), p. 24.
293 Compare Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (dec.) 
(GC), nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, § 143, 2 May 2007 (“Behrami and Saramati”); see also 8.4.5.2 
below.
294 For a description of the emergence of the concept and a critical appraisal, see Carlo Focarelli, 
“The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambigui-
ties for a Working Doctrine”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2008), Vol. 13 No. 2, 191-213, 
and Nienke van den Have The prevention of gross human rights violations under international 
human rights law (diss. Amsterdam 2017), pp. 209-214.
295 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa (issued by the International Government Research Centre, December 2001). Note how-
ever that “humanitarian intervention” was the international legal ground invoked by the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom in justification of participation by United Kingdom forces in the 
attack on Syrian targets on 14 April 2018 in response to an attack by the Syrian regime in the 
Syrian town of Douma on 7 April 2018 allegedly using chemical weapons: see Syria action – UK 
government legal position, policy paper published on 14 April 2018.
296 The position of the International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, is that “[i]nter-
national humanitarian law cannot serve as a basis for armed intervention in response to grave 
violations of its provisions” and that the expression “armed intervention in response to grave 
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law” is to be preferred. See Anne 
Ryniker, ‘The ICRC’s position on “humanitarian intervention’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, June 2001, vol. 83, no. 842, pp. 527-532 at p. 527 and passim.
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crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective ac-
tion, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation 
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be in-
adequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleans-
ing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the prin-
ciples of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, 
as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out.297 (emphasis added)
The United Nations Security Council reaffirmed this paragraph in April of the fol-
lowing year298 and in November 2009,299 and actually referred to it in a resolution of 
August 2006 authorising action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Darfur.300
In this light, it would be difficult to deny the applicability of Article 15 of the Con-
vention if the Security Council, having found that national authorities of a State, per-
haps a State that is not a party to the Convention, are ‘manifestly failing to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity’ and peaceful means are inadequate, authorises ‘collective action’ to be taken 
by Contracting Parties in application of Chapter VII.
4.3.3.4.5 Aggressor States
What if an aggressor State seeks to rely on Article 15 of the Convention?301 Wars may 
turn against the aggressor State, which may end up seeing its very existence threat-
ened. Examples abound, including in recent history. As the expression is, ex iniuria 
ius non oritur: surely it would offend against the very principles on which human 
rights law is built302 if such a State could get away with limiting the substantive pro-
tection which it has undertaken in the Convention to protect.303 Had the Conven-
297 UNGA Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, § 139.
298 S/Res/1674, 28 April 2006.
299 S/Res/1894, 11 November 2009.
300 S/Res/1706, 31 August 2006.
301 For a definition of “aggression” in international law, see UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX) (1974).
302 “Reaffirming the profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of 
justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political 
democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights on 
which they depend; …” (Preamble to the Convention, fourth paragraph).
303 Compare Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention; see also De Becker v. Belgium, no. 214/56, Com-
mission report of 8 January 1960.
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tion existed in 1944, no one in their right mind would have wished to vouchsafe the 
right to derogate to Nazi Germany.
Of course, the aggression of Nazi Germany is the obvious example – and to date 
the only such case (in Europe at least) that is not denied by the successor State. Even 
in interstate or pseudo-interstate cases, the Court has never found any other State 
to have committed an act of ‘aggression’ though aggrieved Governments have some-
times made suggestions of that nature.304
As it is, Article 2 § 4 of the United Nations Charter requires States to 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
This is accepted as a rule of ius cogens.305 That leaves only ‘demonstrations, blockade, 
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations’ 
sanctioned by the Security Council (Article 42 of the Charter) and individual or col-
lective self-defence (Article 51), both set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, as permis-
sible instances of the ‘threat or use of force’ in international relations, and perhaps, 
in some situations, enforcement action as part of a regional arrangement (Chapter 
VIII of the Charter) – again, provided that it be sanctioned by the Security Council 
(Article 54). Other than these, non-consensual military adventures abroad without 
the blessing of the Security Council, even well-intentioned ones, are not permitted.306
Superfluously perhaps, Article 103 of the Charter provides that obligations under 
the Charter itself override obligations under any other treaty. As a necessary corollary, 
obligations under the Charter negate any rights under such another treaty with which 
they are incompatible.307 That would include, in the event of such incompatibility, 
any right to derogate from the Convention.
4.3.3.4.6 A problematic case: the United Kingdom in Iraq
On 6 July 2016 a Committee of British Privy Council members under the chairman-
ship of Sir John Chilcot published a report (the Report of the Iraq Inquiry, known as 
the ‘Chilcot Report’) on the decision-making that led to the military involvement of 
the United Kingdom in Iraq starting in 2003.
304 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) (GC), nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 
10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04 and 21819/04, § 67 and 99, ECHR 2010 (Cyprus, intervening, 
in relation to Turkey); Kononov, § 179 (Lithuania, intervening, in relation to both the Soviet 
Union and Nazi Germany).
305 Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects”, in EJIL 10 (1999), 1-22, 
pp. 1-6.
306 Simma, ibid.; Antonio Cassese, “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?”, in EJIL 
10 (1999), 1-22, pp. 23-40 at p. 25; Crawford (2012), p. 757.
307 See also Article 75 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
78 chapter 4
The stated intention of the report is not to express an opinion on the legality in 
terms of international law of the decision of the United Kingdom to take part in 
the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, although it notes, unambiguously, 
that the United Kingdom did so without the authorisation of the Security Council 
and before the point was reached where military action was the last resort,308 and that
Unlike other instances in which military force has been used, the invasion was 
not prompted by the aggression of another country or an unfolding humanitar-
ian disaster.309
It has been suggested that in the circumstances the United Kingdom would not have 
been entitled to derogate under Article 15 in respect of an elective overseas opera-
tion.310
The Chilcot Report reassures the reader that 
The decision to join the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the product of a 
particular set of circumstances which are unlikely to be repeated311
– which is just as well.
4.3.4 Provisional conclusion
We have no doubt that a Contracting State making use of its right to individual and 
collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter may avail itself 
of Article 15 of the Convention.
If the Contracting State resorts to the use of ‘hard power’ outside its own territory 
in compliance with a mandate of the Security Council under Article 42 or Article 54 
of the Charter, as in the case of the Korean war of 1950-1953 or a peace operation 
mandated by the Security Council, it is in our opinion open to that State to make use 
of Article 15. 
Provisionally, one must conclude that the expression ‘threatening the life of the 
nation’ does not qualify ‘war’ as long as the ‘war’ is being fought in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations: that is, either in pursuance of a decision of the Se-
308 Report of the Iraq Inquiry (“Chilcot Report”), Executive Summary, §§ 338-39. Similar conclu-
sions have been reached elsewhere; for example, for the Netherlands, see the Report of the Com-
mittee to Investigate Decision-Making concerning Iraq (Commissie van onderzoek besluitvorming 
Irak, known as the “Davids Committee”, after its chairman), Uitgeverij Boom 2010, p. 145.
309 Chilcot Report, Executive summary, § 826.
310 Eirik Bjorge, “What is living and what is dead in the European Convention on Human Rights? 
A Comment on Hassan v. United Kingdom”, Questions of International Law Zoom-In 15 (2015), 
23-36 at 26-28; see also R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for 
Defence (Respondent), [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 AC 332, § 38 (per Lord Bingham).
311 Chilcot Report, Executive summary, ibid.
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curity Council (Article 42 or Article 54) or, pending action by the Security Council, 
for individual or collective self-defence (Article 51).
Interestingly, support for this view can be drawn from the drafting history of Ar-
ticle 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Even though the 
drafters of the Covenant refused to countenance the possibility of war in the text of 
the instrument itself, they did consider the legality of war in the context of the ‘other 
obligations under international law’ with which derogating measures must be consist-
ent:
The opinion was expressed that reference to the Charter [of the United Na-
tions] would … make it clear that war was recognized only in case of self-defence 
or for other reasons consonant with the Charter. It was pointed out, however, 
that the principles of the Charter were part of international law …312
This, however, does not tell us what the law is when Article 51 of the Charter does 
not apply and the Security Council has not, or not yet, explicitly authorised military 
action under Chapter VII or Chapter VIII.
For all that it finds no violation of Article 5 despite the absence of a derogation 
under Article 15, the Hassan judgment gives us some indication of what the position 
might be. It will be remembered that UNSC Resolution 1441 (2002) of 8 November 
2002 referred to Chapter VII of the Charter but did not in terms authorise the use 
of force against Iraq (although it did reiterate warnings that Iraq would ‘face seri-
ous consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations’).313 Hav-
ing established the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom (in terms of Article 1 of the 
Convention), the Court referred to case-law of the International Court of Justice to 
find that ‘the protection offered by human rights conventions and that offered by 
international humanitarian law [co-existed] in situations of armed conflict’.314 The 
Court’s willingness to construe the guarantees of Article 5 in the light of provisions of 
the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which cover the detention of prisoners 
of war and the internment of civilians for security reasons respectively in situations of 
international armed conflict, suggests that a fortiori the Court might not have been 
disinclined to give favourable consideration to a notice of derogation had one been in 
place – at least, not at that time.315
312 UN Doc A/2929, § 43.
313 S/RES/1440 (2002), § 13.
314 Hassan, § 102. 
315 See the following sections.
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4.4 Legal consequences of lawful derogation in time of war
The effect of derogation under Article 15 is not to make the rights derogated from en-
tirely inoperable. No measures derogating from the Convention may go further than 
‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’; and moreover, they must not be 
‘inconsistent with [the State’s] other obligations under international law’.
Views can – and do – differ from case to case, and depending on standpoint, as to 
what is ‘the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.316 So do views 
on what constitute ‘other obligations under international law’.317 There is however no 
room for discussion on the applicability in an armed conflict, be it international or 
non-international, of international humanitarian law. The importance of this state-
ment derives from the fact that international humanitarian law admits of no further 
derogation: by its very nature, when it applies it sets the lowest permissible legal 
standard of rights protection.318
4.5 Derogation in response to an ‘emergency threatening the life of the 
nation’ in practice
Ireland derogated from the Convention in the 1950s, when the IRA was causing trou-
ble; the United Kingdom did so, also in the 1950s, to deal with EOKA insurgents in 
what was then its ‘Crown Colony’ of Cyprus; the Greek colonels did so, to counter 
the political threat from the left; the United Kingdom did so again, for a while, in re-
spect of Northern Ireland; Turkey did so at the height of the troubles with the PKK; 
and as we shall see, the United Kingdom did so, yet again, after the 9/11 attacks.
In recent years, internal turmoil led Albania to enter a derogation in 1997 refer-
ring to a ‘constitutional and public order crisis’319 and riots induced the Armenian 
Government in 2008 to declare a state of emergency in the capital Yerevan in 2008 
requiring it to derogate from freedom of information, assembly and movement for 
twenty days.320 An outbreak of bird flu caused by the H5N1 virus caused Georgia to 
316 See 4.8 below.
317 See 4.9 below.
318 Doswald-Beck, pp. 79-80; Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of Internation-
al Law (2nd edition 2015), Cambridge University Press, pp. 480-481; Austin, supra note 262; 
Marko Milanovic, “Extraterritorial Derogations from Treaties in Armed Conflict”, in The Fron-
tiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and its Challenges, Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law, vol. XXIV/1, p. 55-88 at p. 60.
319 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick (3rd edn. 2014), p. 824, fn. 6.
320 Notification - JJ6631C Tr./005-175 04 March 2008.
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derogate for a short period in 2006,321 as did an attempted coup d’état in 2007,322 but 
the Russian incursion into Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 did not.
The most recent notices of derogation are that submitted by Ukraine on 10 June 
2015, which as already mentioned is based on what Ukraine submits to be the unlaw-
ful Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea and the separatist violence in the 
Ukrainian east; that of France, lodged on 24 November 2015 in the wake of the ter-
rorist attacks in Paris of the preceding 13 November, extended several times since; and 
yet another lodged by Turkey, this time on 21 July 2016 after the attempted coup d’état 
of 15 July 2016.323 The French derogation was terminated in November 2017.324 The 
Turkish state of emergency was terminated on 19 July 2018; the Turkish derogation 
was formally withdrawn by note verbale of 8 August 2018.325 The Ukrainian deroga-
tion remains in force at the time of writing.
The attacks of ‘9/11’ prompted the North Atlantic Council to state the very next 
day that 
if it [was] determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the 
United States, it [should] be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the 
Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all” and that “the United States’ NATO Allies [stood] ready to provide the as-
sistance that [might] be required as a consequence of these acts of barbarism.326
It was soon suspected, and later confirmed, that the attacks were directed from 
Afghanistan by al-Qaeda.327 To this day this remains the only occasion on which 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has been activated.
Yet despite the magnitude of the attack on a major ally whose support was essential 
to their own security and the resulting certain need for a robust military response, not 
321 from freedom of movement in a particular district. Notification - JJ6239C Tr./005-166, 13 March 
2006, withdrawn by Notification - JJ6268C Tr./005-168 07 April 2006.
322 Notification - JJ6565C Tr./005-173 09 November 2007, withdrawn by Notification - JJ6566C 
Tr./005-174 20 November 2007.
323 Quoted in Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, no. 13237/17, § 81, 20 March 2018, and Şahin Alpay v. 
Turkey, no. 16538/17, § 65, 20 March 2018. See also 4.5.1.9 below.
324 The French state of emergency, and hence the French derogation, ended on 1 November 2017. 
Annex to Notification JJ8525C Tr./005-213, 7 November 2017; see also the web site of the Coun-
cil of Europe’s Treaty Office, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/005/declarations?p_auth=8PL9eBer (accessed on 12 April 2018). 
325 Letter from the Turkish Permanent Representative to the Secretary General withdrawing the 
derogation notified on 21 July 2016, 8 August 2018.
326 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO press release (2001)124, 12 September 2001, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm (accessed 28 July 2015). See also UNSC Res-
olution 1368 of the same date.
327 US Government, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report, pp. 145-169, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf (ac-
cessed 28 July 2015).
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one of the European NATO members – all of which are Contracting Parties to the 
Convention – derogated from the Convention under Article 15 on that ground alone. 
At this remove, one can only surmise that if this failure was not a massive oversight, 
which seems unlikely, none of them was willing either to declare war or to recognise 
publicly the capability of a non-state actor to cause ‘a public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation’.
We cannot know now what view the Court would have taken of any derogation 
announced in reliance on the statement of the North Atlantic Council. That said, it is 
apparent that Governments of Contracting States do not view the activation on Arti-
cle 5 of the Washington Treaty by itself as evidence of a situation requiring derogating 
measures. Accordingly, should any Contracting State in future wish to derogate from 
the Convention following a decision to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 
it will presumably be necessary to identify features distinguishing the new situation 
from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
In fact, only the United Kingdom derogated under Article 15 of the Convention 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks – but only from its obligations under Article 5 § 1 (f ), 
with a view to enhancing its powers to detain suspect foreign nationals and remove 
them from its territory.328 This derogation accordingly bore no direct relation to the 
9/11 attacks themselves, nor to the military activity that would soon follow.
4.5.1 Commission and Court case-law
4.5.1.1 Greece v. the United Kingdom (the ‘First Cyprus Case’)
Having been a part of the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century and placed 
under British administration after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Cyprus was made 
a British Crown Colony during the First World War. After the Second World War, a 
Greek Cypriot movement sprouted which sought unity with the Kingdom of Greece 
(enosis). This led to the founding, in 1955, of the EOKA movement, which sought 
to bring about such unity by armed struggle. The British colonial government re-
sponded by enacting emergency legislation and deporting the Greek Cypriot leader, 
Archbishop Makarios III, and three of his followers to the Seychelles. The United 
Kingdom Government transmitted notes verbales giving notice of derogation under 
Article 15 to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on 7 October 1955 and 
13 April 1956.
In May 1956 the Kingdom of Greece brought an interstate application against the 
United Kingdom, which responded by invoking its derogation.
Losing little time, the Commission declared the application admissible less than 
a month later,329 holding among other things that ‘the effects of derogations made 
by the Government of the United Kingdom under Article 15 of the Convention 
relate[d] to the merits of the case and not to the admissibility of the application’. It 
then appointed a ‘Sub-Commission’ from among its members to establish the facts.
328 A. and Others v. the United Kingdom § 11.
329 Greece v. the United Kingdom, no. 176/56, Commission decision of 2 June 1956.
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The Commission, in plenary formation once more, adopted its report330 on 26 Sep-
tember 1958. It is a bulky document, published in two volumes. The first volume deals 
with the preliminary issues, namely whether there was a ‘public emergency threaten-
ing the life of the nation’ and whether the notice given to the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe was sufficient in its terms. The second goes into the substance of 
the derogating measures.
In considering whether there was a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the na-
tion’, it first determined that the expression ‘nation’ meant not the United Kingdom 
itself or the Commonwealth, but ‘the people and its institutions, even in a non-self-
governing territory, or in other words, the organised society, including the authori-
ties responsible both under domestic and international law for the maintenance of 
law and order’. Any other interpretation would have made nonsense of the ‘colonial 
clause’ contained in then Article 63 of the Convention (now Article 56) by hindering 
a colonial power in taking measures aimed at preventing the violent overthrow of a 
subordinate government.331
The Commission next noted that during the year 1955 until the state of emergency 
was proclaimed (on 26 November 1955), EOKA violence had killed 11 persons and 
wounded 74 more. There had been 185 bomb explosions, 20 cases of arson and 3 
‘raids on police stations etc.’ From the proclamation of the state of emergency until 
14 March 1957 when EOKA declared a truce there were a further 245 killed and 636 
wounded, 866 bomb explosions, 251 cases of arson, and 57 raids. These figures had to 
be seen against the background of the population of Cyprus, which at the time num-
bered only some 500,000 souls. During EOKA’s self-declared truce the occurrence 
of incidents involving violence was reduced, but strikes, riots, demonstrations and 
‘reported threats and intimidation’ continued.
The Commission was unwilling to accept the Greek argument that there was no 
‘emergency threatening the life of the nation’ during the first period, up to 26 Novem-
ber 1955. Such a conclusion might have been justified if only the number of incidents 
were taken into account; however, ‘these incidents emanated from a fast-growing and 
militant organisation which, according to its own statements, aimed at obtaining self-
determination for Cyprus by all possible means, including force and violence’. The 
existence of such a threat already at that time was accordingly ‘at least plausible’. The 
Commission continued:
The assessment whether or not a public danger existed is a question of apprecia-
tion. The United Kingdom Government made such an assessment of the situ-
ation prevailing at that time and concluded that there existed a public danger 
threatening the life of the nation. That this appreciation by the British Gov-
330 Article 31 of the Convention (1950 text).
331 Greece v. the United Kingdom, § 130.
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ernment was correct was subsequently proved by the great increase of violence 
which occurred between November 1955 and March 1957.332
There could, however, be no doubt that such a threat existed during the second period 
(November 1955-March 1957), when the threat perceived earlier materialised.
During the remaining period, other developments had included the emergence of 
a Turkish Cypriot counter-movement opposed to unification with Greece, which also 
threatened to turn violent, and tensions between the political right, represented by 
EOKA and related organisations, and the political left, which was said by the United 
Kingdom Government to have links to the Communist movement.
All these factors together led the Commission, with one dissenting vote (that of its 
Greek member, Mr C.Th. Eustathiades),333 to express the following opinion:
The Commission of Human Rights is authorised by the Convention to express a 
critical opinion on derogations under Article 15, but the Government concerned 
retains, within certain limits, its discretion in appreciating the threat to the life 
of the nation. In the present case the Government of Cyprus has not gone be-
yond these limits of appreciation.334
The substance of the complaints made by the Greek Government concerned the use 
of curfews, allegedly imposed on communities by way of collective punishment; ar-
rest without warrant and detention for up to sixteen days before the detainee was 
brought before a court; detention without trial of terrorist suspects; the deportation 
of Archbishop Makarios and the others; the infliction of corporal punishment on 
male juvenile offenders (whipping); the application of collective punishments (other 
than curfews); and the existence and use of powers to search and censor, control buri-
als, prevent processions and meetings, close schools and restrict the right to strike.
A majority of the Commission was unable to find that the curfews had been any-
thing other than necessary measures to maintain order.335 As to arrest without war-
rant, the Commission noted that it was not prohibited by the Convention. As re-
gards administrative detention for up to sixteen days, the Commission noted that 
this measure was not mentioned in the notice of derogation but found nonetheless 
that since a notice of derogation had been lodged which covered detention without 
trial the omission was ‘a technical rather than a substantive departure from the term 
of the Convention’.336 On the subject of detention without trial of suspected terror-
ists, a majority of the Commission recognised that this was an extraordinarily far-
reaching measure but accepted that it was necessary in an environment where the 
332 ibid., § 132.
333 ibid., § 139.
334 ibid., § 136.
335 ibid., § 287.
336 ibid., § 297.
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intimidation of witnesses made it unlikely that a conviction could be secured at trial, 
and also that safeguards existed, in the form of a habeas corpus procedure, to prevent 
abuse.337 Archbishop Makarios and the three others having been released from deten-
tion in the Seychelles, the remaining issues were their removal from Cyprus and the 
order preventing their re-entry; these a majority of the Commission did not find to 
violate Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention as such.338 The other measures complained 
of were grouped together and accepted as legitimate within the terms of the second 
paragraphs of Articles 9, 10 11, respectively, simply in the light of the established exist-
ence of a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’.339 The Commission did 
not find it necessary to express a view on corporal punishment, the United Kingdom 
Government having agreed to discontinue the practice (though it survived a while 
longer in parts of the British Isles340); nor, for the same reason, did it give a legal opin-
ion on collective fines.341
This report, the very first published by the Commission, unites all the elements of 
the later case-law under Article 15 of the Convention: the concept of a ‘nation’; the 
question whether there is a ‘public emergency’ threatening its ‘life’; whether the mat-
ters in issue were ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’; whether there 
was adequate notice given to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe; and 
whether there was compliance with ‘other obligations under international law’.
The case came to be known as the ‘First Cyprus Case’. There is, of course, a Second 
Cyprus Case; but the Commission’s report in that case merely closes the file and is of 
no substantive interest whatsoever.342
4.5.1.2 Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3)
Mr Gerard Lawless, a national and resident of the Republic of Ireland, was arrested in 
September 1956 with two others on suspicion of firearms offences, the group having 
been found in possession of a Thompson sub-machine-gun, six army rifles, six sport-
ing guns, a revolver, an automatic pistol and 400 magazines. He admitted on that 
occasion having taken part in an armed raid in which guns and revolvers had been 
stolen. Put on trial for unlawful possession of firearms, he was however acquitted, 
the trial judge directing the jury that (in the words of both the Commission and the 
Court) ‘it had not been conclusively shown that no competent authority had issued 
a firearms certificate authorising him to be in possession of the arms concerned’.343 
Lawless was arrested a second time in May 1957, having been found in possession of 
documents implicating him in the planning of attacks to be carried out by the IRA on 
337 ibid., § 318.
338 ibid., § 337.
339 ibid., § 363.
340 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, §§ 14-15, Series A no. 26.
341 Greece v. the United Kingdom, § 235.
342 Greece v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), no. 299/57, Commission report of 8 July 1959.
343 Lawless v. Ireland, no. 332/57, Commission report of 19 December 1959, § 2; Lawless v. Ireland 
(No. 3), judgment of 1 July 1961, § 19, Series A no. 3.
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border posts and military and civilian targets in Northern Ireland. He was tried and 
sentenced to a brief term of imprisonment, which he served.
On 8 July 1957, after a series of IRA attacks on targets in both the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland and shortly before the annual Orange Processions, the 
Irish Government activated the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act, 1940, 
giving Ministers of State the power to order the detention without trial of ‘any par-
ticular person (…) engaged in activities which, in his opinion, are prejudicial to the 
preservation of public peace and order or to the security of the State’. The Irish Gov-
ernment informed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe accordingly on 20 
July, invoking Article 15 of the Convention.
A few days later, on 11 July, Lawless was again arrested as being a suspected member 
of an unlawful organisation, namely the IRA. His detention was ordered by the Min-
ister of Justice. He unsuccessfully challenged his detention in habeas corpus proceed-
ings; he was released in December 1957 after giving an undertaking ‘not to engage in 
any illegal activities under the Offences against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940’.
The Court, like the Commission before it, held that Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 allowed 
the arrest and detention of a criminal suspect only for the purpose of bringing him 
before a judge and entitled him to trial within a reasonable time. These provisions 
therefore could not justify Lawless’s detention between July and December 1957.344 
The question therefore became whether any other Convention provision – Article 15 
– could serve instead.
The Court interpreted the words ‘other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation’ as meaning ‘an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects 
the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community 
of which the State is composed’, and concluded, given the attacks that had taken place 
and the violence to be expected around the time of the Orange Processions (12 July), 
that the Irish Government had been entitled to invoke Article 15. As to whether the 
measures taken were ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’, the Court ac-
cepted that IRA activities were mainly intended to produce effects across the border, 
in Northern Ireland, and were extremely difficult to prevent from within the Repub-
lic applying ordinary criminal law. Short of sealing the border entirely, which would 
have had serious repercussions on ‘the population as a whole’, administrative deten-
tion appeared an adequate response. Moreover, safeguards were in place in the form 
of a (non-judicial) Detention Commission that was accessible to the detainee and 
had the power to order release, and could in fact be ordered to do so by the courts. 
Finally, release could be obtained by means of an undertaking to desist from unlawful 
activity.345
344 Lawless (No. 3), §§ 9 and 15.
345 Lawless (No. 3), §§ 36-37.
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4.5.1.3 The ‘Greek Case’
On 21 April 1967 a group of senior officers of the Greek armed forces deposed the 
constitutional government of the Kingdom of Greece and, by Royal Decree, suspend-
ed certain provisions of the Greek Constitution guaranteeing basic rights. Over the 
following months the revolutionary government, as they styled themselves, disband-
ed Parliament and dissolved political parties; gave themselves sweeping powers of ar-
rest, detention and search; introduced trial of political offences by military courts; 
imposed censorship on the media; suspended trade union freedoms; and replaced 
the Constitution. On 3 May 1967 the permanent representative of Greece transmit-
ted a French translation of the Royal Decree to the Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe. On 27 September 1967 the permanent representative again wrote to the 
Secretary General, stating that the letter of 3 May had constituted a notice of deroga-
tion under Article 15 of the Convention and setting out the view of his masters that a 
public emergency existed that threatened the life of the nation: the letter made refer-
ence to anarchist demonstrations, revolutionary activity by Communist sympathisers 
and other left-wing movements, strikes called by trade unions and an alleged plot to 
subvert the armed forces. The letter added that there was no infringement of any of 
the non-derogable rights set out in Article 15 § 2.
Interstate applications against Greece were lodged by the governments of Den-
mark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.346
The Commission gave a first decision on 24 January 1968, declaring the applica-
tions admissible; after the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Governments submitted 
additional complaints, the Commission gave a follow-up decision on 31 May 1968 
declaring these admissible also.
The Commission adopted its report on 5 November 1969.347 Considering, firstly, 
the argument of the Greek government that in applying Article 15 they were entitled 
to special consideration (in the form of a wider margin of appreciation) as a ‘revo-
lutionary’ government, the Commission, referring to its first admissibility decision, 
reiterated that a revolutionary government was not absolved from its obligations un-
der the Convention. That said, such a government ‘established in a High Contracting 
State, and recognised as representing this State in international relations’, might in 
principle invoke Article 15 provided that the conditions laid down in that Article were 
fulfilled348 – which, however, was not the case. The Commission found on the facts 
that the circumstances cited – the danger of a Communist takeover, the existence of a 
constitutional crisis and a breakdown in law and order – were not established: while 
undoubtedly there had been some political unrest in the years preceding the coup, to 
all appearances the cataclysmic events feared by the colonels had not been imminent 
and the constitutional Government had remained in firm control of the country un-
346 Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67 respectively.
347 Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece, nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 
3344/67 (the “Greek Case”), Commission report of 5 November 1969.
348 ibid., §§ 27 and 49.
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til ousted.349 Although after the coup there had been a number of violent incidents 
and a number of illegal organisations had been formed, the Commission was not 
convinced that ‘either factor [was] beyond the control of the public authorities using 
normal measures, or that they [were] on a scale threatening the organised life of the 
community’.350
Nevertheless, the Commission decided to consider whether the measures taken 
could have been said to have been ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ 
had the derogation been valid. It came to the conclusion that the restrictions on the 
rights protected by Articles 5 and 6 did not meet that requirement, and that restric-
tions on the rights protected by Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 could not be considered 
‘necessary’ within the substantive meaning of those Articles given the absence of any 
corresponding emergency threatening the life of the nation.351 A remedy within the 
meaning of Article 13 appropriate to complaints of torture had been lacking. Finally, 
there had been no need to suspend Parliament, in violation of Article 3 of Protocol 
No 1. In contrast, there had been no violation of Article 7 of the Convention,352 and 
there was no need to address issues raised under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.353
The ‘Greek Case’, as the case came to be called, remains the only one to date in 
which either Strasbourg institution has refused to accept the Government’s assess-
ment that an existential threat to the nation was sufficiently great to justify the taking 
of derogating measures in reliance on Article 15.
The case did not reach the Court. In the system as it existed at the time, either the 
Commission or an applicant or respondent Contracting State had to refer the case to 
the Court within three months from the date on which the Commission’s report was 
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (Articles 32 and 
48 of the 1950 Convention); this did not happen. It therefore fell to the Committee 
of Ministers to express its opinion in the matter. On 15 April 1970 the Committee 
of Ministers adopted a resolution in which it adopted the Commission’s views as its 
own.354
4.5.1.4 Brannigan and McBride
It is not necessary here to chart the background of the internecine conflict in North-
ern Ireland frequently referred to as ‘the Troubles’. Suffice it for present purposes that 
the United Kingdom sought to contain it by enacting, from 1974 on, a series of Pre-
vention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts proscribing certain named Irish 
Republican underground organisations that had a history of violence, broadening the 
349 ibid., §§ 115-125.
350 ibid., §§ 142-144.
351 ibid., §§ 198-201 (Article 5); §§ 231-234 (Article 6); § 251 (Article 8); §§ 274-276 (Articles 9 and 
10); §§ 296-300 (Article 11); § 305 (Article 13); §§ 319-320 (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1).
352 ibid., §§ 327-328.
353 ibid., § 329.
354 The “Greek Case”, nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, Committee of Ministers resolu-
tion DH (70)1 of 15 April 1970.
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powers of the police to arrest terrorist suspects and extending the permitted length of 
police custody, normally forty-eight hours, by a further five days.
In its Brogan and Others judgment of 29 November 1988, the Court held that there 
had been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in respect of each of the ap-
plicants, all of whom had been detained under the Act in its redaction of 1984. The 
Court held that even the shortest of the four periods of detention concerned, namely 
four days and six hours, fell outside the constraints as to time permitted by the first 
part of Article 5 § 3.355
Less than a month later, on 23 December 1988, the United Kingdom lodged a no-
tice of derogation with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. As relevant 
to our discussions, it read as follows:
... Following [the Brogan and Others judgment], the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department informed Parliament on 6 December 1988 that, against the 
background of the terrorist campaign, and the over-riding need to bring ter-
rorists to justice, the Government did not believe that the maximum period of 
detention should be reduced. He informed Parliament that the Government 
were examining the matter with a view to responding to the judgment. On 22 
December 1988, the Secretary of State further informed Parliament that it re-
mained the Government’s wish, if it could be achieved, to find a judicial process 
under which extended detention might be reviewed and where appropriate au-
thorised by a judge or other judicial officer. But a further period of reflection and 
consultation was necessary before the Government could bring forward a firm 
and final view. Since the judgment of 29 November 1988 as well as previously, 
the Government have found it necessary to continue to exercise, in relation to 
terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland, the powers described 
above enabling further detention without charge, for periods of up to 5 days, 
on the authority of the Secretary of State, to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation to enable necessary enquiries and investigations prop-
erly to be completed in order to decide whether criminal proceedings should be 
instituted. To the extent that the exercise of these powers may be inconsistent 
with the obligations imposed by the Convention the Government have availed 
themselves of the right of derogation conferred by Article 15(1) of the Conven-
tion and will continue to do so until further notice ...356
Messrs Brannigan and McBride were arrested in January 1989. They were kept de-
tained for six days, fourteen hours and thirty minutes, and four days, six hours and 
355 Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84 and 11386/85, 
§§ 55-62, Series A no. 145-B.
356 Quoted in Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, nos. 14553/89 and 14554/89, § 31, 
Series A no. 258-B.
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twenty-five minutes respectively without being brought before a magistrate. They 
complained of this under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
Given the precedent established by Brogan and Others, the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment were not in a position to dispute that the requirement of ‘promptness’ con-
tained in Article 5 § 3 had not been met. Discussion therefore focused on the validity 
of the derogation.
The applicants, supported by a group of NGOs as intervening third parties (Am-
nesty International, Liberty, Interights and the Committee on the Administration of 
Justice), argued that the margin of appreciation left to the respondent Government in 
the matter should be a narrow one, especially since the state of emergency giving rise 
to the use of the special powers in issue had already been in existence for a very long 
time. The Court responded as follows:
The Court recalls that it falls to each Contracting State, with its responsibil-
ity for ‘the life of [its] nation’, to determine whether that life is threatened by 
a ‘public emergency’, and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to 
overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with 
the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in 
a better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence 
of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to 
avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left 
to the national authorities (see the Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 
18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, pp. 78-79, § 207).
Nevertheless, Contracting Parties do not enjoy an unlimited power of appreci-
ation. It is for the Court to rule on whether inter alia the States have gone beyond 
the ‘extent strictly required by the exigencies’ of the crisis. The domestic margin 
of appreciation is thus accompanied by a European supervision (ibid.). At the 
same time, in exercising its supervision the Court must give appropriate weight 
to such relevant factors as the nature of the rights affected by the derogation, the 
circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the emergency situation.357
The majority of the Court had little difficulty accepting the existence of a public 
emergency ‘threatening the life of the nation’. That was clear enough in view of its 
own earlier case-law – Lawless, Ireland v. the United Kingdom – and from ‘all the 
material before it as to the extent and impact of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland 
and elsewhere in the United Kingdom’; the latter reflected that there had since the 
early 1970s been over forty thousand terrorist shooting and bombing incidents in 
Northern Ireland alone leaving over thirty-five thousand people injured.
As to whether the absence of judicial control of extended detention was justified, 
the United Kingdom Government relied heavily on the need to withhold classified 
information from detainees and their legal advisers. In the Court’s paraphrase,
357 Brannigan and McBride, § 43.
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… the Government had reluctantly concluded that, within the framework of 
the common-law system, it was not feasible to introduce a system which would 
be compatible with Article 5 § 3 but would not weaken the effectiveness of the 
response to the terrorist threat. Decisions to prolong detention were taken on 
the basis of information the nature and source of which could not be revealed 
to a suspect or his legal adviser without risk to individuals assisting the police or 
the prospect of further valuable intelligence being lost. Moreover, involving the 
judiciary in the process of granting or approving extensions of detention created 
a real risk of undermining their independence as they would inevitably be seen 
as part of the investigation and prosecution process.
– which conclusion was supported by Government-commissioned reports sub-
mitted to Parliament each time the Act came up for renewal.358
The Court was prepared to accept the Government’s argument. In so doing, it 
made reference to the specific context of Northern Ireland, ‘where the judiciary [was] 
small and vulnerable to terrorist attacks’, and that accordingly ‘public confidence in 
the independence of the judiciary [was] understandably a matter to which the Gov-
ernment [attached] great importance’.359
In addition, ‘basic safeguards against abuse’ were available in the form of the com-
mon-law remedy of habeas corpus and access to a solicitor (after an initial period of 
detention of forty-eight hours – any denial of access to a solicitor beyond that was 
reviewable by the courts); and the operation of the legislation was kept under regular 
independent review. Further protection was offered by the entitlement of detainees 
to inform a relative or friend about their detention and to have access to a doctor.360
There remained some discussion as to whether the reference to ‘other obligations 
under international law’ in Article 15 § 1 meant that a state of emergency must be ‘of-
ficially proclaimed’, that being a requirement set out in Article 4 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For its part, the Court, while declining to 
give an interpretation of the terms ‘officially proclaimed’ in Article 4 of the Cov-
enant, declared itself satisfied with the statement made by the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department to the House of Commons explaining in detail the reasons 
underlying the Government’s decision to derogate and announcing that steps were 
being taken to give effect to that decision.361
4.5.1.5 Marshall
The notice of derogation in issue in Brannigan and McBride was again put to the 
test in 2001. The applicant, Mr Marshall, had been arrested in February 1998. The 
situation was, in its essentials, identical to that in issue in Brannigan and McBride. 
358 ibid., § 56.
359 ibid., §§ 58-59.
360 ibid., § 64.
361 ibid., § 73.
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The complaint, for our purposes, was essentially that the continued existence of the 
powers of detention resulting from the maintenance in force of the Prevention of Ter-
rorism Act, which had been renewed each year since 1989, could no longer be justified 
with reference to Article 15 of the Convention.
After announcing its intention to apply Brannigan and McBride while noting that 
it ‘must at the same time address with special vigilance the fact that almost nine years 
separate the prolonged administrative detention of the applicants Brannigan and 
McBride from that of [Mr Marshall]’, the Court held:
The Court does not agree with the applicant’s submission that the security situa-
tion in Northern Ireland at the time of his detention had improved to the point 
where it was no longer justified to refer to it as a public emergency “threatening 
the life of the nation”. It notes that the authorities continued to be confronted 
with the threat of terrorist violence notwithstanding a reduction in its incidence. 
It cannot but note that the weeks preceding the applicant’s detention were char-
acterised by an outbreak of deadly violence. This of itself confirms that there 
had been no return to normality since the date of the Brannigan and McBride 
judgment such as to lead the Court to controvert the authorities’ assessment of 
the situation in the province in terms of the threats which organised violence 
posed for the life of the community and the search for a peaceful settlement. It 
recalls in this connection that by reason of their direct and continuous contact 
with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle 
better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of 
such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogation necessary to 
avoid it (…).
As to the decision to prolong the applicant’s detention in the absence of judi-
cial intervention, the Court observes that the Government rely on the same jus-
tifications for this measure which they advanced in the Brannigan and McBride 
case. Those justifications were accepted by the Court in that case on the basis 
that it was not its role to substitute its view as to what measures were most ap-
propriate or expedient at the relevant time in dealing with an emergency situa-
tion for that of the Government which have direct responsibility for establish-
ing the balance between the taking of effective measures to combat terrorism on 
the one hand, and respecting individual rights on the other. …
Going on to find that the reasoning on which Brannigan and McBride had been de-
cided remained pertinent, the Court declared the application inadmissible.362
In actual fact, by the time the Court gave its decision in this case the United King-
dom Government had withdrawn their notice of derogation. They had done so on 
19 February 2001, with effect from 26 February 2001.
362 Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 41571/98, 10 July 2001.
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The Court adopted its decision on 10 July 2001, two months and one day before 
the attacks of 9/11 which changed the world’s conception of terrorism completely.
4.5.1.6 Aksoy
The case of Aksoy v. Turkey is generally remembered as the first in which the Court 
reached a finding that treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention amounted 
to ‘torture’. Tortured Zeki Aksoy certainly was, but what is more is that this this hap-
pened during a fourteen-day stretch of detention without his being brought before a 
magistrate.
Turkey too had derogated under Article 15 at the time.363 The legislative measure 
relevant to Article 5 of the Convention read as follows:
The Governor of the state of emergency region can order persons who continu-
ously violate the general security and public order, to settle at a place to be speci-
fied by the Minister of the Interior outside the state of emergency region for a 
period which shall not exceed the duration of the state of emergency ...364
The Court was willing to accept that ‘the particular extent and impact of PKK terror-
ist activity in South-East Turkey [had] undoubtedly created, in the region concerned, 
a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation”’.365 It did not, however, accept 
that the measures taken were ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’, and 
moreover found that even the most basic safeguards were lacking:
77. In the Brannigan and McBride judgment (…), the Court held that the 
United Kingdom Government had not exceeded their margin of appreciation 
by derogating from their obligations under Article 5 of the Convention to the 
extent that individuals suspected of terrorist offences were allowed to be held for 
up to seven days without judicial control.
In the instant case, the applicant was detained for at least fourteen days with-
out being brought before a judge or other officer. The Government have sought 
to justify this measure by reference to the particular demands of police investiga-
tions in a geographically vast area faced with a terrorist organisation receiving 
outside support (…).
78. Although the Court is of the view – which it has expressed on several oc-
casions in the past (see, for example, the … Brogan and Others judgment) – that 
the investigation of terrorist offences undoubtedly presents the authorities with 
special problems, it cannot accept that it is necessary to hold a suspect for four-
363 Letters of the Permanent Representative of the Turkish Republic to the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe, 6 August 1990 and 5 May 1992; Aksoy v. Turkey, no. 21987/93, §§ 31-33, 
Reports 1996-VI.
364 Aksoy, § 31.
365 ibid., § 70. 
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teen days without judicial intervention. This period is exceptionally long, and 
left the applicant vulnerable not only to arbitrary interference with his right to 
liberty but also to torture (…). Moreover, the Government have not adduced 
any detailed reasons before the Court as to why the fight against terrorism in 
South-East Turkey rendered judicial intervention impracticable.’366
4.5.1.7 Sakık and Others
In Sakık and Others the Turkish Government sought to rely on the same derogation 
in respect of the trial and detention of a number of former members of the Grand 
National Assembly found to be of a separatist bent. However, the trial and detention 
having taken place in Ankara not in the South-Eastern Anatolian provinces covered 
by the derogation, the derogation could not apply.367
This judgment demonstrates that the scope and extent of a derogation under Arti-
cle 15 is limited by the terms in which it has been couched in the notice to the Secre-
tary General of the Council of Europe.368
4.5.1.8 A. and Others v. the United Kingdom
As we have seen, the United Kingdom was the only State party to the Convention to 
derogate from the Convention under Article 15 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
on the United States. In its relevant parts, the notice of derogation lodged with the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe on 18 December 2001 read as follows:369
Public emergency in the United Kingdom
The terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 
11  September 2001 resulted in several thousand deaths, including many Brit-
ish victims and others from seventy different countries. In its Resolutions 1368 
(2001) and 1373 (2001), the United Nations Security Council recognised the 
attacks as a threat to international peace and security.
The threat from international terrorism is a continuing one. In its Resolution 
1373 (2001), the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Na-
366 Aksoy, §§ 77-78. See also Demir and Others v. Turkey, nos. 21380/93, 21381/93 and 21383/93, 
§§ 49-57, Reports 1998-VI (incommunicado detention for at least sixteen or twenty-three days); 
Nuray Şen v. Turkey, no. 41478/98, §§ 25-29, 17 June 2003 (eleven days before the applicant was 
brought before a judge or other judicial officer); Elci and Others v. Turkey, nos. 23145/93 and 
25091/94, § 684, 17 June 2003 (detention not “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” 
in that the lawful authority of a “judge or other officer” was entirely lacking); and Bilen v. Tur-
key, no. 34482/97, §§ 44-50, 21 February 2006 (eighteen days before the applicant was brought 
before a judge or other judicial officer).
367 Sakık and Others v. Turkey, nos. 23878/94, 23879/94, 23880/94, 23881/94, 23882/94 and 
23883/94, § 39, Reports 1997-VII. See also Sadak v. Turkey, nos. 25142/94 and 27099/95, § 56, 8 
April 2004; Yurttas v. Turkey, nos. 25143/94 and 27098/95, § 58, 27 May 2004; and Abdülsamet 
Yaman v. Turkey, no. 32446/96, § 69, 2 November 2004.
368 Loof, p. 625.
369 Quoted in A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 11.
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tions Charter, required all States to take measures to prevent the commission 
of terrorist attacks, including by denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, 
support or commit terrorist attacks.
There exists a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from persons suspected 
of involvement in international terrorism. In particular, there are foreign nation-
als present in the United Kingdom who are suspected of being concerned in 
the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism, of 
being members of organisations or groups which are so concerned or of having 
links with members of such organisations or groups, and who are a threat to the 
national security of the United Kingdom.
As a result, a public emergency, within the meaning of Article 15 § 1 of the 
Convention, exists in the United Kingdom.
and
Article 5 § 1 ( f ) of the Convention
It is well established that Article 5 § 1 (f ) permits the detention of a person with 
a view to deportation only in circumstances where “action is being taken with 
a view to deportation” (Chahal v. the United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413 at 
paragraph 112). In that case the European Court of Human Rights indicated 
that detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5 § 1 (f ) if deportation 
proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence and that it was necessary in 
such cases to determine whether the duration of the deportation proceedings 
was excessive (paragraph 113).
In some cases, where the intention remains to remove or deport a person on 
national security grounds, continued detention may not be consistent with Ar-
ticle 5 § 1 (f ) as interpreted by the Court in the Chahal case. This may be the 
case, for example, if the person has established that removal to their own coun-
try might result in treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. In such 
circumstances, irrespective of the gravity of the threat to national security posed 
by the person concerned, it is well established that Article 3 prevents removal 
or deportation to a place where there is a real risk that the person will suffer 
treatment contrary to that Article. If no alternative destination is immediately 
available then removal or deportation may not, for the time being, be possi-
ble even though the ultimate intention remains to remove or deport the person 
once satisfactory arrangements can be made. In addition, it may not be possible 
to prosecute the person for a criminal offence given the strict rules on the admis-
sibility of evidence in the criminal justice system of the United Kingdom and 
the high standard of proof required.
Derogation under Article 15 of the Convention
The Government has considered whether the exercise of the extended power to 
detain contained in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 may be 
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inconsistent with the obligations under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. As indi-
cated above, there may be cases where, notwithstanding a continuing intention 
to remove or deport a person who is being detained, it is not possible to say that 
“action is being taken with a view to deportation” within the meaning of Article 
5 § 1 (f ) as interpreted by the Court in the Chahal case. To the extent, therefore, 
that the exercise of the extended power may be inconsistent with the United 
Kingdom’s obligations under Article 5 § 1, the Government has decided to avail 
itself of the right of derogation conferred by Article 15 § 1 of the Convention and 
will continue to do so until further notice.
British immigration law, like the immigration laws of other countries, provided for 
the detention of non-nationals pending deportation. However, detention was not 
permissible under the ordinary law where deportation was known to be impossible, 
whether because there was no country willing to take the person in question or be-
cause there would be a risk of torture or other serious ill-treatment to the proposed 
deportee in his or her country of origin – and accordingly, as in Chahal,370 a prospec-
tive violation of Article 3 of the Convention.371
The legislation enacted in derogation of the ordinary law provided that a ‘suspected 
international terrorist’ might be detained despite the fact that his removal or depar-
ture from the United Kingdom was prevented by ‘a point of law which wholly or 
partly relates to an international agreement’ – such as, presumably, the assessment 
that the person’s removal would be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention – or 
‘a practical consideration’.372 It is implicit that persons detained under this legislation 
could obtain release if they left of their own accord for another country – as indeed 
several of the applicants later did.
From the outset, both the legislation and the derogation were criticised within 
the United Kingdom and internationally. A Review Committee consisting of Privy 
Councillors (the ‘Newton Committee’, after its chairman) pointed out that a con-
siderable proportion of terrorist suspects had been British citizens, which justified 
doubts as to both the principle and the efficacy of a measure aimed solely at foreign 
nationals.373 Similar concerns were voiced by a British Joint Parliamentary Commit-
tee on Human Rights.374 Outside the United Kingdom, the European Commissioner 
for Human Rights queried the need for derogating from the Convention at all, point-
ing out that no other European State – not even States ‘long faced with recurring ter-
370 Chahal §§ 79-80.
371 Immigration Act 1971 and R. v. Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh, [1984] 1 
Weekly Law Reports 704, cited in A. and Others, § 87.
372 Section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, quoted in A. and Others, § 90.
373 Privy Councillor Review Committee, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review, Or-
dered by The House of Commons to be printed 18th December 2003, §§ 193-94; see A. and Oth-
ers, §§ 98-99.
374 Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Second Report of the Session 2001-02, § 38, 
and Sixth Report of the Session 2003-04, §§ 42-44, quoted in A. and Others, § 100.
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rorist activity’ – had found such a course needful.375 He also observed that deporting 
suspected terrorists – or allowing them to leave of their own volition – left them ‘at 
liberty to plan and pursue, albeit at some distance from the United Kingdom, activity 
potentially prejudicial to its public security’.376 The United Nations Committee on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was concerned that the meas-
ures provided for discriminated against non-nationals.377
In the light of such forceful criticism, it could have been no surprise to the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom that their derogating measures were challenged both in 
the English courts and in Strasbourg.
Of the eleven applicants in A and Others v. the United Kingdom one was stateless 
(he had been born in a Palestinian refugee camp); the others were of various nation-
alities, all of States in North Africa and the Middle East. All were identified by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department as ‘suspected international terrorists’ 
and made subject to deportation orders. All were accordingly placed in detention 
ostensibly for the purpose of deportation.
The applicants appealed, first to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC), then to the Court of Appeals. Ultimately they were granted leave to appeal 
to the House of Lords.378
SIAC and the Court of Appeal both found it established that the terrorist threat 
identified constituted a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. They 
differed, however, in their views of whether the legislation enacted in derogation of 
ordinary immigration law was ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. 
SIAC found it to discriminate unjustifiably against foreign nationals, in violation of 
Article 14 of the Convention. The Court of Appeal took the contrary view: it found 
that British nationals suspected of being terrorists were not an analogous situation to 
foreign nationals who could not be deported because to do so would place them in 
danger, the latter having no right to remain in the country but merely a right not to 
be removed for their own safety.
The House of Lords, by eight to one, accepted the assessment that there was a ‘pub-
lic emergency threatening the life of the nation’. It found this to be based on the very 
real threat posed by the presence of a ‘significant body’ of foreign nationals in the 
United Kingdom who had the will and the capability of mounting coordinated at-
tacks such as those the world had just witnessed in the United States. The lone dis-
senter, Lord Hoffmann, accepted that there was credible evidence of a threat of seri-
ous terrorist attack within the United Kingdom but considered that it would not 
destroy the life of the nation, since the threat was not so fundamental as to threaten, 
375 Opinion of the European Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, on certain 
aspects of the United Kingdom 2001 derogation from Article 5 par. 1 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, 28 August 2002, CommDH(2002)7, § 33).
376 ibid., § 37.
377 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Unit-
ed Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CERD/C/63/CO/11, § 17.
378 For a summary of the domestic proceedings, see A. and Others, §§ 14-23.
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in his words, ‘our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community’. 
He concluded that ‘the real threat to the life of the nation … [came] not from terror-
ism but from laws such as these’.379
In broad agreement with SIAC but differing from the Court of Appeal, the House 
of Lords nonetheless held that the legislation in issue did not satisfy the requirements 
of Article 15 § 1. To begin with, the Law Lords found on three principal grounds that 
it was not a proportional response: firstly, in that the detention scheme applied only 
to non-nationals suspected of international terrorism and did not address the threat 
which came from United Kingdom nationals who were also so suspected; secondly, 
in that it left suspected international terrorists at liberty to leave the United King-
dom and continue their threatening activities abroad (perhaps in a country ‘as close 
as France’); and thirdly, in that the legislation was drafted too broadly, so that it could, 
in principle, apply to individuals suspected of involvement with international terror-
ist organisations which did not fall within the scope of the derogation.380
In addition, they found that the legislation in issue was discriminatory and incon-
sistent with Article 14 of the Convention, from which there had been no derogation. 
The applicants were in a comparable situation to United Kingdom nationals suspect-
ed of being international terrorists, with whom they shared the characteristics of be-
ing irremovable from the United Kingdom and being considered a threat to national 
security. Since the detention scheme was aimed primarily at the protection of the 
United Kingdom from terrorist attack, rather than immigration control, there was 
no objective reason to treat the applicants differently on grounds of their nationality 
or immigration status.381
The House of Lords gave a declaration under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 
of 1998 that the legislation in issue – Section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 – was incompatible with the Convention in so far as it was dispro-
portionate and permitted discriminatory detention of suspected international ter-
rorists.382 This did not, however, avail the applicants, such declarations being neither 
binding on the parties to the proceedings in which they are made nor capable of af-
fecting the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect 
of which they are given.383 Thus it was that the case was able to reach the Court in 
Strasbourg.
Among the wider issues raised – which included complaints under Articles 3 and 
13 (in respect of which no violation was found)384 – that which interests us is the 
way the Court dealt with the applicants’ detention and the Government’s derogating 
measures.
379 A. and Others, § 18.
380 ibid., § 20.
381 ibid., § 21.
382 ibid., § 23.
383 United Kingdom, Human Rights Act 1998, section 4 (6) (a) and (b).
384 A. and Others, §§ 130-136.
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Most unusually, the Government found themselves in disagreement with the high-
est judicial authority of their own State and the applicants submitted preliminary ob-
jections calling into question the Government’s right to challenge the House of Lord’s 
findings. This situation is, to date, unique in the case-law of the Court. This, however, 
was neither a case of a Government taking a position inconsistent with that which 
they had defended at the domestic level385 nor one of estoppel; nor, more generally, 
was there ‘any prohibition on a Government making such a challenge, particularly if 
they [considered] that the national Supreme Court’s ruling is problematic under the 
Convention and that further guidance is required from the Court’. Moreover, since 
the Lords’ declaration of incompatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998 had not 
had the effect of making it unnecessary for the applicants to lodge their application, 
there was no reason in principle why the Court should not consider the case in its en-
tirety, which meant that the Government should not now be prevented from raising 
all arguments open to them to defend their position.386
The Court had first to consider whether the detention of the applicants was in 
accordance with Article 5 § 1 (f ) of the Convention. In accordance with existing case-
law, this involved examining the question whether action was actually being taken 
against the applicants with a view to their deportation.387 As regards two of the appli-
cants, it found that there actually had been: in a matter of no more than a few months, 
one had left for Morocco, the other for France.388 In the cases of the others, however, 
the Court found that their deportation was not being actively pursued: instead, it was 
clear from the terms of the derogation notice and the legislation in issue that their 
detention was based on the suspicion that they were ‘international terrorists’ and the 
belief that their presence in the United Kingdom gave rise to a threat to national secu-
rity. Dismissing the Government’s argument that a balance should be struck between 
the individual’s right to liberty and the State’s interest in protecting its population 
from terrorist threat, it reiterated that Articles 5 § 1 (a) – (f ) amounted to an ‘exhaus-
tive list of exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these exceptions was 
compatible with the aims of Article 5’. If detention did not ‘fit within the confines 
of the subparagraphs as interpreted by the Court, it could not be made to fit by an 
appeal to the need to balance the interests of the State against those of the detainee’. 
Referring to earlier findings in Lawless and Ireland v. the United Kingdom to the effect 
that ‘internment and preventive detention without charge’ were incompatible with 
Article 5 § 1 absent a valid derogation under Article 15, the Court then had to consider 
the validity of the derogation.389
385 cf. Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v. Ireland, no. 12742/87, § 47, Series A no. 222.
386 A. and Others, §§ 153-59.
387 See, among many other authorities, Chahal, § 113.
388 A. and Others, § 168.
389 ibid., §§ 170-172.
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In considering whether there was a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation’, the Court was once again willing to grant the domestic authorities a wide 
margin of appreciation. In the words of the Court:
177.  Before the domestic courts, the Secretary of State adduced evidence to 
show the existence of a threat of serious terrorist attacks planned against the 
United Kingdom. Additional closed evidence was adduced before SIAC. All 
the national judges accepted that the danger was credible (with the exception 
of Lord Hoffmann, who did not consider that it was of a nature to constitute “a 
threat to the life of the nation” …). Although when the derogation was made no 
al-Qaeda attack had taken place within the territory of the United Kingdom, 
the Court does not consider that the national authorities can be criticised, in the 
light of the evidence available to them at the time, for fearing that such an attack 
was “imminent”, in that an atrocity might be committed without warning at any 
time. The requirement of imminence cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to 
require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with 
it. Moreover, the danger of a terrorist attack was, tragically, shown by the bomb-
ings and attempted bombings in London in July 2005 to have been very real. 
Since the purpose of Article 15 is to permit States to take derogating measures 
to protect their populations from future risks, the existence of the threat to the 
life of the nation must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which 
were known at the time of the derogation. The Court is not precluded, however, 
from having regard to information which comes to light subsequently (see, mu-
tatis mutandis, Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, 
§ 107(2), Series A no. 215).
…
180.  As previously stated, the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appre-
ciation under Article 15 in assessing whether the life of their nation is threatened 
by a public emergency. While it is striking that the United Kingdom was the 
only Convention State to have lodged a derogation in response to the danger 
from al-Qaeda, although other States were also the subject of threats, the Court 
accepts that it was for each Government, as the guardian of their own people’s 
safety, to make their own assessment on the basis of the facts known to them. 
Weight must, therefore, attach to the judgment of the United Kingdom’s execu-
tive and Parliament on this question. In addition, significant weight must be 
accorded to the views of the national courts, which were better placed to assess 
the evidence relating to the existence of an emergency.390
The Court accordingly endorsed the view of the House of Lords that there had been 
a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ within the meaning of Arti-
cle 15 § 1.
390 ibid., §§ 177-180.
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This meant that the Court had to address the question whether the measures taken 
against the applicants had been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation – 
the precise question on which the Government had found itself at variance with the 
House of Lords.
At the outset, the Court took the view that:
… it should in principle follow the judgment of the House of Lords on the ques-
tion of the proportionality of the applicants’ detention, unless it can be shown 
that the national court misinterpreted the Convention or the Court’s case-law 
or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable.391 
Dismissing the Government’s suggestion that the House of Lords should have left it 
greater latitude, the Court held:
As the House of Lords held, the question of proportionality is ultimately a judi-
cial decision, particularly in a case such as the present where the applicants were 
deprived of their fundamental right to liberty over a long period of time. In any 
event, having regard to the careful way in which the House of Lords approached 
the issues, it cannot be said that inadequate weight was given to the views of the 
executive or of Parliament.392
Further endorsing the House of Lords’ use of its powers to give a general decision on 
the application of Article 15, the Court held:
The Court, however, considers that the House of Lords was correct in holding 
that the impugned powers were not to be seen as immigration measures, where 
a distinction between nationals and non-nationals would be legitimate, but in-
stead as concerned with national security. Part 4 of the 2001 Act was designed to 
avert a real and imminent threat of terrorist attack which, on the evidence, was 
posed by both nationals and non-nationals. The choice by the Government and 
Parliament of an immigration measure to address what was essentially a security 
issue had the result of failing adequately to address the problem, while imposing 
a disproportionate and discriminatory burden of indefinite detention on one 
group of suspected terrorists. As the House of Lords found, there was no sig-
nificant difference in the potential adverse impact of detention without charge 
on a national or on a non-national who in practice could not leave the country 
because of fear of torture abroad.
Finally, and dismissing for lack of evidence the suggestion that British Muslims were 
‘significantly more likely to react negatively to the detention without charge of na-
391 ibid., § 182.
392 ibid., § 184.
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tional rather than foreign Muslims reasonably suspected of links to al-Qaeda’ and 
that foreign nationals posed a significantly greater threat to national security than 
United Kingdom nationals, the Court, like the House of Lords, found that the dero-
gating measures were ‘disproportionate in that they discriminated unjustifiably be-
tween nationals and non-nationals.’ From this it followed that there had been a viola-
tion of Article 5 § 1 in respect of the applicants affected.393
4.5.1.9 Mehmet Hasan Altan and Şahin Alpay
During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces 
attempted a coup d’état. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, more than 300 peo-
ple were killed and more than 2,500 were injured. 
In the wake of the coup attempt, on 20 July 2016 the Turkish Government declared 
a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of 
emergency was subsequently extended for further periods until it was finally termi-
nated in 2018.394
On 21 July 2016 the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Council of Europe 
sent the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the following notice of deroga-
tion:
I communicate the following notice of the Government of the Republic of Tur-
key.
On 15 July 2016, a large-scale coup attempt was staged in the Republic of Tur-
key to overthrow the democratically-elected government and the constitutional 
order. This despicable attempt was foiled by the Turkish state and people acting 
in unity and solidarity. The coup attempt and its aftermath together with other 
terrorist acts have posed severe dangers to public security and order, amounting 
to a threat to the life of the nation in the meaning of Article 15 of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The Republic of Turkey is taking the required measures as prescribed by law, 
in line with the national legislation and its international obligations. In this con-
text, on 20 July 2016, the Government of the Republic of Turkey declared a State 
of Emergency for a duration of three months, in accordance with the Constitu-
tion (Article 120) and the Law No. 2935 on State of Emergency (Article 3/1b). ... 
The decision was published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly on 21 July 2016. Thus, the State of Emergency takes 
effect as from this date. In this process, measures taken may involve derogation 
from the obligations under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, permissible in Article 15 of the Convention.
I would therefore underline that this letter constitutes information for the 
purposes of Article 15 of the Convention. The Government of the Republic of 
393 ibid., §§ 187-190.
394 See 4.5 above.
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Turkey shall keep you, Secretary General, fully informed of the measures taken 
to this effect. The Government shall inform you when the measures have ceased 
to operate. ...395
The applicants in these two cases were journalists with a record of public criticism of 
the serving government. Both were arrested as suspected members of FETÖ/PDY 
(‘Gülenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure’), which was stated by the 
national authorities to be a terrorist organisation led by Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish 
citizen living in the USA, to which organisation the coup attempt was imputed. Both 
were placed in detention. Both were charged with trying to overthrow the constitu-
tional order. Mehmet Hasan Altan was sentenced at first instance to ‘aggravated life 
imprisonment’. Criminal proceedings remain ongoing against both applicants at the 
time of writing.
Both applicants applied to the Turkish Constitutional Court for their release. On 
11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave judgment in both applicants’ cases 
holding that ‘“strong evidence that an offence had been committed” had not been 
sufficiently established’; there had accordingly been violations of the right to liberty 
and security and the right to freedom of expression and of the press. The judgments 
were transmitted to the trial courts in order that they take ‘the necessary action’. The 
applicants’ counsel applied to those courts for the applicants’ release the same day. 
However, the trial courts, in open defiance of the Constitutional Court, decided that 
the applicants’ detention on remand should continue.
The Government submitted, and the Court accepted, that the coup attempt and 
its immediate aftermath had constituted a ‘public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation’; so indeed had the Constitutional Court, and the applicants had not sug-
gested otherwise.396
The Court noted that the Turkish Constitutional Court formed an integral part 
of the judiciary within the constitutional structure of Turkey and that it played an 
important role in protecting the right to liberty and security under the Turkish Con-
stitution and Article 5 of the Convention by offering an effective remedy to individu-
als detained during criminal proceedings. On that basis, the Court found that the 
refusal of the courts below to order the applicants’ release was arbitrary, and therefore 
in violation of Article 5 of the Convention:
For another court to call into question the powers conferred on a constitutional 
court to give final and binding judgments on individual applications runs coun-
ter to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and legal certainty. The Court 
reiterates that these principles, inherent in the protection afforded by Article 5 
395 Mehmet Hasan Altan, § 81; Şahin Alpay, § 65. See also the web site of the Council of Europe’s 
Treaty Office, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/
declarations?p_auth=8PL9eBer (accessed on 12 April 2018).
396 Mehmet Hasan Altan § 93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, § 76. 
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of the Convention, are the cornerstones of the guarantees against arbitrariness 
(…). Although the Constitutional Court transmitted its judgment to the Assize 
Court so that it could take “the necessary action”, the Assize Court resisted the 
Constitutional Court by refusing to release the applicant, with the result that 
the violation found by the Constitutional Court was not redressed.397
Echoing the finding of the Turkish Constitutional Court, the Court went on to hold 
‘that a measure of pre-trial detention that [was] not “lawful” and [had] not been ef-
fected “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” on account of the lack of 
reasonable suspicion [could not] be said to have been strictly required by the exigen-
cies of the situation’; the same applied to the concomitant interference with freedom 
of expression.398
However, no violation of Article 5 § 4 was found in respect of the duration of the 
appeals before the Constitutional Court: fourteen months and three days in the case 
of Mehmet Hasan Altan, sixteen months and three days in the case of Şahin Alpay. 
The Court accepted that the applicants’ cases were among the first of a series of cases 
raising new and complicated issues concerning the right to liberty and security and 
freedom of expression under the state of emergency following the attempted military 
coup. Moreover, bearing in mind the Constitutional Court’s case-load following the 
declaration of a state of emergency, the Court accepted that this was an exceptional 
situation. Although proceedings as protracted as these ‘could not be described as 
“speedy” in an ordinary context’, in the ‘specific circumstances of the [cases]’ they 
were nonetheless acceptable.399
4.6 When does a public emergency threaten the life of the nation?
The concept of ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ is of necessity 
more vague than that of ‘war’. In a report which it published in 2006, the Venice 
Commission, referring to the Commission’s decision in the ‘Greek Case’ and to the 
Court’s Lawless judgment, summarised the characteristics of such an emergency as 
follows:
(1)  It [i.e. the emergency] must be actual or imminent; 
(2)  Its effects must involve the whole nation; 
(3)  The continuance of the organised life of the community must be threat-
ened; 
(4)  The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or 
restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, 
397 Mehmet Hasan Altan, §§ 138-139; Şahin Alpay, §§ 117-118.
398 Mehmet Hasan Altay, §§ 140 and 213; Şahin Alpay, §§ 119 and 183.
399 Mehmet Hasan Altay, §§ 165-167; Şahin Alpay, §§ 137-139.
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health and order, are plainly inadequate. In 1961 the ECtHR stressed that there 
must be a “threat to the organised life of the community” 400
Thus far, in the cases that have reached the Commission and the Court, such an emer-
gency has been found to exist when an organised armed group arose with the aim of 
overthrowing and replacing, at least locally, the existing governmental structures of 
the Convention State concerned and whose actions reflected both the will and the 
ability to use force effectively in the process. Such situations, of course, come close to 
a non-international armed conflict or may develop into one if left unchecked. 
One might imagine ‘the life of the nation’ being threatened by hostile action that 
need not necessarily involve any direct danger to the State’s control over its land 
territory. For example, many if not most European countries would be crippled by 
sustained interference with shipping, air traffic or energy supply, or even by action 
directed against the country’s communications (in the form, perhaps, of sustained 
cyber-attacks).401
We have seen that the Court is prepared to leave the State a wide margin of ap-
preciation in deciding on the need for derogation – indeed, the concept of ‘margin of 
appreciation’ was first developed in that precise context,402 and it has been observed 
that ‘this is the area in Convention law where the margin is at its widest’.403
There would therefore be nothing to prevent the Court from accepting the exist-
ence of an ‘emergency threatening the life of the nation’ if the crisis were caused not 
by a conflict but by a natural disaster, uncontrollable immigration (or emigration), 
an epidemic or even an economic or monetary crisis that proves beyond the capacity 
of government to contain by ordinary means.404 The existence of such an emergency 
requiring derogating measures might also be found to exist in a particularly chaotic 
post-war situation, to which the expression ‘war’ would no longer be appropriate.
400 Venice Commission, Opinion on the protection of human rights in emergency situations, CDL-
AD(2006)015, § 10. Emphasis in the original.
401 With regard to cyber-attacks, see generally Jack Goldsmith, How Cyber Changes the Laws of War, 
EJIL (2013), Vol. 24 No. 1, 129-138, and Lieutenant Ken M. Jones, USN, Cyber War: The Next 
Frontier For NATO, Progressive Management, 2016.
402 J.G.C. Schokkenbroek, Toetsing aan de vrijheidsrechten van het Europees verdrag tot bescherming 
van de rechten van de mens (diss. Leiden 1996), pp. 15-18; Michael O’Boyle, “The Margin of Appre-
ciation and Derogation under Article 15: Ritual Incantation or Principle?”, 19 HRLJ (1998) p. 23. 
For a critical appraisal, see Gross, O., and Ní Aoláin, F., “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting 
the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001) 625-649, passim; see 
also Bart van der Sloot, “Is All Fair in Love and War? An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 
ECHR”, in Military Law and the law of War Review 53/2 (2014), pp. 319-358 at pp. 325-326.
403 Michael O’Boyle, ibid., at p. 25 (citing R. St.J. Macdonald, “The Margin of Appreciation in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, Collected Courses of the Academy of Eu-
ropean Law (1990), Vols. I-II.
404 Jean-Paul Costa and Michael O’Boyle, “The European Court of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law”, in The European Convention on Human Rights: a living instrument, Essays in 
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While the effects of the emergency situation must involve the whole nation, it is 
not a requirement that the emergency itself cover the entire territory of the State. 
The Court has accepted the existence of emergencies affecting only the six counties 
of Northern Ireland and certain named provinces in south-eastern Turkey.405 How-
ever, as we have seen, it would fly in the face of the purpose of Article 15 to allow the 
Contracting State to make use of derogating measures outside the territory covered 
by the derogation.406
There is no temporal limit to the validity of a derogation. As the Court expressed 
it in A. and Others:
While the United Nations Human Rights Committee has observed that meas-
ures derogating from the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights must be of ‘”an exceptional and temporary nature” (…),407 the 
Court’s case-law has never, to date, explicitly incorporated the requirement that 
the emergency be temporary, although the question of the proportionality of 
the response may be linked to the duration of the emergency. Indeed, the cases 
cited above,408 relating to the security situation in Northern Ireland, demon-
strate that it is possible for a “public emergency” within the meaning of Article 
15 to continue for many years.
Ronald St. John Macdonald, a long-serving judge in the Old Court, points out that 
an interpretation of the concept of emergency wide enough to include economic cri-
ses carries certain dangers in that it might be abused, for example, to justify the in-
troduction of repressive measures inimical to civil and political rights. The example 
he gives is forced labour.409 He is, of course, right; but whatever the nature of the 
emergency, the Court – and presumably the domestic courts410 – would not be pre-
cluded from considering the validity of any such derogation in terms of whether the 
measures taken are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.
Macdonald suggests an additional test in that the State must be found to be acting 
in good faith. Citing another author, he suggests ‘distrust of the motivations of the 
Greek military government and revulsion against its anti-democratic character’ as 
the real explanation (or at least part of it) for the Commission’s refusal to accept the 
Greek Government’s derogation in the ‘Greek Case’. Indeed, as he puts it, 
405 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, § 205; Brannigan and McBride, § 47; Aksoy, § 70.
406 Sakık and Others, § 39.
407 Reference to United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 on Article 4 
of the ICCPR (24 July 2001), paragraph 2.
408 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Brannigan and McBride, Marshall.
409 R. St.J. Macdonald, “Derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, [1997] 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law p. 225 at p. 236.
410 cf. Article 13 of the Convention. See also Michael O’Boyle, “Emergency Government and Dero-
gation under the ECHR”, [2016] E.H.R.L.R. p. 331 at p. 333. 
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[t]he Convention is founded on a commitment to preserve and strengthen dem-
ocratic systems of government. A state of emergency declared not to further 
democracy, but to destroy or repress it, would be invalid under article 15. Such a 
condition is explicit in article 17, which provides that no state may “perform any 
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth [in the 
Convention]”.411
This view is certainly correct.
The United Kingdom withdrew the derogation of 18 December 2001 with effect 
from 14 March 2005. Only four months later, on 7 and 21 July 2005, Muslim terror-
ists launched attacks on the public transport system of London; the first succeeded, 
the second did not. As well it might, the Court took these attacks as proof that the 
terrorist threat had at all relevant times been real.412
Nonetheless, at the present remove an observer cannot help noting that despite 
the two attacks of July 2005, and despite further terrorist incidents including the car 
bomb attack on Glasgow International Airport in 2007, the murder of a soldier in 
broad daylight in the streets of Woolwich in 2013, a stabbing at a tube station in Lon-
don’s East End in December 2015, a suicide bomb attack on visitors of a pop concert 
in Manchester in May 2017, and in March and June 2017, two attacks carried out 
in central London using vehicles to attack pedestrians, for the vast majority of the 
British population – who were neither perpetrators nor victims of the actual attacks 
themselves – normal life continued much as it had done, as did the business of Gov-
ernment and the law. While it can accordingly be accepted that on any reasonable 
view there was a threat of terrorist attack in the early years of the present century, we 
cannot of course know whether the use of the powers granted the Government by 
Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 were effective to prevent 
such an attack while the grant remained in force. More to the point, neither do we 
know what terrorist attacks may have been prevented, both before and after with-
drawal of the notice of derogation on 14 March 2005, by ordinary police work, or by 
the use of methods that have yet to be considered under the Convention but are not 
the object of any derogation. All that can be said with the knowledge we have is that, 
in retrospect, Lord Hoffmann – no friend of the Court he, but no enemy of freedom 
either – may well have had a point worth pondering in doubting the existence of a 
genuine threat to ‘the life of the nation’.413
Absent any suggestion of bad faith, the Court’s willingness to accept the assess-
ment of the domestic authorities comes close to complete deference, as the A. and 
Others judgment shows.
411 Macdonald (1997), at p. 249; Loof, p. 386.
412 A. and Others, § 177.
413 See also Bart van der Sloot, “Is All Fair in Love and War? An Analysis of the Case Law on 
Article 15 ECHR”, in Military Law and the law of War Review 53/2 (2014), pp. 319-358 at p. 348. 
For a very different view, see Michael O’Boyle, “Emergency Government and Derogation under 
the ECHR”, [2016] E.H.R.L.R. p. 331 at p. 336.
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This apparent passivity has been criticised by academics. Thus, Oren Gross and 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin argue that the Court is better placed than domestic authorities 
to consider the need for derogating measures, not worse:
… it may well be that the supranational Court, detached and further removed 
from the immediate turmoil, reviewing the relevant issues post facto rather than 
at the time of their occurrence, is able to judge matters more clearly and more 
accurately.414
Criticism of the Court’s deferential attitude has also come from within the Court 
itself. In his dissenting opinion in Brannigan and McBride, Judge Martens, expressing 
agreement on this point with arguments submitted by amici curiae Amnesty Interna-
tional, Liberty, Interights and the Committee on the Administration of Justice, put 
it as follows:
Inevitably, in this context, a certain margin of appreciation should be left to 
the national authorities. There is, however, no justification for leaving them a 
wide margin of appreciation because the Court, being the “last-resort” protector 
of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention, is 
called upon to strictly scrutinise every derogation by a High Contracting Party 
from its obligations.415
While it is undoubtedly true that an urgent need to stave off disaster may arise on 
the spur of the moment, as time goes on the executive arm of Government may con-
tinue to restrict human rights – and limit judicial and even legislative scrutiny of its 
choices – based on a state of ‘emergency’ that no longer so justifies. There is force in 
the suggestion, made by Gross and Ní Aoláin already in 2001, that ‘[a] government’s 
attempt to justify or excuse a perceived violation of human rights in terms of exigency 
and derogation ought to be treated as a suspect classification that calls for a stricter 
scrutiny of the government’s case’.416
For the present, however, the Court seems disinclined to alter its position. The 
Turkish notice of derogation lodged on 21 July 2016, quoted above in the context of 
the Mehmet Hasan Altan and Şahin Alpay judgments,417 refers only to the ‘coup at-
414 Gross, O., and Ní Aoláin, F., “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001) 625-649 at p. 639.
415 Brannigan and McBride, dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, § 4.
416 Gross, O., and Ní Aoláin, F., “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001) 625-649 at p. 642. The point is also made 
in Mariniello, T., “Prolonged Emergency and Derogation of Human Rights: Why the Europe-
an Court Should Raise Its Immunity System”, to appear in German Law Journal (forthcoming 
2019), available on https://www.academia.edu/ (last accessed 26 June 2018).
417 See 4.5.1.9 above.
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tempt and its aftermath’ which ‘together with other terrorist acts have posed severe 
dangers to public security and order, amounting to a threat to the life of the nation’. 
While there can hardly be any dispute about the finding that the coup attempt itself 
threatened ‘the life of the nation’, it is arguably not self-evident that such a threat 
persisted during its aftermath – and the notice of derogation was sent to the Secretary 
General several days after the coup attempt had been well and truly crushed. One 
might also question whether the acts in issue could properly be called ‘terrorist’: since 
the aim of the coup attempt seems to have been the direct overthrow of President 
Erdoğan and the incumbent Government themselves, it is not immediately obvious 
that the acts in issue, unlawful though they undoubtedly were, fit our working defini-
tion of ‘terrorism’ as being ‘criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of 
terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political pur-
poses’.418 Nevertheless, in the two judgments, which were handed down nearly two 
years later, the Court does not question the position of the Turkish Government: it 
is worth noting however that the applicants do not seem to have argued either point 
and the Chamber has confined itself to taking note of their silence.419
4.7 Non-derogable rights
Even though the situation may be dire to the point of admitting of derogation from 
the Convention, there are rights from which no derogation is permitted in any cir-
cumstances.
Article 15 § 2 sets out the following: the right to life (Article 2), except in respect 
of deaths resulting from ‘lawful acts of war’ (a concept which we will briefly explore); 
the prohibition of torture (Article 3); the prohibition of slavery or servitude (Article 
4 § 1); and the principle nulla poena sine lege (Article 7). Additional non-derogable 
rights created subsequently include the prohibition of the death penalty (Article 3 
of Protocol No. 6 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 13) and the right not to be tried or 
punished twice (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7).
4.7.1 Article 2
Article 2 protects the right to life. It provides in its first paragraph that no one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally except consequent on a lawful sentence of death 
handed down by a court.420 Other than that, deprivation of life is not to be regarded 
as contrary to that Article
418 For this definition of terrorism, see 4.3.2.2 and footnote 266 above.
419 Mehmet Hasan Altan, § 92; Şahin Alpay, § 76.
420 Cases in which the death penalty is in issue are very rare in the case-law of the Commission 
and the Court, most Contracting States having ceased executing it or abolished it altogether 
before ratifying or acceding to the Convention or accepting the right of individual petition. 
An exception is Turkey, which became a Party to Protocol No. 6 only on 1 December 2003. 
On 30 November 1999 the Court indicated a provisional measure to Turkey under Rule 39 of 
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when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person law-
fully detained;
(c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.421
There is no mention of deaths occurring in an international or non-international 
armed conflict. Article 2 was written for, and fits, a law-enforcement paradigm exclu-
sively. In this it differs from Article 6 § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Article 4 § 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 
Article 4, third sentence, of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, all 
of which provide that no one shall be ‘arbitrarily’ deprived of their life – an expression 
that admits of far broader interpretation.422
It is therefore entirely conceivable that killing a combatant during an international 
armed conflict in accordance with international humanitarian law might have to be 
found in violation of Article 2 of the Convention423 – a position that Colonel Abbot, 
whom we encountered above,424 has labelled ‘absurd’.425 No doubt many others would 
agree with him.426
In its second paragraph, however, Article 15 lists Article 2 as non-derogable ‘except 
in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war’. This means that the meaning of 
the expression ‘war’ is relevant not only to the applicability of Article 15 as a whole, 
but also to the interpretation of the specific right guaranteed by Article 2.
It is likely that the drafters of this provision were concerned with ius in bello: a 
death resulting from a lawful act committed in a lawful war would be covered by the 
the Rules of Court to the effect that the death sentence imposed on Abdullah Öcalan should 
not be carried out pending the outcome of the proceedings before it (Öcalan v. Turkey (GC), 
no. 46221/99, § 5, ECHR 2005-IV). See also leges posteriores Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 6 
and Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 13, discussed in 4.7.5 below.
421 Article 2 § 2 of the Convention.
422 Kirby Abbott, “A brief overview of legal interoperability challenges for NATO arising from 
the interrelationship between IHL and IHRL in light of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 96, no. 893, pp. 107-37 at p. 127.
423 Evangelia Vasalou, “Les rapports normatifs entre le droit international humanitaire et la Conven-
tion européenne des droits de l’homme : Le droit international humanitaire, une lex specialis par 
rapport a la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme ?”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme (112/2017), pp. 953-987 at p. 960.
424 See 1.2.4.2 above.
425 Kirby Abbott, “A brief overview of legal interoperability challenges for NATO arising from 
the interrelationship between IHL and IHRL in light of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 96, no. 893, pp. 107-37 at p. 124.
426 A similar view is expressed by Anne-Marie Baldovin, “Impact de la jurisprudence récente de la 
Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme sur la planification et l’exécution des opérations mili-
taires à venir : Application extraterritoriale de la Convention, imputabilité des faits des troupes et 
fragmentation du droit international”, in Military Law and the Law of War Review 50/3-4 (2011), 
pp. 369-418 at p. 404.
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derogation but a death resulting from an unlawful act surely would not. One obvious 
consequence would be that the procedural obligations immanent in Article 2427 could 
be derogated from in the former case but not in the latter: the duty to investigate and, 
if necessary, prosecute deaths resulting from unlawful acts would continue to flow 
from Article 2.428
It is probably a mistake to understand the expression ‘war’ in this context as re-
ferring to international armed conflicts only, as has been suggested.429 Already for 
purposes of Article 15 § 1 we have defined our understanding of that expression so as 
to include an armed conflict not of an international character between a State and 
a non-State organised armed group but reaching the minimum intensity needed to 
trigger the applicability of international humanitarian law; there is no good reason 
not to do so for purposes of Article 15 § 2 as well.
It is tempting to include ius ad bellum in the definition of ‘lawful acts of war’: on 
this view, deaths resulting from acts committed in an unlawful war would ipso iure be 
excluded from the protection of the derogation. Admittedly such an interpretation 
sits well with the ‘profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foun-
dation of justice and peace in the world’.430 It does not, however, accord with the ac-
tual text of Article 15 § 2 of the Convention: the French text, arguably less ambiguous 
than the English version, has ‘actes licites de guerre’ – which renders more accurately, 
if more cumbersomely, as ‘legally permitted acts of war’.431
All agree that under the law of armed conflict, in international armed conflict at 
least, combatants are liable to lethal attack at any time without warning.432 Under hu-
man rights law, in principle, no one is and the status of combatant does not exist. It is 
submitted, accordingly, that the expression ‘lawful acts of war’ should be interpreted 
as meaning that the legality of the taking of life is governed by international humani-
tarian law.433
The use of the expression ‘war’ must not necessarily be understood in the same 
sense for the first paragraph of Article 15 and for the second. For one thing, it is dif-
ficult to see how the procedural requirements of Article 2 – that is the duty officially 
to investigate a death and, if appropriate, prosecute its author434 – could apply to 
every single death occasioned in a war of doubtful legality by hostile action that was, 
427 See 2.2.2 above.
428 And indeed from international humanitarian law, on which subject, see 4.9 below. Compare 
International Committee of the Red Cross, IHL Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/cus-
tomary-ihl/eng/docs/home, Rule 158, with further references (accessed on 5 September 2018).
429 Nils Melzer, Targeted killing in international law, Oxford University Press 2008, p. 122.
430 Preamble to the Convention.
431 See also Bethlehem, supra note 233, at p. 237.
432 For example, Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 2016), p. 42, § 116.
433 cf. Varnava and Others, § 185, ECHR 2009; see also Bethlehem at p. 239 and Sicilianos (2015) at 
p. 12.
434 For example, Kasap and Others v. Turkey, no. 8656/10, § 58, 14 January 2014, and Armani da 
Silva, § 238.
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from an operational perspective, legitimate: such a view would place the individual 
serviceman in the impossible position of having to question the political decision to 
go to war before obeying an order given by his lawful superior. Different considera-
tions may well govern the right to derogate per se. Admittedly this leaves us with the 
non sequitur of a death sanctioned by Article 15 § 2 occurring in a war not meeting the 
requirements of Article 15 § 1; but the distinction will be dictated by the stark reality 
of the situation.
Absent a genuine state of war, there is no getting away from Article 2. This has been 
rightly noted in the United Kingdom by the Joint Committee on Human Rights of 
the House of Lords and the House of Commons:
We note that any future derogation from the ECHR will not affect the Gov-
ernment’s policy in relation to the use of lethal force abroad outside of armed 
conflict. Derogation from the right to life in Article 2 ECHR is only possible in 
relation to “deaths resulting from lawful acts of war”. States can therefore choose 
to be bound by the more permissive rules of the Law of War, rather than the 
more restrictive rules of human rights law, in times of war or public emergency. 
However, the Government will not be able to derogate from the right to life in 
Article 2 where it uses lethal force abroad outside of armed conflict: such deaths 
will not be the result of “acts of war” because by definition they will have taken 
place outside armed conflict. The right to life in Article 2 ECHR therefore ines-
capably applies to uses of lethal force abroad outside of armed conflict.435
It is submitted that it is not inconceivable that human rights law – even Article 2 of 
the Convention outside the strict confines of ‘legitimate acts of war’436 – might admit 
of targeted killing without warning (a drone strike for example),437 but the justifica-
tion offered would surely have to be the most persuasive imaginable.438 Otherwise, 
it has been suggested that a targeted killing might be brought within the scope of an 
armed conflict if a nexus between the two could be shown439 – which might allow the 
Contracting State to avail itself of Article 15 of the Convention.
435 House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Government’s 
policy on the use of drones for targeted killing, Second Report of Session 2015–16, paragraph 3.62.
436 See 4.9 below.
437 Contra Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd edition 
2015), Cambridge University Press, p. 577.
438 Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson Chengeta, “The 
International Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones”, ICLQ vol 65, October 2016, 
pp 791-827 at pp. 818-821. See also PACE Resolution 2051 (2015) on Drones and targeted killings: 
the need to uphold human rights and international law (23 April 2015), paras 6.3 and 6.4.
439 Milanović and Hadži-Vidanović, supra note 250, p. 309; see also Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Ter-




Article 3 of the Convention prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment in absolute terms. As the Court was careful to point out in Ireland 
v. the United Kingdom, ‘there can be no derogation therefrom even in the event of a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation’440 – nor even, we would add, in 
the event of war.
For present purposes, one obvious corollary of the non-derogability of Article 3 is 
that resorting to torture or, for that matter, the use of force short of torture in inter-
rogating prisoners, even enemy agents or spies, is not permissible however grave the 
situation and is likely to engage the responsibility of the Contracting State under the 
Convention. The same applies to the use of weapons or tactics that cause unnecessary 
human suffering. The standards to be applied under the Convention are free-standing 
and do not necessarily depend on the corresponding standards of the law of armed 
conflict, although the latter will be helpful in setting the threshold.441
4.7.3 Article 4
Only the first paragraph of Article 4 is listed in Article 15 § 2. It provides that ‘[n]o 
one shall be held in slavery or servitude’. The Court has defined ‘slavery’ in the terms 
of the 1926 Slavery Convention as ‘the status or condition of a person over whom 
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’,442 and ‘ser-
vitude’ as ‘an obligation, under coercion, to provide one’s services’, the latter concept 
being linked with that of ‘slavery’.443
The second paragraph of Article 4 provides that ‘[n]o one shall be required to per-
form forced or compulsory labour’. For ‘forced or compulsory labour’ to arise, the 
Court has held that there must be ‘some physical or mental constraint, as well as some 
overriding of the person’s will’.444
This paragraph is immediately qualified by the third paragraph of Article 4, which 
provides that certain duties that the State may impose shall not count as ‘forced or 
compulsory labour’. These are duties which the State may impose in the absence of a 
‘war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’.
For the purposes of our discussions, the pertinent exceptions are ‘any service of a 
military character’ (or ‘in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are 
recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service’) and ‘any service 
exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the 
community’. 
440 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, § 163; see also Andrew Drzemczewski, “Ireland v. U.K.”, [1978] 12 
The Law Teacher 1 p. 49 at p. 52.
441 cf., mutatis mutandis, Van Anraat, §§ 89-91.
442 Siliadin v. France, no. 73316/01, § 122, ECHR 2005-VII; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 




No derogation under Article 15 is necessary for either of these exceptions to apply 
(nor indeed for the two other exceptions provided for by Article 4 § 3, namely prison 
work and work or service which forms part of ‘normal civic obligations’ – e.g. service 
in a fire brigade445 or on a jury446). 
As we have seen, an exception for service exacted instead of military service applies 
‘in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised’ (Article 4 
§ 3 (b)). On the face of it, this wording leaves it to the countries themselves whether 
to recognise conscientious objections to military service. However, in its Bayatyan 
judgment, the Court recognised a general right to claim exemption from military 
service provided that it be based on serious and convincing conscientious objections, 
as protected under Article 9 – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion.447 It remains to be seen whether such a right will survive actual war: the letter of 
the Convention does not prevent Contracting States from derogating from it under 
Article 15. Nevertheless, on any reasonable view, one would imagine so. To recognise 
a right of conscientious objection in peacetime but deny it in wartime would defeat 
its very purpose. It is submitted, therefore, that the Bayatyan judgment has created a 
new non-derogable right.
4.7.4 Article 7
Article 7 – which enshrines the nulla poena sine lege principle – is listed in Article 15 
§ 2 as non-derogable. However, a derogating clause is contained in the very Article 
itself, in that its second paragraph states that it ‘shall not prejudice the trial and pun-
ishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was com-
mitted, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations’.
The applicant in Korbely was an officer in the Hungarian army in 1956. During 
the uprising, he killed an insurgent; for this act, classed as a ‘crime against humanity’ 
rather than common murder, he was put on trial in the 1990s. The Court found a vio-
lation of Article 7 in that the understanding of the expression ‘crime against human-
ity’ in 1956 did not – at the time – encompass ordinary murder without the presence 
of additional elements, in particular that the crime ‘should form part of “State action 
or policy” or of a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population’; it was 
therefore not enough to find, as the domestic courts had done, that the victim had 
come within the scope of protection of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions.448
The second paragraph of Article 7 has its origins in an amendment to the provision 
later to congeal as Article 15 § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
445 Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, no. 13580/88, § 23, Series A no. 291-B.
446 Zarb Adami v. Malta, no. 17209/02, § 47, ECHR 2006-VIII.
447 Bayatyan v. Armenia (GC), no. 23459/03, §§ 123-127, ECHR 2011; see Petr Muzny, “Bayatyan 
v Armenia: The Grand Chamber Renders a Grand Judgment”, Human Rights Law Review 
12:1(2012), 135-147.
448 Korbely, §§ 81-85.
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Rights. It was suggested by the British Government, which pointed out that without 
it that provision ‘might be thought to impugn the validity of the judgments of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’.449 Article 15 of the Covenant is identical word for word with 
Article 7 of the Convention (except for punctuation).
Given the context for which it was drafted, the application of Article 7 § 2 in re-
spect crimes committed during the Second World War by the Nazis and their hench-
men raises no complicated questions.450 In contrast, the Court has held that it also 
applies to crimes committed by others than Nazi collaborators – in particular Soviet 
Communists.
The applicants in Kolk and Kisliy were found guilty in the early years of the 21st 
century by Estonian courts of having participated, in March 1949, in the deportation 
of Estonian civilians to remote areas of the Soviet Union. The criminal legislation 
applied had been enacted only in 1994, after Estonia had successfully regained its 
independence. The applicants had argued that their actions had been legal under the 
law of the Soviet Union. The Estonian courts had rejected that defence referring to 
Article 7 § 2. 
Declaring the application inadmissible de plano, the Court held as follows:
The Court notes that deportation of the civilian population was expressly rec-
ognised as a crime against humanity in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
of 1945 (Article 6 (c)).451 Although the Nuremberg Tribunal was established for 
trying the major war criminals of the European Axis countries for the offences 
they had committed before or during the Second World War, the Court notes 
that the universal validity of the principles concerning crimes against humanity 
was subsequently confirmed by, inter alia, resolution 95 of the United Nations 
General Assembly (11 December 1946)452 and later by the International Law 
Commission.453 Accordingly, responsibility for crimes against humanity cannot 
be limited only to the nationals of certain countries and solely to acts committed 
within the specific time frame of the Second World War. …
It was thus established, at the very least, that though Article 7 § 2 had been written 
with a particular view to punishing the crimes of the Nazis its applicability was not 
limited to them alone. The Nuremberg Charter and the affirmation by the General 
449 UN Doc. E/CN.4/353/Add.2 (Comments of Governments on the draft International Covenant 
on Human Rights and measures of implementation), quoted in the Preparatory Work on Article 
7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe document DH (57) 6).
450 Touvier v. France, no. 29420/95, Commission decision of 13 January 1997, DR 88-B p. 148 at 
p. 161; Papon v. France (dec.), no. 54210/00, ECHR 2001-XII.
451 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal), annexed to the London 
Agreement of 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 280.
452 UNGA Res. 95 (I), 11 December 1946 (Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recog-
nized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal).
453 Nuremberg Principles, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol. II, pp. 374-378.
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Assembly of the United Nations of its principles were taken as indicative of the ‘gen-
eral principles of law’ and, what was more, their actual recognition by the Soviet Un-
ion by 1949.
The Nuremberg Principles, adopted in 1950, codify ‘crimes against peace’, ‘war 
crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ and set out the principle of international crimi-
nal responsibility in a form applicable to those States that are not party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.454 Other documents relevant to this dis-
cussion include the Genocide Convention455 and the Convention against Torture,456 
both of which have been ratified or acceded to by all Council of Europe Member 
States.
4.7.5 The death penalty
Article 3 of Protocol No. 6 adds prohibition of the death penalty to the list of non-
derogable rights. However, Article 2 of Protocol No. 6 permits States to ‘make provi-
sion in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of 
imminent threat of war’. The use of the expression ‘war’ implies that the death penalty 
may not be imposed in any other emergency threatening the life of the nation. Thus, 
for example, the venerable practice of shooting rioters or looters out of hand in a ca-
lamity falling short of war is effectively rendered legally impossible.
Protocol 13 takes matters still further. Born of the realisation that Protocol No. 6 
‘does not exclude the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of 
imminent threat of war’ and the resolve ‘to take the final step in order to abolish the 
death penalty in all circumstances’,457 it removes the option left to States by Article 2 
of Protocol No. 6 to make provision for the death penalty even in wartime. As a mat-
ter of logic, the second Article of that Protocol – ‘No derogation from the provisions 
of this Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention’ – would seem 
redundant, but it serves the useful purpose of driving home the point that abolition 
of the death penalty is now absolute.
At least for the vast majority of European States, that is. To date, Protocol No. 
13 has been signed but not ratified by Armenia, and neither signed nor ratified by 
Azerbaijan and Russia. Russia is not even a party to Protocol No. 6. This is worrying 
given that these are States that have strained relations with some of their neighbours, 
in some cases to the point of maintaining a military presence on territory over which 
their sovereignty is disputed.
454 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 of 
17 July 1998 and corrected by proces-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 
1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. Available for download on the web site 
of the International Criminal Court.
455 Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277.
456 Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
1465 UNTS 85.
457 Preamble to Protocol No. 13, paragraphs 3 and 4.
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It is however arguable in the light of the reasoning developed by the Court in Öca-
lan that the ratification of Protocol No. 13 by the overwhelming majority of Con-
tracting States coupled with the practice of the remaining Contracting States, at least 
as far as is known, of not carrying out executions even in cases where such would be 
permitted under the terms of Protocol No. 6 can now be construed as the de facto abo-
lition of the death penalty in all circumstances, and thus as evidence of the emergence 
of a corresponding rule of customary international law broadening the protection of 
the Convention system in that respect.458
4.7.6 Article 4 of Protocol No. 7
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 guarantees, in respect of those States that have ratified the 
Protocol, the right not to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under 
the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which one has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State 
concerned. It admits of reopening of the proceedings only if there is evidence of new 
or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous 
proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case.
This Article is non-derogable by virtue of its third paragraph.
The practical importance of the non-derogable nature of this provision is illus-
trated by the Court’s judgment in Marguš v. Croatia which we have examined in the 
previous chapter.459
It is true that there was no derogation under Article 15 in this case (nor could there 
be), but had there been, its effect would have been identical to that of the amnesty: to 
shield war criminals from a second prosecution after escaping accountability for their 
crimes through abuse of law. Understood in this sense, Article 4 § 3 of Protocol No. 7 
can be seen as a useful companion provision to Article 7 § 2 of the Convention.
4.7.7 Implied non-derogable rights 
We have seen that a non-derogable right to claim exemption from military service, 
provided that it be based on serious and convincing conscientious objections, is im-
plied by the logic of the right itself.460
Some authors have identified other rights as non-derogable based on their essen-
tial importance or on their connection with the rights recognised as non-derogable 
by Article 15. These would include Article 13,461 which would be non-derogable in 
so far as it is interlinked with non-derogable substantive rights, and the procedural 
provisions contained in the Convention itself – most notably the right of individual 
458 Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, §§ 162-165, ECHR 2005-IV; see also Al-Saadoon and Muf-
dhi, § 120 (“These figures, together with consistent State practice in observing the moratorium 
on capital punishment, are strongly indicative that Article 2 has been amended so as to prohibit 
the death penalty in all circumstances.”)
459 Marguš; see paragraph 3.4.4 above.
460 See 4.7.3 above.
461 Loof, p. 530, with further references.
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petition (Article 34).462 Others would derive non-derogable status from their being 
rules of either ius cogens or international humanitarian law.463 An example of the lat-
ter would be the guarantees of trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, at-
tended by all appropriate guarantees, which is guaranteed by Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions and Article 6 of Additional Protocol No. II to the Geneva 
Conventions.464
Let us consider these suggestions in the light of the Court’s case-law. 
4.7.7.1 Freedom from discrimination
Freedom from discrimination is largely non-derogable under the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (‘provided that such measures … do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin’, Article 4 § 1 of the Covenant)465 and the American Convention on Human 
Rights (Article 27 § 1, which uses the same terms as the Covenant bar the word ‘sole-
ly’). There is nothing in the text of Article 15 of the Convention to suggest that the 
principle of non-discrimination is non-derogable. Nonetheless, the suggestion that 
that requirement is subjacent is not new.466
In A. and Others, as we have seen, the Court found that the measures complained 
of were ‘disproportionate in that they discriminated unjustifiably’ between nationals 
and foreigners, without finding it necessary to delve separately into the complaint 
brought under Article 14 taken together with Article 5.467 This could be understood 
to suggest that there is now a separate non-derogable right to be protected against 
discrimination under the Convention also.
A separate requirement that any derogating measures taken not be discriminatory 
was formulated by Judge Matscher in his separate opinion in Ireland v. the United 
Kingdom. He phrases it as follows:
If the authorities deemed it necessary in order to combat terrorism to take emer-
gency measures which weighed heavily on the population concerned, and if 
these measures were applied to only one section of the population whereas, in 
order to combat a comparable terrorist campaign originating from the other side 
– insofar as it was seriously combated –, they thought that they could confine 
themselves to the ordinary means of prevention and punishment, the question 
also arises whether the emergency measures were really indispensable within the 
meaning of Article 15 of the Convention.468
462 Loof, p. 538.
463 Loof, p. 540-550.
464 Loof, p. 543.
465 Article 26 of the Covenant is not among the non-derogable Articles enumerated in Article 4 § 2.
466 Macdonald (1997) at p. 264.
467 A. and Others, §§ 190 and 192.
468 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, separate opinion of Judge Matscher, in fine.
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Discrimination is covered by Articles 14 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 12. 
Article 14 of the Convention protects only against discrimination in ‘the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Convention’, whereas Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 forbids 
discrimination in ‘the enjoyment of any right set forth by law’ and ‘by any public au-
thority’. The test is the same:
The notion of discrimination has been interpreted consistently in the Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning Article 14 of the Convention. In particular, this ju-
risprudence has made it clear that “discrimination” means treating differently, 
without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in similar situations 
(...). The authors used the same term, discrimination, in Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 12. Notwithstanding the difference in scope between those provisions, the 
meaning of this term in Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 was intended to be identical 
to that in Article 14 (see the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 12, § 18). The 
Court does not therefore see any reason to depart from the settled interpreta-
tion of “discrimination”, noted above, in applying the same term under Article 1 
of Protocol No. 12 (…).469
Consequently, if there is objective and reasonable justification for the difference in 
treatment in issue (or for the failure to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different),470 there is no discrimination and hence no violation of either 
Article.
It is submitted that there is no need to formulate non-discrimination as a separate 
non-derogable right. A distinction that is objectively and reasonably justified, and for 
that reason not discriminatory, may well come within the protection of Article 15 § 1: 
for example, it is difficult to argue that in time of international armed conflict aliens 
who owe allegiance to the enemy should be treated the same as nationals in all things. 
Conversely, if objective and reasonable justification cannot be established, there will 
in any event be a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with the 
substantive Article (or Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 as the case may be): absent such 
justification, it is logically impossible to argue that the measure in issue is ‘strictly re-
quired by the exigencies of the situation’.
4.7.7.2 Article 5
In Hassan, the Court defined the limits of the protection of Article 5 in international 
armed conflict in accordance with Articles 4A and 21 of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion and Articles 42 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.471 This necessarily im-
469 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, § 55, ECHR 
2009.
470 Thlimmenos v. Greece (GC), no. 34369/97, § 44, ECHR 2000-IV.
471 Hassan, §§ 105-107.
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plies the same limits when Article 44 § 4 of Additional Protocol No. I to the Geneva 
Conventions applies.
To that extent it can be said that the rights guaranteed by Article 5 are, in part, non-
derogable by virtue of international humanitarian law.
It is also interesting to compare Article 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention with 
Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The former vouchsafes to any alien ‘protected per-
son who has been interned or placed in assigned residence’ the entitlement to have 
such action ‘reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administra-
tive board’, followed, if necessary, by periodic review at twice-yearly intervals. This 
suggests that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention is non-derogable at least as far as alien 
civilians caught up in an international armed conflict are concerned.472
4.7.7.3 Article 6
Although Article 6 is not specifically mentioned in Article 15, it is difficult to con-
ceive of circumstances that might justify restrictions on the right of everyone to a ‘fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’, at the very least when the case concerns the determination of a 
‘criminal charge’. 
It would be all the less reasonable to countenance such restrictions given that the 
Third Geneva Convention provides, in its Article 84, that 
In no circumstances shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind that 
does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as gen-
erally recognized, and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the 
accused the rights and means of defence provided for in Article 105.
Article 105 of the Third 1949 Geneva Convention sets out in considerable detail 
rights of the defence that are, for the most part, equivalent to the catalogue of rights 
set out in Article 6 § 3; the only one that seems to be lacking is the right to call defence 
witnesses under the same conditions as prosecution witnesses (Article 6 § 3 (d) of the 
Convention). The right to call witnesses is, however, mentioned in the Commentary 
of 1960.473 Although there is no requirement that the trial of a prisoner of war be 
public, an equivalent purpose is served by notification of the Protecting Power and 
by allowing that Power to attend the trial as long as the detaining Power’s security is 
not at risk.
The Fourth Geneva Convention, in its Article 71 and 72, also sets out fair trial 
guarantees largely corresponding to those provided by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the 
Convention. Article 71, in its opening words, sets out the requirement of a ‘regular 
472 See 4.9 below.
473 International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 1960 (Article 105).
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trial’. Under the terms of Article 5 of that Convention, these requirements are non-
derogable even in respect of spies and saboteurs.
The ICRC Commentary of 1958 adds the following:
The inclusion in the Convention of the express rule that no sentence may be 
pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after “a 
regular trial” introduces into the law of war a fundamental notion of justice as it 
is understood in all civilized countries.
The safeguards provided in the Articles dealing with penal legislation, which 
we have just discussed, and those prescribed elsewhere, particularly in Arti-
cle 32, which prohibits torture and all other forms of brutality, obviously rep-
resent conditions which must be fulfilled if a trial is to be regular; but there are 
other rules relating to penal procedure which are not expressly laid down in the 
Convention, but must nevertheless be respected as they follow logically from 
its provisions. One is the principle that any accused person is presumed to be 
innocent until he is proved guilty. This essential rule remains fully valid in oc-
cupied territory.474
As regards armed conflicts not of an international character, the second paragraph 
under (d) of Article 3 common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits ‘at any 
time and at any place whatsoever’
the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
For the interpretation of this provision, the ICRC Commentary of 2016 refers to 
‘[t]he 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human 
rights treaties’. It also mentions treaty bodies having ‘stated that the fundamental prin-
ciples of fair trial and the requirement that courts be independent and impartial can 
never be dispensed with’.475 Although the Court is not among the ‘treaty bodies’ hav-
ing expressed itself in quite such sweeping terms,476 in a footnote the Commentary 
refers to the requirements of independence and impartiality set by the Court’s Find-
lay and Belilos judgments.477
474 International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 1958 (Article 71).
475 International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Commentary of 2016 (Article 3).
476 The Court goes no further than to refer to “the prominent place held in a democratic society by 
the right to a fair trial”, as for example in Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzer-
land (GC), no. 5809/08, § 127, ECHR 2016.
477 loc. cit., footnote 562: Belilos v. Switzerland, no. 10328/83, § 64, Series A no. 132; Findlay v. the 
United Kingdom, no. 22107/93, Reports 1997-I, §§ 73-77, Reports 1997-I.
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The conclusion can be none other than that the fair trial guarantees set out in Ar-
ticle 6 are non-derogable in cases of international and non-international armed con-
flict; in our submission, it is therefore difficult to see how they are not non-derogable 
in any lesser emergency.
4.7.7.4 Other implied non-derogable rights
The Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 29 on States of Emer-
gency, signals the existence of other rights that, in its opinion, cannot be made subject 
to derogation under Article 4 of the Covenant. These are derived from the Covenant 
itself and from other norms of customary and treaty law. They include such matters as 
the right of all persons deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person (Article 10 of the Covenant 
itself ); the prohibition on the taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged de-
tention, which are described as ‘norms of general international law’; certain aspects of 
minority rights; the deportation or forced displacement of populations; and propa-
ganda for war or advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that would constitute 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence; the right to an effective remedy; 
and procedural guarantees including the presumption of innocence and the right of 
habeas corpus.478
The Court does not issue general comments such as this; indeed, precisely because 
it is a court, that would not be proper. Courts set substantive standards through their 
case-law. Nonetheless we would consider it highly unlikely that the Court would ac-
cept measures such as those proscribed by the Human Rights Committee, if only 
because it would be difficult to justify them as justified by the ‘exigencies of the situ-
ation’.
4.8 Strictly required by the exigencies of the situation
The requirement that the measures taken be ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation’ suggests a strict necessity test. In fact, however, the State has until now been 
allowed greater discretion than that. 
It is a reasonable requirement that any measures taken correspond in some way 
to the crisis which they are intended to address.479 The Court implies as much in A 
v. Others in criticising the choice of ‘an immigration measure to address what was 
essentially a security issue’, which ‘had the result of failing adequately to address the 
problem’ and moreover was discriminatory in its effects.480
478 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001, §§ 13-16 and footnote 9.
479 Macdonald (1997), p. 243.
480 A. and Others, § 186.
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In its report in the ‘First Cyprus Case’, which admittedly is now sixty years old, the 
Commission was prepared to accept such interferences with ordinary life as curfews, 
prolonged periods of administrative detention, censorship and controls on burials 
and religious ceremonies. In Lawless, its very first case, the Court accepted adminis-
trative detention, though subject to a safeguard in the form of the possibility to seek 
review before a non-judicial body and of a way out in the form of a binding under-
taking to renounce the use of violence. In Brannigan and McBride, the Court was 
marginally less accommodating: it accepted extended periods of detention without 
access to a magistrate, but only subject to safeguards both procedural (a remedy in 
the form of habeas corpus) and physical (including access to a doctor and the right to 
notify someone on the outside). 
Nonetheless, the existence of safeguards does not exhaust the margin of apprecia-
tion in this respect: it is also a reasonable requirement that the respondent State be in 
a position to satisfy the Court that the measures resorted to are of a nature to assist 
efforts towards a return to normality – and therefore temporary.481 Indeed, the ex-
pression ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ would have no meaning if 
it did not encompass such a requirement.
Judge Martens, dissenting in Brannigan and McBride, doubts that the strict neces-
sity test leaves Governments any margin of appreciation. In his words:
The second question [i.e. once it is determined that there is a threat to “the life 
of the nation”] is whether the derogation is to “the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation”. The wording underlined clearly calls for a closer 
scrutiny than the words “necessary in a democratic society” which appear in the 
second paragraph of Articles 8-11. Consequently, with respect to this second 
question there is, if at all, certainly no room for a wide margin of appreciation.482
It is a view that undeniably sits well with a grammatical interpretation of Article 15.483
4.9 Not inconsistent with the State’s other obligations under 
international law
We have seen that the expression ‘other obligations under international law’ relevant 
to the interpretation of Article 15 primarily include those arising from the Charter of 
the United Nations, including those that govern the legality of war (Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations).
481 Loof, p. 379; Gross, O., and Ní Aoláin, F., “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Applica-
tion of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001) 625-649 at p. 644.
482 Brannigan and McBride, dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, § 4.
483 See also O’Boyle (2016), p. 339.
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However, once war becomes a reality, other international legal obligations that be-
come pertinent are those that are part of international humanitarian law which, as 
we have seen, on the one hand are generally more permissive vis-à-vis public author-
ity – although not in all cases: sometimes they are noticeably stricter484 – but on the 
other hand generally admit of no derogation at all. Consequently, where provisions of 
international humanitarian law coincide with rights guaranteed by the Convention, 
their effect is actually to make those rights by implication non-derogable.485
It is not necessarily the case that those ‘other obligations under international law’ 
offer less protection to the individual than the Convention itself. For example, Article 
43 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (Geneva Convention (IV)) prescribes twice-yearly review of internment 
(Article 43) – such frequency of review being far more generous than that vouch-
safed to long-term detainees (‘persons of unsound mind’ detained in accordance with 
Article 5 § 1 (e), for example) by the case-law of the Court.486 Similarly, Article 73 of 
Geneva Convention (IV) – and let us recall that the four Geneva Conventions enjoy 
universal ratification – extends the right to an appeal in criminal matters even to ter-
ritories occupied by Convention States that have not ratified Protocol No. 7.487
The expression ‘other obligations under international law’ may also be relevant to 
calamities not of a hostile nature that involve more than one country, a major natural 
disaster or an economic crisis perhaps, to which customary or conventional rules of 
international law may apply.488
Obligations relevant to this provision identified in doctrine include the so-called 
‘basic human rights conventions’ of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).489 
It would appear obvious that rights corresponding to the prohibitions set out in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also fall within this category, such 
as the destruction and seizure of property not justified by military necessity (Article 
8 § 2 (a) (iv) and (xiii)); the destruction of religious buildings and hospitals that are 
not military objectives (Article 8 § 2 (a) (ix)); declaring abolished, suspended or in-
admissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party 
(Article 8 § 2 (a) (xiv)); and pillaging (Article 8 § 2 (a) (xvi)) – at the very least, as con-
ventional obligations in respect of those States that have ratified the Rome Statute.490 
As a matter of common sense, it must be a mistake to interpret ‘other obligations 
under international law’ so as to import into Article 15 substantive provisions from 
other human rights treaties offering greater protection than the Convention itself, as 
is sometimes suggested.491 Article 4 § 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
484 See 6.7 below.
485 See 4.7.7 above.
486 See the summary set out in Abdulkhanov v. Russia, no. 14743/11, § 212, 2 October 2012.
487 See Article 2 of Protocol No. 7.
488 Loof, p. 388-389.
489 Loof, p. 592.
490 supra note 454.
491 Loof, p. 592.
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Political rights, for example, has a broader catalogue of non-derogable rights than the 
Convention – including for example the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (Article 18).
The requirement that the measures concerned be not ‘inconsistent with [the 
State’s] other obligations under international law’ is a difficult one for the Court to 
monitor, since the Court is not set up to rule on any rules of international law other 
than the Convention. Even so, the Court is prepared to do so to the extent that the 
facts of the case make it inevitable, as for example the Van Anraat492 and Stichting 
Mothers of Srebrenica and Others493 decisions demonstrate. In relation to Article 15, 
the question has thus far only been raised in relation to formal requirements. In that 
respect the Court has eschewed extremes of formalism.494
4.10 Formalities
France proclaimed a state of emergency in November 2015, in the wake of the ter-
rorist attacks in Paris, as we know; so did Turkey, in July 2016, after the attempted 
coup d’état. Unlike Article 4 § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Article 15 of the Convention does not require that a state of emergency (or, 
for that matter, war) be officially declared. Ireland and the United Kingdom did not 
do so before lodging their notices of derogation.
In the ‘First Cyprus Case’, the Greek Government disputed the validity of the notes 
verbales transmitted to the Secretary General. The Commission stated the impor-
tance of giving notice in accordance with Article 15 § 3 in the following terms:
It follows from the above-mentioned provisions of Articles 19, 24 and 25 [now 
Articles 19, 33 and 34] that, when one High Contracting Party exercises its right 
to take measures under Article 15 derogating from its obligations under the 
Convention, the other High Contracting Parties have a legal interest in being 
informed of those measures since temporarily their own rights under Article 
24 of the Convention [now Article 33] are pro tanto curtailed. It equally follows 
from the provisions of Articles 19, 24 and 25, that the position of the Com-
mission (and, ultimately, of the European Court of Human Rights) in applying 
the Convention is directly affected by the fact that a High Contracting Party 
has taken measures under Article 15 which derogate from its obligations under 
the Convention. It further follows, in the case of a State which has recognised 
the competence of the Commission to receive petitions from individuals and 
groups under Article 25 [now superseded by Article 34], that the work of the 
Commission in determining the admissibility of such petitions may be impeded 
492 Van Anraat v. the Netherlands, supra note 207.
493 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65542/12, ECHR 2013.
494 Brannigan and McBride, § 73.
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if it does not receive timely and definite information concerning any measure 
derogating from its obligations under the Convention which a State claims to 
have taken in reliance on Article 15.
The obvious implication was that notice to the Secretary General had to be given 
‘without any unavoidable delay’ and must contain sufficient information to allow 
the other Contracting States and the Commission itself ‘to appreciate the nature and 
extent of the derogation of the provisions of the Convention which the measures 
involve’.495
The Commission considered that the note verbale had been transmitted to the Sec-
retary General with excessive delay – nearly three months after the measures derogat-
ing from Article 5 of the Convention had been introduced. Its content, nevertheless, 
was deemed ‘sufficient to indicate in a general way the nature of the measures taken’ 
although lacking in detail and precision. This being the first instance of derogation 
under Article 15, the Commission was unwilling to find it insufficient on that ground 
but noted for future reference that it required ‘rather fuller information’ in order sat-
isfactorily to discharge its functions.
In the ‘Greek Case’, in contrast, the Commission found that not only had the Greek 
rulers failed to give adequate notice of their derogating measures to the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe: notice of many of the measures adopted – in-
cluding the promulgation of the new Constitution – was given either with several 
months’ delay or not at all.496
The most recent notice of derogation, that of Turkey of 21 June 2016, again lacked 
specificity: in the Court’s words, it indicated merely 
that a state of emergency has been declared in order to tackle the threat posed to 
the life of the nation by the severe dangers resulting from the attempted military 
coup and other terrorist acts, [and did] not explicitly mention which Articles 
of the Convention [were] to form the subject of a derogation. Instead, it simply 
[announced] that “measures taken [might] involve derogation from the obliga-
tions under the Convention”.
Even so, since
none of the parties [had] disputed that the notice of derogation by Turkey satis-
fied the formal requirement laid down in Article 15 § 3 of the Convention, name-
ly to keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the 
measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for 
495 Greece v. the United Kingdom, § 158.
496 The “Greek Case””, § 46.
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them … [the Court was] prepared to accept that this formal requirement has 
been satisfied.497
What is required by Article 15 § 3 is a statement of the measures taken and the reason 
therefor. There is no requirement that the notice of derogation specify the Articles ac-
tually derogated from – although, as the former Deputy Registrar of the Court points 
out, this is obviously desirable from the point of view of legal certainty.498
In Mehmet Hasan Altan and Şahin Alpay the Court declared itself satisfied with 
the bald statement of the Turkish Government that
[t]he coup attempt and its aftermath together with other terrorist acts have 
posed severe dangers to public security and order, amounting to a threat to the 
life of the nation in the meaning of Article 15 of the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.499
– which suggests that as the case-law of the Court currently stands, it is not re-
quired either that the nature of the threat be specified in detail.
Nor is there a requirement that the existence of a public emergency be officially 
proclaimed, as in Article 4 § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. One may assume, however, that in practice such an official proclamation will 
often be made, if only because States derogating under Article 15 of the Convention 
are likely to lodge the same derogation under Article 4 of the Covenant at the same 
time.500
It is submitted that Contracting States derogating in order for their armed forces 
to participate in joint military operations with the forces of States that are not Parties 
to the Convention might consider including in their notice of derogation a statement 
of, or at least a reference to, the standing or ad hoc rules governing the joint enterprise, 
such as memoranda of understanding.501 This might help to allay the problems of 
‘legal interoperability’ mentioned in our opening chapter.502
4.11 The Hassan judgment
In Hassan the Court stretched the margin of appreciation of the Contracting State to 
its logical extreme by denying the necessity to seek the application of Article 15 at all 
– at least, as the Court’s case-law now stands, in respect of Article 5 of the Convention 
in case of international armed conflict. We have seen that the Court was favourable 
497 Mehmet Hasan Altan, § 89; Şahin Alpay, § 73.
498 O’Boyle (2016), p. 335.
499 Mehmet Hasan Altan, § 89; Şahin Alpay, § 73.
500 As Ukraine did (see footnote 251 above).
501 Compare Jaloud, §§100-103 and 138.
502 See 1.2.4.2 above.
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to the United Kingdom Government’s argument that there had been no need for the 
United Kingdom to derogate under Article 15.503 One author has called the Hassan 
judgment a ‘final blow’.504
It was perhaps not inevitable that the Court should bypass Article 15 as it did. As 
outlined above, the applicability of Article 15 need not have depended on the ‘war’ 
in Iraq ‘threatening the life of the nation’. On this view, the United Kingdom might 
well have given prior expression to its will to be bound only to apply international 
humanitarian law.505
Even better – and it is only right at this point to refer to a paper by Tugendhat and 
Croft published by the British think tank Policy Exchange in 2013 – the United King-
dom might have lodged a notice of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention 
and sought ‘explicit language in future Chapter VII United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions in order to provide a legal basis for detention or internment acceptable to 
the ECHR’.506 That is sound advice for the future.
4.12 Conclusion
Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.507 Article 15 was included in the Convention pre-
cisely for that reason. It offers Contracting States the possibility to reduce their sub-
stantive Convention liabilities in appropriate cases while yet remaining within their 
Convention obligations.
It is submitted that Article 15 has not yet been tested to its limits. In particular, 
the cases considered by the Commission and the Court have only ever concerned 
the threat of terrorist attack (Ireland, United Kingdom, France) or direct attempts 
to displace the Government (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey). As we have seen, however, the 
occasion to apply Article 15 may conceivably arise in situations not readily definable 
in terms of conflict, for example an environmental disaster or economic collapse.
Equally, from the Court’s perspective the time may have come to reassess the limits 
themselves. Thus far application of Article 15 has been found impermissible only once 
in Strasbourg case-law: in the Greek case, in which as we have seen the bad faith of 
503 See 3.4.2 above.
504 Bart van der Sloot, “Is All Fair in Love and War? An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 
ECHR”, in Military Law and the law of War Review 53/2 (2014), pp. 319-358 at p. 350.
505 In a similar sense, see Marko Milanovic, “Extraterritorial Derogations from Treaties in Armed 
Conflict”, in The Frontiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and its Challenges, Collected 
Courses of the Academy of European Law, vol. XXIV/1, p. 55-88 at p. 71. See also Leuven Manual 
on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations (Terry D. Gill, Dieter Fleck, William 
H. Boothby and Alfons Vanheusden, general eds; Marco Benatar and Remy Jorritsma, assistant 
eds.), Cambridge University Press 2017, pp. 85-88.
506 Tugendhat and Croft, The Fog of Law: An introduction to the legal erosion of British fighting power, 
https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/the-fog-of-law.pdf (last accessed 
on 16 October 2016) pp. 12 and 58-60.
507 Corpus Iuris Civilis, D.50.17.185.
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those who had usurped the powers of government was considered manifest.508 Rarely 
until now have there been prolonged states of emergency in place, with corresponding 
Article 15 derogations, and rarely have they covered the entire territory of the State. 
The Turkish derogations in issue in Sakık and Others and other cases of the period 
covered only certain provinces in the southeast of the country; the United Kingdom 
derogations covered only the six counties of Northern Ireland. Between July 2016 
and November 2017 there were for the first time three sweeping notices of derogation 
in place simultaneously, all of them for prolonged periods: that of Ukraine (lodged 
on 5  June 2015), that of France (lodged on 25 November 2015) and that of Turkey 
(lodged on 21 July 2016). The French and Turkish notices have been withdrawn. Of 
the three, only the Ukrainian derogation does not apply to the whole of the country. 
The continent of Europe appears to be heading towards more instability and crisis, 
not less; it may well be that more governments succumb to the temptation to solve 
their domestic problems by limiting substantive Convention rights. If they do, the 
day will surely come when the Court must consider critically, firstly, whether the situ-
ation so justifies, and secondly, whether the derogating measures themselves are – or 
continue to be – justified.
A further point to be made is that Contracting States have thus far eschewed its use 
in situations that could properly be described as ‘war’. One reason for this, pointed 
out above,509 may be that Governments are unwilling both to acknowledge their own 
inability to contain the situation and to recognise to their opponents combatant sta-
tus within the meaning of international humanitarian law – especially if the conflict 
is a non-international one fought on the territory of the Contracting State itself. An-
other may be a fear of criticism of their unwillingness fully to comply with Conven-
tion standards.510
The time may soon come for them to reconsider this stand. At all events, if it proves 
necessary to see current events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as occurring within an 
‘international armed conflict’,511 then the Ukrainian notice of derogation of 5 June 
2015 suggests that the practice of not lodging derogations under Article 15 in situ-
ations where the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions can apply, as identified in 
Banković and Hassan, is no longer universal.512
508 See 4.6 above.
509 See 4.3.2.2 above.
510 Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers, Cambridge 
University Press 2012, pp. 312-13.
511 There are interstate cases between Ukraine and the Russian Federation pending before the 
Court: these include, among others, Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), no. 20958/14, communi-
cated on 25 November 2014 and 29 September 2015, and Ukraine v. Russia (re Eastern Ukraine), 
no. 42410/15, communicated on 29 September 2015.
512 cf. International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities 2016, §§ 158 (“The information available suggests that the situation within the territory 
of Crimea and Sevastopol amounts to an international armed conflict between Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation”) and 169 (“Additional information, such as reported shelling by both States 
of military positions of the other, and the detention of Russian military personnel by Ukraine, 
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In another interesting development, several Convention States – Germany, Bel-
gium, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway – have sent let-
ters to the Security Council justifying military action targeting Islamic State on the 
territory of Iraq and Syria in terms of ‘collective self-defence’ within the meaning of 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.513 Recently, also, Turkey invoked Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter (as well as a number of existing Security Council reso-
lutions) in justification of military action in the Afrin region, just across the border in 
Syria, and directed against ‘Deash and the PKK/KCK Syria affiliate, PYD/YPG’.514 
and vice-versa, points to direct military engagement between Russian armed forces and Ukrain-
ian government forces that would suggest the existence of an international armed conflict in 
the context of armed hostilities in eastern Ukraine from 14 July 2014 at the latest, in parallel to 
the non-international armed conflict.”) See also footnotes 24 and 25 above and Sergey Sayapin, 
“Russia’s Withdrawal of Signature from the Rome Statute Would not Shield its Nationals from 
Potential Prosecution at the ICC”, EJIL:Talk!, 21 November 2016.
513 S/2015/928, 3 December 2015 (United Kingdom); S/2015/946, 10 December 2015 (Germany); 
S/2016/34, 13 January 2016 (Denmark); S/2016/132, 10 February 2016 (Netherlands); S/2016/513, 
3 June 2016 (Norway); S/2016/523, 9 June 2016 (Belgium). See Marko Milanovic, http://www.
ejiltalk.org/belgiums-article-51-letter-to-the-security-council/ (accessed on 19 June 2016) and 
Monica Hakimi and Jacob Katz Cogan, http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-role-for-the-security-council-
on-defensive-force/ (accessed on 22 November 2016).
514 Identical letters dated 20 January 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission 
of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council, S/2018/53. See also Anne Peters, “The Turkish Operation in Afrin (Syria) and 
the Silence of the Lambs”, EJIL:Talk!, 30 January 2018.
5 Jurisdiction of the Contracting States
5.1 Introduction515
Article 1 of the Convention makes the Contracting States promise to secure the rights 
and freedoms to ‘everyone within their jurisdiction’. Contracting States may some-
times seek to render the Convention inapplicable to their predicament by evading 
Article 1 jurisdiction altogether: it is therefore necessary to understand the meaning 
of the expression.
When the Convention was being negotiated in 1949 and 1950, the first draft held 
the promise of the Contracting States to guarantee human rights to their nationals; 
then to everyone ‘domiciled’ in their territory; later this was widened to ‘residents’, 
later still to ‘all persons within the territory’. The formulation ‘within their jurisdic-
tion’ was copied from an early draft of an International Covenant on Human Rights, 
which was then being prepared for the United Nations at Lake Success, New York. It 
was accepted apparently without discussion.516
What precisely the expression meant was not defined. It was left to the Court to 
construe it.
In general international law, ‘jurisdiction’ is in many respects an emanation of ‘sov-
ereignty’. ‘Sovereignty’ is an expression of ‘legal personality of a certain kind, that of 
statehood’.517 The expression ‘jurisdiction’ then refers to certain attributes of sover-
eignty: namely, the right and the power unilaterally to exercise legislative, executive 
and judicial power to prescribe conduct, whether it be to act in a particular way, to 
desist from particular action, or to suffer particular action by another.518 Jurisdiction 
in this sense is asserted as a right.
In contrast, the expression ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure’, as used in 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, imposes on States a duty, 
515 An earlier version of the text contained in 5.1 – 5.4 appeared in Human Rights in a Global World: 
Essays in honour of Judge Luis López Guerra (Guido Raimondi, Iulia Motoc, Pere Pastor Vilano-
va, Carmen Morte Gómez, eds.; Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), pp. 69-88, with the title “The Con-
vention a ‘regional’ instrument? Territorial and quasi-territorial scope of Article 1 jurisdiction”.
516 Collected edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, Article 1, Cour (77) 9. For more extensive de-
scriptions, see Lawson (1999), pp. 250-51 and Eric Pouw, International Human Rights Law and 
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Context of Counterinsurgency - With a Particular Focus on Target-
ing and Operational Detention (diss. UvA 2013), pp. 61-62.
517 Crawford (2012), p. 204.
518 Crawford (2012), p. 456; Jankowska-Gilberg, Magdalena, Extraterritorialität der Menschenre-
chte: Der Begriff der Jurisdiktion im Sinne von Art. 1 EMRK (diss. Regensburg 2007), Nomos, 
2008, pp. 25-29; Alex Mills, “Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law”, The British Yearbook 
of International Law (2014), Vo. 84 No. 1, 187-239 at pp. 194-200; Marko Milanovic, Extraterri-
torial application of human rights treaties, Oxford University Press 2011/2013, pp. 23-26; Michael 
Duttwiler, “Authority, Control and Jurisdiction in the Extraterritorial Application of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 30/2, 137-162, 
2012, at p. 157.
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or as it has been expressed, a ‘one-way obligation’, towards individuals519 – namely 
to secure the rights and freedoms which the Convention guarantees. The expression 
‘to everyone within their jurisdiction’ defines the circle of those towards whom this 
obligation exists. Jurisdiction in this sense is borne as a responsibility.
The two concepts of ‘jurisdiction’ are interrelated. The link between the two is 
that the State has both the right and the duty to exercise its legislative, executive and 
judicial powers to secure human rights.520
Despite their interrelation, the difference between the two concepts of ‘jurisdic-
tion’ predicates a difference in approach to the limits to be imposed. 
Where the expression ‘jurisdiction’ refers to the powers that international law 
recognises to States to impose their will on the individual, the limits will be such as 
to impose restrictions on the State’s liberty to act. These are generally limits flowing 
from the existence of other States enjoying the same powers; the ‘jurisdiction’, in this 
sense, of one State ends where that of another begins.
Conversely, where ‘jurisdiction’ refers to the obligation of the State to secure rights 
and freedoms to the individual, the limits will be on the scope of the State’s duties 
and, as a corollary, the possibility of applicant States or individuals521 to hold States 
responsible for violating these rights and freedoms. The latter is what is meant when 
the Court states, as it has done on several occasions in recent years, that Article 1 ju-
risdiction is a ‘threshold criterion’.522
There is an obvious tension between the two understandings of ‘jurisdiction’. Rai-
son d’état may induce Contracting States to seek to enjoy ‘jurisdiction’ in the first 
sense to the greatest possible extent and at the same time limit the responsibilities 
attending ‘jurisdiction’ in the second sense when they impose unwelcome constraints 
on the business of government.
The first step is therefore to consider the scope of ‘jurisdiction’ understood as the 
exercise of sovereignty. That will be the focus of this chapter. 
519 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, § 239; Maarten den Heijer and Rick Lawson, “Extraterritorial 
Human Rights and the Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’”, in M. Langford a.o. (eds.), Global Justice, State 
Duties (Cambridge University Press 2013), p. 153, at paragraph 3.1; see also Rick Lawson, “Out of 
Control: State Responsibility and Human Rights: Will the ILC’s Definition of the ‘act of State’ 
meet the Challenges of the 21st Century?” In M. Castermans, F. van Hoof and J. Smiths (eds.), 
The Role of the Nation State in the 21st Century – Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr (Kluwer Law 
International, 1998).
520 Milanovic (2011/13), p. 53; Angelika Nußberger, “The Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’ in the Jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights”, [2012] Current Legal Problems 65 p. 241 at 
p. 249 (footnote 19). Compare Article 2 § 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: “Each State Party shall take effective legisla-
tive, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.”
521 Articles 33 and 34 of the Convention respectively.
522 See, among other authorities, Al-Jedda, § 74; Al-Skeini, § 130; Nada v. Switzerland (GC), 
no. 10593/08, § 118, ECHR 2012; Djokaba Lambi Longa v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 33917/12, 
§ 61, ECHR 2012; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia (GC), nos. 43370/04, 
18454/06 and 8252/05, § 103, ECHR 2012.
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In normal circumstances the territorial and quasi-territorial limits on the powers of 
the State define the limits ratione loci on its Convention undertakings. We will exam-
ine these in 5.2-5.4. Further down, in 5.5, we will see that States exercise ‘jurisdiction’ 
in this sense beyond their borders as well; and in 5.6, that the exercise of domestic 
jurisdiction may produce Convention-relevant effects abroad.
The next chapter, Chapter 6, will focus more closely on the other aspect of ‘juris-
diction’, namely jurisdiction in the sense of ‘accountability’ – the sense in which it is 
understood for purposes of Article 1 of the Convention in ‘hard power’ situations.
5.2 Territorial and quasi-territorial jurisdiction
As the European Court of Human Rights has construed ‘jurisdiction’, the concept is 
‘primarily territorial’.523 There is thus no doubt that the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights applies throughout the European land territory of the various Contract-
ing States. However, as a matter of international law other than Convention law the 
exercise of domestic ‘jurisdiction’ outside the metropolitan land territory of the State 
is by no means unusual; this part of our study will therefore investigate the implica-
tions for the exercise of ‘Article 1 jurisdiction’.
5.2.1 The ‘colonial clause’
Article 56 § 1 of the Convention provides that 
[a]ny State may at the time of its ratification or at any time thereafter declare by 
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that 
[the] Convention shall … extend to all or any of the territories for whose inter-
national relations it is responsible.
In other words, applicability of the Convention to territorial possessions outside the 
European land mass is not automatic. Neither is the right of individual application: 
according to the fourth paragraph of that Article, it too must be extended separately.
For all that Article 56 is sometimes referred to as the Convention’s ‘colonial clause’, 
at the time when it was drafted – as Article 63 of the Convention of 1950 – it did not 
refer to ‘colonies’ – territorial possessions – alone. After the Second World War and 
the creation of the United Nations Organisation, certain States held territories in 
trust under Chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations; the territories in ques-
tion, most of them former German colonies and protectorates until 1918, had gener-
ally been League of Nations mandate territories until the League of Nations ceased 
to exist in 1946. The former German colonies in Africa were placed under French or 
523 Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 86, Series A no. 161; Banković and Others v. Belgium 
and 16 Other Contracting States (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, §§ 59 and 61, ECHR 2001-XII; Kalo-
geropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), no. 59021/00, ECHR 2002-X.
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British administration (with the exception of Rwanda-Urundi, which was entrusted 
to Belgium). Italy was entrusted with its own former colony of Italian Somaliland un-
til this territory was merged with British Somaliland to become what is now Somalia.
It is to a large extent a matter of opinion whether Article 56 allows the scope of the 
Convention’s territorial protection to be extended beyond European land borders or, 
conversely, restricts it to the territory of the mother country and allows Governments 
to choose carefully the dependencies to which they consider it can safely apply. 
The classical view is that Article 63 of the Convention of 1950 – as mentioned, 
the predecessor to the present Article 56 – was drafted in recognition of the inap-
propriateness of a colonial power assuming treaty obligations without the say-so of 
the ‘fledgling democratic institutions’ of a soon-to-be-independent territory.524 This 
is the view espoused by the Court itself: in Tyrer, it noted that ‘the system established 
by Article 63 was primarily designed to meet the fact that, when the Convention was 
drafted, there were still certain colonial territories whose state of civilisation did not, 
it was thought, permit the full application of the Convention’.525
On a more mistrustful view, it has been suggested that regardless of the wording 
of Article 56, its intended effect is the fruit of cynical politics, British in particular. 
Marko Milanovic, for example, paints a dark picture of shadowy figures in the Brit-
ish Colonial Office conspiring to withhold the protection of the Convention, and in 
particular the right of individual petition, from ‘large swathes’ of the then still-to-be-
dismantled British Empire.526
There is merit in the traditional view as expressed by the Court in Tyrer. In the 
mid-twentieth century traditional practices incompatible with the Convention sur-
vived in some overseas territories under European colonial sovereignty, for example 
head-hunting and cannibalism in Western New Guinea.527 While the Dutch, until 
1962 the colonial overlords of that particular territory, were certainly concerned to 
put a stop to these, it is beyond dispute that they could not in reason have been ex-
pected to enforce Article 2 of the Convention there as they could in Europe. Simi-
larly, female genital mutilation – an acknowledged violation of Article 3528 – was, and 
remains to this day, an indigenous custom accepted and widespread in parts of Africa 
and the Middle East that in the 1940s and 50s were still under British or French ad-
ministration.
524 Catherina Meredith and Theodora Christou, “Not in my Front Yard: Security and Resistance to 
Responsibility for Extraterritorial State Conduct”, in War or Crime? National Legal Challenges in 
Europe to the War in Iraq (Elspeth Guild, editor), Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009, at p. 404.
525 Tyrer, § 38.
526 Milanovic (2011/13), pp. 14-16, citing L. Moore and A.W.B. Simpson, ‘Ghosts of Colonialism 
in the European Convention on Human Rights’, (2006) BYIL 121, at 136-58. In a similar sense, 
Marco Duranti, The Conservative Human Rights Revolution, Oxford University Press 2017, 
pp. 197-205.
527 For a graphic eyewitness account from the 1950s, see http://www.papuaerfgoed.org/en/Head_
Hunting_on_the_South_Coast (translated from the Dutch) (retrieved on 3 April 2016).
528 Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden (dec.), no. 23944/05, 8 March 2007.
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Article 56 in its present redaction empowers Contracting States to extend the ap-
plicability of the Convention to ‘all or any’ of the territories for whose international 
relations they are responsible.
France did so, at the time of ratification, for ‘the whole territory of the Republic’ 
– that is, including all of its overseas departments and territories, while specifying 
that due regard should be had to ‘local requirements’. However, Saarland, a French 
protectorate from 1947 until 1956 (now a federal state of Germany), was a Party to 
the Convention in its own right even though representation of its interests abroad 
was entrusted to France.529
The Netherlands extended the applicability of the Convention to overseas territo-
ries that were part of its Kingdom (Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles but not 
Netherlands New Guinea) though some time after ratifying; the Netherlands decla-
ration is still valid for the Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curaçao, and the Netherlands 
part (just under half ) of Sint Maarten/Saint Martin.530
In contrast, the Convention was never made to apply in the Belgian Congo.531
The United Kingdom, at the time of ratification of the Convention in 1953, ex-
tended the applicability of the Convention (though not the right of individual peti-
tion) to
Aden Colony [now part of Yemen], The Bahamas, Barbados, Basutoland [now 
Lesotho], Bechuanaland [now Botswana], Bermuda, British Guiana [now Guy-
ana], British Honduras [now Belize], British Solomon Islands [now Solomon 
Islands], Channel Islands: The Bailiwick of Jersey, The Bailiwick of Guernsey 
[which includes the Channel islands Alderney and Sark], Cyprus, Falklands Is-
lands, Fiji, Gambia, Gilbert and Ellice Islands [Gilbert Islands, now Kiribati; El-
lice Islands, now Tuvalu], Gold Coast [now Ghana], Jamaica, Kenya, Gibraltar, 
Leeward Islands, Federation of Malaya [now absorbed into Malaysia], Malta, 
Isle of Man, Mauritius, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia [now Zambia], North Bor-
neo [now absorbed into Malaysia], Nyassaland [or Nyasaland, now Malawi], 
St. Helena, Sarawak [now absorbed into Malaysia], Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Somaliland [now absorbed into Somalia], Swaziland, Tanganyika 
[now absorbed into Tanzania], Trinidad, Uganda, Windward Islands: Domi-
nica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Zanzibar [now absorbed into Tanzania],
and at the request of the Government of that Kingdom, for whose interna-
tional relations Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom is responsi-
ble, Kingdom of Tonga.
529 Constitution of Saarland of 15 December 1947, Preamble (http://www.verfassungen.de/de/saar/
saarland47-index.htm, accessed 22 April 2017).
530 It extended to Suriname until 25 November 1975 when that country became independent from 
the Kingdom. The islands of Bonaire, Saba and St Eustatius, formerly part of the Netherlands 
Antilles, are now administratively part of the Netherlands proper (the Realm in Europe).
531 See X, Y and Z v. Belgium, Commission decision of 30 May 1961, Yearbook 1961 p. 260-70.
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Most of the lands mentioned are now independent. Cyprus and Malta are parties to 
the Convention in their own right. It remains interesting to see that for a brief period 
of perhaps ten years the Convention applied, via the United Kingdom, in much of 
continental Africa, South-East Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
The presence of the Kingdom of Tonga on this list is especially noteworthy. Be-
tween 1900 and 1970 Tonga (a Polynesian archipelago) was a self-governing British 
‘protected state’. This remarkable case of application of the Convention to a wholly 
non-European State retaining its own international legal personality remains unique.
Other British colonies and British-governed territories, however, were not offered 
the protection of the Convention. One example is Southern Rhodesia, where white 
minority rule prevailed. This territory was later to gain independence as Zimbabwe. 
Another is Hong Kong, which was to revert to Chinese sovereignty after a century 
and a half as a British Crown Colony. To date, no territorial declaration has been 
made in respect of the British Antarctic Territory, the British Indian Ocean Territory 
(the Chagos Islands) and the Pitcairn Islands.532
Only sixteen non-self-governing territories remain on the United Nations list. Of 
these, eleven are administered by States Parties to the Convention: one by France 
(New Caledonia) and ten by the United Kingdom (Anguilla, Bermuda, the British 
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Montserrat, St Helena, the 
Turks and Caicos Islands, Gibraltar and Pitcairn). Other offshore territories of Eu-
ropean states form a single constitutional entity with the mother country, such as 
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands (Denmark), Jan Mayen Island and Svalbard (Nor-
way), and the island regions of Portugal (the Azores and Madeira Islands) and Spain 
(the Balearic and Canary Islands), even though they may have internal self-govern-
ment within the structures of the State; for these, applicability of the Convention is 
axiomatic.
It should be pointed out that a territorial extension applicable to the Convention 
itself does not ipso iure also cover any of the Protocols: as is apparent from the deci-
sion of inadmissibility in Quark Fishing Ltd. v. the United Kingdom, either the Pro-
tocols included in the extension are specified, or for each Protocol a separate specific 
territorial extension is needed.533 Indeed, each of the Protocols that contain substan-
tive guarantees (Protocols 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13) has its own colonial clause.534
Similarly, although in respect of the mother country the right of individual peti-
tion is automatic by virtue of Article 34, in respect of territories for whose interna-
532 For the text of these declarations, see the web site of the Council of Europe’s Treaty Office, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=
20/06/2015&CL=ENG&VL=1 (English; also available in French). With respect to the British 
Indian Ocean Territory in particular, for which the point was disputed, see Chagos Islanders v. the 
United Kingdom (dec.), no. 35622/04, §§ 61-62, 11 December 2011.
533 Quark Fishing Ltd. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 15305/06, ECHR 2006-XIV; see also Gil-
low v. the United Kingdom, no. 9063/80, § 63, Series A no. 109.
534 Article 4 of Protocol No. 1; Article 5 of Protocol No. 4; Article 5 of Protocol No. 6; Article 6 of 
Protocol No. 7; Article 2 of Protocol No. 12; Article 4 of Protocol No. 13.
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tional relations the mother country is responsible a separate declaration accepting the 
right of individual petition remains a requirement (Article 56 §§ 1 and 4).
In addition to the United Kingdom, two other Contracting States (France and 
Norway) lay claims to territory on the continent of Antarctica. No territorial exten-
sions under Article 56 of the Convention covering those areas appear to be in force 
and it will have to be seen if the question ever presents itself whether, and to what ex-
tent, the Convention applies there. It should however be observed that the Antarctic 
Treaty, which according to its preamble is intended to ensure that Antarctica ‘shall 
continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become 
the scene or object of international discord’ and to establish scientific cooperation, 
includes a provision requiring its Contracting Parties ‘to exert appropriate efforts, 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages 
in any activity in Antarctica contrary to [its] principles and purposes …’535 – that is, 
to assert their legislative and, if necessary, judicial and executive jurisdiction for the 
purposes stated.
The question has been raised before the Court whether the two principal excep-
tions to territoriality identified in al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, namely 
‘State agent authority and control’ and ‘effective control over an area’,536 can create 
a jurisdictional link for purposes of Article 1 over an overseas territory even in the 
absence of a declaration under Article 56. In the one case where it arose (the Chagos 
Islanders case), the Court recognised the anomaly that would result from accepting 
Article 1 jurisdiction in areas for whose international relations the Contracting State 
was not responsible while making applicability of the Convention to legitimate over-
seas territories of the State itself (‘anachronistic colonial remnants’537 though they be) 
conditional on a declaration to that effect. Nevertheless, the Court did not on that 
occasion find it necessary to provide an answer because the application was in any 
event inadmissible for reasons quite unrelated to the exercise of jurisdiction.538
In Ilaşcu and Others the Moldovan Government tried to rely on the declaration 
made by Moldova at the time of ratification of the Convention, to the effect that it 
was unable to guarantee compliance with the Convention ‘omissions and acts com-
mitted by the organs of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester republic within the terri-
tory actually controlled by such organs’, and suggested that the Court could interpret 
Article 56 a contrario so as to permit a restriction of Moldova’s Article 1 jurisdiction in 
relation to the parts of its territory on which its writ did not run. The Court rejected 
this argument, holding 
535 Article X of the Antarctic Treaty (Washington, 1 December 1959). For a Norwegian view, see 
Magne Frostad, “The ‘Colonial Clause’ and Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights: The 
European Convention on Human Rights Article 56 and its Relationship to Article 1”, Arctic Re-
view on Law and Politics, vol. 4, 1/2013 pp. 21-41.
536 Al-Skeini, §§ 133-140; see below.
537 Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 35622/04, § 74, 11 December 2012.
538 Chagos Islanders, no. 35622/04, §§ 82, 85 and 86.
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that neither the spirit nor the terms of Article 56, which provides for extending 
the Convention’s application to territories other than the metropolitan territo-
ries of the High Contracting Parties, could permit of a negative interpretation in 
the sense of restricting the scope of the term “jurisdiction” within the meaning 
of Article 1 to only part of the territory.539
5.3 Sea, airspace and outer space under the sovereignty of States
5.3.1 Sea
5.3.1.1 Applicable regime
Of the Council of Europe Member States, only Andorra, Azerbaijan, San Marino 
and Turkey are not signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 1982 (hereafter UNCLOS). Liechtenstein is a signatory, but not a party. The 
Member States of the European Union are dually bound by the European Union’s 
ratification and by their own. 
Andorra, Liechtenstein and San Marino are landlocked; Azerbaijan borders on an 
inland sea (the Caspian); Turkey has direct access to the high seas. Both Azerbai-
jan and Turkey have naval forces and a merchant fleet; Andorra, Liechtenstein and 
San Marino have neither. None of these five States is a party to the four Law of the 
Sea Conventions of 1958 (the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone; the Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas; and the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf ), although these remain in force as between those parties that have not 
chosen to join UNCLOS (most notably the United States). 
Turkey’s position stems from its dispute with Greece over the Aegean. Turkey 
claims a 6-mile territorial sea there and recognises Greek jurisdiction to the same dis-
tance from the shore, opposing Greek claims based on UNCLOS.540
The status of the Caspian Sea is disputed between its littoral states, which include 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan in addition to Azerbaijan. The Caspian 
Sea is only accessible by water from the Baltic, Black and White Seas, and then only 
via internal waters indisputably Russian – the river Volga and the Russian inland ca-
nal system. The first question, which to date remains unanswered, is whether the law 
of the sea applies at all, or whether alternatively the Caspian should be viewed as an 
international lake; if the latter, the next question goes to the current status of existing 
539 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (GC) (dec.), no. 48787/99, 4 July 2001.
540 Turkey: “The Breadth of Territorial Waters”, website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-breadth-of-territorial-waters.en.mfa; “The De-
limitation of the Aegean Continental Shelf ”, ibid., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-delimitation-
of-the-aegean-continental-shelf.en.mfa; Greece: “Territorial sea – Casus belli”, web site of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, http://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-
turkish-relations/relevant-documents/territorial-sea-casus-belli.html; all accessed on 6 October 
2015.
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treaties entered into over the centuries by imperial Persia and imperial Russia (and 
later by the Soviet Union).541
Since it cannot be the purpose of this study to take a position on the delimitation 
and use of disputed stretches of water, this section will focus on the application of 
UNCLOS.
5.3.1.2 Sovereignty and ‘sovereign rights’ over marine areas
The baseline from which the various maritime zones are measured is, in principle, the 
low-water line along the coast, as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by 
the coastal State542 (or along the seaward low-water line of fringing reefs,543 or around 
archipelagos544); however, straight baselines may be drawn along heavily indented 
coast or highly unstable coastlines.545
Internal waters – that is, those waters that lie landwards of the baseline (special 
rules apply to archipelagic States546) – are within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
coastal state.547 There is no doubt that the State exercises its jurisdiction there as it 
does on its land territory, and accordingly undertakes the corresponding obligations 
pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention.
Articles 2 and 3 UNCLOS allow those Contracting States with a sea coast to ex-
tend their national sovereignty – and therefore their jurisdiction – up to twelve miles 
offshore, into their territorial sea.548 Article 2 § 3 UNCLOS provides that sovereignty 
over the territorial sea shall be exercised not only subject to that Convention, but also 
to ‘other rules of international law’ – a formulation that cannot in reason exclude du-
ties assumed under human rights treaties.
The Women on Waves judgment can be construed as an illustration of this. Portugal 
prevented the entry into its territorial sea of a vessel offering aid and information re-
lated to voluntary abortion. Abortion being then illegal in Portugal, the Government 
argued before the Court that actively supporting it was inconsistent with ‘innocent 
passage’ within the meaning of Articles 19 and 25 UNCLOS. While recognising the 
Portuguese interest in enforcing its laws, the Court nonetheless found the interfer-
ence with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Conven-
tion) disproportionate.549 Thus, in the Court’s view as expressed in this judgment at 
least, the rights and freedoms secured by the Convention, understood as ‘other rules 
of international law’ in the sense of Article 2 § 3 UNCLOS, can be seen to have a cer-
541 Hanna Zimnitskaya, James von Geldern, “Is the Caspian Sea a sea; and why does it matter?”, 
Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 1-14. 
542 Article 5 UNCLOS.
543 Article 6 UNCLOS.
544 Article 47 UNCLOS.
545 Article 7 UNCLOS.
546 Article 50 UNCLOS.
547 Articles 2 § 1 and 8 UNCLOS.
548 Articles 2 and 3 UNCLOS.
549 Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal, no. 31276/05, 3 February 2009.
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tain bearing on what constitutes ‘innocent passage’. The door would seem to be open 
to other Convention-compliant interpretations of definitions contained in UNC-
LOS.
Article 33 of UNCLOS allows a coastal State, within an additional twelve-mile 
zone (the ‘contiguous zone’), to 
exercise the control necessary to:
(a)  prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws 
and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b)  punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within 
its territory or territorial sea.
This too necessarily entails the applicability of any human rights treaties to which the 
coastal State is party.
Up to two hundred miles offshore, in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state 
enjoys ‘sovereign rights’ to regulate and police the use and harvesting of living and 
non-living resources, the construction and use of marine installations and artificial 
islands, scientific research and environmental protection.550 If the coastal state has 
a continental shelf extending further than that, it enjoys sovereign rights up to 350 
miles from its coast for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its resources.551 Again, 
the exercise of sovereignty – which involves legislating and policing, and potentially 
the exercise of jurisdictional powers – necessarily entails the applicability of human 
rights law.
A special regime applies to straits that are used for international navigation be-
tween one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone. The basic status of the waters of such a strait 
is that of the normal category to which they otherwise belong – territorial sea, con-
tiguous zone, etc., as the case may be – but the rights of transit are not identical. For 
present purposes, it is noted that States bordering such straits may designate sea lanes 
and prescribe traffic separation schemes and otherwise legislate in order to protect 
safety and the marine environment, to regulate fishing and to enforce customs tax, 
immigration and sanitary laws.552
Within archipelagic States, another special regime applies, that of ‘archipelagic wa-
ters’. Within the baselines drawn around the group (or groups) of islands, the State 
has sovereignty extending to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to 
their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein,553 albeit that pre-existing 
submarine cables and fishing rights are to be respected, ships are allowed passage un-
der a regime similar to that applicable to the territorial sea and straits used for inter-
550 Articles 56 and 57 UNCLOS.
551 Articles 76 and 77 UNCLOS.
552 Articles 41-43 UNCLOS.
553 Article 49 §§ 1 and 2 UNCLOS.
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national navigation, and special lanes may be created obligatory for both ships and 
aircraft to use.554
It is submitted that the Convention applies to the extent that Convention rights 
are affected by such exercise of sovereign rights, subject as appropriate to territorial 
declarations under Article 56 applicable to the relevant coastal land territory.555 This 
indeed corresponds to the way the Court has applied the concept of Convention ju-
risdiction to sea areas delineated in accordance with the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea.
In Drieman and Others v. Norway, a group of Greenpeace protesters complained 
under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention about being prosecuted and fined for try-
ing to impede whaling in the Norwegian exclusive economic zone. The Court noted, 
forthrightly, that
the applicants’ convictions and sentence to pay fines and the confiscation of the 
first applicant’s dinghy were all measures which the respondent State had taken 
in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 of the Convention, and 
thus were capable of engaging its responsibility under the Convention.556
In later cases the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone 
was simply taken for granted. Thus it was in Mangouras v. Spain, which concerned 
the modalities of detention on remand of the captain of an oil tanker registered in 
the Bahamas whose cargo of fuel oil had spilled into the sea and caused an ecological 
disaster.557
Plechkov v. Romania was the case of a Bulgarian fisherman prosecuted and sen-
tenced for illegal shark-fishing using long lines twenty-nine nautical miles off the Ro-
manian coast. A legislative decree declaring the Romanian exclusive economic zone 
in the Black Sea, dating back to 1986, had been repealed shortly before the fisherman’s 
arrest but not replaced by a new one; there being uncertainty as to the delineation of 
the zone, particularly in the absence of any pertinent agreement between Bulgaria 
and Romania, there was thus a violation of Article 7 of the Convention.558 The viola-
tion can be said to have resulted from a failure effectively to exercise legislative juris-
diction in pursuance of UNCLOS.
Conversely, in Quark Fishing v. the United Kingdom the refusal to extend a licence 
permitting long-lining for Patagonian toothfish in the exclusive economic zone sur-
rounding South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands could not be challenged 
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because, as we have seen, the United Kingdom, be-
ing the Contracting State responsible for the international relations of South Georgia 
554 Articles 50 -53 UNCLOS.
555 Compare Quark Fishing Ltd, supra note 533.
556 Drieman and Others v. Norway (dec.), no. 33678/96, 4 May 2000.
557 Mangouras v. Spain, no. 12050/04, 8 January 2009.
558 Plechkov v. Romania, no. 1660/03, §§ 71-74, 16 September 2014.
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and the South Sandwich Islands, had extended the applicability of the Convention 
itself to that territory but not that of Protocol No. 1.559
It is observed that Denmark, Norway and the Russian Federation claim exclusive 
economic zones and rights to the adjoining continental shelf in the Arctic. At least 
two of them – the Russian Federation and Denmark – lay competing claims to the 
continental shelf as far north as the geographical North Pole; these are currently un-
der discussion in the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf. It was announced in May 2016 that Canada intended to submit claims of its 
own in 2018.560
5.3.2 Territorial airspace
Article 1 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation provides that 
every state party to it has ‘complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above 
its territory’, ‘territory’ being defined by its Article 2 as ‘the land areas and territorial 
waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate’ of 
the state concerned. The State whose territory is overflown has the right to require 
aircraft to land in particular places, follow particular routes and comply with regula-
tions governing the loading and unloading of cargo and passengers.561
Again, this necessarily brings Article 1 of the Convention into play. However, case-
law addressing issues in this respect is rare indeed. In one case only, P.N. v. Switzerland, 
was jurisdiction over airspace in dispute: the applicant, who resided in the canton of 
Solothurn south of Basel, complained of noise pollution caused by aircraft taking off 
and landing at Basel-Mulhouse Airport. Switzerland had however delegated control 
of the airspace over that part of her territory to France. In declaring the application 
559 Quark Fishing Ltd, supra note 533.
560 The Danish and Russian claims remain on the agenda of the United Nations Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS); see UN Doc. CLCS/102, 6 February 2018, Agenda 
for the forty-sixth session (New York, 29 January-6 March 2018), and Progress of work in the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf - Statement by the Chair - Forty-sixth ses-
sion, UN Doc. CLCS/103 (8 April 2018) and UN Doc. CLCS/103/Corr.1 (9 May 2018). For the 
Danish claim, see Partial Submission of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together 
with the Government of Greenland to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
The Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland (executive summary, 15 December 2014), https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk76_14/dnk2014_es.pdf; for the Rus-
sian claim, see the Partial revised submission of the Russian Federation to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf in respect of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation 
in the Arctic Ocean (executive summary, 3 August 2015), https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_
new/submissions_files/rus01_rev15/2015_08_03_Exec_Summary_English.pdf. With respect to 
the claim intended to be submitted by Canada, see Radio Canada International, 3 May 2016, 
http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2016/05/03/canada-to-submit-its-arctic-continental-shelf-claim-
in-2018/, accessed on 3 September 2016. For a map depicting the present claims, see https://
www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/Arcticmap04-08-15.pdf (IBRU Centre for Borders 
Research, Durham University, accessed on 3 September 2016).
561 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 7 December 1944; Ninth Edition, 2006), 
Articles 3 bis and 5.
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inadmissible, the Commission based its decision directly on the inapplicability of Ar-
ticle 6 of the Convention, thus sidestepping the issue of jurisdiction.562
5.3.3 Outer space
In the discussions on jurisdiction under the European Convention on Human Rights 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space,563 including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, usually called the 
‘Outer Space Treaty’, is even more marginal than the conventions applicable to the 
sea and the sky. Assimilated territorial jurisdiction is expressly excluded: it is provided 
that ‘[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to 
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or 
by any other means’.564 A further treaty, the Agreement Governing the Activities of 
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, sometimes called the ‘Moon Treaty’, 
extends this principle to ‘other celestial bodies within the solar system’.565
Since, consequently, there can be no quasi-territorial exercise of sovereignty in out-
er space or on the heavenly bodies, Article 1 jurisdiction also of necessity follows the 
exercise of sovereignty over individual man-made objects.
States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty bear ‘international responsibility’ for 
‘national activities in outer space’, including on the Moon, whether such activities 
are carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities. The activities of non-
governmental entities shall require ‘authorization and supervision by the appropriate 
State Party’.
A number of States, including States Party to the Convention, have adopted legis-
lation to regulate the activities of their citizens in outer space and the registration of 
spacecraft.566
We will go into the detail of this below.
5.4 Ships, aircraft and spacecraft
In Assanidze, the Court stated that in certain ‘exceptional cases’, a State’s jurisdiction 
is assumed on the basis of ‘non-territorial factors’; examples given include ‘acts per-
562 P.N. v. Switzerland, no. 26245/95, Commission decision of 11 September 1997.
563 Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
564 Outer Space Treaty, Article II; see also Article 11 § 2 of the Agreement Governing the Activities 
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (for the moon in particular). See also Michael 
N. Schmitt, “International Law and Military Operations in Space”, in Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, Volume 10, 2006 (A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, eds.), pp. 89-125 at 
p. 101.
565 loc. cit., Article 1 § 1.
566 The Parties to the Convention referred to are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. For 
a collection of legal texts, see the web site of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw/index.html.
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formed on board vessels flying the State flag or on aircraft or spacecraft registered 
there’.567
It is submitted that the jurisdiction of a State over ships flying its flag or an air-
craft or spacecraft which it has registered, being exclusive and linked to nationality, 
is actually exercised within that State’s domestic limits; it is ‘extra-territorial’ only in 
the sense that it is not exercised on that State’s land territory. A ship, an aircraft or a 
spacecraft is not territorium nullius; nor, for the flag state or state of registration, is it 
foreign territory. It follows that the expression ‘exceptional cases’ is not really appro-
priate in this context; and in fact, this supposed exception is no longer mentioned in 
more recent case-law statements.568
5.4.1 Ships
5.4.1.1 Flag state jurisdiction
Article 91 § 1 UNCLOS provides that ships shall have the nationality of the State 
whose flag they are entitled to fly; and Article 92 § 1 of that Convention places ships on 
the high seas under the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag state. Article 94 § 1 requires 
the flag state effectively to exercise its ‘jurisdiction and control in administrative, tech-
nical and social matters over ships flying its flag’. The regulation required – which 
includes registration, the technical state and seaworthiness of ships, the qualifications 
of the master, officers and crew – is detailed in paragraphs 2 through 7 of that Article. 
The flag state is also expected to impose on the masters of ships flying its flag a duty to 
render assistance to persons in distress (Article 98). 
There has long been a plethora of international agreements and other legal instru-
ments setting out requirements binding on the flag state to implement these under-
takings. For example, the first International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), negotiated in the wake of the Titanic disaster of 1912, was adopted in 1914 
(although it never entered into force owing to the outbreak of World War I). The cur-
rent SOLAS Convention was adopted in 1974.569 Under its Article I, all ‘Contracting 
Governments’ undertake to ‘promulgate all laws, decrees, orders and regulations and 
to take all other steps which may be necessary’ to give that treaty ‘full and complete 
effect’.570 Other treaties govern standards of training, certification and watchkeep-
ing for ships’ officers and crews571 and such matters as compulsory insurance of ships 
567 Assanidze, § 137.
568 For example, Chagos Islanders, § 70.
569 International Maritime Organization web site, http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/Ref-
erencesAndArchives/HistoryofSOLAS/Pages/default.aspx, retrieved on 10 October 2015.
570 SOLAS, Article I (b).
571 International Maritime Organisation web site, International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), http://www.imo.org/en/
About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Standards-of-
Training,-Certification-and-Watchkeeping-for-Seafarers-%28STCW%29.aspx, retrieved on 10 
October 2015.
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against civil liability for oil pollution damage;572 it goes without saying that these 
require States parties to legislate and enforce their laws.
In a recent advisory opinion573 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
held that the list of ‘administrative, technical and social matters’ set out in Article 94 
UNCLOS was indicative, not exhaustive.574 In particular, 
119. It follows from the provisions of article 94 of the Convention that as far 
as fishing activities are concerned, the flag State, in fulfilment of its responsibil-
ity to exercise effective jurisdiction and control in administrative matters, must 
adopt the necessary administrative measures to ensure that fishing vessels flying 
its flag are not involved in activities which will undermine the flag State’s respon-
sibilities under the Convention in respect of the conservation and management 
of marine living resources. …
120. … [T]he flag State is under an obligation to ensure compliance by vessels 
flying its flag with the relevant conservation measures concerning living resourc-
es enacted by the coastal State for its exclusive economic zone because, as con-
cluded by the Tribunal, they constitute an integral element in the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.575
Elsewhere it is stated that flag states must
.… ensure that their nationals engaged in fishing activities within the exclusive 
economic zone of a coastal State comply with the conservation measures and 
with the other terms and conditions established in its laws and regulations.576
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal state – if it is not the same as the flag state 
– may only be exercised within the territorial sea and within strict limits, which for 
present purposes may be summarised as those cases in which there is a link between 
the crime committed on board and the coastal state; in which the flag state or the 
master of the vessel requests the coastal State to exercise criminal jurisdiction; and for 
the purpose of suppressing the trade in illegal drugs.577 The exercise of civil jurisdic-
tion on board ship is likewise reserved to the flag state, absent ‘obligations or liabilities 
assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the purpose of its voyage 
572 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), International 
Maritime Organisation web site, http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfCon-
ventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-
%28CLC%29.aspx, retrieved on 10 October 2015.
573 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Request for an advisory opinion submitted by the 
Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) (Case No. 21), Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015.
574 loc. cit., § 117.
575 loc. cit., § 119.
576 loc. cit., § 123.
577 Article 27 UNCLOS.
146 chapter 5
through the waters of the coastal State’ or in order to execute a civil judgment or court 
order against the ship herself.578
The primacy of flag State jurisdiction over coastal State jurisdiction is therefore 
established.
The admissibility decision in Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania has been 
cited in doctrine as an example of Italy’s exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction on 
the high seas.579 It is submitted that that is not the case in any relevant respect. The 
case concerns a collision that took place in March 1997, thirty-five miles offshore (i.e. 
outside the Italian territorial sea and contiguous zone), between a corvette of the 
Italian navy and a ship flying the Albanian flag carrying Albanian nationals seeking 
to enter Italy illegally. The Albanian ship sank; fifty-eight people lost their lives. Italy 
prosecuted the captain of its corvette for manslaughter. The applicants, survivors of 
the accident and relatives of some who died, joined the proceedings as civil parties.
The Court found that the collision had been ‘directly caused’ by the Italian naval 
vessel. Before the Court the applicants invoked, among other Articles of the Con-
vention, Articles 2 and 3. Since domestic proceedings were, at the time, still pending 
in Italy, the Court declared the application inadmissible on the ground that it was 
premature.580
Admittedly the decision does mention Article 1 of the Convention and the positive 
obligations of the State under Article 2. Even so, it is difficult to see how it establishes 
the Article 1 jurisdiction of Italy in the applicants’ favour. Italy’s right to board the 
Albanian vessel derived directly from a treaty between the two States concluded four 
days before the collision.581 Moreover, Italy was, of course, entirely within its rights to 
prosecute the captain of one of its own naval vessels – indeed, no other state would 
have been allowed to do so.582 However, the applicants’ position is hardly the same 
as that of an Italian naval officer serving on an Italian warship: since the proceed-
ings were pending at the time the application was lodged (and apparently the Italian 
courts – true to form – had not brought them to a conclusion even at first instance 
three years later when the decision was adopted), it would not have been unthinkable 
that the Italian courts might ultimately have declined jurisdiction to entertain the 
applicants’ claims.
578 Article 28 UNCLOS.
579 See, for example, Michael Duttwiler, “Authority, Control and Jurisdiction in the Extraterritorial 
Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights, Vol. 30/2, 137-162, 2012, at pp. 147 and 157.
580 Xhavara v. Italy and Albania (dec.), no. 39473/98, 20 September 1997; see also Banković, § 81, 
and Michael O’Boyle, “The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Juris-
diction: A Comment on Life After Banković”, in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties, Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kamminga, eds., Intersentia, 2004, pp. 125-139 at p. 134.
581 Compare and contrast Article 101 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and Article 22 § 1 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. Note that, at the time, Albania was 
not a party to the former but both were parties to the latter.
582 Article 97 of UNCLOS and Article 11 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.
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The case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy concerned a group of Somalian and 
Eritrean refugees intercepted at sea by Italian Revenue Police and Coastguard vessels 
while attempting to reach the island of Lampedusa. The refugees were transferred to 
Italian military vessels, from which they were set ashore at Tripoli without having 
been allowed to seek asylum in Italy.
Before the Court the Italian Government argued that the applicants had been tak-
en on board Italian ships in a rescue operation and then landed in Libya, from which 
it followed that the applicants had not come within Italian jurisdiction.
The Court replied as follows:
77. The Court observes that, by virtue of the relevant provisions of the law of 
the sea, a vessel sailing on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the State of the flag it is flying. This principle of international law has led the 
Court to recognise, in cases concerning acts carried out on board vessels flying a 
State’s flag, in the same way as registered aircraft, cases of extraterritorial exercise 
of the jurisdiction of that State (…). Where there is control over another, this is 
de jure control exercised by the State in question over the individuals concerned.
…
81. The Court observes that in the instant case the events took place entirely 
on board ships of the Italian armed forces, the crews of which were composed 
exclusively of Italian military personnel. In the Court’s opinion, in the period 
between boarding the ships of the Italian armed forces and being handed over to 
the Libyan authorities, the applicants were under the continuous and exclusive 
de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities. Speculation as to the nature 
and purpose of the intervention of the Italian ships on the high seas would not 
lead the Court to any other conclusion.583
5.4.1.2 Exercise of jurisdiction over foreign ships with the permission of the 
flag State
In Rigopoulos v. Spain the applicant was the master of a vessel flying the Panamanian 
flag that was intercepted three thousand miles from the Canary Islands pursuant to an 
order of a Spanish investigating judge. Prior verbal authorisation had been obtained 
from the Panamanian embassy in Spain, in accordance with Article 17 §§ 3 and 4 of 
the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances.584 The applicant complained, unsuccessfully, of having been kept 
in detention for sixteen days before being presented to a ‘judge or officer authorized 
583 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, §§ 77 and 81, ECHR 2012. See also Vio-
leta Moreno-Lax, “Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus Extraterritorial 
Migration Control?”, Human Rights Law Review 12:3(2012), 574-598 at pp. 579-582, and Tullio 
Treves and Cesare Pitea, “Piracy, International Law and Human Rights”, in The Frontiers of Hu-
man Rights: Extraterritoriality and its Challenges, Collected Courses of the Academy of European 
Law, vol. XXIV/1, pp. 89-126 at p. 105.
584 Vienna, 20 December 1988.
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by law to exercise judicial power’ (Article 5 § 3 of the Convention). No question of 
jurisdiction was raised.585
In contrast, in Medvyedyev and Others v. France586 there was. A merchant ship reg-
istered in Cambodia was suspected of carrying large quantities of illegal drugs in-
tended for delivery to Europe. In response to a request from the French government 
through the French embassy in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation granted France permission by diplomatic note 
to ‘intercept, inspect and take legal action against’ the vessel.
A frigate of the French navy was given orders to intercept the ship. She put a board-
ing party on board, after first having had to fire warning shots and use force to over-
come the resistance of the ship’s crew. One crew member died as a result of an injury 
sustained in the process. The ship was towed to France by a tug and her crew were 
confined to their quarters.
The surviving crew members complained before the Court of, among other things, 
having been arbitrarily detained on board their ship (Article 5 § 1 of the Convention).
In considering whether the events complained of came within French ‘jurisdiction’, 
the Court found that, in the circumstances described, France had exercised ‘full and 
exclusive control over the [ship] and its crew, at least de facto, from the time of its inter-
ception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner until they were tried in France’.587 
In terms of Article 1 of the Convention, the position is the same as in Hassan v. the 
United Kingdom, since France ‘retained authority and control over all aspects of the 
detention relevant to the [applicants’] complaints under Article 5’ regardless of any 
lack of territorial or quasi-territorial sovereignty.588
The question then arose whether the detention of the crew had an adequate le-
gal basis. Cambodia was not a party to either UNCLOS, which in its Article 108 
makes provision for the flag State to request the assistance of other States to combat 
drug trafficking, or the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.589
The majority of the Grand Chamber found that Article 5 § 1 had been violated. 
They found that since the diplomatic note permitted France only to ‘intercept, in-
spect and take legal action against’ the ship, there was no legal authority for action 
to be taken against the crew – which meant that a ‘clearly defined’ legal basis for the 
applicants’ detention was lacking. Moreover, an agreement made for the nonce and 
confidentially by diplomatic note did not meet the ‘foreseeability’ requirement either.
585 Rigopoulos v. Spain, no. 37388/97, Commission decision of 16 April 1998; Rigopoulos v. Spain 
(dec.), no. 37388/97, ECHR 1999-II. 
586 Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, ECHR 2010.
587 Medvedyev and Others, § 67.
588 Hassan, §§ 78-80; compare also al-Skeini, § 136. See also Tullio Treves and Cesare Pitea, “Piracy, 
International Law and Human Rights”, in The Frontiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and 
its Challenges, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, vol. XXIV/1, pp. 89-126 at 
p. 105.
589 Vienna, 20 December 1988.
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Interestingly, the majority added the following obiter dictum:
It is regrettable, in the Court’s view, that the international effort to combat drug 
trafficking on the high seas is not better coordinated bearing in mind the in-
creasingly global dimension of the problem. The fact remains that when a flag 
State, like Cambodia in this case, is not a party to the Montego Bay or Vienna 
Conventions, the insufficiency of such legal instruments, for want of regional 
or bilateral initiatives, is of no real consequence. In fact, such initiatives are not 
always supported by the States in spite of the fact that they afford the possibility 
of acting within a clearly defined legal framework. In any event, for States that 
are not parties to the Montego Bay and Vienna Conventions one solution might 
be to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements, like the San José Agreement 
of 2003, with other States. Having regard to the gravity and enormity of the 
problem posed by illegal drug trafficking, developments in public international 
law which embraced the principle that all States have jurisdiction as an excep-
tion to the law of the flag State would be a significant step in the fight against 
illegal trade in narcotics. This would bring international law on drug trafficking 
into line with what has already existed for many years now in respect of piracy.590
– thus apparently suggesting that if the crime being committed were one of piracy 
rather than drug trafficking, universal jurisdiction sufficient for purposes of the Con-
vention would exist under Articles 100-107 UNCLOS applied as customary interna-
tional law.591
A sizeable minority of the Court took a very different view. They considered it 
‘illogical’ to construe the diplomatic note so narrowly that jurisdiction over the crew 
was dissociated from jurisdiction over the ship. As to the requirement of ‘foreseeabil-
ity’, the dissenters accepted that the diplomatic note was not foreseeable in the sense 
of being ‘accessible’ to the applicants. That said, an exchange of diplomatic notes was 
usually confidential and necessarily so; in any case, the resistance put up by the crew 
showed that they at least had entertained no doubts about the nature of their traffic 
and had foreseen their own probable fate with complete accuracy.592
590 Medvedyev and Others, § 110; see also § 85.
591 Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia, EJIL 
2009), Vo. 20 No. 2, 399-414 at p. 401; Stefano Piedimonte Bodini, Fighting Maritime Piracy 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, EJIL (2011), Vol. 22 No. 3, 829-848 at page 
832. See also Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; that Article is 
identical to its predecessor, Article 19 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. For a historical 
view of the development of universal jurisdiction, see Mathilda Twomey, Muddying the waters of 
maritime piracy or developing the customary law of piracy? Somali piracy and Seychelles, (2014) 20 
CLJP/JDCP pp. 137 et seq. at pp. 139-144.
592 Medvedyev and Others, Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Casadevall, Bîrsan, Gar-
licki, Hajiyev, Šikuta and Nicolaou.
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5.4.2 Aircraft
Aircraft, like ships, have the nationality of the State in which they are registered.593 
Chapter 5 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation sets out de-
tailed rules governing such matters as registration, equipment, documents to be car-
ried on board, certification of airworthiness of aircraft and the licensing of aviators. 
Some of the rules set out in, or under, the Chicago Convention apply only as long 
as the aircraft is in flight. The definition of ‘flight time’ used in Annexes 1 and 6 to the 
Chicago Convention (on personnel licensing and operation of aircraft, respectively) 
is ‘the total time from the moment an aeroplane first moves for the purpose of taking 
off until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight’.594
Jurisdiction over crimes committed on board aircraft are the subject of several in-
ternational treaties. Thus, according to the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Cer-
tain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, the State of registration has juris-
diction over crimes committed on board an aircraft while it is ‘in flight’, even when 
overflying the territory of another State – ‘in flight’ being defined as ‘from the mo-
ment when power is applied for the purpose of take-off until the moment when the 
landing run ends’.595
The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safe-
ty of Civil Aviation is more complicated in that it differentiates between acts commit-
ted in or against an aircraft ‘in flight’ or ‘in service’. In the words of that instrument:
(a)  an aircraft is considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when 
all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when 
any such door is opened for disembarkation; in the case of a forced landing, the 
flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities take over the 
responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board;
(b)  an aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of the preflight 
preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight 
until twenty-four hours after landing; the period of service shall, in any event, 
extend for the entire period during which the aircraft is in flight as defined in 
paragraph (a) of this Article.596
The Montreal Convention requires States to establish their criminal jurisdiction over 
the offences in issue:
(a)  when the offence is committed in the territory of that State; 
593 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 17.
594 For a discussion of these definitions, see generally Sami Shubber, Jurisdiction over crimes on board 
aircraft, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
595 Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Tokyo, 14 Sep-
tember 1963), Article 1 §§ 2 and 3 and Article 3. 
596 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Mont-
real, 23 September 1971), Article 2.
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(b)  when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in 
that State; 
(c)  when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its ter-
ritory with the alleged offender still on board; 
(d)  when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft leased with-
out crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no 
such place of business, his permanent residence, in that State.597
We have already seen that the Court has recognised Article 1 jurisdiction on board 
aircraft registered in a Contracting State.598
The Chicago Convention does not apply to ‘State aircraft’ – that is, aircraft used in 
military, customs and police services.599 Aircraft that play a role in Strasbourg case-law 
are typically State aircraft. They normally enjoy immunity under customary interna-
tional law.600
In Öcalan v. Turkey the applicant, a terrorist leader on the run who had sought 
refuge in Kenya, was taken onto an aircraft at Nairobi Airport by Kenyan officials and 
arrested by Turkish officials. The registration of the aircraft does not appear from the 
Court’s judgment. At all events, the Court viewed the handover of the applicant into 
Turkish control as the fact defining Article 1 jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality 
or location of the aircraft; for this reason, the exercise of jurisdiction by Turkey was 
considered ‘extraterritorial’.601 Later, in Al-Skeini and Others, the Court gave an inter-
pretation of this finding defining the exercise of jurisdiction in terms of ‘State agent 
authority and control’.602
The finding in Öcalan nevertheless owes much in the way of inspiration to the then 
recent Commission decision Sanchez Ramirez v. France. The applicant in that case, 
then a well-known Marxist-Leninist ‘professional revolutionary’ who had sought ref-
uge in Sudan, was kidnapped, apparently by Sudanese officials – he alleges that he 
recognised some of them –, bundled onto an aircraft and flown to France where he 
was served with an arrest warrant. The registration of the aircraft, according to the 
applicant, was French. In the words of the Commission, 
597 Montreal Convention, Article 5 § 1.
598 Assanidze, § 137; Hirsi Jamaa and Others, § 77.
599 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 3.
600 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion 
(no.  363/2005) on the international legal obligations of Council of Europe Member States in 
respect of secret detention facilities and inter-state transport of prisoners (CDL-AD(2006)009), 
§ 95. For a discussion on the modalities governing the use of State aircraft in foreign airspace, see 
§§ 86-104.
601 Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 91, ECHR 2005-IV.
602 Al-Skeini, § 136.
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If this was indeed the case, the applicant was effectively under the authority, and 
therefore the jurisdiction, of France, even if this authority was, in the circum-
stances, being exercised abroad (…)603
– words taken from an even earlier, again very similar decision, that of Reinette 
v. France, the applicant in that case having been apprehended and unceremoniously 
handed over on the Caribbean island of Saint Vincent.604
The same kind of language appears in Freda v. Italy, a case in which the applicant, 
an Italian criminal on the run, was arrested in Costa Rica and handed over to Italian 
officers to be flown out on an Italian military aircraft.605 The aircraft made two stops 
in foreign countries – we do not know which countries – before reaching Italy. It was 
alleged that on both occasions the applicant asked to be allowed to leave the aircraft 
to request asylum and on both occasions he was met with a refusal. This implies that 
the applicant remained in Italian detention throughout the return journey, even while 
the aircraft was stationary on foreign territory. The Commission did not find it nec-
essary to devote any discussion to this aspect of the case but nonetheless found that 
Mr Freda’s detention had an adequate basis in Italian law for purposes of Article 5. 
We do not know whether Italy sought and obtained the permission of the countries 
concerned before landing on their territory, as would normally be required;606 the de-
cision gives no information about this, and the question may not have been raised by 
the applicant. If such be not the case, then the Commission’s finding, which implied 
that it was ‘lawful’ in terms of Article 5 § 1 for Italian agents to detain an individual on 
board an Italian aircraft even while it was parked on foreign soil, of necessity implies 
that the Article 1 jurisdiction of Italy, understood in a quasi-territorial sense, followed 
the registration of the aircraft.607 
We do not know the registration of the aircraft that conveniently suffered a mal-
function in flight from Strasbourg to Luxembourg, forcing it to land at Saarbrücken 
where the German police were waiting to arrest its passenger Stocké.608 Presumably 
however it was a civilian aircraft, which German police officers could in any case 
board without seeking the permission of any foreign government; only if that be so 
could the Court not find that the circumstances of Mr Stocké’s arrest involved ‘unlaw-
ful activities abroad’.609
603 Ramirez Sanchez v. France, no. 28780/95, Commission decision of 24 June 1996, DR86-B p. 155 
et seq.
604 Reinette v. France, no. 14009/88, Commission report of 2 October 1989, DR 63, p. 192 et seq.
605 Freda v. Italy, no. 8916/80, Commission decision of 7 October 1980, DR 21, p. 254 et seq.
606 On this subject, see European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 
Opinion (no. 363/2005) on the international legal obligations of Council of Europe Member 
States in respect of secret detention facilities and inter-state transport of prisoners (CDL-
AD(2006)009), § 18.
607 Freda v. Italy, loc. cit.
608 Stocké v. Germany, no. 11755/85, Series A no. 199.
609 loc. cit., § 54.
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5.4.3 Spacecraft
We have seen that in Assanidze the Court, in an obiter dictum, recognised that ‘[i]
n certain exceptional cases’, jurisdiction was assumed on the basis of ‘non-territorial 
factors’ including acts performed on board ‘spacecraft registered [in the State con-
cerned]’. This is to date the only judgment or decision on record in which the Court 
has recognised Article 1 jurisdiction in respect of spacecraft.
A State Party ‘on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried’ re-
tains ‘jurisdiction and control thereof, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer 
space or on a celestial body’.610 For present purposes, by far the most numerous cat-
egory of such objects is made up of unmanned satellites.
Satellites are owned and operated for a variety of uses by European State and non-
State actors. Among the better-known of these are INMARSAT, based in the United 
Kingdom (international telecommunications, especially for marine and aircraft use), 
and GLONASS (Russian, marine navigation), in addition to a large number of com-
mercial television broadcasters who are household names. 
Currently the only manned space station is the International Space Station, which 
is the fruit of co-operation by Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation, the USA and 
the Member States of the European Space Agency. Alone among the parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (alone in the world, in fact, since the Amer-
ican space shuttle programme was closed down), Russia operates manned delivery 
devices.
It would be logical to imagine that in principle both unmanned and manned space-
craft (or other extra-terrestrial human habitations), the latter including their occu-
pants, should, by analogy to more conventional maritime or airborne conveyances 
and their passengers and crew, be considered for purposes of Article 1 of the Conven-
tion to be within the jurisdiction of the State which owns, or whose nationals own, 
the spacecraft or other extra-terrestrial installation should the question ever arise. In 
fact, the rights and duties of States would appear to go further: Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty provides that 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national ac-
tivities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such 
activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, 
and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the 
provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental 
entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall re-
quire authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party 
to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for 
610 Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty; see also Article II of the Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space.
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compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organiza-
tion and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.611
It has been pointed out that this creates a form of State responsibility unique to space 
law in that it makes States directly internationally responsible for the acts and omis-
sions of private parties.612
The legal framework governing the International Space Station is constituted by 
an Intergovernmental Agreement to which Canada, Japan, Russia, the USA and ten 
European Space Agency member States are parties (or ‘partners’), the participating 
European States delegating their role to the European Space Agency (ESA) as ‘the Eu-
ropean Partner’.613 Since each of the partners provides parts of the International Space 
Station (which it registers as its own), each retains ‘jurisdiction and control’ over the 
parts it provides and registers as well as ‘over personnel who are its nationals’.614 This 
solution should be understood in the light of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty in 
fine. It remains to be seen how it will work for European nationals in terms of Article 1 
of the Convention if the occasion should ever arise, the European Space Agency itself 
and some of its component ‘partners’ (Canada, Japan, the USA) not being Contract-
ing Parties and the European Space Agency itself enjoying immunity from suit.615
The Galileo project, a European–based global navigation satellite system set up 
in parallel with the American Navstar GPS system and GLONASS, is funded by 
the European Union and operated by ESA.616 The older European Geostationary 
Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) system, which complements GPS, is owned 
by the European Union.617 Article 1 jurisdiction in relation to these is likely to arise 
no sooner than when the European Union overcomes its hesitation to accede to the 
Convention.618
611 Emphasis added.
612 Schmitt (2006), p. 106.
613 Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the European 
Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America concerning cooperation on the Civil International Space 
Station (“the Intergovernmental Agreement”, Washington, 29 January 1998). See also Article VI 
of the Outer Space Treaty in fine.
614 Article 5 of the Intergovernmental Agreement; see also André Farand, Astronauts’ behaviour onboard 
the International Space Station: regulatory framework, in legal and ethical framework for astronauts 
in space sojourns, proceedings of a symposium co-hosted by the European Center for Space Law 
(ECSL), the Legal department of the European Space Agency (ESA), L’institut du droit de l’espace 
et des télécommunications de l’Université de Paris XI (IDEST) and United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), (Paris, 29 October 2004), pp. 70-78.
615 Waite and Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083/94, § 57, ECHR 1999-I. See also 8.4.5.1 below.
616 European Space Agency, Galileo Full Operational Capability Procurement factsheet, http://download.
esa.int/docs/Galileo_IOV_Launch/FOC_factsheet_20111003.pdf, accessed on 5 October 2015.
617 European Space Agency, EGNOS brochure, http://www.egnos-pro.esa.int/Publications/ESA_
EGNOS_br284_2009.pdf, accessed on 5 October 2015.
618 Article 59 § 2 of the Convention (a provision inserted by Protocol No. 14); but see Opinion 2/13 of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union on accession to the Convention (18 December 2014).
155Jurisdiction of the Contracting States
5.5 Extraterritorial jurisdiction
Even in normal circumstances, the State may find itself exercising jurisdiction in re-
spect of matters occurring outside its territorial or quasi-territorial sovereignty. Let us 
therefore now determine when the exercise of jurisdiction can properly be said to be 
extraterritorial.
5.5.1 Legal acts of domestic authorities in another country, such as diplomatic 
or consular activity
A State may impose on aliens wishing to take up residence on their territory the re-
quirement that they normally apply for permission to do so from their own home 
country. The decision to grant or refuse permission will be submitted to the diplo-
matic or consular representatives of the State concerned and decided by the Govern-
ment in accordance with its own domestic legislation, generally – as in the case of the 
Netherlands – on its own territory.619 This does not alter the fact that the victim is 
– and if permission is refused, remains – resident abroad, which means that to that ex-
tent the effects of any resulting violation are extraterritorial. Issues under the Conven-
tion, when they occur in this situation, tend to concern the application of Article 8 
of the Convention (right to respect for family life). The Court has so far declined 
to answer the question whether they involve the extraterritorial exercise of Article 1 
jurisdiction by the Convention State concerned.620
The Commission has held that ‘authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic 
or consular agents bring other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State 
to the extent that they exercise authority over such persons or property’.621 An exam-
ple of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to the acts of diplomatic or consular of-
ficials from the Court’s case-law is El Morsli v. France,622 the applicant being a woman 
of Muslim faith who objected to a requirement by the French consular authorities 
remove her veil for identity check before being allowed to enter the French consulate 
general in Marrakech. The assumption that France had Article 1 jurisdiction was im-
plicit: the Court considered, without addressing that or any other preliminary issue, 
that the application was manifestly ill-founded. 
Conversely, while the execution in foreign territory of an agreement with the re-
ceiving State can engage the responsibility of the sending Convention State, a uni-
lateral legal act by the receiving State affecting the execution of such an agreement 
cannot be imputed to the Convention State. An example is Gentilhomme, Schaff-
Benhadji and Zerouki v. France, which concerned the withdrawal by Algeria from an 
619 For example, Ahmut v. the Netherlands, no. 21702/93, Reports 1996-VI; and Tuquabo-Tekle and 
Others v. the Netherlands, no. 60665/00, 1 December 2005. 
620 I.A.A. and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 25960/13, § 26, 8 March 2016.
621 See, for example, X v. the United Kingdom, no. 7547/76, Commission decision of 15 December 
1977, Decisions and Reports (DR) 12, p. 73; for a summary of the Court’s case-law on the matter, 
see, among other authorities, Assanidze, § 137.
622 El Morsli v. France (dec.), no. 15585/06, 4 March 2008.
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agreement under which children with dual Algerian and French nationality could be 
educated in French schools on Algerian territory.623
5.5.2 The exercise of jurisdiction by a State over its own troops abroad 
5.5.2.1 In general
It is standard practice for States to exercise their jurisdiction over members of their 
own armed forces when these are engaged in operation abroad.
In Serves v. France624 the applicant was a French officer commanding a company 
of paratroops in the Central African Republic in the late 1980s. It was brought to his 
notice that one of his platoon commanders had been responsible for the murder of a 
native. Captain Serves failed to report the incident to his superiors and ordered his 
men to say nothing about it to anyone. Ultimately he was sent back to metropolitan 
France where he was prosecuted for aiding and abetting murder.
Captain Serves’s complaint to the Court, which was under Article 6 of the Con-
vention, concerned the alleged violation of his right not to incriminate himself. In the 
event, no violation was found. 
The case concerns the exercise by a State of its criminal jurisdiction over one of its 
own servicemen in connection with acts suspected to have been committed abroad. It 
is worth mentioning here for that reason only, even though the question of Article 1 
jurisdiction did not need to be addressed by the Court. On a substantive level, it is 
little different in its essentials from many other cases decided by the Court under the 
criminal head of Article 6.
5.5.2.2 Under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 
States may exercise their jurisdiction over members of their own armed forces sta-
tioned abroad and over any civilian component of their forces including family mem-
bers of their service personnel. This can include the exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
by a court martial in the foreign country. Typically there will be an arrangement in 
place between the States concerned. The legal instrument most relevant to European 
States, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, provides for the sending State to have 
primary jurisdiction in situations where jurisdiction is concurrent.625
Examples in the Court’s case-law include Coyne v. the United Kingdom, Mills v. the 
United Kingdom and Germany and Martin v. the United Kingdom, the issue being the 
independence and impartiality of a British court martial called upon to try a Brit-
ish serviceman stationed in Germany (or, in the case of Martin, a dependent family 
member).626
623 Gentilhomme, Schaff-Benhadji and Zerouki v. France, no. 48205/99 48207/99 48209/99, § 20, 
14 May 2002.
624 Serves v. France, 20 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997VI.
625 Galić v. the Netherlands (dec.), § 44; Djokaba Lambi Longa (dec.), § 70; NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement 1951, Article VII.
626 Coyne v. the United Kingdom, no. 25942/94, Reports 1997-V; Mills v. the United Kingdom, 
no.35685/97, 5 June 2001; Martin v. the United Kingdom, no. 40426/98, 24 October 2006.
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The Convention applies in such a situation by virtue of binding the sending State.
5.5.3 Ad hoc domestic tribunal set up abroad with the permission of the 
receiving State
To date, there has been only one ad hoc domestic tribunal created on foreign terri-
tory with the permission of the receiving State by any State Party to the Convention, 
namely the Scottish Court organised in the Netherlands to try the Lockerbie bomb-
ing suspects under Scots law and procedure.627 It was set up at a disused air base near 
Zeist and existed from 1999 until 2002.
Again, there is no doubt that the Convention applied by virtue of binding the 
United Kingdom.
5.5.4 Cases in which the presence of foreign judges is not exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by another State
Not all cases involving foreign judges are cases in which a foreign State exercises ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction.
Fomerly, French and Spanish judges sat as members of Andorran courts. In Drozd 
and Janousek v. France and Spain, the question arose whether their acts came within 
the jurisdiction of France and Spain, respectively: sovereignty over the principality 
was – and still is – shared by the Co-Princes, the president of the French Republic and 
the bishop of Urgell in Spain, and Andorra was at the time not yet a party to the Con-
vention in its own right. The Court found that they did not; French or Spanish the 
nationality of the judges might be but they sat as Andorran judges applying Andorran 
law, not as judges of France and Spain. Similarly, as the Court pointed out, Austrian 
and Swiss jurists sat as judges in Liechtenstein.628
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is constituted of nine judges, 
six of them nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina appointed by the Entities and three 
appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consulta-
tion with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The three judges appointed by 
the President of the Court are not allowed to be nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
or any neighbouring State.629 An interesting feature of this court is that it is part of an 
armistice arrangement: the Constitution under which it was set up is an annex to the 
Dayton Peace Agreement – the agreement that ended the 1992-95 war, that still holds 
Bosnia and Herzegovina together more than twenty years later and that none dare 
touch, let alone replace, lest the country unravel. We will discuss the Dayton system 
in greater detail below.
627 Mentioned in Galić,§ 45; Djokaba Lambi Longa, § 70. See the Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning a Scottish trial in the Netherlands (with annexes), The 
Hague, 18 September 1998, UNTS 35699 (vol. 2117).
628 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, no. 12747/87, §§ 91 and 96, Series A no. 240.
629 Article 6 (1)(a)-(b) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4 to the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Dayton Peace Agreement”).
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Kosovo makes extensive use of foreign judges, prosecutors and registry staff in its 
Specialist Chambers, which are set up to try crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed on the territory of Kosovo between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000 
– most notably trafficking in human organs taken by members of the UÇK (Ushtria 
Çlirimtare e Kosovës, Kosovo Liberation Army (also KLA)) from prisoners during 
the Kosovo War.630 The Specialist Chambers are based in The Hague rather than in 
Kosovo itself to ensure the safety of witnesses. They are attached to every level of the 
Kosovo judiciary. Although it is provided only that the three members of the Special-
ist Chamber of the Constitutional Court shall be international judges,631 in practice 
not one of the judges of the Specialist Chambers has Kosovo citizenship; neither do 
the Specialist Prosecutor and the Registrar.632
5.6 Cases in which acts producing effects abroad are not exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction
5.6.1 Expulsion and extradition
As the Court has held many a time, Contracting States have the right, as a matter of 
well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations including the 
Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens.633 The decision 
of a competent domestic authority to refuse access to an alien, or to deport an alien, 
undoubtedly constitutes an exercise of domestic sovereignty. Nevertheless, such a de-
cision, if carried out: can produce effects abroad: for our purposes, this will be the case 
when persons are extradited to a foreign country where they are exposed to a situation 
or treatment proscribed by the Convention.
In Soering v. the United Kingdom the Court recognised that the Convention did 
not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor did it purport to be a means of 
requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention standards on other States. 
Article 1 could not be read as justifying a general principle to the effect that, notwith-
standing its extradition obligations, a Contracting State might not surrender an indi-
vidual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of destination 
were in full accord with each of the safeguards of the Convention.634 Even so, 
… the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an 
issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the 
630 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report on “Inhuman treatment of people and illicit 
trafficking in human organs in Kosovo”, Doc. 12462, 07 January 2011.
631 Article 162 § 3 of the Constitution of Kosovo (Constitutional Amendment No. 24). 
632 See generally the Kosovo Law No. 05/L-53 on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s 
Office. For the Roster of International Judges, the Specialist Prosecutor and the Registrar, see also 
the web site of the Specialist Chambers, https://www.scp-ks.org/en (accessed on 22 April 2017).
633 Among other examples too numerous to cite, see Chahal, § 73.
634 Soering, § 86.
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Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the 
person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting coun-
try. The establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an assessment 
of conditions in the requesting country against the standards of Article 3 of the 
Convention. Nonetheless, there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the 
responsibility of the receiving country, whether under general international law, 
under the Convention or otherwise. In so far as any liability under the Convention 
is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by 
reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of 
an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.635
Since then, many an applicant has taken a case to the Court alleging that his or her 
extradition or deportation to another country would entail violation of Article 2, 
Article 3 or Protocols 6 or 13. Cases of this type considered by the Court now number 
in their thousands.
Examples relevant to the subject of this study include Chahal v. the United 
Kingdom,636 Saadi v. Italy,637 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom and Tra-
belsi v. Belgium,638 all of which concern the intended (Chahal) or actual (Saadi and 
Trabelsi) extradition or deportation of terrorist suspects.
Applicants fearing criminal prosecution have also sought to prevent their deporta-
tion or extradition on the ground that they would suffer a ‘flagrant denial of justice’ 
in the receiving country. Although the possibility that deportation or extradition in 
such circumstances might violate Article 6 of the Convention has been recognised in 
the Court’s case-law since Soering, the test is a stringent one. To date, the Court has on 
three occasions found violations on this ground; the applicant Othman (Abu Qata-
da) managed to persuade the Court that he had reason to fear conviction on evidence 
obtained by torturing supposed witnesses, and the applicants Al Nashiri and Husayn 
(Abu Zubaydah), whose cases the Court heard in parallel, were found to have been 
sent to face the prospect of criminal proceedings lacking even elementary procedural 
guarantees on the American military base at Guantánamo Bay.639
There have been several cases in which Contracting States have permitted, or failed 
to prevent, the transfer of a person from within their jurisdiction to a foreign des-
tination where they suffered arbitrary detention. Specifically, these were prisoners 
held by the CIA as victims of rendition who were first held on the territory of the 
635 Soering, § 91. Emphasis added. See also Lawson (1999) pp. 241-48.
636 Chahal v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 22414/93, Reports 1996-V.
637 Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008.
638 Trabelsi v. Belgium, no. 140/10, ECHR 2014.
639 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, no. 8139/09, § 285, ECHR 2012; Husayn (Abu 
Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, §§ 555-560, 24 July 2014; Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 
§§ 565-568, 24 July 2014; Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, no. 46454/11, § 657, 31 May 2018; Al Na-
shiri v. Romania, no. 33234/12, §§ 719-721, 31 May 2018.
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Contracting States concerned and then removed to a place of detention outside the 
jurisdiction of any European State. The Court has found the responsibility of those 
Contracting States to be engaged.640 
The Court explicitly linked the issue of extradition or deportation to Article 1 of 
the Convention in Loizidou (preliminary objections),641 referring (in addition to Soer-
ing) to its landmark judgments Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden and Vilvarajah and 
Others v. the United Kingdom.642 In Cruz Varas the Court was still careful to point out 
that it was not the responsibility of the receiving State that was engaged but that of 
the Convention State only. A statement to similar effect is absent from Vilvarajah and 
Others and indeed from Chahal. It only made its reappearance in the Chamber judg-
ment in Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey643 and in the later Grand Chamber 
judgment in that case (re-named Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey644). It has since 
appeared in Saadi, Al Nashiri, Abu-Zubaydah and Trabelsi and may therefore be con-
sidered to reflect the current state of the law.645
Despite the link to extraterritorial jurisdiction made in paragraph 62 of Loizidou 
(preliminary objections), deportation and extradition cases do not involve the extra-
territorial exercise of territorial jurisdiction properly so-called. Although the danger 
to the person subject to deportation or extradition may threaten or even materialise 
abroad, the decision to deport or extradite is taken on the home territory of the State 
and put into effect there through the person’s forcible removal across the border; the 
Article 1 jurisdiction of the deporting or extraditing State is engaged through the ad-
equacy or otherwise of its assessment of the risks.646
5.6.2 Attack on foreign territory
Although undoubtedly an armed attack on a target located on the territory of a for-
eign State produces effects abroad, the consequence that there is exercise of Article 1 
jurisdiction is not inevitable. A cross-border attack does not necessarily constitute 
the assertion by the attacking State of its ‘sovereignty’, as the refusal to grant access 
to an alien (or to remove an alien from the territory of the State) undoubtedly does. 
The establishment of Article 1 jurisdiction resulting from the exercise of ‘hard power’ 
abroad will be examined in detail in Chapter 6 below. We will see, in particular, that 
the Court has rejected the suggestion that an attack is of itself sufficient to bring its 
640 Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, § 525, 24 July 2014; Al Nashiri v. Poland, 
no. 28761/11, § 531, 24 July 2014; Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, no. 46454/11, § 657, 31 May 2018; 
Al Nashiri v. Romania, no. 33234/12, § 691, 31 May 2018.
641 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections) (GC), no. 15318/89, §§ 61-64, Series A no. 310.
642 Soering, § 91; Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, no. 15576/89, Series A no. 201; and Vilvarajah 
and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 13163/87 13164/87 13165/87 13447/87 13448/87, Series A 
no. 215. 
643 Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 66, 6 February 2003.
644 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC), nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 67, 4 February 2005.
645 Saadi, § 126; Al Nashiri v. Poland, § 457; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, § 454-55; Trabelsi, 
§ 119.
646 Paposhvili v. Belgium (GC), no. 41738/10, § 184, ECHR 2016.
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victims within the jurisdiction of the attacking Contracting State (the ‘cause and ef-
fect’ model).647 
5.7 Conclusion
Man is a land animal, and ‘jurisdiction’ for purposes of Article 1 of the Convention 
will for the most part be exercised on land. However, its exercise is not limited to the 
land territory of the Contracting States, let alone their metropolitan land area. It is 
also exercised on the sea, in the sky, even in outer space, and in some uncontroversial 
situations, on the territory of other States. The scope for using ‘hard power’, as we have 
defined it – for which the Contracting State may be held accountable as a result – ex-
ists in all of these places.
647 See 6.4.3.1 below.

6 Typology of Article 1 jurisdiction in 
‘hard power’ situations
6.1 Introduction
Having in the previous chapter explored the exercise of ‘jurisdiction’ both territorial 
and extraterritorial in general, we will now explore the limits of jurisdiction in the 
type of situation that interests us in particular – situations involving the use of ‘hard 
power’, as we have defined it for our purposes.648 The focus of this part is on defining 
the limits of ‘Article 1 jurisdiction’ in such situations and hence the answerability of 
the State under the Convention.
6.2 States acting exercising ‘hard power’ on their own territory
6.2.1 Acknowledging jurisdiction
The least problematic category of cases is that of Contracting States acting within 
their own territory and acknowledging – indeed, actively asserting – their jurisdic-
tion. There is no doubt in these cases that the Convention applies.
6.2.1.1 Ireland
Thus, in the Lawless case, the very first case ever brought before the Court, we find the 
Republic of Ireland in the 1950s moving to suppress ‘armed groups, calling themselves 
the “Irish Republican Army” (IRA)’, formed ‘for the avowed purpose of carrying out 
acts of violence to put an end to British sovereignty in Northern Ireland’.649 The case 
concerned an Irish national detained without trial for the sole purpose of prevent-
ing him from engaging in terrorist activity. It raised issues mainly under Article 5 of 
the Convention. In the event, as we have seen, the alleged violation was covered by 
a notice of derogation submitted by the Irish Government under Article 15 of the 
Convention.650
6.2.1.2 United Kingdom
Nearly two decades later, we see the United Kingdom itself acting against individu-
als and groups possessed of very much the same intentions, both on its own side of 
648 See 1.2.3 above.
649 Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), § 6.
650 See 4.5.1.2 above.
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the Northern Ireland border651 and in another territory for whose international rela-
tions it is responsible, Gibraltar652 – and back in Northern Ireland, acting rather more 
equivocally, it has to be said, against loyalist paramilitaries.653 Ireland v. the United 
Kingdom, the first interstate case to reach the Court, led to findings of violation of 
Article 3 of the Convention as a result of treatment meted out by the United King-
dom to suspected IRA terrorists; individual applications in this category tend to in-
volve violations of Article 2. 
6.2.1.3 Turkey
From at least the mid-1980s onwards Turkey’s south-east has been beset by serious 
disturbances between the security forces and the armed wing of the PKK. It was esti-
mated in 1996 that around 4,000 each of civilians and members of the security forces 
had been killed and some 1,000 villages had been destroyed and evacuated.654
Complaints brought about actions of the Turkish security forces concern such mat-
ters as the destruction of houses in a village caught in the crossfire;655 acts of maltreat-
ment and torture;656 allegedly unlawful killing;657 and enforced disappearance.658
6.2.1.4 Russia
Russia has had to contend with varying degrees of unrest in the northern Caucasus 
ever since that region became part of its empire in the late eighteenth century. Res-
tive though the local population may have been over the years (in particular in the 
autonomous republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan and especially Chechnya), sovereignty 
of the Russian Federation over the area is internationally recognised and has never 
been called into question before the Court.
Trouble flared up yet again in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
Russian response was robust, which led to many applications to the Court. Russia has 
651 Beginning with Ireland v. the United Kingdom; McKerr and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 28883/95, Reports 2001-III; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, 4 May 
2001; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no. 37715/97, 4 May 2001; Hugh Jordan v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 24746/94, 4 May 2001; McShane v. the United Kingdom, no. 43290/98, 28 May 
2002; Finucane v. the United Kingdom, no. 29178/75, ECHR 2003-VIII; McCaughey and Others 
v. the United Kingdom, no. 43098/09, ECHR 2013.
652 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324.
653 Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457/04, 27 November 2007; McCartney v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 34575/04, 27 November 2007; O’Dowd v. the United Kingdom, no. 34622/04, 
27 November 2007; Reavy v. the United Kingdom, no. 34640/04, 27 November 2007; McGrath 
v. the United Kingdom, no. 34651/04, 27 November 2007. 
654 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 13, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV.
655 Akdivar and Others.
656 Among many others, Aksoy.
657 Among many others, Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, ECHR 1999-IV; Oğur v. Turkey 
[GC], no. 21594/93, ECHR 1999III.
658 Among others, Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998III; Çakıcı v. 
Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, ECHR 1999IV.
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been held responsible for, among other things, bombing a civilian refugee convoy659 
and a village;660 unlawful killing;661 unacknowledged detention;662 and enforced dis-
appearance.663
Although the Court has found many violations of the Convention by the Russian 
Federation, it is only fair to add that the Russian Federation is not solely to blame. 
If one confines oneself to the Court’s case-law, the two-sided bitterness of the strife 
is well illustrated by the attack on the ‘Dubrovka’ theatre in Moscow carried out by 
Chechen separatists on 23 October 2002664 and by the attack, also by a Chechen war 
band, initiated on 1 September 2004, on a school in the northern Ossetian town of 
Beslan which reportedly left 334 dead including 86 children.665 The Court has made 
no bones about labelling both attacks ‘terrorist’.
6.2.2 Denying jurisdiction
Somewhat more problematical are the cases in which a Contracting Party accepts its 
territorial jurisdiction but denies responsibility for ensuring the enjoyment of Con-
vention rights in a part of its territory that is not under its full control. This may be 
because the region in issue is under the control of a powerful local force or a separatist 
movement that is in a position to deny the Contracting Party projection of its own 
power or because the region is occupied by a foreign power. 
6.2.2.1 Georgia
Thus, we see Georgia being made to answer for the detention of an individual ap-
plicant by the local government of Ajaria in open defiance of an order for his release 
issued by the Georgian Supreme Court. Ajaria itself, though autonomous and to all 
appearances fiercely independent from the Georgian central government, had no 
separatist aspirations and remained an integral part of Georgia. It followed that the 
central government of Georgia were obliged under the Convention actively to assert 
their authority there, as indeed throughout Georgian territory. A ‘presumption of 
659 Isayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, 24 February 2005.
660 Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, 24 February 2005; Esmukhambetov and Others v. Russia, 
no. 23445/03, 29 March 2011.
661 Among many others, Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, 24 Febru-
ary 2005.
662 Bitiyeva and X v. Russia, nos. 57953/00 and 37392/03, 21 June 2007.
663 Bazorkina v. Russia, no. 69481/01, 27 July 2006.
664 Finogenov and Others v. Russia, no. 18229/03, ECHR 2012; Sabanchiyeva and Others v. Russia, 
no. 38450/05, ECHR 2013.
665 Maskhadova and Others v. Russia, no. 18071/05, § 16, 6 June 2013. UNHCR puts the casualty 
figures at over 430 and over 100, respectively: see “UNHCR Position Regarding Asylum-Seekers 
and Refugees from the Chechen Republic, Russian Federation” of 22 October 2004, quoted in 
Jeltsuyeva v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 39858/04, 1 June 2006. For the Court’s description of the 
terrorist attack, see Tagayeva and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 
49380/08, 51313/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11, 9 June 2016, and the ensuing judgment, Tagayeva 
and Others v. Russia, nos. 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 51313/08, 21294/11 and 
37096/11, 13 April 2017.
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competence’ applied.666 The importance of this presumption is stated by the Court in 
the following terms:
Indeed, for reasons of legal policy – the need to maintain equality between the 
States Parties and to ensure the effectiveness of the Convention – it could not be 
otherwise. But for the presumption, the applicability of the Convention could 
be selectively restricted to only parts of the territory of certain States Parties, 
thus rendering the notion of effective human rights protection underpinning 
the entire Convention meaningless while, at the same time, allowing discrimina-
tion between the States Parties, that is to say beween those which accepted the 
application of the Convention over the whole of their territory and those which 
did not.667
In the event, it turned out that Georgia was able to comply: Mr Assanidze was re-
leased the day after the judgment was delivered. The Georgian Government was even-
tually in a position to report that:
[f ]ollowing the resignation, on 6 May 2004, of [A.], the former leader of the 
Autonomous Republic of Ajaria (responsible for the failure to comply with the 
release order of Mr. Assanidze) and the new legitimate elections on 20 June 
2004 in the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, the difficulties encountered in ex-
ercising jurisdiction in this region [were] henceforth solved.668
6.2.2.2 Moldova
The former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (later the Soviet Socialist Republic 
of Moldova) declared its independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991. So, 
separately, did the ‘Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria’, which (although a sepa-
rate territorial entity until 1940) had previously been the part of Moldavian territory 
situated on the east bank of the river Dniestr. An armed struggle ensued between 
the central Moldovan government and a Transdniestrian separatist movement, which 
continued until a ceasefire agreement was reached in July 1992. 
Most of the Soviet 14th Army, which had been present in Moldova, became the 
Russian Operational Group or ‘ROG’ following the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
(a few units elected to join the army of Moldova). As the Court found in Ilaşcu and 
Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC]:
666 Assanidze, §§ 139-142. Such a presumption was suggested by Lawson already in 1998: see Lawson 
(1998), pp. 112-114. See also Lawson (1999) p. 259. Compare Ilaşcu and Others, § 312, and Sargsyan 
v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, §§ 149-150, ECHR 2015. 
667 Assanidze, § 142.
668 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Resolution ResDH(2006)53 (2 November 
2006).
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380. The Court observes that during the Moldovan conflict in 1991-92 forces of 
the 14th Army (which owed allegiance to the USSR, the CIS and the Russian 
Federation in turn) stationed in Transdniestria, an integral part of the territory 
of the Republic of Moldova, fought with and on behalf of the Transdniestrian 
separatist forces. Moreover, large quantities of weapons from the stores of the 
14th Army (which later became the ROG) were voluntarily transferred to the 
separatists, who were also able to seize possession of other weapons unopposed 
by Russian soldiers (…).
The Court notes that from December 1991 onwards the Moldovan authori-
ties systematically complained, to international bodies among others, of what 
they called ‘the acts of aggression’ of the 14th Army against the Republic of 
Moldova and accused the Russian Federation of supporting the Transdniestrian 
separatists.
Regard being had to the principle of States’ responsibility for abuses of au-
thority, it is of no consequence that, as the Russian Government submitted, the 
14th Army did not participate as such in the military operations between the 
Moldovan forces and the Transdniestrian insurgents.
381. Throughout the clashes between the Moldovan authorities and the Trans-
dniestrian separatists, the leaders of the Russian Federation supported the sepa-
ratist authorities by their political declarations (…). The Russian Federation 
drafted the broad lines of the ceasefire agreement of 21 July 1992, and moreover 
signed it as a party.669
Russia ratified the Convention on 5 May 1998. After this happened, the ROG was 
not withdrawn, although its numbers were reduced; its weapons stocks remained 
in Transdniestria and some of its weaponry found its way into the hands of Trans-
dniestrian separatist forces. In addition, the ‘MRT’ received economic and other aid 
from the Russian Federation. The Government of Moldova was thus prevented from 
regaining control over Transdniestria. No state has yet recognised the ‘MRT’ as sov-
ereign and distinct from Moldova even so.
Ilaşcu and Others is the case of four Moldovan nationals, residents of Tiraspol (the 
capital and administrative centre of the ‘MRT’). They were arrested in June 1992 and 
kept in Russian, later in Transdniestrian detention. By the time Russia ratified the 
Convention the applicants had been handed over to the Transdniestrian separatists. 
An application complaining of developments after the Court’s judgment in this case 
gave rise to the Ivanţoc and Others judgment.670
Other complaints concern the denial of education in the Romanian/Moldovan 
language.671 In Mozer the Court ruled detention ordered by ‘MRT’ courts illegal on 
669 Ilaşcu and Others, §§ 380-381.
670 Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, no. 23687/05, 15 November 2011.
671 Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04, 18454/06 and 8252/05, ECHR 
2012.
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the ground that the judiciary of that entity (which in the submission of the Mol-
dovan Government was still cast in the old Soviet mould) did not ‘form part of a 
judicial system operating on a “constitutional and legal basis” compatible with the 
Convention’.672
It was not in dispute that Moldova was unable to assert its authority over Trans-
dniestria, and we shall see later that Moldova made an unsuccessful attempt to escape 
Article 1 jurisdiction on that ground. Nevertheless, the facts on the ground ‘[reduced] 
the scope of that jurisdiction in that the undertaking given by the State under Article 
1 must be considered by the Court only in the light of the Contracting State’s positive 
obligations towards persons within its territory’. In other words, as the only legitimate 
government of the Republic of Moldova under international law, Moldova still had 
a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, eco-
nomic, judicial or other measures which it was in its power to take and which were in 
accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by 
the Convention.673
The applicants in Pocasovschi and Mihaila were convicts sentenced by Moldovan 
courts who were serving their sentences in a prison in Bender, a town in the Trans-
dniestrian region. The prison was situated in a security zone under the control of 
peacekeepers from Moldova, Russia and the ‘MRT’. The prison itself was under 
the exclusive control of the Moldovan authorities. However, it was dependent on 
the ‘MRT’ authorities for electricity, water and heating supplies – and in 2002, the 
‘MRT’ authorities decided to disconnect the prison from them. International pres-
sure led to the temporary resumption of supplies; but in 2003 the ‘MRT’ authori-
ties disconnected the prison again in order that the Moldovan Government close it 
down. Conditions of detention deteriorated seriously as a result. The applicants were 
eventually transferred to other prisons in 2004.
Attempts were made to have the persons who had disconnected the prison from 
the utilities systems prosecuted in Moldova. This proved impossible because Mol-
dova did not control ‘MRT’ territory. In parallel with these attempts, the applicants 
and other prisoners brought civil proceedings in Moldova. These met with marginally 
greater success: the applicants were awarded limited sums of money. The sums were 
however too small to deprive them of their status of ‘victims’ of the violations they 
alleged.674
The applicants lodged an application against both Moldova and the Russian Fed-
eration. In so far as directed against the Russian Federation the application was de-
clared inadmissible on the ground that it was out of time: since their transfer, the 
applicants had no longer been held in allegedly inhuman conditions and more than 
672 Mozer v. Moldova and Russia (GC), no. 11138/10, § 148, 23 February 2016.
673 Ilaşcu and Others, §§ 333-335; Ivanţoc and Others, § 105, 15 November 2011; Catan and Others, 
§§ 109-110; Ziaunys v. Moldova, no. 42416/06, § 16, 11 February 2014; Mozer, §§ 99-100.
674 Pocasovschi and Mihaila v. Moldova and Russia, no. 1089/09, § 66, 29 May 2018.
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six months had passed before they applied to the Court.675 With regard to Moldova, 
the Court held as follows:
… unlike in previous cases concerning alleged breaches of the Convention by the 
“MRT”, the Moldovan authorities in the present case were not limited to only 
fulfilling their positive obligations as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. 
The case is different in that, while not having control over the local authori-
ties in Bender which disconnected prison no. 8 from the utilities, the Moldo-
van authorities had full control over that prison itself and the detainees there 
throughout the relevant period. They could have taken measures in the prison it-
self to cope with the effects of the disconnection from the utilities or they could 
have transferred the prisoners to other prisons at any time. By choosing to con-
tinue to detain the applicants in prison no. 8 without immediate action taken 
to ensure basic conditions of detention, the Moldovan authorities knowingly 
exposed them to the conditions which prevailed there after the disconnection 
from all utilities. In addition to the above-mentioned positive obligations, it was 
therefore also the direct responsibility of the Moldovan authorities to prevent or 
redress the alleged violation of the applicants’ rights in that prison.676
6.2.2.3 Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh is an area whose traditional population is overwhelmingly of Ar-
menian ethnicity. It has no common border with the territory of the Republic of Ar-
menia. While the Soviet Union existed it was part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist 
Republic. Having sought since Soviet times to secede to Armenia, the inhabitants of 
the region proclaimed the ‘Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh’ when Azerbaijan itself 
broke away from the Soviet Union in 1991. In the fighting that ensued, a land corridor 
was established between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper under the control 
of Nagorno-Karabakh separatists. A ceasefire has been in force since 1994.
Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan is the case of an Armenian national displaced from a village 
in the front line between the army of Azerbaijan and the forces of the ‘Republic of 
Nagorno-Karabakh’. Much was in dispute; for example, it was not known whether 
the Azerbaijan army had an effective military presence in the locality. At all events, it 
seems that the village was within range of Armenian artillery fire. 
In its judgment on the merits, the Court applied the presumption of competence 
developed in Assanidze and Ilaşcu and Others that the territorial state was in a posi-
tion, and as a corollary, under a positive obligation in the light of Article 1 of the 
Convention to impose its authority. The rebuttable presumption developed in Ilaşcu 
and Others, which limited this obligation in respect of parts of a Contracting State’s 
territory that were occupied by a foreign state or under the effective control of a sepa-
675 Article 35 § 1. Pocasovschi and Mihaila, § 50.
676 Pocasovschi and Mihaila, § 46.
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ratist regime, therefore did not apply. The events complained of were thus found to 
come within the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan.677
This was not a case of extraterritorial jurisdiction properly so-called. As the Court’s 
own Jurisconsult points out, this case did not concern the jurisdiction and respon-
sibility of a State when it exercised jurisdiction extraterritorially, as did Turkey over 
Northern Cyprus or Russia over Transdniestria. Nor did it concern the jurisdiction of 
a State over part of its territory which was under the effective control of another State, 
as Transdniestria remained under the jurisdiction of Moldova itself. In the words of 
the Court’s Jurisconsult:
Since Azerbaijan was the territorial State, it was presumed to have jurisdiction 
and there were no exceptional circumstances (such as the effective exercise of 
control by another State) to rebut that presumption. The Court therefore found 
that the impugned facts fell within the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. The Court 
acknowledged the difficulties which would inevitably be encountered by Azer-
baijan at a practical level in exercising authority over such disputed territory: 
however, those were matters to be taken into account on the merits of each com-
plaint.678
The Jurisconsult continues:
Consequently, this was the first time the Court had to rule on the merits of Con-
vention complaints against a State which had legal jurisdiction, but which had 
practical control problems over a part of its territory which was “disputed”.679
This judgment demonstrates that the presumption of territorial jurisdiction is a pre-
sumption of fact, which it is for the Contracting State claiming foreign occupation or 
separatist secession to disprove.
6.2.2.4 Kosovo 
In June 1999, following a series of NATO air strikes, an agreement was reached under 
which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (by this time composed of the republics of 
Serbia and Montenegro) would withdraw from the territory of Kosovo. The Unit-
ed Nations Security Council adopted a resolution (Resolution 1244) according to 
which an international civil (‘United Nations Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK’) and 
security (‘Kosovo Force – KFOR’) presence would be deployed in Kosovo. A Special 
Representative would be appointed by the UN Secretary General to head UNMIK. 
In the performance of duties entrusted to UNMIK, the Special Representative is-
677 Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.) (GC), no. 40167/06, 14 December 2011; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan 
[GC], no. 40167/06, 15 June 2015.
678 Overview of the Court’s case-law, January to June 2015 (prepared by the Jurisconsult), page 2.
679 ibid.
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sued legislative acts in the form of regulations with a view to establishing the govern-
ing framework in Kosovo. Section 1 of UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 (UNMIK/
REG/1999/1) provided that all legislative and executive authority with respect to Ko-
sovo, including the administration of the judiciary, was vested in UNMIK and was 
exercised by the Special Representative.
Apparently in April 1990 – before the onset of the wars that resulted in the dissolu-
tion of the SFRY – a Kosovo resident, Mr Ali Azemi, brought an action in an employ-
ment dispute before the competent civil court in Pristina. He won a judgment in his 
favour, finally, in January 2002. However, the judgment was never enforced.
Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. To date, Kosovo has been 
recognised as an independent state by a majority of United Nations Member States 
(which has led to envious statements of support from breakaway entities seeking state-
hood for themselves), Serbia itself – in common with a number of other Council of 
Europe Member States – not among them. However, the Serbian Supreme and Con-
stitutional Courts have held that Serbia does not exercise jurisdiction over Kosovo.680
The applicant brought an application before the Court against Serbia in February 
2009 complaining of the non-enforcement of the judgment delivered in his favour. 
The Court declared the application inadmissible on 5 November 2013. As is its 
usual practice – necessarily so, since the Member States of the Council of Europe do 
not agree on the matter – it declined to rule on the validity of Kosovo’s statehood: the 
decision carries a footnote stating that ‘[a]ll reference to Kosovo, whether to the ter-
ritory, institutions or population, in this text shall be understood in full compliance 
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the 
status of Kosovo.’ Its reasoning on the Article 1 point was as follows:
46.  On 17 February 2008 Kosovo proclaimed its independence, having been 
subsequently recognised as independent by at least 89 States. On 15 June 2008 
the Constitution of Kosovo was adopted. On 10 September 2012, apart from the 
exercise of certain “residual responsibilities” by UNMIK, the end of “supervised 
independence” was declared. In these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that 
there existed objective limitations which prevented Serbia from securing the 
rights and freedoms in Kosovo.
47.  Consequently, Serbia’s domestic courts have confirmed that its authorities 
have not been exercising any effective control in Kosovo since 1999 (…). Moreo-
ver, the applicant has not been able to point to a particular action or inaction 
of the respondent State or substantiated any breach of the respondent State’s 
duty to take all the appropriate measures with regard to his right which are still 
within its power to take. Having regard to the particular circumstances of this 
case, the Court cannot point to any positive obligations that the respondent 
680 Constitutional Court of Serbia, judgment of 1 April 2010 (case no. 531/2008), cited in Azemi 
v. Serbia (dec.), no. 11209/09, § 29, 5 November 2013; Supreme Court of Serbia, judgment of 
23 May 2007 (case no. 1251/07), ibid., § 30.
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State had towards the applicant (compare and contrast with Moldova’s positive 
obligations in the case of Ilaşcu and Others …).681
6.2.2.5 Cyprus
Like Moldova and Serbia, the Republic of Cyprus is prevented from exercising its sov-
ereignty over part of its territory – namely, that where a ‘Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus’ (or ‘TRNC’) survives by virtue of the support of the Republic of Turkey. 
We will discuss the jurisdiction of Turkey with regard to the ‘TRNC’ in its proper 
place, that of military action abroad as exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.682 Al-
though there is no suggestion that the Republic of Cyprus is under any obligation to 
recognise the ‘TRNC’ de iure or de facto,683 nonetheless the question arises whether 
Cyprus is at liberty to refuse all intercourse with it for reasons of political expediency.
In January 2005 a businessman and his wife and daughter, all three Cypriot nation-
als of Turkish Cypriot origin, were found murdered by the side of the Nicosia-Larn-
aca highway, within the borders of the Republic of Cyprus. The ensuing criminal in-
vestigation yielded eight suspects; six were Cypriot nationals who also held ‘TRNC’ 
citizenship, the remaining two were Turkish nationals. One of the Cypriots was later 
arrested in Limassol but had to be released for lack of evidence; the others all made 
their escape across the border into the ‘TRNC’. One was later murdered himself.
In September 2008 Cyprus sent a request to Turkey, via the embassy in Athens, to 
extradite the six remaining suspects. The request was returned to the Cypriot embassy 
unexecuted.
The ‘TRNC’ does not extradite its own citizens but its criminal courts have juris-
diction to try crimes committed by its nationals abroad. Accordingly, already in Janu-
ary 2005, the ‘TRNC’ authorities had initiated a criminal investigation of their own 
and arrested all eight identified suspects. All were charged with premeditated murder 
and remanded in custody. 
Attempts were made via UNFICYP to establish a line of communication between 
the investigating authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the ‘TRNC’, in order for 
a prosecution to be brought in the ‘TRNC’; these were unsuccessful as ‘the Cypriot 
police could not have direct contact with the “TRNC” police’ and indeed it was for 
this reason UNFICYP’s intervention had been sought. Eventually, in February 2005, 
all suspects were released on the ground of a lack of evidence linking them to the 
crime.
According to UNFICYP’s Senior Police Adviser and Commander, the ‘TRNC’ 
side were genuinely concerned to resolve this matter, perhaps with the involvement of 
Interpol, the United Nations or the Turkish Government. They feared ‘more crimes 
of this nature – that is to say criminals going through crossing points, committing 
crimes and then returning to the other side in order to avoid arrest and punishment’. 
681 Azemi v. Serbia (dec.), no. 11209/09, 5 November 2013.
682 See 6.4.1.1 below.
683 Inter alia, Cyprus v. Turkey, §§ 61 and 238, Reports 2001-IV; Demopoulos and Others, §§ 95-96.
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The Cypriot Government, for their part, refused to cooperate for fear of lending le-
gitimacy to the ‘TRNC’.
The surviving kin of the three murder victims, the Güzelyurtlu family, lodged an 
application to the Court against both the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey complain-
ing under Article 2 of the Convention of the failure to conduct an effective investiga-
tion into the crime.
A Chamber of the Court found both Contracting States responsible for violating 
Article 2 under its procedural head, based on their failure to cooperate with each oth-
er. As to Cyprus, it did not accept that cooperation in this case would have amounted 
either to recognition of Turkish sovereignty over Northern Cyprus or of the ‘TRNC’ 
itself; as to Turkey, it found it ‘striking’ that the extradition requests made by the Cyp-
riot Government, still the sole legitimate government of Cyprus, had been ignored.684
Both Governments asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber (Arti-
cle 43 of the Convention). On 18 September 2017 the Grand Chamber Panel acceded 
to these requests. The case remains pending at the time of writing.685 For the moment, 
therefore, the question whether – and if so, in what measure – the Republic of Cyprus 
must interrelate directly with the ‘TRNC’ remains open, as indeed does the question 
of Turkey’s responsibility as a go-between if nothing else.
6.3 Foreign State agents committing unlawful acts with the acquiescence of 
Convention State
Terrorism was a fact of life in much of Europe for the latter decades of the twentieth 
century: in the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland especially, the Irish Republican 
Army and its offshoots were household names (so indeed were its Loyalist opposite 
numbers, the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association), as were the 
Red Brigades in Italy, Action Directe in France and the Red Army Faction in Western 
Germany, to mention but some the better-known. It was not unknown either for 
groups from the Middle East to hijack European civilian passenger aircraft or even to 
carry out attacks on European soil, the best-remembered of the latter being the Black 
September attack on the Olympic games being held in Munich in 1972. In contrast, 
the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York of 11 September 2001 took the 
whole world by surprise. The hurt was very deeply felt in the United States itself, 
whose territory had not been a target for foreign hostility since the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (and before that, not on anything like the same scale 
since the burning of Washington by the British in 1814).
The reaction of the American president George W. Bush to these attacks was to 
declare a ‘war on terror’. This ‘war’ – which as has been sufficiently pointed out else-
684 Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, no. 36925/07, 4 April 2017, §§ 291-296.
685 September 2018.
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where was, and is, not a ‘war’ in any legal sense of the word686 – was taken afield, not 
only to al-Qaeda’s leadership in Afghanistan but also – even – to Europe.687
In November 2005 it became public knowledge through the American press that 
the United States, through its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had been detain-
ing and interrogating terrorist suspects on the territory of some of its allies, including 
European states. 
As was to be written in later years by the rapporteur appointed by the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe to look into the matter, Senator Dick Marty 
of Switzerland:
While the states of the Old World have dealt with these threats primarily by 
means of existing institutions and legal systems, the United States appears to have 
made a fundamentally different choice: considering that neither conventional 
judicial instruments nor those established under the framework of the laws of 
war could effectively counter the new forms of international terrorism, it decided 
to develop new legal concepts. The latter are based primarily on the Military Or-
der on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
against Terrorism signed by President Bush on 13 November 2001. It is significant 
that, to date, only one person has been summoned before the courts to answer 
for the 11 September attacks: a person, moreover, who was already in prison on 
that day, and had been in the hands of the justice system for several months. By 
contrast, hundreds of other people are still deprived of their liberty, under Amer-
ican authority but outside the national territory, within an unclear normative 
framework. Their detention is, in any event, altogether contrary to the principles 
enshrined in all the international legal instruments dealing with respect for fun-
damental rights, including the domestic law of the United States (which explains 
the existence of such detention centres outside the country). …688
In a follow-up report, Senator Marty points out that it is not only American moral 
and legal responsibility that is engaged:
The rendition, abduction and detention of terrorist suspects have always taken 
place outside the territory of the United States, where such actions would no 
686 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd edition 2015), 
Cambridge University Press, p. 2, fn. 3 and pp. 296-97; Luc Reydams and Jan Wouters, “A la 
guerre comme à la guerre”, in Armed Conflicts and the Law, Jan Wouters, Philip De Man, Nele 
Verlinden (eds.), Intersentia, 2016, pp.1-27 at pp.22-24.
687 For a description of the American measures relevant to this study (in particular, the “High Value 
Detainee” programme), see Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, §§ 20-89, and Al Nashiri v. Romania, 
§§ 22-97. 
688 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights, Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers involving Council of Europe 
member states (AS/Jur (2006) 16 part II (first Marty report), 7 June 2006, paragraph 2.
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doubt have been ruled unlawful and unconstitutional. Obviously, these actions 
are also unacceptable under the laws of European countries, who nonetheless 
tolerated them or colluded actively in carrying them out. This export of illegal 
activities overseas is all the more shocking in that it shows fundamental con-
tempt for the countries on whose territories it was decided to commit the rel-
evant acts. The fact that the measures only apply to non-American citizens is just 
as disturbing: it reflects a kind of “legal apartheid” and an exaggerated sense of 
superiority. Once again, the blame does not lie solely with the Americans but 
also, above all, with European political leaders who have knowingly acquiesced 
in this state of affairs.689
The first Marty report, published in June 2006, gave detailed information about the 
practice referred to as ‘rendition’ and gave a detailed account of a number of specific 
cases.
6.3.1 ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’
One of the cases singled out by Marty was that of Khaled El Masri, who was later to 
lodge an application with the Court. A German national of Lebanese descent, he was 
on holiday in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia when he was arrested, 
apparently by mistake, by Macedonian agents. The Macedonians held him incom-
municado, questioned him and ill-treated him. After several weeks they handed him 
over at Skopje Airport to a CIA rendition team who transferred him, on a special 
CIA-operated flight, to a CIA-run secret detention facility in Afghanistan for further 
interrogation over a period in excess of four months.
The applicant’s detention and treatment by Macedonian agents raised no problem 
of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. As regards the cir-
cumstances of the applicant’s handover of the applicant to the CIA rendition team, 
which was found to have been brutal to the point of torture, the Court considered the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ‘responsible under the Convention for acts 
performed by foreign officials on its territory with the acquiescence or connivance of 
its authorities’.690 The applicant’s transfer to the CIA by itself constituted an ‘extraju-
dicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, for the purposes 
of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, where there was a real 
risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ engaging the responsibility 
of the respondent Contracting State under the Soering line of case-law691 – not only 
under Article 3 of the Convention, but also under Article 5 as regards the detention 
in Afghanistan.692
689 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights, Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member 
states: second report (second Marty report), 7 June 2007, para. 4.
690 El-Masri, § 206.
691 See 5.6.1 above.
692 El-Masri, §§ 221 and 239.
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6.3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina
The case of Boumediene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina could have raised simi-
lar questions. It concerned a group of Algerian nationals released from prison straight 
into the hands of American armed forces in open defiance of an order for a provi-
sional measure given by the Human Rights Chamber, a hybrid human rights court 
then in existence set up under the Dayton Peace Agreement on which we will dwell 
at greater length below,693 and removed to the American base at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. The applicants’ handover having taken place before the entry into force of the 
Convention for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court was asked to consider whether 
it had jurisdiction ratione temporis in the case. In the event, the Court did not declare 
the application inadmissible on the ground that it had not: rather, it went straight to 
the merits of the case and found that in any event Bosnia and Herzegovina had done 
what could reasonably be expected of it by interceding with the American authorities, 
obtaining assurances concerning the treatment of the applicants and facilitating their 
eventual return.694
Where formal admissibility conditions are open to dispute and the facts admit 
of a finding that an application is manifestly ill-founded, the Court will sometimes 
opt for the latter ground of inadmissibility rather than commit itself to a decision on 
preliminary issues that may unnecessarily tie its hands in future cases as precedent.
6.3.3 Poland
In Al Nashiri v. Poland the applicant was a Saudi Arabian national of Yemenite de-
scent suspected in the United States of the attacks on the American destroyer USS 
Cole in the harbour of Aden, Yemen, in 2000 and on the French oil tanker Limburg 
in the Gulf of Aden in 2002. He was captured in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in 
October 2002. After having been held by the CIA in Afghanistan and in Thailand, he 
was taken to Poland, where he was held for approximately six months in a ‘black site’ 
in Stare Kiejkuty. There he was subjected to various forms of ill-treatment including 
‘water-boarding’. In June 2003 he was taken first to Morocco and then to Guantána-
mo Bay to be tried before an American Military Commission.
The applicant in Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland was a stateless Palestinian 
thought to be a high-ranking member of Al-Qaeda and as such co-responsible for 
the attacks of 11 September 2001. He was captured in Pakistan in early 2002 and was 
held there and in Thailand until taken to Poland in November 2002. From early De-
693 Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Agree-
ment on Human Rights), Article VIII. See Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, Cases nos. CH/02/8679, CH/02/8689, CH/02/8690 and CH/02/8691, Had` BOUDEL-
LAA, Boumediene LAKHDAR, Mohamed NECHLE and Saber LAHMAR against Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 October 2002; see also J. David 
Yaeger, “The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Case Study in Transitional 
Justice”, 14 International Legal Perspectives (Spring 2004), pp. 50-51.
694 Boumediene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), nos. 38703/06, 40123/06, 43301/06, 
43302/06, 2131/07 and 2141/07, §§ 62-67, 18 November 2008.
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cember 2002 until late September 2003 he was held in the Stare Kiejkuty ‘black site’, 
the same where Al Nashiri was detained, and suffered much the same ill-treatment 
as Al Nashiri. From there he was transferred to other sites, ultimately to end up in 
Guantánamo Bay.
6.3.4 Italy
In Nasr and Ghali the applicants were Egyptian nationals, an imam (Mr Nasr) and 
his wife (Ms Ghali). As a member of an Islamist organisation, Jama’a al-Islamiya, that 
was illegal in his country of origin Mr Nasr had requested, and been granted, Italian 
asylum, after which he had been joined in Italy by his wife. 
It does not seem to be in dispute that Mr Nasri was abducted from the streets of 
Milan by ‘foreign agents’ with the assistance of a member of the carabinieri, the latter 
apparently operating without official sanction, and the active involvement of the Ital-
ian intelligence service SISMi. Mr Nasri was taken to Egypt where he was detained 
and subjected to harsh interrogation. He is still in Egypt; he is forbidden to leave that 
country.
Criminal proceedings were later brought against a number of American nationals, 
several of whom were convicted and sentenced in their absence. However, the Italian 
Government did not actively seek their extradition for trial or execution of sentence; 
several were later reprieved by the President of the Italian Republic. Prosecutions 
were also brought against members of SISMi; these however collapsed because the 
Italian Government refused to declassify ‘State secret’ information that would have 
enabled the criminal courts to establish the facts.695
A Chamber of the Court found violations of, inter alia, Articles 3 (under both its 
substantive and its procedural heads), 5, and 8 in respect of Mr Nasri as the direct vic-
tim, and separately in respect of Ms Ghali in respect of the wrongs found to have been 
committed against her. From our perspective, the judgment is interesting in what it 
says about the involvement of the Italian Government.696
To establish the Article 1 jurisdiction of Italy, the Chamber applied the principles 
set out in Al Nashiri, Abu Zubaydah and El Masri and summarised above. 
The case is interesting because of its findings with respect to Article 3 under its 
procedural head. The Chamber is pleased to acknowledge the quality of the investi-
gations carried out by the Italian courts.697 It finds a violation on the ground that the 
splendid work of the courts is deprived of its effect by the failure of the executive arm 
695 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Abuse of state secrecy and national security: ob-
stacles to parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of human rights violations, Doc. 12714, 16 September 
2011 (third Marty report), § 8.
696 Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, no. 44883/09, 23 February 2016.
697 “[La Cour] rend hommage au travail des juges nationaux qui ont tout mis en œuvre pour tenter 
d’‘établir la vérité’” (Nasr and Ghali, § 265). But see Helen Duffy and Stephen A. Kostas, “‘Ex-
traordinary Rendition’: A Challenge for the Rule of Law”, in Counter-Terrorism: International 
Law and Practice (Ana MarÍa de FrÍas, Katja L.H. Samuel, Nigel D. White, eds.), Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2011 p. 539 at p. 569.
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of government to make those responsible for the substantive breaches – significant-
ly, including foreign State agents – face the criminal sanctions appropriate to their 
crimes.698
The Italian Government has declined to seek referral of the case to the Grand 
Chamber and in so doing has allowed this judgment to become final.699
6.3.5 Lithuania
Abu Zubaydah alleged that after been taken from Poland to Guantanamo Bay, he 
had been flown via Morocco to Lithuania and detained in a secret prison on the out-
skirts of Vilnius, there to be submitted to further brutal questioning. The Lithuanian 
Government accepted that the applicant had been brutalised but denied that it had 
happened on Lithuanian soil or with the connivance of Lithuanian authorities.
The Court conducted a joint fact-finding effort in this case and that of Al Nashiri 
v. Romania.700 It considered evidence already presented in the earlier cases mentioned 
above, documentary evidence submitted by the applicant and respondent parties, 
and affidavits by Senator Marty and the then Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Mr Thomas Hammarberg. A joint fact-finding hearing was held in 
camera; witnesses heard included Mr Giovanni Claudio Fava, who had been the Rap-
porteur of the European Parliament’s Temporary Committee on the alleged use of 
European countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of Prisoners, 
Senator Marty himself, an advisor to Senator Marty and Mr Hammarberg referred to 
only by initials and an investigative journalist, Mr Crofton Black. The Court was able 
to find it established beyond reasonable doubt that:
(a) the Lithuanian authorities knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s 
activities on its territory at the material time;
(b) the Lithuanian authorities, by approving the hosting of the CIA Deten-
tion Site Violet, enabling the CIA to use its airspace and airports and to disguise 
the movements of rendition aircraft, providing logistics and services, securing 
the premises for the CIA and transportation of the CIA teams with detainees 
on land, cooperated in the preparation and execution of the CIA rendition, se-
cret detention and interrogation operations on its territory; and
(c) given their knowledge of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities 
on their territory and their involvement in the execution of that programme, 
the Lithuanian authorities knew that, by enabling the CIA to detain terrorist 
suspects – including the applicant – on their territory, they were exposing them 
to a serious risk of treatment contrary to the Convention.701
698 Nasr and Ghali, §§ 266-74. 
699 Article 43 § 1 of the Convention.
700 See 6.3.6 below.
701 Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, § 576.
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Once all this was established as fact, the question of Article 1 jurisdiction could be 
answered in the light of the existing case-law, including Ilaşcu and Others, El-Masri, 
Al Nashiri v. Poland, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, and Nasr and Ghali.702 The 
Court held as follows:
Following an extensive and detailed analysis of evidence in the present case, the 
Court has established conclusively and to the required standard of proof that 
the Lithuanian authorities hosted CIA Detention Site Violet from 17 or 18 Feb-
ruary 2005 to 25 March 2006; that the applicant was secretly detained there dur-
ing that period; that the Lithuanian authorities knew of the nature and purposes 
of the CIA’s activities in their country and cooperated in the execution of the 
HVD Programme; and that the Lithuanian authorities knew that, by enabling 
the CIA to detain terrorist suspects – including the applicant – on their ter-
ritory, they were exposing them to a serious risk of treatment contrary to the 
Convention (…).
The above findings suffice for the Court to conclude that the matters com-
plained of in the present case fall within the “jurisdiction” of Lithuania within 
the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention and are capable of engaging the re-
spondent State’s responsibility under the Convention, and that the applicant 
can be considered a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention.
…
– which, once the reality of the treatment undergone by the applicant was estab-
lished, made the unanimous finding of violations of Articles 2, 3, 5, 8 and 13 in con-
junction with 3 of the Convention inevitable.
6.3.6 Romania
It appears that after having been taken from Poland to Guantanamo Bay, the appli-
cant Al Nashiri was taken to a ‘black site’ elsewhere – in his case, in Bucharest in 
Romania. He lodged an application against the latter Contracting State. His case was 
considered by the same Chamber of the Court as Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, and in 
parallel with it.
The findings of fact in both cases were in essentially identical terms, only the prop-
er names of the applicants and the Contracting States being different, and as in Abu 
Zubaydah v. Lithuania, violations were found of Articles 3, 5, 8 and 13 taken together 
with 3 of the Convention. Violations were also found of Articles 2 and 6 § 1 of the 
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 in that Romania had allowed the appli-
cant to be removed from its territory to face the distinct possibility of both a trial so 
grossly inadequate as to amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’703 and a death sentence 
at the end of it.
702 Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, § 579.
703 See, inter alia, Soering, § 113; Saadi v. Italy, § 158.
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6.4 ‘Hard power’ as exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
The most contentious questions under Article 1 of the Convention to come before 
the Court thus far have all concerned either the maintenance of a military presence 
on territory over which another State claims sovereignty or kinetic military action 
taking place, or producing effects, elsewhere than on home territory. Typically, Con-
tracting States faced with applications relating to such actions will seek to deny having 
any jurisdiction at all, whereas applicants (and sometimes other Contracting States 
– generally those whose territory and/or nationals are affected) will posit that the 
responsibility of the respondent State is well and truly engaged.
‘Jurisdiction’ in this sense, if jurisdiction there be, may be lawful under internation-
al law (meaning that it coincides with ‘jurisdiction’ understood in terms of sovereign-
ty, as discussed in Chapter 5) – or it may be disputed – or it may even be manifestly 
unlawful.704 It may even be questionable in terms of domestic law, as we shall see. Even 
so, whether or not ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Article 1 exists – and accord-
ingly, whether the State’s responsibility under the Convention is engaged – does not 
depend on whether ‘jurisdiction’ (understood as ‘sovereignty’) is lawful under either 
general international law or domestic law.
6.4.1 Maintaining a military presence on foreign territory
6.4.1.1 Northern Cyprus
Turkish forces entered and took control of the northern part of Cyprus in 1974. By 
the 1990s the Turkish military presence in Northern Cyprus comprised two divisions 
of infantry totalling 30,000 personnel plus a naval command and an outpost.705
Cyprus responded by lodging two applications with the Commission alleging a 
large variety of violations of the Convention, ranging from illegal expropriations, de-
struction of churches and displacing the Greek Cypriot population to rape, forced 
prostitution, torture and murder. Turkey argued that the Commission had no juris-
diction ratione loci: Turkey had ‘not extended her jurisdiction to the island of Cyprus 
since she had neither annexed a part of the island nor established a military or civil 
government there’. 
The Commission found that:
In Article 1 of the Convention, the High Contracting Parties undertake to 
secure the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 to everyone “within their 
jurisdiction” (in the French text: “relevant de leur juridiction”). The Commis-
sion finds that this term is not, as submitted by the respondent Government, 
equivalent to or limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Party 
704 Samantha Besson, “The extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: why 
human rights depend on jurisdiction and what jurisdiction amounts to”, Leiden Journal of Inter-
national Law 2012, 25(4), 857-884 at p. 868.
705 Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, §§ 16, Reports 1996-VI.
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concerned. It is clear from the language, in particular of the French text, and the 
object of this Article, and from the purpose of the Convention as a whole, that 
the High Contracting Parties are bound to secure the said rights and freedoms 
to all persons under their actual authority and responsibility, whether that au-
thority is exercised within their own territory or abroad. …
It continued:
The Commission further observes that nationals of a State, including registered 
ships and aircrafts [sic], are partly within its jurisdiction wherever they may be, 
and that authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic or consular agents 
and armed forces, not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad but bring 
any other persons or property “within the jurisdiction” of that State, to the ex-
tent that they exercise authority over such persons or property. Insofar as, by 
their acts or omissions, they affect such persons or property, the responsibility 
of the State is engaged.706
The same reasoning was later to reappear in the Commission’s admissibility decision 
in Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey and in its Article 31 report 
in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey.707
We shall see elsewhere that Turkey sought, unsuccessfully, to exclude its account-
ability under the Convention by setting up a nominally independent state708 and by 
adding territorial provisos to the declarations accepting the right of individual peti-
tion (former Article 25 of the Convention) and the jurisdiction of the Court (former 
Article 46).709 In Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), the Court formulated 
the following rule:
Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of 
a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action – 
whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises effective control of an area outside its 
national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and free-
doms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control whether 
it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration.710
706 Cyprus v. Turkey (I) and (II), nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission decision of 26 May 1975, 
DR 2, p. 125, § 8.
707 Loizidou v. Turkey, no. 15318/89, Commission report of 8 July 1993; Chrysostomos, Papachrysos-
tomou and Loizidou v. Turkey, nos. 15299/89, 15300/89 and 15318/89, Commission decision of 
4 March 1991, DR 68, p. 216.
708 See 6.4.2.1 below.
709 See 7.2 below.
710 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 22, Series A no. 310.
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In a series of applications brought against Turkey by Cypriot nationals711 and by the 
Republic of Cyprus itself,712 we see Turkey answering for denying displaced Greek 
Cypriots formerly resident in Northern Cyprus access to immovable property that 
remains theirs;713 denying them access to their homes;714 failing to investigate alleged 
enforced disappearances;715 and much else besides.716
That is not to say that the violations are all one way. The Egmez case concerned a 
Turkish Cypriot resident in the northern part who was maltreated by police of the 
Republic of Cyprus trying to coerce a confession out of him.717 In Denizci and Others 
v. Cyprus we find Turkish Cypriots being maltreated and unlawfully detained by the 
police of the Republic of Cyprus in the direct vicinity of the demarcation line and 
their movements monitored to an extent amounting to an unjustified interference 
with their freedom of movement (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4).718 In Aziz v. Cyprus we 
see a Turkish Cypriot deprived of his right to vote and stand for election in his chosen 
state of nationality and residence, the Republic of Cyprus, on account of his ethnicity 
(Article 3 of Protocol No. 1).719
6.4.1.2 Western Germany
Following the unconditional surrender of the German High Command on 8 May 
1945 the Governments of the four allied occupation forces – France, the Soviet Un-
ion, the United Kingdom and the United States – assumed supreme authority with re-
spect to Germany. In October 1949 the Soviet Military Governor decided to transfer 
to the Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic the function of 
administration which hitherto belonged to the Soviet Military Administration. On 
5 May 1955 the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers (France, United 
Kingdom and USA) and the Federal Republic of Germany entered into force termi-
nating the Occupation régime in the Republic. The Three Powers retained however 
711 Among many others, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, Series A 
no. 310, and Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1996-VI; Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001IV; Demades v. Turkey, no. 16219/90, 
31 July 2002; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, no. 46347/99, 22 December 2005; Varnava and Others v. 
Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 
16072/90 and 16073/90, .ECHR 2009.
712 Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, Reports 2001-IV.
713 Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996VI; De-
mades v. Turkey, no. 16219/90, 31 July 2002; Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd and Michael 
Tymvios v. Turkey, no. 16163/90, 31 July 2003; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, no. 46347/99, 22 Decem-
ber 2005. 
714 Demades v. Turkey, no. 16219/90, 31 July 2002; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, no. 46347/99, 
22 December 2005.
715 Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, ECHR 2009.
716 Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, Reports 2001-IV.
717 Egmez v. Cyprus, no. 30873/96, Reports 2000-XII.
718 Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, nos. 25316-25321/94 and 27207/95, Reports 2001-V.
719 Aziz v. Cyprus, no. 69949/01, Reports 2004-V.
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the rights and responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin, 
which had since 1948 been exercised with the abstention of the Soviet authorities.
The applicant in the case of Hess v. the United Kingdom was the wife of Rudolf 
Hess, the former deputy of Adolf Hitler, who had been convicted at Nuremberg of 
conspiracy to wage aggressive war and crimes against peace and sentenced to life im-
prisonment. At the time when the application was lodged, he was the last remain-
ing Nazi prisoner in Spandau Prison, Berlin. Spandau Prison is located in the British 
sector of Berlin and was guarded in monthly turns by the United States of America, 
France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The Commission observed that 
the exercise of authority by the United Kingdom took place outside its territory, in 
Berlin, but was of the opinion that ‘there [was] in principle, from a legal point of view, 
no reason why acts of the British authorities in Berlin should not entail the liability of 
the United Kingdom under the Convention’.720
The applicants in Vearncombe and Others v. the United Kingdom and the Federal 
Republic of Germany721 were the owners and inhabitants of dwellings situated close 
to a firing range in the British zone of West Berlin built and operated by the British 
Army. Relying on Articles 8 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 1 they com-
plained of the noise, and relying on Article 13 they complained that the remedy avail-
able was ineffective.
The Commission noted that 
… under the existing regulations in the Allied Kommandatura Law German au-
thorities do not exercise any control with regard to the Forces of the Allied Pow-
ers in Berlin nor do German courts exercise criminal or civil jurisdiction over the 
Allied Forces, except when expressly authorised by the Allied Kommandatura or 
the appropriate Sector Commandant.
The shooting range in question is not only used exclusively by the British 
Army but it was also constructed entirely under the control of the British Mili-
tary Government. Although the German authorities in Berlin were informed 
of the plans for constructing the range and certain consultations took place be-
tween British and German authorities, the responsibility for the construction 
and/or use of the range lies solely with the British Military Government.
With regard to Germany, the application was therefore inadmissible ratione personae.
With regard to the United Kingdom, the Commission noted that, unlike in the 
Hess case, the responsibility of the other Occupying Powers was not in issue. None-
theless it declined to express itself on whether the United Kingdom had Article 1 
720 Hess v. the United Kingdom, no. 6231/73, Commission decision of 28 May 1975.
721 Vearncombe and Others v. the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, no. 12816/87, 
D.R. No. 59, p. 186; see also Magdalena Jankowska-Gilberg, Extraterritorialität der Menschen-
rechte: Der Begriff der Jurisdiktion im Sinne von Art. 1 EMRK (diss. Regensburg 2007), Nomos, 
2008, p. 68.
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jurisdiction in the matter because the application was in any event inadmissible on 
unrelated grounds.
6.4.2 Maintaining a proxy government on foreign territory
6.4.2.1 Northern Cyprus (Turkey)
In 1983 the occupied territory declared independence as the ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’ in a move condemned as unlawful secession by, among others, the 
United Nations Security Council and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, both of which continue to regard the government of the republic of Cyprus 
as the sole legitimate government of the island state.722 To date, the Republic of Tur-
key remains the only state to recognise the ‘TRNC’ as a state in its own right.
Turkey sought to argue that far from being a ‘puppet’ State, the ‘TRNC’ was a 
democratic constitutional State with impeccable democratic features and credentials. 
Basic rights were effectively guaranteed and there were free elections. It followed that 
the exercise of public authority in the ‘TRNC’ was not imputable to Turkey. The fact 
that this State had not been recognised by the international community was not of 
any relevance in this context.
In Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), the Court answered this argument 
in the following terms:
It is not necessary to determine whether, as the applicant and the Government 
of Cyprus have suggested, Turkey actually exercises detailed control over the 
policies and actions of the authorities of the “TRNC”. It is obvious from the 
large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus ... that her 
army exercises effective overall control over that part of the island. Such control, 
according to the relevant test and in the circumstances of the case, entails her 
responsibility for the policies and actions of the “TRNC” ... Those affected by 
such policies or actions therefore come within the ‘”jurisdiction” of Turkey for 
the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. Her obligation to secure to the ap-
plicant the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention therefore extends to 
the northern part of Cyprus.723
In the Cyprus v. Turkey interstate judgment, the Court added the following:
77. It is of course true that the Court in the Loizidou case was addressing an 
individual’s complaint concerning the continuing refusal of the authorities to al-
low her access to her property. However, it is to be observed that the Court’s rea-
soning is framed in terms of a broad statement of principle as regards Turkey’s 
general responsibility under the Convention for the policies and actions of the 
722 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983), 18 November 1983; 550 (1984), 11 May 
1984; see Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, §§ 19-23, Reports 1996-VI.
723 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 56, Series A no. 310.
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“TRNC” authorities. Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, 
its responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials 
in northern Cyprus but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local 
administration which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support. 
It follows that, in terms of Article 1 of the Convention, Turkey’s “jurisdiction” 
must be considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights 
set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which she has ratified, 
and that violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey.
78. In the above connection, the Court must have regard to the special char-
acter of the Convention as an instrument of European public order (ordre pub-
lic) for the protection of individual human beings and its mission, as set out 
in Article 19 of the Convention, “to ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties” (see the Loizidou judgment (pre-
liminary objections) cited above, p. 31, § 93). Having regard to the applicant 
Government’s continuing inability to exercise their Convention obligations 
in northern Cyprus, any other finding would result in a regrettable vacuum in 
the system of human-rights protection in the territory in question by removing 
from individuals there the benefit of the Convention’s fundamental safeguards 
and their right to call a High Contracting Party to account for violation of their 
rights in proceedings before the Court.724
There have been many cases brought against Turkey in relation to the acts of its agents 
in Northern Cyprus. Some, like Loizidou and the interstate case Cyprus v. Turkey, pri-
marily raise issues of property rights and access by displaced persons to their former 
homes. Others raise issues under Article 2. Thus, in Solomou v. Turkey we see a Greek 
Cypriot protester who has managed to enter the buffer zone between the ‘TRNC’ 
and Cyprus proper across the barbed-wire barrier being shot by a Turkish or Turkish 
Cypriot soldier while trying to take down a Turkish flag.725 
In Djavit An v. Turkey the applicant was a Cypriot national of Turkish Cypriot 
ethnicity, a member of a movement set up to create peace between the island’s two 
communities, who was denied permission to enter the ‘TRNC’ to meet like-minded 
opposite numbers. The Court found a violation of Articles 10 and 11.726 Indeed there 
can be little doubt that a State using a proxy government to monitor persons entering 
the territory under its control is exercising ‘jurisdiction’ in every sense of the word.
6.4.2.2 Transdniestria (Russia)
In all of the judgments concerning the Trandsniestrian territory – Ilaşcu and Others, 
Ivanţoc and Others, Catan and Others and Mozer, mentioned above – Russia is cited 
as respondent in addition to Moldova. 
724 Cyprus v. Turkey (merits) [GC], no. 25781/94, §§ 77-78, ECHR 2001-IV.
725 Solomou v. Turkey, no. 36832/97, 24 June 2008.
726 Djavit An v. Turkey, no. 20652/92, ECHR 2003-III.
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As we have seen, when Moldova declared independence from the Soviet Union 
there was a Soviet army in place that transmogrified in situ into an operational group 
of the Russian army and never left. As the Court has found, the separatist government 
of the ‘MRT’ has been allowed to survive thanks to Russian economic and political 
assistance and the continued Russian military presence on Transdniestrian territory.
In the Court’s own words:
In the light of all these circumstances, the Court considers that the Russian Fed-
eration’s responsibility is engaged in respect of the unlawful acts committed by 
the Transdniestrian separatists, regard being had to the military and political 
support it gave them to help them set up the separatist regime and the participa-
tion of its military personnel in the fighting. In acting thus, the authorities of the 
Russian Federation contributed both militarily and politically to the creation of 
a separatist regime in the region of Transdniestria, which is part of the territory 
of the Republic of Moldova.
The Court also notes that even after the ceasefire agreement of 21 July 1992 
the Russian Federation continued to provide military, political and economic 
support to the separatist regime (…), thus enabling it to survive by strengthen-
ing itself and by acquiring a certain amount of autonomy vis-à-vis Moldova.727
This is in its essentials the application of the reasoning set out in Loizidou v. Turkey 
(preliminary objections). 
6.4.2.3 Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia)
We have seen above that following the dissolution of the Soviet Union war broke 
out between Armenia and Azerbaijan centred on Nagorno-Karabakh, the area within 
the territory of Azerbaijan inhabited by ethnic Armenians. The breakaway ‘Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic’ (or ‘NKR’) now controls some 95% of the original Nagorno-
Karabakh oblast as well as a land corridor joining it to the Republic of Armenia. Dis-
placed persons, overwhelmingly Azerbaijani nationals, number in the hundreds of 
thousands.
The application in Chiragov and Others v. Armenia728 was brought by six Azer-
baijani nationals. They were among the many displaced from the Lachin district, 
which had become part of the land corridor linking the ‘NKR’ with Armenia proper. 
They obtained from the Court a judgment finding them to be victims of violations of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 8 of the Convention itself 
in that they had been denied the possibility to regain control of their former homes. 
The type and level of support given by Armenia to the ‘NKR’ was disputed. The 
Court found, on the evidence available (which included reports by NGOs such as 
727 Ilaşcu and Others, § 382. 
728 Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (dec.) (GC), no. 13216/05, 14 December 2011; Chiragov and 
Others v. Armenia, (merits) [GC], no. 13216/05, 16 June 2015.
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Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group as well as United Nations 
Security Council resolutions, a treaty setting up a military alliance between the Re-
public of Armenia and the ‘NKR’ and most strikingly, statements by an Armenian 
minister of defence and the incumbent Armenian president), that Armenian mili-
tary support had been and continued to be ‘decisive for the conquest of and con-
tinued control over the territories in issue, and the evidence, not the least the 1994 
military co-operation agreement, convincingly shows that the armed forces of Arme-
nia and the ‘NKR’ [were] highly integrated’.729 Other support offered to the ‘NKR’ 
by Armenia included financial support, both public and private; political support; 
the adoption in the ‘NKR’ of Armenian legislation and ‘the operation of Armenian 
law enforcement agents and the exercise of jurisdiction by Armenian courts on that 
territory’.730
6.4.3 Air attack on foreign territory
6.4.3.1 European NATO members in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
6.4.3.1.1 Banković and Others
In March 1999 the North Atlantic Council, the political decision-making body of 
NATO, decided – unanimously, as it always does – to carry out air strikes against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) in order to 
back up demands of the international community for Kosovo to be granted auton-
omy. Among the targets was Radio Televizije Srbije (‘RTS’), the Serbian state radio 
and television station, which was later stated by NATO to be a ‘dual use’ target used 
both for civilian communication and for purposes of military command and control. 
The building was hit by a missile launched from a NATO aircraft on 23 April 1999 
at 2.20 a.m. Sixteen persons were killed and another sixteen were seriously injured. 
Human Rights Watch later reported that the attack had been planned for an earlier 
date but postponed because of disagreement between the American and French gov-
ernments regarding the legality and legitimacy of the target.731
A ‘Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, set up to report to the ICTY Prosecutor on questions 
of legality, found that during the entire air campaign NATO aircraft flew 38,400 sor-
ties, including 10,484 strike sorties, releasing 23,614 munitions. Comparing these fig-
ures with the total number of civilian killed – approximately 500 in total – the Com-
mittee considered that
729 Chiragov and Others (merits), §§ 173-180.
730 Chiragov and Others (merits), §§ 181-185.
731 Human Rights Watch, The Crisis in Kosovo, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Nat-
bm200-01.htm (retrieved on 5 July 2015).
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These figures [did] not indicate that NATO [might] have conducted a campaign 
aimed at causing substantial civilian casualties either directly or indirectly732
NATO later alleged that it made ‘every possible effort’ to avoid civilian casualties and 
collateral damage. Timing the attack on the RTS station in the middle of the night, 
when presumably most civilian personnel would normally be at home in bed, would 
be consistent with such an aim, although doubts were expressed as to whether NATO 
had done enough to give advance warning of it.733
The Committee concluded that the number of civilian casualties caused by the at-
tack on the RTS station ‘were unfortunately high but [did] not appear to be clearly 
disproportionate’.734
In the case brought before the Court against the European NATO member States, 
which came to be known as Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others,735 the ap-
plicants were one direct victim who had been injured in the attack and the surviving 
kin of three of the people killed. They alleged violations of Articles 2, 10 and 13 of the 
Convention.
As relevant to this study, the applicants argued from the case-law developed in 
Loizidou and Cyprus v. Turkey736 that jurisdiction followed from ‘effective control’. 
Admittedly the level of control exercised by means of an air strike was not the same 
as that exercised by Turkey in northern Cyprus, but States that struck a target outside 
their territory could be held accountable under the Convention for those Conven-
tion rights within their control in the situation in question.737 They further submitted 
that air attack constituted acts of State that might produce effects in the territory of 
another State and in that respect similar to the deportation or extradition of aliens 
to a foreign country in which they might be at risk of ill-treatment.738 The decision-
making process that had led to the attack was comparable to acts of diplomatic agents 
of the State, which also produced extraterritorial effects;739 and the attack itself had 
been launched from the land territory of one or more NATO Member States – Italy 
and elsewhere – and from ships and aircraft that constituted the territory of one or 
more of such States. Finally, drawing on Article 15 of the Convention, they suggested 
732 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, § 54. Available from ICTY’s web site, 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf (accessed on 20 August 2017).
733 Final Report to the Prosecutor, para. 77. See also Paolo Benvenuti, “The ICTY Prosecutor and 
the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, in 
EJIL (2001), Vol. 12 No. 3, 503–529, at p. 523.
734 Final Report to the Prosecutor, ibid.
735 Banković and Others v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom (GC) (dec.), no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII.
736 Footnotes 723 and 724 above.
737 Banković and Others, §§ 47-48 and observations of the applicants, §§ 78-80.
738 Banković and Others, observations of the applicants, §§ 71-84.
739 Banković and Others, observations of the applicants, §§ 85-87.
189Typology of Article 1 jurisdiction in ‘hard power’ situations
that that Article would be rendered ‘meaningless’ if it did not also apply to extra-
territorial war or emergencies.740
The Governments countered that it was 
… rather the applicants’ novel “cause-and-effect” theory of extra-territorial ju-
risdiction that would have serious international consequences. Such a theory 
would, when added to the applicants’ assertion concerning the several liability 
of all respondent States as members of NATO, seriously distort the purpose and 
scheme of the Convention. In particular, it would have serious consequences for 
international military collective action as it would render the Court competent 
to review the participation of Contracting States in military missions all over the 
world in circumstances when it would be impossible for those States to secure 
any of the Convention rights to the inhabitants of those territories and even in 
situations where a Contracting State had no active part in the relevant mission. 
The resulting Convention exposure would, according to the Governments, risk 
undermining significantly the States’ participation in such missions and would, 
in any event, result in far more protective derogations under Article 15 of the 
Convention.741
The Court understood the real connection between the applicants and the respond-
ent States to be the ‘extraterritorial act’ itself; the question was therefore whether the 
attack itself was sufficient to bring the applicants (and their relatives killed in the at-
tack) within the jurisdiction of those States.742
In answering this question, the Court held that 
Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect [the] ordinary and 
essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being ex-
ceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of 
each case.743
State practice was ‘indicative of a lack of any apprehension on the part of the Con-
tracting States of their extra-territorial responsibility in contexts similar to the present 
case’: although there had been a number of military missions involving Convention 
States acting extra-territorially, no State ‘[had] indicated a belief that its extra-terri-
torial actions involved an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of 
the Convention by making a derogation pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention’; 
all Article 15 derogations made until them having related to ‘internal conflicts’ (in 
south-east Turkey and Northern Ireland), there was no basis to accept the applicants’ 
740 Banković and Others, § 49.
741 Banković and Others, § 43.
742 Banković and Others, § 54.
743 Banković and Others, § 61 (references omitted).
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suggestion that Article 15 covered all ‘war’ and ‘public emergency’ situations wherever 
they might arise.744
With regard to the arguments drawn from Loizidou and Cyprus v. Turkey, the 
Court held that 
the case-law of the Court demonstrates that its recognition of the exercise of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional: it has done so 
[i.e. given such recognition] when the respondent State, through the effective 
control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of 
military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the 
Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers nor-
mally to be exercised by that Government.745
The fact of the attack itself was not sufficient to bring the applicants and their relatives 
killed by it within the Article 1 jurisdiction of the respondent States. The suggestion 
that ‘anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State, wherever 
in the world that act [might] have been committed or its consequences felt, [was] 
thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1 of 
the Convention’746 was not supported by the text of Article 1. Even the applicants’ 
suggestion that the positive obligation in Article 1 to secure the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of the Convention could be ‘divided and tailored in accordance 
with the particular circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question’ failed to sway 
the Court: if the drafters of the Convention had wished to ensure jurisdiction as ex-
tensive as that advocated by the applicants, they could have adopted a text the same 
as or similar to the contemporaneous Articles 1 of the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 – which demand respect ‘in all circumstances’.747
It was true that in Cyprus v. Turkey the Court had recognised the need to avoid ‘a 
regrettable vacuum’ in the protection offered by the Convention in northern Cyprus, 
but this related to an entirely different situation: Cyprus was a Party to the Conven-
tion, and prevented by the ‘effective control’ exercised by Turkey from meeting its 
Convention obligations throughout its territory. In summary,
[t]he Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating, subject to Article 56 of the 
Convention, in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space 
(espace juridique) of the Contracting States. The FRY clearly does not fall within 
this legal space. The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout 
the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States. Accordingly, 
the desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human rights’ protection has so 
744 Banković and Others, § 62.
745 Banković and Others, § 71.
746 Also referred to as the ‘cause and effect’ theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
747 Banković and Others, § 75.
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far been relied on by the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction only when 
the territory in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would 
normally be covered by the Convention.748
The decision has been criticised in academic writing.749 Much of the criticism has in 
the meantime been overtaken by subsequent case-law developments on the extrater-
ritorial exercise of Article 1 jurisdiction; it would stretch the scope of this study too 
far to go into the detail of it. Let us nonetheless consider a few.
Happold, for example, is typical of those who argue that the very fact of causing 
harm through military action ought to have induced the Court to find Article 1 juris-
diction established. He points out, correctly per se, that the extraterritorial exercise of 
jurisdiction engages the responsibility of a State whether or not it is legal – pointing 
to Loizidou as an example of Article 1 jurisdiction arising from ‘effective control’ – 
then turns to the quite different issue of State agent control over the individual and 
boldly states that ‘whether in any given situation a Contracting Party is exercising 
jurisdiction over an individual is a question of fact, not of law’.750 This appears to be 
based on a misunderstanding of Loizidou: it is the effectiveness of the control over an 
area exercised by a Contracting Party that is a question of fact, not of law.751 If control 
is effective, it can amount to the exercise of jurisdiction – but that is not a necessary 
corollary.
Lawson makes a different argument, for which he points to Article 2 of the In-
ternational Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. He would have expected the Court to follow the order in which that 
Draft Article sets out the elements of State responsibility and query first whether the 
bombing attack was attributable to the respondent States, and only then whether it 
was in breach of these states’ international obligations.752 This is opposed by Michael 
O’Boyle, the Deputy Registrar of the Court at that time, who counters that the logic 
748 Banković and Others, § 80.
749 See, for example, Matthew Happold, “Banković v. Belgium and the territorial scope of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights”, in Human Rights law Review 2003, Volume 3, Number 
1, pap. 77-90; Rick Lawson, “Life after Banković: On the Extraterritorial Application of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights”, in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
(Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kamminga, eds.), Intersentia, 2004, pp. 83 et seq.; Federico Sper-
otto, “Beyond Banković: Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, Human Rights & Human Welfare, working paper no. 38, 13 November 2006; Magdalena 
Jankowska-Gilberg, Extraterritorialität der Menschenrechte: Der Begriff der Jurisdiktion im Sinne 
von Art. 1 EMRK (diss. Regensburg 2007), Nomos, 2008, pp. 42-63; Nienke van der Have, The 
prevention of gross human rights violations under international human rights law (diss. Amster-
dam 2017), pp. 100-101 (describing the decision as an “infamous judgment”).
750 Happold, p. 87.
751 See Al-Skeini, § 132, second sentence: “In each case, the question whether exceptional circum-
stances exist which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising juris-
diction extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the particular facts.”
752 Rick Lawson, Life After Banković , passim.
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of the Convention is actually the opposite precisely because the existence of jurisdic-
tion is a precondition for the existence of an international obligation.753
Some authors simply disagree with the outcome, which they dismiss as politically 
motivated. Sperotto, for example, calls the Banković decision a ‘clear symptom of the 
States’ tendency to subordinate human rights protection to political interests or op-
portunities’ and calls on the Court to ‘dismiss State practice, when it appears clearly 
inconsistent with fundamental human rights’.754 Lawson suggests that the Court was 
unwilling to be drawn into politically sensitive discussions on remote conflicts.755 The 
fact is that the governments’ argument based on the possible international political 
repercussions of any finding that they had Article 1 jurisdiction was not answered by 
the Court, which was able to declare the application inadmissible on other grounds.
Ultimately the decision in Banković rests on the findings, firstly, that the European 
NATO members did not exercise ‘effective authority and control’ over Belgrade, nor 
intended to; and secondly, that they neither did nor intended to wield legislative, 
judicial or executive power over the individuals unfortunate enough to be hit in the 
attack.756 In other words, what was lacking was the intent on the part of the European 
NATO members to bend any individuals to their will – that is, the assertion of juris-
diction over individuals.
6.4.3.1.2 Markovic and Others
In a separate development, a different group of citizens of Serbia and Montenegro 
brought joint and several civil claims in the Italian domestic courts against the Com-
mand of NATO’s Allied Forces in Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) and against the 
Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Defence, basing their claim on the fact 
that the aircraft that had bombed the Belgrade and the RTS television station had tak-
en off from air bases located in Italian territory. The proceedings against AFSOUTH 
were discontinued by the applicants after NATO invoked the immunity of its head-
quarters.757 Those against the Italian Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Defence 
ended in a preliminary ruling of the Italian Court of Cassation finding that the appli-
cants’ claims were based on alleged violations of public international law which were 
not reviewable by the Italian domestic courts.
753 Michael O’Boyle, “The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion: A Comment on Life After Banković’”, in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Trea-
ties, Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kamminga, eds., Intersentia, 2004, pp. 125-139 at pp. 127 and 
131.
754 Federico Sperotto, “Beyond Banković: Extraterritorial application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights”, in East European Human Rights Review 2008, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 131-152 at p. 
145.
755 Rick Lawson, Life after Banković, p. 116.
756 In the same sense, Eric Pouw, International Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict in 
the Context of Counterinsurgency – With a Particular Focus on Targeting and Operational Deten-
tion (diss. UvA 2013), pp. 158-59.
757 Article VIII § 5 of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 19 June 1951.
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In their application to the Court, the applicants argued that there had been viola-
tion of Articles 1, 2, 10 and 17 of the Convention as a result of the actual attack, and 
of Articles 6 and 13 taken together with Article 1 in that the Court of Cassation had 
blocked their civil claim for damages. 
The Court gave a separate decision on admissibility758 in which it declared the 
complaints under Articles 1, 2, 10 and 17 inadmissible in view of the Banković prec-
edent. The fact that the applicants had brought their case before the Italian courts was 
not sufficient distinction.
What remained was the applicants’ complaint under Articles 6 and 13, taken to-
gether with Article 1. The Court redefined this as a complaint concerning the right of 
access to a court as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, taken together with 
Article 1.
In the proceedings on the merits, the Italian Government submitted a preliminary 
objection that the matters complained of fell outside Italy’s Article 1 jurisdiction. This 
was easily disposed of:
54 Even though the extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been 
at the origin of an action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and 
the final outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect 
the jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil 
proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by Article 
1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights pro-
tected by Article 6.
The Court considers that, once a person brings a civil action in the courts or 
tribunals of a State, there indisputably exists, without prejudice to the outcome 
of the proceedings, a “jurisdictional link” for the purposes of Article 1.
55. The Court notes that the applicants in the instant case brought an action 
in the Italian civil courts. Consequently, it finds that a “jurisdictional link” ex-
isted between them and the Italian State.’759
The Italian Government then sought to argue that the applicants’ claim was one to 
which Article 6 did not apply.
The Court disagreed:
101. The Court … considers that there was from the start of the proceedings a 
genuine and serious dispute over the existence of the right to which the appli-
cants claimed to be entitled under the civil law. The respondent Government’s 
argument that there was no arguable (civil) right for the purposes of Article 6 
because of the Court of Cassation’s decision that, as an act of war, the impugned 
act was not amenable to judicial review, can be of relevance only to future allega-
758 Markovic and Others v. Italy (dec.), no. 1398/03, 12 June 2003.
759 Markovic and Others, §§ 54-55.
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tions by other complainants. The Court of Cassation’s judgment did not make 
the applicants’ complaints retrospectively unarguable (see Z and Others v. the 
United Kingdom ([GC], no. 29392/95, § 89, ECHR 2001-V). In these circum-
stances, the Court finds that the applicants had, on at least arguable grounds, a 
claim under domestic law.’760
An arguable ‘claim’ there might be. However, a ‘right’ to compensation that could be 
said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised in domestic law was a different 
matter:
113. The Court does not accept the applicants’ assertion that the impugned 
decision constituted an immunity, either de facto or in practice, because of its 
allegedly absolute or general nature. As the respondent Government rightly not-
ed, the decision concerned only one aspect of the right to bring an action against 
the State, this being the right to claim damages for an act of government related 
to an act of war, and cannot be regarded as an arbitrary removal of the courts’ 
jurisdiction to determine a whole range of civil claims (see [Fayed v. the United 
Kingdom (21 September 1994, § 65, Series A no. 294-B]). As was pointed out by 
the British Government and as the Court observed in paragraph 93 above, it is 
a principle of Convention case-law that Article 6 does not in itself guarantee 
any particular content for civil rights and obligations in national law. It is not 
enough to bring Article 6 § 1 into play that the non-existence of a cause of action 
under domestic law may be described as having the same effect as an immunity, 
in the sense of not enabling the applicant to sue for a given category of harm (see 
Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 98).
114. The Court considers that the Court of Cassation’s ruling in the present 
case does not amount to recognition of an immunity but is merely indicative of 
the extent of the courts’ powers of review of acts of foreign policy such as acts 
of war. It comes to the conclusion that the applicants’ inability to sue the State 
was the result not of an immunity but of the principles governing the substan-
tive right of action in domestic law. At the relevant time, the position under the 
domestic case-law was such as to exclude in this type of case any possibility of the 
State being held liable. There was, therefore, no limitation on access to a court of 
the kind in issue in [Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 57, Series 
A no. 93].761
– and consequently no violation of Article 6.
760 Markovic and Others, § 101.
761 Markovic and Others, §§ 113-14.
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6.4.4 Incursion into foreign territory
6.4.4.1 Turkey in Northern Iraq762
In March and April 1995 Turkish troops carried out military operations in Northern 
Iraq for the purpose of pursuing and eliminating terrorists who were seeking shelter 
there. The applicants were, variously, wives and mothers of men allegedly last seen in 
the custody of Turkish soldiers and later found dead. Turkey, for its part, acknowl-
edged the presence of its troops in the area at that time but denied all knowledge of 
the capture of the applicants’ husbands and sons or of their fate.
After restating the principles developed in Banković and Others, Ilaşcu and Others 
and Assanidze, the Court made the following statement of principle:
… [A] State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights 
and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are 
found to be under the former State’s authority and control through its agents 
operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter State (see, mutatis 
mutandis, M. v. Denmark, application no. 173 92/90, Commission decision of 
14 October 1992, DR 73, p. 193; Illich Sanchez Ramirez v. France, application 
no. 28780/95, Commission decision of 24 June 1996, DR 86, p. 155; Coard et al. 
v. the United States, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights decision 
of 29 September 1999, Report No. 109/99, case No. 10.951, §§ 37, 39, 41 and 43; 
and the views adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 29 July 1981 in the 
cases of Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, nos. 
52/1979 and 56/1979, at §§ 12.3 and 10.3 respectively). Accountability in such 
situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be inter-
preted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on 
the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory 
(ibid.).763
This, however, was a case that hinged on its facts. The Court defined the essential 
question as whether at the relevant time Turkish troops conducted operations in the 
area where the killings took place. Doubt in this respect arose from the absence of 
any information identifying the soldiers seen as Turkish, such as a description of their 
uniforms. In the absence of proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, faced with the Turk-
ish denial and given that the area had been the scene of fierce fighting by Kurdish 
factions, the Court could not find it established that the men had been within the 
jurisdiction of Turkey for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.764
The above-quoted paragraph of Issa has often been cited by authors critical of the 
restrictive approach taken by the Court in respect of the ‘cause-and-effect’ view of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. At this point, however, it must be recognised that that 
762 Issa and Others v. Turkey, no. 31821/96, 16 November 2004.
763 Issa and Others, § 71.
764 Issa and Others, §§ 72-81.
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paragraph – taken from a judgment delivered in 2004 by a Chamber – is no longer 
good law in so far as it purports to extend beyond Banković. As Clare Ovey correctly 
points out, in Al-Skeini (a judgment delivered in 2011 and now universally considered 
leading) the Grand Chamber did not endorse the reasoning set out in Issa: instead, 
it resumed the narrower understanding of State agent authority and control given in 
Banković (as indeed it later did in Jaloud) according to which there has to be some 
prior exertion of State agent authority and control, such as an arrest or detention, 
for Article 1 jurisdiction to be established.765 The citation of Issa in paragraph 136 of 
Al-Skeini, which includes the qualification ‘had it been established that Turkish sol-
diers had taken the applicants’ relatives into custody in northern Iraq, taken them to a 
nearby cave and executed them’, is not inconsistent with this interpretation.
6.4.4.2 Turkey in northern Iran?
A curious decision is Pad and Others v. Turkey.766 The application was brought by 
the surviving kin of a group of seven Iranian nationals killed by Turkish armed forces 
close to the border between Turkey and Iran. The facts, as so often in cases of this 
nature, were disputed: the applicants claimed that the seven men had gone to look 
for ‘wild vegetables and fruit, such as mushrooms and rhubarb’, while the defending 
government had sent its military to go looking for a ‘terrorist group’ with arms and 
equipment.
The applicants, relying on Issa v. Turkey, argued that the events complained of 
had occurred within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Turkey. The Turkish Govern-
ment ‘vigorously denied’ having carried out a cross-border operation in Iran, claiming 
instead that the seven men had been intercepted on Turkish territory after having 
illegally crossed the border. Ultimately, the Court held that it was ‘not required to 
determine the exact location of the impugned events, given that the Government had 
already admitted that the fire discharged from the helicopters had caused the killing 
of the applicants’ relatives, who had been suspected of being terrorists’767 – an un-
necessary confession on the part of the respondent government and an unnecessary 
finding for the Court to make, since in any event the domestic remedies had not been 
exhausted.
The Pad and Others decision has been understood, even welcomed, as the begin-
ning of a reversal of the Banković case-law.768 It is submitted that Pad and Others is not 
765 Clare Ovey, “Application of the ECHR during International Armed Conflicts”, in The UK and 
European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks and Love-
day Hodson, eds.), Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 225-245 at p. 230.
766 Pad and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 60167/00, 28 June 2007.
767 Pad and Others, § 54.
768 Rick Lawson, Really out of sight? Issues of Jurisdiction and Control in Situations of Armed Conflict 
under the ECHR, in Margins of Conflict: The ECHR and Transitions to and from Armed Conflict 
(Antoine Buyse, ed.), Intersentia, 2011, pp. 57-76, at pp. 65-66; Marco Sassòli, “The Role of Hu-
man Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts”, in Orna 
Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas 
de Deux, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law vol. XIX/1, Oxford University 
197Typology of Article 1 jurisdiction in ‘hard power’ situations
that, and it is certainly not the ‘outright rebellion’ claimed by at least one author;769 
this case stands on its own. Jurisdiction is not contested but is actually recognised by 
the respondent, though on its own stated facts and on its own terms; if the events 
complained of had occurred unambiguously on the Iranian side of the border, who 
can say whether the Turkish Government would have conceded the jurisdiction point 
so easily, and how the arguments of the parties might have differed from Issa?
6.4.4.3 Turkey in the Northern Cyprus buffer zone
There were no such doubts in the case of Isaak v. Turkey. The death in issue in that 
case was witnessed by many, including UNFICYP personnel, and captured on pho-
tograph and film. The case was the subject of reports by UNFICYP and the Secretary 
General of the United Nations.
The victim was a protester who entered the United Nations buffer zone between 
the TRNC and the Government-controlled Cyprus – a demilitarized area policed by 
UNFICYP. He was pounced upon and beaten to death by a group later found to have 
included Turkish or TRNC soldiers. The Court found the events to come within the 
Article 1 jurisdiction of Turkey.770
6.4.5 Exercise of jurisdiction in foreign territorial waters
One case has thus far reached the Court concerning pirates captured at sea, Hassan 
and Others v. France.771 The pirates had taken a sailing yacht and her crew off the 
Somalian coast and anchored in Somalian territorial waters. They were attacked by 
French naval forces who liberated the crew of the yacht, killing one pirate and taking 
six others prisoner. The international legal basis was Security Council Resolution 1816 
(2008), in which the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Na-
tions Charter, authorised States taking part in anti-piracy operations off Somalia to
(a) Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action per-
mitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law; 
and 
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with 
action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant interna-
tional law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery
Press 2011, pp. 34-94 at p. 65; Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Ter-
rorism (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 21; Eric Pouw, International Human Rights Law and the 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Context of Counterinsurgency - With a Particular Focus on Targeting 
and Operational Detention (diss. UvA 2013), p. 159.
769 Rick Lawson, “The Extra-Territorial Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights,” European Yearbook of International Law 2011, pp. 427-444 at p. 435.
770 Isaak v. Turkey, no. 44587/98, 24 June 2008.
771 Hassan and Others v. France, nos. 46695/10 and 54588/10, 4 December 2014.
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– which had the effect of rendering Articles 100-107 of UNCLOS, which ordi-
narily apply only on the high seas or ‘in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State’,772 
applicable by analogy to the Somalian territorial sea.773
In the ensuing proceedings, the Court found that the Security Council resolution 
constituted an adequate legal basis for the pirates’ arrest,774 but that the lack of any 
legal provision for their subsequent detention or for any judicial control thereof vio-
lated Article 5 §§ 1 and 3.775 In the light of the above-mentioned Medvyedyev and Oth-
ers judgment, the French Government did not deny that France had jurisdiction from 
the moment the pirates were under the control of the French armed forces.776
It is clear that ensuring swift review of the lawfulness of the arrest and detention 
of persons taken at sea presents problems of a practical nature, but other Convention 
States have proved equal to these. When, in 2010, twenty suspected Somalian pirates 
were captured in the Gulf of Aden by a Dutch naval vessel, judges and a prosecutor 
of the first-instance criminal court in Rotterdam were flown out to hold hearings in 
camera on board. Of the twenty, fifteen were released as there was insufficient evi-
dence to charge them and five were placed in detention on remand before being sent 
for trial in the Netherlands.777
6.4.6 Targeted killing abroad
6.4.6.1 Shot fired across the border
In 1996 Greek Cypriots demonstrating against the Turkish presence in Cyprus on 
the Greek Cypriot side of the ceasefire line were fired on from the ‘TRNC’ side. One 
demonstrator, the applicant, was wounded by a bullet in the abdomen.
After restating the principles set out in case-law including Banković and Others and 
Issa, the Court came to the following conclusion on Article 1 jurisdiction:
The Court reiterates that, in exceptional circumstances, the acts of Contracting 
States which produce effects outside their territory and over which they exer-
cise no control or authority may amount to the exercise by them of jurisdic-
772 Article 101 (a) (i) and (ii), respectively, of UNCLOS.
773 S/RES/1816 (2008) of 2 June 2008, para. 7. See also Tullio Treves and Cesare Pitea, “Piracy, In-
ternational Law and Human Rights”, in The Frontiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and its 
Challenges, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, vol. XXIV/1, pp. 89-126 at p. 101. 
For an overview of the international law and practice governing the combating of Somali piracy 
in particular, see Tamsin Philippa Paige, “The Impact and Effectiveness of UNCLOS on Coun-
ter-piracy Operations”, in Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2017), Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 97-123.
774 Hassan and Others, §§ 61-68.
775 Hassan and Others, §§ 69-72 and 86-104.
776 Hassan and Others, § 39. Compare also Vassis and Others v. France, no. 62736/09, 27 June 2013.
777 Openbaar ministerie (Dutch public prosecution service), press release 5 December 2010, Vijf 
Somaliërs wegens zeeroof vervolgd, https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/@28465/vijf-
somaliers/; Dutch Ministry of Defence, press release 8 December 2010 (in English), The Nether-
lands picks up 5 Somalis, https://www.defensie.nl/english/latest/news/2010/12/08/the-nether-
lands-picks-up-5-somalis (both accessed 23 April 2017).
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tion within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. The Court notes that, 
according to UNFICYP’s press release and the UN Secretary-General’s report 
on the events of 14 August 1996, the applicant’s injuries were caused by Turkish 
and/or Turkish Cypriot uniformed personnel, who fired some 25 to 30 rounds 
into the crowd. These agents of the State were at the time of opening fire in the 
territory of the “TRNC”. The Court further notes that, when she was hit by 
the bullet, the applicant was standing outside the neutral UN buffer zone and 
in close vicinity to the Greek-Cypriot National Guard checkpoint. Unlike the 
applicants in the Banković and Others case (…) she was accordingly within terri-
tory covered by the Convention.
In these circumstances, even though the applicant sustained her injuries in 
territory over which Turkey exercised no control, the opening of fire on the 
crowd from close range, which was the direct and immediate cause of those in-
juries, was such that the applicant must be regarded as ‘within [the] jurisdiction’ 
of Turkey within the meaning of Article 1 and that the responsibility of the re-
spondent State under the Convention is in consequence engaged.778
This line of reasoning seems to ignore the fact that the Turkish exercise of jurisdic-
tion in the ‘TRNC’ is already extraterritorial. If the case is seen in that way, an easier 
distinction to be made from Banković and Others is that the applicant sustained her 
wound while in ‘territory covered by the Convention’ – which, as we have seen in 
Cyprus v. Turkey, is sufficient to bring the Convention into play simply in order that 
there be no gap in its applicability ratione loci. Nonetheless, it is submitted that we 
have here a clear indication that a targeted attack by a Contracting State on an in-
dividual situated in the territory of a foreign State engages the Contracting State’s 
Article 1 jurisdiction.
Three weeks after the Andreou decision the Court delivered its judgment in the 
case of Solomou v. Turkey. That case concerned a Greek Cypriot demonstrator who 
had managed to enter the buffer zone between Cyprus Government-held territory 
and the ‘TRNC’ and had shinned up a flagpole to try and remove a flag – a Turkish 
flag, according to the judgment. His attempt was cut short by rifle fire from within 
the ‘TRNC’ that proved lethal.
The Court noted that the area in which the acts complained of took place was 
partly situated in the neutral UN buffer zone and the flagpole on which the victim 
had been climbing when he was shot was situated in the ‘TNRC’ territory. Be that 
as it might – the judgment does not decide whether the locus in quo was in the buffer 
zone or not – it was beyond dispute that the fatal shots had been fired, if not by Turk-
ish forces, then by ‘TRNC’ forces; the Court therefore considered that ‘in any event 
778 Andreou v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45653/99, 3 June 2008. The Court delivered its judgment on the 
merits of the case on 27 October 2009.
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the deceased was under the authority and/or effective control of the respondent State 
through its agents’.779
Pouw sees the distinction between these cases and Banković in terms of the dif-
ference between use of force that is not ‘collective and depersonalised’, but ‘selective 
and individualised’.780 It is submitted that this is inaccurate. Rather, the difference is 
between an intended victim and an accidental one as we shall see.
6.4.6.2 Drone attack
Unmanned remotely-piloted aircraft known as ‘drones’ (the ordinary meaning of the 
word is a male bee) have been used for military purposes, mostly reconnaissance and 
surveillance, since the Vietnam War. Many European Governments continue to use 
them in such a role. Civilian police too have adopted them for surveillance and detec-
tion.
Drones have been armed with missiles and used as weapons of war since at least 
the turn of the century. They are known to have been used for the targeted killing of 
individuals by the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom outside their own 
territory. The first reported drone strike appears to have been an American attack on 
a high-level al-Qaeda meeting in Kabul in November 2001.781 
In September 2015 the British Prime Minister informed the House of Commons 
that drones operated by the British Royal Air Force had carried out successful tar-
geted strikes in Syria the month before, killing two British nationals. One of the two 
Britons was reported to have been planning a terrorist attack in the United Kingdom, 
the other was stated to have been a cyber-warfare expert. In the words of the Prime 
Minister, this was ‘the first time in modern times that a British asset has been used 
to conduct a strike in a country where [the United Kingdom was] not involved in a 
war’. The justification cited was ‘the “inherent right of self-defence” contained in the 
Charter of the United Nations, based on evidence from intelligence agencies’; the 
strike was stated to have been authorised by the Defence Secretary.782
This attack brings the reality of drone warfare within the scope of our discussion. It 
is undeniable that the armed drone is a lethal weapon with considerable potential. Its 
use is likely to increase rapidly as time goes on. European Governments other than that 
of the United Kingdom are said to be eying the armed drone with covetous interest.783
779 Solomou v. Turkey, no. 36832/97, §§ 48-50, 24 June 2008.
780 Eric Pouw, International Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Context of 
Counterinsurgency - With a Particular Focus on Targeting and Operational Detention (diss. UvA 
2013), p. 160.
781 Stuart Casey-Maslen (Editor), Weapons Under International Human Rights Law, Cambridge 
University Press 2014, pp. 383-385.
782 BBC 7 September 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34178998, see also dronewars.net, 
http://dronewars.net/2015/12/14/fallon-to-face-questions-on-drone-targeted-killing-but-will-
there-be-answers/ (retrieved on 9 March 2016).
783 The Dutch Government, for example, though for the present it denies any intention to use armed 
drones. Lower House of Parliament (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal), Parliamentary Year 2015-
16, appendix to the parliamentary proceedings, no. 2640, question by the Member of Parliament 
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It is no longer inconceivable that one State Party to the Convention may one day 
launch a drone attack against a target on the territory of another State Party. It is sub-
mitted that such a situation will be similar, in terms of Article 1 of the Convention, to 
Andreou v. Cyprus – the case of the fatal rifle shot fired into Cyprus by a serviceman 
in the ‘TRNC’. There is little doubt that the Convention will apply, if only because – 
under the Cyprus v. Turkey rule – there would otherwise be an unconscionable gap in 
the protection offered by it.
If the drone strike is launched outside the territory of any Convention State, then 
the starting point will probably have to be that there is not ‘effective control over 
an area’. Incidental air attack, whether by manned or unmanned aircraft, cannot be 
equated to establishing dominion over territory.
The next question is therefore whether to follow Banković and Others or, alterna-
tively, the ‘State agent authority and control’ approach developed in al-Skeini and 
Others and confirmed in Jaloud.784
We have seen that in Banković and Others the Court refused to accept the ‘cause-
and-effect’ model of extraterritorial jurisdiction,785 according to which the mere fact 
of being a ‘victim’ of an act that, viewed in isolation, is incompatible with the Conven-
tion was sufficient to bring the Convention itself into play. 
Conversely, it may be argued that targeting an individual with lethal force con-
stitutes the ultimate exercise of ‘State agent authority and control’ – the deliberate 
assumption of power to dispose of the life of a human being. On this view, it matters 
little from what precise location the actual weapon is controlled, whether within or 
outside the territory of the Contracting State responsible: what matters is that the 
decision to apply selective and individualised lethal force is purposely taken by the au-
thorities of that State.786 As we must conclude,787 it is precisely this element of intent 
that was absent from Banković and Others: the attack was not intended to exercise 
destructive power over individual human beings or otherwise bend them to the will 
of any one of the Governments involved, but to put beyond use a building and instal-
lations housed in it, both belonging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.788
Ms. S. Belhaj to the Minister of Defence (submitted on 3 May 2016) and the Minister’s reply (re-
ceived on 26 May 2016). According to the Minister, other governments expressing a similar interest 
include the German, French, Italian and Spanish (ibid.). See also PACE Resolution 2051 (2015) on 
Drones and targeted killings: the need to uphold human rights and international law (23 April 2015), 
§ 3.
784 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “International Humanitarian Law and Extraterritorial State Con-
duct”, in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, edited by Fons Coomans and 
Menno Camminga (Intersentia, 2004), pp. 25-40 at p. 39.
785 Banković and Others, § 75.
786 Nils Melzer, Targeted killing in international law, Oxford University Press 2008, p. 137-138.
787 6.4.3.1.1 above.
788 Compare Michael Duttwiler, “Authority, Control and Jurisdiction in the Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of the European Convention on Human Rights, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 
Vol. 30/2, 137-162, 2012, at p. 158, and Eric Pouw, International Human Rights Law and the Law 
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In a recent report, the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the House of Lords 
and the House of Commons stated in so many words that ‘[o]n the current state of 
the case-law, the use of lethal force abroad by a drone strike is sufficient to bring the 
victim within the jurisdiction of the UK’ – ‘jurisdiction’ here meaning Article 1 juris-
diction, which entails the applicability of Article 2 of the Convention.789
In November 2015, it was reported in the Dutch news media that two Somalian 
alleged victims of an American drone strike were bringing an action in the Dutch 
civil courts against the Dutch Government. The connection with the Netherlands 
was said to be that the American armed forces had made use of intelligence, so-called 
metadata, collected by the Netherlands military intelligence service MIVD in the 
course of the international counter-piracy operation ‘Ocean Shield’ in which both 
States took part. The choice of a Dutch forum over an American one was stated to 
be based on the perception that Dutch courts were more ‘amenable to cases that in-
volved innocent victims of war crimes’ when the victims were foreign nationals.790
6.4.6.3 Clandestine murder 
On 23 November 2006 Alexander Litvinenko, a former Russian national who had 
been granted first British asylum and later British citizenship, died in a hospital in 
London. Post-mortem examination showed that his death had been caused by an in-
gestion of a fatal dose of a radioactive substance, polonium-210.
Finding circumstances of Litvinenko’s death suspicious, the British authorities be-
gan an inquest. When the inquest came to a dead end because the United Kingdom 
Government refused to divulge information in their possession, invoking ‘public in-
terest immunity’, Litvinenko’s widow obtained an order for a public inquiry to be 
held in its place. The report of the inquiry was presented to the House of Commons 
on 21 January 2016.791 It was based on evidence both public and ‘closed’, i.e. classified 
secret by the Home Secretary.
The report reaches the unambiguous finding that Litvinenko died from radiation 
syndrome caused by the ingestion of a lethal quantity of polonium-210 slipped into 
his tea by two Russian nationals in the bar of a London hotel.792
of Armed Conflict in the Context of Counterinsurgency - With a Particular Focus on Targeting and 
Operational Detention (diss. UvA 2013), p. 160.
789 House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Government’s 
policy on the use of drones for targeted killing, Second Report of Session 2015–16, para. 3.58.
790 De Volkskrant, 28 November 2015, http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/somali-victims-of-us-
drone-strike-take-legal-action-against-the-netherlands~a4196845/ (English), http://www.volk-
skrant.nl/buitenland/somalische-droneslachtoffers-klagen-nederlandse-staat-aan~a4196859/ 
(Dutch); RTL Nieuws, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CMmu5mPNGic (retrieved 
15 March 2016).
791 The Litvinenko Inquiry: Report into the death of Alexander Litvinenko, presented to the House 
of Commons on 21 January 2016 (HC 695), and Statement by the Chairman; https://www.lit-
vinenkoinquiry.org/report, accessed on 14 February 2016.
792 Litvinenko Inquiry report, pp. 183-207.
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Discounting alternative suggestions – including that Litvinenko might have been 
murdered by the British intelligence agencies – the report goes on to find ‘strong cir-
cumstantial evidence of Russian State responsibility’ for Litvinenko’s death,793 the 
killing having been an ‘FSB [Federal Security Service, Russian Federation] operation 
… probably approved by Mr Patrushev [Nikolai Patrushev, Head of the FSB in 2006] 
and also by President Putin [Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation in 
2006]’.
The present author stops short of accepting the findings of the British inquiry as 
fact, let alone assuming that any organ of the Russian Government was in any way re-
sponsible for the death of Alexander Litvinenko. One reason for this has to be the of-
ficial Russian denial,794 which must be taken at face value unless and until it is proven 
false; the other is that an application has been brought against Russia by Litvinenko’s 
widow (it was communicated to the Russian Government in 2010).795 Nevertheless, 
cases in which an official inquiry throws up a suspicion of a targeted assassination by 
one State Party to the Convention on the territory of another – what is more, without 
the latter’s tacit acquiescence or active connivance – are otherwise unknown, so this 
case can serve as a hypothetical example if nothing else.
It is argued by at least one author that Russia could not be held to account under 
the Convention because, applying reasoning based on Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda, 
Russia did not have effective control over any part of London, it did not exercise 
public powers in the city, and it seems far-fetched to conclude that Litvinenko 
was in custody of the Russian agents when he was poisoned.
Moreover,
To argue that Litvinenko may be considered to be within the “jurisdiction” of 
Russia because his assassination was in all likelihood planned on Russian terri-
tory does not seem convincing. After all, there is usually a link between com-
manders and decision-makers who may be physically located within the state 
and those state representatives (agents, soldiers, etc.) that act on their commands 
and orders abroad, and Strasbourg has not yet found that the mere planning of 
extraterritorial activities is sufficient to close the jurisdictional gap.796
793 Litvinenko Inquiry report, p. 240.
794 TASS, “Kremlin does not perceive Litvinenko death investigation results as verdict”, 21 January 
2016, quoting an official spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry; http://tass.com/poli-
tics/851376, accessed on 3 September 2016. 
795 Carter v. Russia, no. 20914/07. “To communicate”, as used here and elsewhere, is a term of art 
meaning “to give notice of the application or part of the application to the respondent Contract-
ing Party and invite that Party to submit written observations thereon” (Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the 
Rules of Court).
796 Anders Henriksen, “The Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the Geographical Scope of 
Human Rights Law”, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/29238/poisoning-litvinenko-
scope-human-rights/, accessed 14 February 2016.
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One answer to that position might be to suggest that this reasoning is based on a mis-
reading of Al-Skeini. Extraterritorial jurisdiction does not exist only within foreign 
territory under actual the control of the Contracting State, or over persons held as 
prisoners. It also exists over persons subjected to the authority and control of State 
agents – and deliberate killing is the ultimate exercise of control over any person. The 
question where the operation is planned would be irrelevant.
Another answer might be to pray in aid the case-law developed in the context 
of the Turkish presence in Northern Cyprus – the interstate case, Cyprus v. Turkey, 
and Andreou v. Turkey,797 the case of the rifle shot fired by a Turkish soldier from 
‘TRNC’ territory at a person in territory unambiguously within the jurisdiction of 
the Republic of Cyprus. In this case, it is after all alleged that a violation of the right 
to life occurred as a result of an unlawful deed committed with malice aforethought 
by one Convention State within another’s borders. 
6.4.7 Cyber-attack
Between 27 April 2007 and 18 May 2007, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) cy-
ber-attacks shut down the websites of all Estonian government ministries, two major 
banks, and several political parties. At one point, hackers even disabled the parlia-
mentary email server. Commentators and even the Estonian Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs were quick to accuse Russia of perpetrating the attacks – linking them to the 
removal of a Soviet-era war memorial from its previous prominent position, an emo-
tive issue in Russia and among the ethnic Russian minority in Estonia – but the Rus-
sian government officially denied it, and neither European Commission nor NATO 
technical experts were able to find credible evidence linking the Russian Government 
to the attack.798 It has been suggested, perhaps more plausibly, that the attack was 
perpetrated by private actors.799
On 13 May 2017 it was reported in the news media that a massive ransomware at-
tack, known as WannaCry, had shut down thousands of computers worldwide. Pay-
ment for unlocking the computers was demanded in bitcoin. Among the most promi-
nent victims were British National Health Service practices and hospitals. General 
practitioners and pharmacies lost access to vital patient information, including medi-
cal prescriptions; appointments and even operations were cancelled; and ambulances 
were diverted.800 The perpetrators remain unknown at the time of writing.
On 27 June 2017 a computer worm later to be known as ‘Petya’ (or more accurately, 
‘NotPetya’ or ‘Petya2017’, so as to disambiguate it from a type of ransomware called 
797 Cyprus v. Turkey; Andreou v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45653/99. See 6.4.6.1 above.
798 Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational 
Responses”, in Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 49-60 at p. 51.
799 Bill Brenner, “Experts doubt Russian government launched DDoS attacks”, http://searchsecuri-
ty.techtarget.com/news/1255548/Experts-doubt-Russian-government-launched-DDoS-attacks 
(accessed 28 May 2017).
800 BBC News, “NHS cyber-attack: GPs and hospitals hit by ransomware”, 13 May 2017, http://
www.bbc.com/news/health-39899646 (accessed 28 May 2017).
205Typology of Article 1 jurisdiction in ‘hard power’ situations
‘Petya’ of which it is a variant) infected computer systems in dozens of countries. 
Although major commercial companies were among the most conspicuous victims 
worldwide, most of the damage was suffered in Ukraine and Russia. Significantly, the 
radiation monitoring system of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was knocked out 
of action and monitoring had to be done manually.801 However, NotPetya appeared 
poorly designed for its ostensible purpose of making money for its operators; infor-
mation technology experts have suggested that it was malware disguised to appear as 
ransomware.802
These three examples of cyber-attacks – perhaps the best-known to have produced 
effects in Europe – drive home the dangers of this new weapon. The first is the dif-
ficulty of attributing responsibility to any particular person, organisation or govern-
ment. The second, underestimated perhaps until now803, is the distinct likelihood that 
individuals may be directly harmed: banks and their customers in the case of the Esto-
nian attack in 2007; worse, the physical health or even the lives of patients in the case 
of WannaCry; and NotPetya’s shutting down the radiation monitoring system of the 
Chernobyl plant presages worse still.
Estonia being one of the most wired countries in the world today, it is perhaps 
not surprising that NATO decided to base its ‘Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence’ in Tallinn. The concept predates the attack of 2007: the Estonian govern-
ment proposed it already in 2004, shortly after joining NATO. 
A prominent product of the Tallinn centre’s work is the ‘Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations’ prepared by groups of legal and 
other experts (technicians, military officers). The first edition (‘Tallinn Manual 1.0’) 
appeared in 2013. The second edition (‘Tallinn Manual 2.0’) was published in 2017.
801 The Independent, 27 June 2017, ‘”Petya” cyber-attack: Chernobyl’s radiation monitoring sys-
tem hit by worldwide hack’, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/chernobyl-
ukraine-petya-cyber-attack-hack-nuclear-power-plant-danger-latest-a7810941.html (accessed 
25 August 2017); CNN, 28 June 2017, ‘Chernobyl monitoring system hit by global cyber attack’, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/27/europe/chernobyl-cyber-attack/index.html (accessed 
25 August 2017).
802 Comae Technologies, 28 June 2017, ‘Petya.2017 is a wiper not a ransomware’, https://blog.comae.
io/petya-2017-is-a-wiper-not-a-ransomware-9ea1d8961d3b (accessed 25 August 2017); Interna-
tional Business Times, 29 June 2017, ‘Petya ransomware: What were the hackers’ motives and 
how much money have they raked in so far?’, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/petya-ransomware-
what-were-hackers-motives-how-much-money-have-they-raked-so-far-1628223 (accessed 25 Au-
gust 2017).
803 One advisory opinion on cyber warfare still focuses on “’cyber warfare’ … defined as ‘the conduct 
of military operations to disrupt, mislead, modify or destroy an opponent’s computer systems or 
networks by means of cyber capabilities’” and “‘Cyber terrorism’ defined as ‘the attempt, using 
cyber capabilities, to seriously disrupt a society or parts of a society in order to achieve a political 
objective’” Cyber Warfare, Report No 77, AIV (Adviesraad international vraagstukken, Advisory 
Council on International Affairs)/ No 22, CAVV (Commissie van advies inzake volkenrechteli-
jke vraagstukken, Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law) December 2011, 
pp. 9-10.
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Tallinn Manual 2.0 purports to identify ‘black letter’ rules of international law gov-
erning cyber operations and provides commentary on them. The international legal 
sources most prominent in the work are taken from general public international law 
and international humanitarian law: these include, among others, the Hague and Ge-
neva Conventions and judgments of the ICJ and ICTY. International human rights 
law is given far less attention: sources referred to include the Convention and a few of 
the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.
The definition of a cyber-attack is breathtakingly simple:
A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is rea-
sonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction 
to objects.804
Examples given of a cyber-attack in this sense include an operation that interferes 
with an electricity grid and causes a fire and an operation that releases dam waters and 
causes downstream destruction.805
Reassuringly, the manual states that ‘[i]nternational human rights law is applica-
ble to cyber-related activities’.806 As regards the extraterritorial application of human 
rights law, the Convention in particular, no general rule is formulated. Note is taken 
of the case-law of the Court on this point, in particular as developed in Al-Skeini,807 
but that is considered to be ‘specific treaty law’ – the Tallinn Manual is intended to 
be relevant also to States that are not Parties to the Convention. The majority view 
was that 
… in the current state of the law, physical control over territory or the individual 
[was] required before human rights law obligations were triggered. [footnote 
reference to Al-Skeini.] These Experts asserted that the premise of exercising 
power or effective control by virtual means such that human rights obligations 
attach runs contrary to both extensive State practice and the paucity of expres-
sions of opinio juris thereon. As an example, there [was] little evidence that when 
States conducted signals intelligence programmes directed at foreigners on for-
eign territory, they [considered] that their activities implicated the international 
human right to privacy.808
However, a minority of the Experts 
804 Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 92 (p. 415).
805 Tallinn Manual 2.0, p. 416. Compare Rules 140 and 141 (pp. 529-534) and Articles 56 and 57 of 
the First 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. 
806 Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 34, p. 182.
807 Al-Skeini, §§ 130-139.
808 Tallinn Manual 2.0, p. 185.
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… took the position that so long as the exercise or enjoyment of a human right in 
question by the individual concerned [was] within the power or effective con-
trol of the State, that State [had] power or effective control over the individual 
with respect to the right concerned. In other words, if an individual [could not] 
exercise a human right or enjoy the protection of one because of a State’s action, 
international human rights law [applied] extraterritorially.809
The minority position is thus identical to the ‘cause-and-effect’ view of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction rejected by the Court in Banković.810
It is submitted that in the current state of the law, there is no need to distinguish 
between cyber-attacks and other attacks as regards extra-territorial jurisdiction.811
An accepted general definition of an ‘attack’ is that given in Article 49 § 1 of Ad-
ditional Protocol 1 (1977):
“Attacks” mean acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in 
defence.
It is on this definition that Rule 92 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 draws.
In the examples given above – a cyber-attack directed against an electricity grid 
that causes a fire, or a cyber-attack that releases dam water and causes damage down-
stream – it is possible, assuming that the effects of the attack are felt on the territory 
of a State not party to the Convention, that the applicable precedent may be Banković 
not Al-Skeini. Should such an attack ever materialise, it will have to be determined on 
the facts of the case whether it is any different in principle from a missile attack on a 
radio station carried out in the middle of the night.
6.5 Peacekeeping and peace-enforcing 
6.5.1 All European members of the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq
After the capture of Baghdad by American forces in April 2003, Iraq’s long-time presi-
dent Saddam Hussein went into hiding. He was captured by American forces in De-
cember 2003 near Tikrit, in the Central Zone of occupation (which was garrisoned 
by American troops). After the transfer of authority from the Coalition Provisional 
Authority to the interim government of Iraq, Saddam Hussein was handed over to 
the Iraqi interim government for trial.
On 29 June 2004 – the day before he was to be handed over to the Iraqi authori-
ties – Saddam Hussein lodged an application with the Court complaining that he 
809 Tallinn Manual 2.0, p. 185.
810 See above 6.4.3.1.1. 
811 See also United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/Res/ 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, 
Definition of Aggression, Articles 3 and 4.
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was likely to face the death penalty after a ‘show trial’ lacking even the most basic 
guarantees of fairness. He cited as respondents the Convention States participating 
in the occupation of Iraq.
It took the Court nearly two years to declare the application inadmissible.812 The 
Court found that Saddam Hussein had failed to show that any respondent State had 
had ‘any responsibility for, or any involvement or role in’ his capture, detention and 
handover or that any Convention State had held control over any territory where the 
events complained of had occurred. The Court’s reasoning continues:
This failure to substantiate any such involvement also constitutes a response to 
his final submission to the effect that the respondent States were responsible for 
the acts of their military agents abroad. Finally, there is no basis in the Conven-
tion’s jurisprudence and the applicant has not invoked any established principle 
of international law which would mean that he fell within the respondent States’ 
jurisdiction on the sole basis that those States allegedly formed part (at varying 
unspecified levels) of a coalition with the US, when the impugned actions were 
carried out by the US, when security in the zone in which those actions took 
place was assigned to the US and when the overall command of the coalition 
was vested in the US.813
One interesting conclusion to be drawn from this decision is that mere participa-
tion in a coalition is not sufficient to establish Convention jurisdiction: more direct 
responsibility is required.
6.5.2 United Kingdom in Iraq
6.5.2.1 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi
This was precisely the position of the United Kingdom in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, 
decided some three years later. The applicants were suspected of involvement in the 
shooting of two British servicemen in southern Iraq. Arrested by United Kingdom 
troops, they were, for a while, detained in an American-run facility but later handed 
back to the British. An investigation by the United Kingdom’s Royal Military Police 
into the deaths of the two British soldiers led to the conclusion that ‘the strength of 
the evidence against the applicants warranted referral of the case to the Iraqi authori-
ties’.814
The applicants brought proceedings, first in the Iraqi courts, then in the English 
courts seeking to prevent their handover for trial by the Iraqi High Tribunal on war 
crimes charges. After the failure of their appeal in the English Court of Appeal, the 
812 Saddam Hussein v. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23276/04, 14 March 2006.
813 ibid.
814 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, § 26.
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Court ordered an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court informing the 
Government that the applicants should not be removed or transferred from the cus-
tody of the United Kingdom until further notice. Even so, the applicants were trans-
ferred into the physical custody of the Iraqi authorities the following day, that being 
the last day on which the memorandum of understanding (MOU) under which the 
United Kingdom was entitled to detain criminal suspects held for trial in Iraqi courts 
remained in force.815
The United Kingdom did not at any time deny that it had Article 1 jurisdiction in 
the case. Rather, the discussion centred on the manner of its exercise, the respondent 
Government citing its obligations under general international law vis-à-vis Iraq and 
arguing that these overrode the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Con-
vention.
As we will see later on when we discuss this judgment in greater detail, the Court 
did not so find.
6.5.2.2 Al-Skeini and Others
The applicants in Al-Skeini and Others were surviving kin of five men and a woman 
who had died either at the hands of British forces in Iraq or (in one case) in their 
custody. The deaths had all occurred during the time when the United Kingdom was 
an occupying power in Iraq under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483.
The United Kingdom Government tried to argue before the Court that two of the 
deaths were not attributable to the United Kingdom. Those deaths had occurred after 
16 October 2003, the date on which the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1511. Paragraph 13 of that Resolution authorised a Multinational Force to 
take ‘all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability 
in Iraq’. The argument was that, in conducting the relevant operations in which the 
two victims were shot, United Kingdom troops had not been exercising the sovereign 
authority of the United Kingdom but the international authority of the Multina-
tional Force acting pursuant to the binding decision of the United Nations Security 
Council.
The Court held that the United Kingdom Government were estopped from rais-
ing this objection before it, since no corresponding argument had been made before 
the domestic courts.816
The attribution argument having failed, the United Kingdom Government then 
submitted that – save in respect of one applicant, who had died in British custody 
– the deaths had occurred outside United Kingdom jurisdiction. This argument was 
815 Memorandum Of Understanding Between The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern 
Ireland Contingent Of Multinational Forces-Iraq And The Ministries Of Justice And Interior Of Iraq 
Regarding Criminal Suspects, published by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
with evidence taken jointly with the Defence Committee on Iraq and Afghanistan on 28 October 
2008, HC (2007-08) 1145–I, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/
cmdfence/1145/8102807.htm; for relevant excerpts, see Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, § 25.
816 Al-Skeini, §§ 97-100.
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based primarily on Banković and Others, in which – as we have seen – the Court 
had described Article 1 jurisdiction as ‘primarily’ or ‘essentially’ territorial; outside the 
area of the metropolitan State, Article 1 jurisdiction existed only in so far as the State 
itself had extended it in application of Article 56. The only exception was where ‘ef-
fective control’ was exercised outside the national territory of the State but still within 
the ‘espace juridique’ of the Convention – the metropolitan territory of the State plus 
the territory covered by declarations under Article 56 – where, as found in Cyprus v. 
Turkey, a gap in the protection of the Convention would exist if the controlling State 
did not assume responsibility for securing the entire range of Convention rights. Up 
until July 2003, government was vested in a Coalition Provisional Authority headed 
by an American official, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, and which did not answer to 
the United Kingdom; after July 2003, a Governing Council of Iraq existed which the 
Coalition Provisional Authority was required to consult with it on all matters con-
cerning the temporary governance of Iraq.
1.1.1.1 Extraterritorial jurisdiction: the ‘Al-Skeini rule’
The Court’s reasoning setting out the broad principles for the extraterritorial exercise 
of jurisdiction in conflict or post-conflict situations is what gives this judgment its 
importance.
The Court starts by stating, in the usual way, the principle of territoriality – as al-
ready set out in Soering, Banković and Ilaşcu – and the exceptional nature of extrater-
ritorial exercise of jurisdiction.817 It continues:
In each case, the question whether exceptional circumstances exist which re-
quire and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction 
extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the particular facts.818
The Court then divided situations in which Article 1 jurisdiction can exist extrater-
ritorially into two main categories: firstly, State agent authority and control, and sec-
ondly, effective control over an area.
6.5.2.2.1 State agent authority and control
A State exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction through ‘State agent authority and con-
trol’ by way of ‘acts of its authorities which produce effects outside its own territory’. It 
can exercise such authority and control consensually, for example through diplomatic 
and consular agents of the State stationed on foreign territory in the normal way, or 
if through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the foreign Government, it exer-
cises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government; 
in the latter situation, ‘the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of the 
Convention thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable to it rath-
817 Al-Skeini, § 131.
818 Al-Skeini, § 132.
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er than to the territorial State’.819 In addition, in certain circumstances, the use of force 
by a State’s agents operating outside its territory might bring the individual thereby 
brought under the control of the State’s authorities into the State’s Article 1 jurisdic-
tion. Citing Öcalan, Issa (a contrario), Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi and Medvyedyev and 
Others, the Court observed that it had applied this principle where an individual was 
taken into the custody of State agents abroad. It did not consider that jurisdiction in 
the cases cited arose solely from the control exercised by the Contracting State over 
the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the individuals were held: what was decisive in 
such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question.820
It was clear that, whenever the State, through its agents, exercised control and au-
thority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State was under an obligation 
under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section I 
of the Convention that were relevant to the situation of that individual. In this sense, 
therefore, the Convention rights could be ‘divided and tailored’.821
This last statement has been misunderstood: it has been suggested822 that it is 
not consistent with the Court’s holding in Banković and Others that ‘the wording of 
Article 1 does not provide any support for the applicants’ suggestion that the posi-
tive obligation in Article 1 to secure “the rights and freedoms defined in Section I 
of this Convention” could be divided and tailored in accordance with the particular 
circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question’.823 In fact there is no inconsist-
ency: the statement in Banković and Others is an answer to a very different argument. 
It will be recalled that the Court so held in response to the applicants’ suggestion 
that the extraterritorial exercise of ‘effective control’ over an individual brought that 
individual within the State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, but that the State’s obliga-
tion under Article 1 to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention 
applied in a manner ‘proportionate to the level of control in fact exercised’ – i.e. the 
State was accountable ‘for those Convention rights within [its] control in the situa-
tion in question’.824 As noted, the Banković applicants were arguing that jurisdiction 
arose from the very fact that they (or their deceased relatives as the case might be) had 
been affected by the air strike on the RTS building in Belgrade – a position rejected 
by the Court, and clearly different from the Court’s finding that jurisdiction in the 
form of ‘State agent authority and control’ arose from the deliberate exercise of execu-
tive or jurisdictional powers of the State over the individual. In the case of someone 
held in detention, for example, the obligation to secure to that person the rights and 
freedoms relevant to his or her situation related to the rights and freedoms relevant 
819 Al-Skeini, §§ 134-135.
820 Al-Skeini, § 136.
821 Al-Skeini, § 137.
822 For example, Van den Have, p. 103.
823 Banković, § 75. Emphasis added.
824 Banković, §§ 46 and 47.
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to that person’s situation as a detainee.825 One may consider relevant, for example, 
the rights which a detainee enjoys under Article 3, Article 5 (including habeas corpus, 
Article 5 § 4), Protocols 6 and 13 of course, perhaps also Articles 8 (contact with fami-
ly, confidentiality of correspondence with legal counsel and with the European Court 
of Human Rights) and, if there is a criminal charge, Article 6 under its criminal head. 
If the exercise of authority and control takes the form of the lethal use of force – as 
was the case in Al-Skeini and Jaloud, as we shall see – the rights and freedoms relevant 
to the situation of the person concerned include, at the very least, those guaranteed 
by Article 2 under its procedural head.
6.5.2.2.2 Effective control over an area
Article 1 jurisdiction also exists when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military 
action, a Contracting State exercises effective control of an area outside that national 
territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in 
the Convention, derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, 
through the Contracting State’s own armed forces, or through a subordinate local ad-
ministration. Where the fact of such domination over the territory is established, it is 
not necessary to determine whether the Contracting State exercises detailed control 
over the policies and actions of the subordinate local administration. The fact that the 
local administration survives as a result of the Contracting State’s military and other 
support entails that State’s responsibility for its policies and actions. The controlling 
State has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the area under its control, 
the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional 
Protocols which it has ratified.826 The prime indicator for the existence of ‘control 
over an area’ is the strength of the State’s military presence in the area; the extent to 
which its military, economic and political support for the local subordinate admin-
istration provides it with influence and control over the region may also be relevant. 
Whether a Contracting State exercises effective control over an area outside its own 
territory is a question of fact, to be decided from case to case.827
6.5.2.3 The Convention legal space828
It remains the case that the Convention is a constitutional instrument of European 
public order. Thus, when one Convention State occupies – and therefore exercises 
jurisdiction – on the territory of another, the former is responsible under Article 1 
825 Clare Ovey, “Application of the ECHR during International Armed Conflicts”, in The UK and 
European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks and Love-
day Hodson, eds.), Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 225-245 at pp. 229-230.
826 Al-Skeini, § 138.
827 Al-Skeini, § 139.
828 An expression that has come to be used to refer to the aggregate of the territorial and quasi-
territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting States to which the Convention actually applies. As we 
have seen above (5.1-5.4), this does not coincide with the Contracting States’ metropolitan land 
territory.
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of the Convention for securing the rights and freedoms which the Convention guar-
antees simply because there would otherwise be a ‘vacuum’ of protection within the 
‘legal space’ or ‘espace juridique’ of the Convention. However, it does not follow a 
contrario that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention can never exist outside 
the territory covered by the Council of Europe member States.829
6.5.2.4 Application of the ‘Al-Skeini rule’ to the facts of the Al-Skeini case
The Court took as its starting point that the USA and the UK had entered Iraq with 
the specific aim of displacing the regime then in power. Having done so, they set 
themselves up as ‘occupying powers’ and created a subordinate administration – the 
CPA – ‘to exercise powers of government temporarily’. One of the powers of govern-
ment specifically referred to was the provision of security in Iraq, including the main-
tenance of civil law and order. In the Basra area, where the fatalities in issue occurred, 
the United Kingdom had command of the military presence charged with supporting 
the civilian administration.830
Even so, the Court did not find that the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction derived 
from ‘control over an area’ – rather, it derived from the exercise of ‘authority and 
control over individuals killed in the course of … security operations’.831 Ovey explains 
that any finding that the United Kingdom had ‘effective control’ in south-east Iraq at 
the relevant time would have sat uncomfortably with the evidence led in the domestic 
proceedings in the UK as to the extreme state of violence and anarchy that prevailed 
in the area during the period of British administration.832
As we will see, the Court was later to reach a similar finding in Hassan.
6.5.2.5 Domestic case-law in the wake of Al-Skeini
There was not long to wait before the impact of the Al-Skeini judgment on domestic 
courts was felt.
On 6 September 2014 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) gave 
judgment in a case brought by the surviving kin of three Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) 
men who had been killed in the Srebrenica massacre after having been denied pro-
tection as United Nations staff by officers of the Dutch battalion then stationed in 
the Srebrenica enclave. The Supreme Court’s judgment included the following obiter 
dictum:
3.17.2  According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights it is 
not excluded that a Contracting State may, in extraordinary circumstances, have 
829 Al-Skeini, §§ 141-42.
830 Al-Skeini, § 143-148.
831 Al-Skeini, § 149.
832 Clare Ovey, “Application of the ECHR during International Armed Conflicts”, in The UK and 
European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks and Love-
day Hodson, eds.), Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 225-245 at p. 230; see also the summary of the 
domestic proceedings given in Al-Skeini, §§ 72-88.
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jurisdiction as referred to in Article 1 of the Convention even outside its own 
territory [case-law reference to the Court’s Al-Skeini and Others judgment].
3.17.3  In this case, the presence of Dutchbat in Srebrenica and on the com-
pound in Potočari flowed from the participation of the Netherlands in UN-
PROFOR, UNPROFOR deriving its competence to act in Srebrenica from the 
Agreement on the status of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina entered into between the United Nations and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (…). It follows that the State had competence to exercise jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention in the compound through 
Dutchbat. 
Furthermore, it cannot be said that after the fall of the enclave on 11 July 1995 
and more in particular at the time of the action impugned to Dutchbat the State 
was in the factual impossibility to exercise jurisdiction as referred to above in 
the compound. In view of the facts which it has taken as its starting point, the 
Court of Appeal has proceeded on the assumption that the Bosnian Serb Army 
respected the authority of Dutchbat on the compound to which Dutchbat had 
withdrawn until Dutchbat’s departure on 21 July 1995. These facts offer a suf-
ficient basis for the finding that the State, through Dutchbat, was actually in a 
position to supervise observance with respect to Muhamed and Ibro Nuhanović 
of the rights secured in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and Articles 6 and 7 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.833
To this already far-reaching statement, the Supreme Court added the following fur-
ther comment:
3.18.3  In so far as the [statement of grounds of appeal] reproaches the Court 
of Appeal for having failed properly to take into account the importance of reti-
cence in its assessment, [it] also fails, given that no basis for such reticence can 
be found in customary international law, the Convention or the Covenant, and 
incidentally, not in the domestic law of the Netherlands either.
The reticent assessment advocated in the [statement of grounds of appeal] 
would mean that hardly any scope would remain for a judicial assessment of 
the consequences of the actions of a military force within the framework of a 
peace mission – in this case: the behaviour impugned to Dutchbat and thus 
to the State. Such far-reaching reticence is unacceptable. It makes no difference 
that the State expects harmful consequences [of such an assessment] for the im-
plementation of peace operations by the United Nations and in particular for 
833 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, State v. Nuhanović, judgment of 6 September 2014, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225. Translation by the author. Identical reasoning appears in 
the Supreme Court’s judgment of the same date in State v. Mustafić-Mujić and Others, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9228, also published in NJ 2015/376 with an annotation by N.J. Schrij-
ver. 
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the willingness of Member States to make available troops for such operations. 
This, after all, ought not to stand in the way of an ex post facto judicial assessment 
of the conduct of the individual military force. It is correct that in so doing, 
the court should take into account the fact that the decisions in issue are taken 
under great pressure in a war situation, but the Court of Appeal has not misun-
derstood this.834
Thus we see that the guardian of at least one domestic legal system is now prepared to 
adopt a wide view of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of its State.
It is interesting to contrast this approach with the course followed by the Italian 
Court of Cassation in Markovic and Others.835 One is left to wonder what might have 
happened if, following the example of its Italian counterpart, the Dutch Supreme 
Court had thrown these cases out and the relatives of the three victims had applied to 
the Court in Strasbourg.
6.5.3 The Netherlands in Iraq
Like Al-Skeini, Jaloud v. the Netherlands concerned the lethal use of force in south-
eastern Iraq. The victim, the applicant’s son, was mortally hit by rifle fire as the car in 
which he was a passenger was fired upon after crashing through a checkpoint manned 
by Iraqi security forces and Netherlands Royal Army troops commanded by a Dutch 
officer. The Dutch troops were under the overall command of a British officer as part 
of one of the multinational divisions existing in Iraq at the relevant time.
The Netherlands Government, supported by the United Kingdom Government 
which intervened as a third party, argued that the Netherlands had no jurisdiction 
in the case. The Netherlands Government, in particular, submitted that the Dutch 
troops had been under the command and control of a British officer. Moreover, pri-
mary responsibility for security had rested with the Iraqi forces, the Dutch forces 
being present merely to observe and advise.
The Court dismissed both arguments. The fact of Dutch troops being under Brit-
ish orders was not sufficient to divest the Netherlands of their Article 1 jurisdiction: 
the Netherlands had retained ‘full command’ over their military personnel, as the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence pointed out in a joint letter to Parlia-
ment and as was apparent from what was known of the arrangements – a network 
of Memoranda of Understanding – defining the interrelations between the various 
armed contingents.836 Nor could responsibility be shifted onto the Iraqi forces: pur-
suant to the relevant order of the CPA, they were supervised by, and subordinate to, 
officers from the Coalition forces – in this case, a Dutch officer.837
834 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, State v. Nuhanović, ibid. An identical passage appears in State 
v. Mustafić-Mujić and Others.
835 See 6.4.3.1.2 above.
836 Jaloud, §§ 143-48.
837 Jaloud, § 150.
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It has been suggested that, since there was no ‘physical contact with or restraint 
placed on’ the deceased, the decision on jurisdiction in Jaloud could be seen as a 
‘significant extension’ of the ‘state agent authority’ basis of jurisdiction, coming very 
close to the ‘cause and effect’ jurisdiction rejected in Banković.838 So to argue is to 
ignore the very purpose for which checkpoints are set up, namely precisely to exercise 
authority and control over individuals. It will be seen, therefore, that we are no closer 
to ‘cause-and-effect’ jurisdiction in Jaloud than in Al-Skeini; if anything, we are fur-
ther from it.
6.6 Exercise of jurisdiction on territory of foreign State with the 
latter’s permission
6.6.1 Turkey in Kenya
In 1999 Abdullah Öcalan was forced out of Syria, from where he had been directing 
the struggle of the PKK against Turkey. Accepted nowhere in Europe, he ended up 
in Kenya where he was not welcome either. Although apparently Öcalan had been 
given to understand that he would be taken to Nairobi airport and from there flown 
to the Netherlands, a car driven by a Kenyan official in fact took him to an aircraft in 
which Turkish officials were waiting for him. Öcalan was arrested immediately after 
boarding the aircraft. Öcalan was later to be tried for his life in Turkey. He was spared 
the gallows but is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment in an island prison 
in the Bosphorus.
Öcalan maintained that there was prima facie evidence that he had been abducted 
by the Turkish authorities operating abroad, beyond their jurisdiction, and that his ar-
rest was for that reason unlawful. The Court did not so find. Quoting from the Com-
mission’s report in Stocké v. Germany,839 it held that an arrest made by the authorities 
of one State on the territory of another State, without the consent of the latter, af-
fected the individual rights to security under Article 5 § 1 of the person concerned. 
However, the handover by Kenyan officials to their Turkish counterparts placed Öca-
lan within Turkish Article 1 jurisdiction.840 Kenya not being party to the Convention 
and absent proof that Turkey had acted extraterritorially in a manner inconsistent 
with Kenyan sovereignty, there was therefore no violation of Article 5 § 1 in that the 
applicant’s arrest and subsequent detention were unlawful.841
As we have seen, the Court has taken the view that jurisdiction was established 
by the handover of the applicant into the control of Turkish state agents. This is not 
wrong; however, although it is plain that the Turkish aircraft could not have over-
838 Aurel Sari, “Untangling Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction from International Responsibility in Jaloud 
v. the Netherlands: Old Problem, New Solutions?” in Military Law and the Law of War Review 
53/2 (2014) pp. 287-316 at pp. 300-301.
839 Stocké v. Germany, opinion of the Commission, p. 24, § 167, Series A no. 199.
840 Öcalan, § 91.
841 ibid., §§ 93-98.
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flown, still less landed in, Kenyan territory without Kenyan authorisation,842 it is clear 
that once on board the aircraft Öcalan was within Turkish jurisdiction considered in 
a territorial sense.
6.6.2 France in Somalia
In a case that on its facts, and as regards its Convention complaints, was comparable 
to that of Hassan and Others v. France, a group of Somalian pirates had captured a 
French vessel off the coast of Yemen and taken her crew – some thirty persons – onto 
land in Somalia. The following day the transitional federal government of Somalia ad-
dressed a note verbale to France granting the French armed forces permission to enter 
Somalian waters and air space and to use proportionate force to resolve the crisis. The 
crew were ransomed. French forces, helicopter-borne, seized six of the pirates and 
recovered part of the ransom money. The pirates were taken to France for trial. As in 
Hassan and Others, the French Government conceded jurisdiction on the strength of 
Medvyedyev and Others.843
6.7 The status of ‘occupying power’
In the context of international law, the expression ‘occupation’ is an emotive one. In 
parts of Europe that were occupied by Nazi Germany during the Second World War 
especially it has become tainted with the suggestion of unlawfulness, having come to 
conjure up pictures of Nazi jackboots trampling cherished freedoms, of concentra-
tion camps, of heroic resistance and abject collaboration. Although ‘occupation’ and 
expressions like it occur in Strasbourg case-law in that narrow context, in old Com-
mission decisions but also in judgments of the Court,844 it is sometimes difficult to 
escape the impression that they are now sometimes used for effect with that historical 
association in mind. For example, individual applicants and the Cypriot Government 
as applicant or intervening third party have sometimes referred to Turkey as the oc-
cupying power in northern Cyprus.845 
842 Article 3(c) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
843 Ali Samatar and Others v. France, nos. 17110/10 17301/10, § 31, 4 December 2014.
844 E.g. De Becker v. Belgium, 27 March 1962, Series A no. 4; X v. Norway, no. 2002/63, Commission 
decision of 2 July 1964, Collection 14, pp. 25-28; X v. Norway, no. 2369/64, Commission decision 
of 3 April 1967, Collection 23, pp. 21-25; D.G.P. N.V. V. the Netherlands, no. 5178/71, Commission 
decision of 12 October 1973, Collection 44, pp. 13-24; Papon v. France, no. 54210/00, ECHR 
2002-VII; Kononov v. Latvia (GC), no. 38376/04, § 195, ECHR 2010.
845 See, for example, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (dec.), no. 46347/99, 14 March 2005; Demopoulos and 
Others §§ 58, 64 and 67; ECHR 2010; and recently, Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, 
no. 36925/07, § 237, 4 April 2017 (referred to the Grand Chamber).
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So also have Governments of Baltic States applied that expression to the Soviet 
Union in referring to the latter’s relationship with their countries until 1991.846 The 
Russian Federation firmly opposes their position.847
The Court itself is usually circumspect in its use of language borrowed from the 
laws of war, although it has been known to use expressions such as ‘occupying pow-
er’ and ‘occupation regime’ to describe the Soviet Union in relation to the Baltic 
States.848 Very forthright views are sometimes expressed by individual judges in sepa-
rate opinions.849
It is submitted that the expression is morally neutral and its identification in the 
popular mind with the forces of evil is fallacious. Thus, as we have seen, after the Sec-
ond World War France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States 
were occupying powers in Germany and Austria until 1955 (in Berlin until 1990).850
Expressions such as ‘occupation’ and ‘occupying power’ have a technical meaning 
in international humanitarian law851 – and actually they are sometimes used in their 
technical sense in domestic legislation.852 The importance of whether a state is an ‘oc-
cupying power’ or not is not in apportioning opprobrium but in imposing obligations 
on it vis-à-vis the population of the occupied territory.
Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of Law on 
Land (text of 1907) read as follows:
Article 42.
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority 
of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.’
846 Sõro v. Estonia, no. 22588/08, 3 September 2015 (see the concurring opinion of Judge Pinto the 
Albuquerque, § 6).
847 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania (GC), no. 35343/05, § 147, ECHR 2015. Compare the joint dissenting 
opinion of Judges Villiger, Power-Forde, Pinto de Albuquerque and Kūris, § 4.
848 Puzinas v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 63767/00, 13 December 2005; Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia (dec.), 
nos. 23052/04 24018/04, ECHR 2006-I; Penart v. Estonia (dec.), no. 14685/04, 24 January 
2006.
849 Slivenko v. Latvia (GC), no. 48321/99, ECHR 2003-X ( Judge Maruste); Andrejeva v. Latvia 
(GC), no. 55707/00, ECHR 2009 ( Judge Ziemele); Ždanoka v. Latvia (GC), no. 58278/00, 
ECHR 2006-IV ( Judge Zupančič).
850 Hess v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 28 May 1975, D.R. 2, p. 72; Vearncombe and 
Others v. the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, no. 12816/87, D.R. No. 59, 
p. 186.
851 See generally Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2nd 
edition 2015), Cambridge University Press, pp. 382-384, and Hanne Cuyckens, “The Law of Oc-
cupation” in Armed Conflicts and the Law, Jan Wouters, Philip De Man, Nele Verlinden (eds.), 
Intersentia, 2016, pp. 417-444.
852 For example, in section 5(5)(d) of the Dutch International Crimes Act (Wet internationale mis-
drijven) of 2003 (quoted in translation in Van Anraat v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65389/09, 
§ 20, 6 July 2010).
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Article 43.
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of 
the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless abso-
lutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’
Other provisions of the Hague Regulations require the occupying power to respect 
‘family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as re-
ligious convictions and practice’ and prohibit the confiscation of private property 
(Article 46); they and give detailed regulation for the levying and use of taxes and 
other contributions and requisitions (Articles 48, 49, 51 and 52); and they prohibit 
the seizure and destruction of, and damage to, religious, charitable, educational and 
cultural property (Article 56) – offering the population of an occupied territory a 
higher level of protection against the enemy, in certain respects, than the Convention 
does against the peacetime government of the State.
Provisions relevant to the rights and duties of the occupying power are also to be 
found in other instruments, most notably the fourth of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions – Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (Articles 41-78). It too enumerates human rights of the classical kind, such as the 
right to humane treatment and a fair trial even for spies, saboteurs or others suspected 
of ‘activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power’ (Article 5) and to habeas 
corpus (Article 43).
As we have seen, when one State Party to the Convention occupies all or part of 
the territory of another State Party, the occupant ipso facto enters into all the Conven-
tion obligations of the occupied Contracting Party.853 In such a case, it is irrelevant 
for purposes of Article 1 jurisdiction whether or not the occupying Contracting State 
is also an ‘occupant’ within the meaning of Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regula-
tions.
However, as the Court points out in Al-Skeini and Others, it does not follow a con-
trario that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention can never exist outside the 
territory of the Convention States.854 It needs to be considered whether the question 
takes on a separate meaning when the territory occupied is outside the territory of any 
Convention State. 
In Al-Skeini and Others, the events complained of took place during a period when 
the United Kingdom alongside the United States was an Occupying Power within 
the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations by virtue of United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 1483 The United Kingdom Government argued at length 
that the ‘effective control of an area’ test was not relevant because, firstly, that test 
could only apply within the Convention legal space; secondly, the United Kingdom’s 
control in south-eastern Iraq was far from effective; and thirdly, governmental au-
853 Cyprus v. Turkey (merits) § 78; see also Ilaşcu and Others, §§ 384-93.
854 Al-Skeini, § 142.
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thority in Iraq was vested in a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was 
governed by an American official. Moreover, the status of Occupying Power, so far 
from conferring sovereignty or colonial dominion, actually required the domestic law 
of the occupied country to be respected and left intact as far as possible; the corollary 
was that the United Kingdom was prevented from imposing Convention standards 
so as to override Iraqi constitutional law.855
In § 143 of Al-Skeini, the Court took note of the United Kingdom’s status of formal 
Occupying Power and in the first sentence of § 149 it finds that ‘the United Kingdom 
(together with the United States of America) assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of 
the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government’ and ‘author-
ity and responsibility for the maintenance of security in south-east Iraq’ – language 
highly reminiscent of Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations – but it did not 
base its finding of Article 1 jurisdiction on that ground, as some of the reasoning in 
Banković and Others might have led one to expect.856 Instead, in the second sentence 
of § 149, it concluded that ‘the United Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in secu-
rity operations in Basra during the period in question, exercised authority and control 
over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish [the 
required] jurisdictional link’.857
In Al-Jedda, the Court also noted the status of the United Kingdom as one of the 
two Occupying Powers;858 but Al-Jedda being a detention case to be considered under 
Article 5, it based its decision on jurisdiction on the ‘authority and control’ exercised 
over the applicant as a prisoner.859
In Jaloud, the Netherlands Government (supported by the United Kingdom as in-
tervening party) submitted that the Netherlands was not an Occupying Power within 
the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, that status belonging exclusively 
to the United States and the United Kingdom; nor had the Netherlands assumed in 
Iraq any of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government, 
these too being vested solely in the Occupying Powers.860
The Court pointed out that 
… the status of “occupying power” within the meaning of Article 42 of the 
Hague Regulations, or lack of it, is not per se determinative. Although it found 
that concept relevant in Al-Skeini (cited above, § 143) and in Al-Jedda v. the 
United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, § 77, ECHR 2011, the Court did not need 
to have recourse to it in finding that the responsibility of Turkey was engaged 
in respect of events in northern Cyprus (see, inter alia, Loizidou v. Turkey (pre-
liminary objections), 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, and Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 
855 Al-Skeini, §§ 114 and 117.
856 Banković and Others, §§ 60 (second sentence) and 71.
857 Al-Skeini §§ 143 and 149-150. 
858 Al-Jedda, § 77.
859 Al-Jedda, § 85.
860 Jaloud, §§ 113-114 and 125.
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no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV), or that of Russia in respect of the situation in 
Moldovan territory east of the Dniester (see, inter alia, Ilaşcu and Others v. Mol-
dova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004-VII, and Catan and Oth-
ers v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 
18454/06, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).861
In other words, Article 1 jurisdiction is an autonomous concept not dependent on the 
status of occupying power. As the use of the word ‘relevant’ bears out, a Contracting 
State possessed of it will find it difficult to deny the concurrent possession of ‘effective 
control of an area’ or, as the case may be, the ‘authority and control’ over an individual 
needed for the Convention to apply; but the absence of that status does not suffice to 
render the Convention inapplicable extraterritorially.
Cases like Al-Skeini and Jaloud are, of course, different from cases like Loizidou, 
Cyprus v. Turkey, Ilaşcu and Others and Catan and Others in that the scene of events is 
not the territory of another Contracting State. The relevance of the difference is that 
in the latter situation – where the occupied territory is that of another Contracting 
State – the entire gamut of Convention rights must be applied in occupied territory 
as it is in the territory of the occupier, so as to prevent the occurrence of a local vac-
uum in the protection offered by the Convention; whereas in the former situation – 
where the scene of events is outside the territory of any Convention State, yet there is 
Article 1 jurisdiction – there may be scope (albeit limited) for the Convention rights 
to be ‘divided and tailored’ in the sense that the State’s obligation under Article 1 is 
to secure to individuals under their ‘authority and control’ the rights and freedoms 
under Section I of the Convention (and of course the substantive rights under any 
Protocols that may be applicable) that are ‘relevant to [their] situation’.862
It is nonetheless implicit that the obligation on the occupant to ‘[respect], unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’ does not suffice to displace the 
obligation to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set 
out in the Convention – in other words, in an occupation properly so-called within 
the meaning of Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations the Convention con-
tinues to take precedence over local law.863 Only derogation under Article 15 of the 
Convention, when permissible, can change that864 – and as we have seen, limits are 
imposed by that Article too.
It is appropriate at this point to draw attention to Article 53 of the Convention, 
which provides that ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or 
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be 
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement 
861 Jaloud, § 142.
862 Al-Skeini, § 137; Jaloud, § 154.
863 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, § 128.
864 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “International Humanitarian Law and Extraterritorial State Con-
duct”, in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, edited by Fons Coomans and 
Menno Camminga (Intersentia, 2004), pp. 25-40 at p. 35.
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to which it is a party’ – and therefore requires an occupying Convention State to re-
spect those rules of international humanitarian law, but also of its own law and even 
the domestic law of the occupied country, that offer human rights protection going 
beyond Convention standards.
6.8 Conclusion
It is uncontroversial that jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 exists when a 
Contracting State acts within its own territory. Few will dispute the logic of also rec-
ognising Article 1 jurisdiction to a Contracting State that actively connives at, or even 
simply permits, violations of the Convention to be perpetrated within its territorial 
jurisdiction by agents of a foreign state, or for that matter within its quasi-territorial 
jurisdiction – perhaps in one of its embassies abroad, or on board of a ship flying its 
flag or an aircraft bearing its registration. It is entirely conceivable that Article 1 ju-
risdiction may exist dually if the foreign agents belong to another Convention State.
We have seen how in Cyprus v. Turkey the Court was concerned that there be no 
‘jurisdictional gap’, which led it to find that events in Northern Cyprus engaged the 
responsibility under the Convention of Turkey. We have seen in Al-Skeini and Jaloud 
how ‘State agent authority and control’ and ‘control over an area’ created extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1, and hence accountability.
But is it necessary to resort to such reasoning when a State Party to the Convention 
permits itself to commit acts of violence, perhaps even amounting to murder, abroad?
The solution might be perfectly simple. Martin Scheinin makes the following sug-
gestion, admittedly in the context of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights:
… the assassination of a targeted individual with a cruise missile, an anthrax let-
ter sent from the neighboring country, a sniper’s bullet in the head from the 
distance of 300 meters, or a poisoned umbrella tip on a crowded street all con-
stitute “effective control” in respect of the targeted individual and his or her 
enjoyment of human rights when undertaken by agents of a foreign state.865
– but similar reasoning might be considered under the Convention. In cases of 
targeted assassination abroad, Article 1 jurisdiction would then be easy to establish, 
regardless of whether only the state in whose name the deed is done or both that state 
and the state in whose territory the deed is done are parties to the Convention. Such 
reasoning does not sit ill with the Court’s case-law until now.
865 Martin Scheinin, “Extraterritorial effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights”, in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Fons Coomans and Menno T. 
Kamminga, eds.), p. 73 et seq. at pp. 77-78.
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However, this line of argument could only apply to the targeted use of force properly 
so-called. Once again, the sole fact of being an incidental ‘victim’ of an extraterritorial 
attack does not suffice to bring a person within the jurisdiction of the attacking Con-
vention State: so to find would be to accept the kind of ‘cause-and-effect’ jurisdiction 
first rejected by the Court in Banković. 
That is not to say that an innocent victim who becomes a casualty as ‘collateral 
damage’ in a targeted attack on an intended victim does not come within the Article 
1 jurisdiction of the attacking Contracting State. Indeed, such a view would sit ill 
with the Court’s case-law – specifically Andreou v. Turkey, in which Article 2 was 
held to apply to a person wounded by one of several rifle rounds fired deliberately 
but indiscriminately into a crowd of bystanders present when a protester was targeted 
and shot.866
The corollary that the targeted victim, even if he has been taken out for good rea-
son, enjoys the protection of the Convention whereas the innocent bystander unfor-
tunate enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time may not, and that for the 
sole reason that no one was actually targeted, feels uncomfortable to be sure, but in 
the current state of the case-law is inescapable.
True it is that an applicant, especially an individual applicant under Article 34 of 
the Convention, may find it difficult to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the at-
tack was targeted against a particular victim; it may be necessary for the Court, in 
such a case, to reverse the burden of proof back onto the respondent Government.867 
Conversely, before launching an attack a wise Government will take precautions to 
minimise – better still, avoid altogether – all danger to other than intended targets 
and be prepared to offer proof of these precautions afterwards.
866 Andreou, §§ 45-46.
867 See 2.7 above.

7 Jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights
7.1 Introduction
In the current redaction of the Convention, the Court’s jurisdiction is defined by 
Article 32. That Article provides, firstly, that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall ex-
tend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention 
and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33 [inter-
State applications], 34 [individual applications], 46 [referrals by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe of problems of interpretation and execution] and 
47 [requests by the Committee of Ministers for advisory opinions]’ and secondly, 
that ‘[i]n the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court 
shall decide’ (that is, the Court enjoys jurisdiction to define the scope of its own com-
petence; this power is sometimes referred to using a German expression, Kompetenz-
Kompetenz).
This chapter will examine the possibilities for removing the exercise of ‘hard power’ 
from the jurisdiction of the Court itself.
7.2 Territorial limitations to the acceptance of Convention jurisdiction
Under the Convention of 1950, the right of individual petition to the then European 
Commission of Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the Court were conditional on 
specific declarations to be made by the Contracting State concerned (Articles 25 and 
46, respectively, of the Convention of 1950).
Former Article 25 admitted of limiting the acceptance of the right of individual 
petition (at that time, to the Commission) to a specific period. Former Article 46 
similarly allowed Contracting States to accept the Court’s jurisdiction on condition 
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain other Contracting States or for a speci-
fied period.
In 1987, Turkey accepted the right of individual petition for a period of three years, 
but only in respect of ‘allegations concerning acts or omissions of public authorities in 
Turkey performed within the boundaries of the territory to which the Constitution 
of the Republic of Turkey is applicable’. Greece protested; other Contracting States 
expressed reservations as to the validity of this restriction. Turkey later extended the 
validity of its declaration for further three-year periods, but again, only in respect of 
‘allegations concerning acts or omissions of public authorities in Turkey performed 
within the boundaries of the national territory of the Republic of Turkey’. 
In 1990 Turkey made a declaration ‘[recognising] as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
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in all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention which 
relate to the exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Conven-
tion, performed within the boundaries of the national territory of the Republic of 
Turkey, and provided further that such matters have previously been examined by the 
Commission within the power conferred upon it by Turkey’. Again, Greece protested.
Given that Turkey recognised the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as a state 
in its own right, these declarations, taken at face value, excluded the possibility of 
invoking the Convention against Turkey in respect of matters occurring in northern 
Cyprus.
An application was brought against Turkey by three Cypriot nationals, one of them 
Mrs Loizidou, whom we have encountered before: she complained of her arrest and 
detention by Turkish forces and of denial of access to immovable property of which 
she claimed ownership. Turkey opposed its territorial restriction. 
In its admissibility decision, the Commission ‘[found] no legal basis in the Con-
vention for a restriction of a declaration under Article 25 other than the temporal 
limitations provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article’.868
Mrs Loizidou’s case was later disjoined from those of the two other applicants. 
After the Commission adopted its report (former Article 31 of the Convention), the 
Government of Cyprus referred it to the Court.
The Court noted the absence from both Article 25 and Article 46 of any wording 
providing for territorial restrictions. It continued:
If, as contended by the respondent Government, substantive or territorial re-
strictions were permissible under these provisions, Contracting Parties would 
be free to subscribe to separate regimes of enforcement of Convention obliga-
tions depending on the scope of their acceptances. Such a system, which would 
enable States to qualify their consent under the optional clauses, would not only 
seriously weaken the role of the Commission and Court in the discharge of their 
functions but would also diminish the effectiveness of the Convention as a con-
stitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public).869
Continuing this line of reasoning, the Court went on to dismiss the argument of the 
Turkish Government that the lack of validity of the territorial restrictions invalidated 
the Turkish acceptance of the right of individual petition and the Court’s jurisdic-
tion.870
This ruling is now of historical interest only. Upon entry into force of Protocol 
No. 11 to the Convention, on 1 November 1998, acceptance of the right of individual 
868 Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey, nos. 15299/89, 15300/89 and 15318/89, 
Commission decision of 4 March 1991, DR 68, p. 216.
869 Loizidou (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 75, Series A no. 310.
870 Loizidou (preliminary objections), § 91.
227Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights
petition to the New Court which had replaced the former Commission and Court 
became de iure mandatory – as indeed it had been, de facto, many a day before then.871
7.3 Reservation (Article 57 of the Convention)
Article 57 of the Convention (like its predecessor, Article 64 of the Convention of 
1950) allows Contracting States to make reservations at the time of signature or ratifi-
cation. This possibility is not unlimited: reservations must relate to a ‘particular pro-
vision’ of the Convention ‘to the extent that any law then in force in [the territory of 
the Contracting State concerned] is not in conformity with the Convention’. Moreo-
ver, reservations of a general character are not permitted.
Obviously, making a reservation is no longer an option for Contracting States once 
they have submitted their instruments of ratification.872
The validity of reservations is within the jurisdiction of the Court to consider. 
Thus, at the time of its ratification of the Convention on 12 September 1997, Moldova 
made several declarations and reservations, including the following:
The Republic of Moldova declares that it will be unable to guarantee compli-
ance with the provisions of the Convention in respect of omissions and acts 
committed by the organs of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester republic within 
the territory actually controlled by such organs, until the conflict in the region 
is finally definitively resolved.
The Court did not accept this. It disposed of the Moldovan declaration in the follow-
ing terms:
It is true that in their observations the Moldovan Government maintained that 
the declaration should be interpreted as a negative declaration under former 
Article 25 of the Convention and, after 1 November 1998, under Article 34 of 
the Convention. However, the Court observes that when the present applica-
tion was lodged, on 5 April 1999, former Article 25 of the Convention was no 
longer in force. Furthermore, the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain an applica-
tion under Article 34 of the Convention is not subject to acceptance of it by a 
High Contracting Party, unlike the competence of the Commission under for-
mer Article 25, which was subject to such acceptance.
Secondly, the Court notes that the declaration does not refer to a specific law 
in force in Moldova. The words used by the Moldovan Government – “omis-
871 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby (ETS 155), Explanatory Report, 
para. 85.
872 See also Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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sions and acts committed ... within the territory actually controlled by such or-
gans, until the conflict in the region is finally definitively resolved” – indicate 
rather that the declaration in question is of general scope, unlimited as to the 
provisions of the Convention but limited in space and time, whose effect would 
be that persons on that “territory” would be wholly deprived of the protection 
of the Convention for an indefinite period.873 
Similarly, Azerbaijan’s reservation to the effect that it could not apply the Convention 
‘in the territories occupied by the Republic of Armenia until these territories [were] 
liberated from that occupation’ failed to find favour in the eyes of the Court, which 
dismissed it in terms identical to those used in the Moldovan case.874
France, when depositing its instrument of ratification in 1974, made a reservation 
to the effect, firstly, that French constitutional and statutory provisions relating to 
the proclamation of a state of siege or emergency should be understood as complying 
with the purpose of Article 15 of the Convention, and secondly, that the expression 
‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ ‘[should] not restrict the power of 
the President of the Republic [under the French Constitution] to take the measures 
required by the circumstances’.875 The state of emergency declared on 14 November 
2015, after the terrorist attacks in Paris of the previous day, is stated in the French no-
tice of derogation to be based on these provisions.876 However, as is also stated in the 
notice of derogation, ‘[t]he extension of the state of emergency for three months, with 
effect from 26 November 2015, was authorised by Law No. 2015-1501 of 20 November 
2015 [, which] law also amends certain of the measures provided for by the Law of 3 
April 1955 in order to adapt its content to the current context’ – and may therefore 
affect the validity of the reservation.877
No less an author than Michael O’Boyle, former Deputy Registrar of the Court 
and one who has done more to shape Convention law than any person living, suggests 
that a reservation intended to ‘tie the hands of an international court from examin-
ing the compatibility of derogatory measures with one of the central provisions of 
the Convention – in other words to exclude all international control of presidential 
emergency measures’ – may be invalid simply because it is incompatible with the sys-
tem itself of the Convention.878
873 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (dec.) [GC], no. 48787/99, 4 July 2001.
874 Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), §§ 59-76.
875 Information taken from the web site of the Council of Europe’s Treaty Office, http://www.coe.
int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/declarations?p_auth=hZbjvpFr 
(retrieved on 12 April 2016).
876 Specifically, Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the state of emergency. Information taken from the 
web site of the Council of Europe’s Treaty Office (see previous footnote). (Retrieved on 5 May 
2016)
877 Fischer v. Austria, no. 16922/90, § 41, Series A no. 312; Stallinger and Kuso v. Austria, nos. 14696/89 
and 14697/89, § 48, Reports 1997-II; Pauger v. Austria, no. 16717/90, §§ 53-54, Reports 1997-III.
878 O’Boyle (2016) at p. 335. cf. Article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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7.4 Conflicting international obligations
Governments may occasionally cite conflicting obligations under international law 
that in their submission prevent them from complying with their obligations under 
the Convention.
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is 
void if it conflicts with a peremptory rule of international law (ius cogens). One such 
international legal obligation that would in theory override the Convention is the 
prohibition of genocide, now generally considered to be ius cogens,879 and the con-
comitant obligation to punish or extradite (preferably to an international tribunal) 
those who have committed that crime.880 Another is the prohibition of torture.881
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that treaties 
shall not bind a party ‘in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation 
which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect 
to that party’.
Conversely, Contracting States are considered to retain Convention liability in re-
spect of treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention.882 
It does not follow, however, that the later treaty commitment is thereby extinguished: 
thus, the effect of Article 3 of the Convention is that in extradition cases where the 
person to be extradited faces the possibility of an irreducible term of life imprison-
ment – which would constitute a violation of that provision883 – the Contracting 
State is under an obligation to accommodate its duty under a later bilateral extradi-
879 International Court of Justice: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (judgment of 3 
February 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6), Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro 
(judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43) and Germany v. Italy (judgment of 3 
February 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99); International Tribunal for Rwanda: Prosecutor v. Kay-
ishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1-T, judgment of 21 May 1999) (note however the judgment of 
the Appeals Chamber in the same case, which avoids the expression ius cogens but describes the 
crime of genocide as “extremely grave”: judgment of 1 June 2001, § 367). See Vasiliauskas v. Lithu-
ania (GC), no. 35343/05, § 113, ECHR 2015.
880 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948), 
Articles IV-VII. See Jorgić v. Germany, no. 74613/01, § 68, ECHR 2007-III, and Stichting Mothers 
of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65542/12, § 157, ECHR 2013.
881 Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 35763/97, § 61, ECHR 2001-XI; compare H. and J. v. 
the Netherlands (dec.), nos. 978/09 and 992/09, §§ 71-74, ECHR 2014 (which does not use the 
expression “ius cogens” but refers to Articles 146 and 147 of Geneva Convention (IV) on Civil-
ians and Articles 4-8 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment). See also International Court of Justice, Questions relating to the 
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 20 July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 
2012, p. 457 at § 99.
882 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland (GC), no. 45036/98, § 154, 
ECHR 2005-VI; Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, § 47, 
ECHR 2001-VIII.
883 Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom (GC), nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, §§ 119-22, 
ECHR 2013; Murray v. the Netherlands (GC), no. 10511/10, §§ 101-12, ECHR 2016.
230 chapter 7
tion treaty to extradite with its prior Convention obligation by ensuring that the risk 
of such a violation is obviated.884
The United Kingdom successfully invoked a prior treaty obligation before the 
Commission in the Hess case.885 As we have seen,886 Rudolf Hess was the last remain-
ing Nazi prisoner in Spandau Prison. Mrs Hess alleged violations of Articles 3 and 8 of 
the Convention in that his continued imprisonment in a building capable of housing 
600 inmates amounted to solitary confinement and in addition interfered with her 
own right to respect of her family life.
The United Kingdom was however bound by an agreement under which decisions 
regarding the administration of Spandau Prison had to be taken unanimously by the 
four Allied Powers – France, the United Kingdom, the USA, and the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union opposed its veto against attempts by the other three Powers to 
release Hess.
The Four Power Agreement dated from 1945, thus predating the Convention by 
five years; moreover, as the Commission found, the United Kingdom was not free 
to withdraw from it unilaterally. It therefore took precedence over the Convention.
A case in which a respondent sought to invoke conflicting international obliga-
tions postdating the Convention was Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom. 
The applicants were Iraqi Baathists who were suspected of having orchestrated violent 
resistance against the multinational force. They were held, first by American, then by 
United Kingdom forces as ‘security internees’, until the Royal Military Police found 
indications linking them to the wilful killing of two British servicemen who had been 
captured by Iraqi forces during the hostilities and had been held as prisoners of war.
Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority set up ‘an Iraqi Special Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’ [later to be known 
as the ‘Iraqi High Tribunal’ or ‘IHT’]) to try Iraqi nationals or residents of Iraq ac-
cused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or violations of certain Iraqi 
laws’. As between Iraq and the United Kingdom, a Memorandum of Understanding 
on criminal suspects was in force that granted the United Kingdom contingent of the 
Multinational Force discretion to keep persons wanted for prosecution before the 
Iraqi High Tribunal in its physical custody. 
The validity of this Memorandum of Understanding was dependent on the man-
date of the Multinational Force to remain in Iraq; it therefore came to an end on 
31  ecember 2008, the date until which the United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion had extended that mandate.
After the cases against the applicants concerning the deaths of the two British ser-
vicemen had been referred to the Iraqi courts, the Iraqi High Tribunal made repeat-
884 Lawson (1999), pp. 297-98 (referring to Soering, in which the question arose with respect to 
the conditions of detention on death row in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the extradition 
treaty applicable dating from 1899); more recently, Harkins and Edwards v. United Kingdom, 
nos. 9146/07 and 32650/07, § 138, 17 January 2012; Trabelsi, §§ 136-39.
885 Hess v. the United Kingdom, no. 6231/73, Commission decision of 28 May 1975.
886 6.4.1.2 above.
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ed requests for the applicants to be handed over to it. The applicants, for their part, 
brought proceedings in the English courts seeking to prevent such handover absent 
assurances that the death penalty, if imposed, would not be carried out. The English 
courts, however, did not prevent the applicants’ handover to the Iraqi authorities, 
holding (in accordance with their practice at the time – this was before the Court’s 
judgment in Al-Jedda) that the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the 
Convention was not in issue.
The United Kingdom Government, in the meantime, made representations to the 
Iraqi Government stating their opposition to the death penalty and asking for as-
surances that it would not be imposed on the applicants. The President of the IHT, 
President Aref, invited letters from the victims’ families and from the British embassy 
in Baghdad opposing the imposition of the death penalty in this case, as ‘that would 
be a factor which would be taken into account by the court’, and also suggested that 
it would be helpful if the United Kingdom Government waived its right to civil com-
pensation. Letters of such purport were provided by the British embassy and by the 
surviving family of one of the two British soldiers; the United Kingdom Government 
also waived civil compensation.
On 30 December 2008, after the failure of the proceedings brought by the appli-
cants in England, the Court gave an indication under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,887 
informing the respondent Government that the applicants should not be removed or 
transferred from the custody of the United Kingdom until further notice. The United 
Kingdom, however, faced with the expiry of the mandate of the Multinational Force 
and the Memorandum of Understanding on Criminal Suspects, transferred the ap-
plicants into Iraqi custody on the very next day.
The Court held as follows:
126. The Government contended that they were under an obligation under in-
ternational law to surrender the applicants to the Iraqi authorities. In this con-
nection, the Court notes that the Convention must be interpreted in the light 
of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, of 
which Article 31 § 3 (c) indicates that account is to be taken of “any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. More gener-
ally, the Court reiterates that the principles underlying the Convention cannot 
be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. The Convention should be interpreted 
as far as possible in harmony with other principles of international law of which 
it forms part (see Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 55, 
ECHR 2001-XI, and Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 
887 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the Court to indicate interim measures to the parties. 
The Court’s practice is only to issue an interim measure against a Member State where, having 
reviewed all the relevant information, it considers that the applicant faces a real risk of serious, 
irreversible harm if the measure is not applied. See the Practice Direction “Requests for interim 
measures”, available on the Court’s Internet web site.
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no. 52207/99, § 55-57, ECHR 2001XII). The Court has also long recognised the 
importance of international cooperation (see Al-Adsani, cited above, § 54, and 
Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 
45036/98, § 150, ECHR 2005VI).
127. The Court must in addition have regard to the special character of the 
Convention as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms. Its approach must be guided by the fact that the object and 
purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual 
human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to 
make its safeguards practical and effective (see, inter alia, Soering, cited above, § 
87; Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 72, Series A no. 
310; and McCann and Others, cited above, § 146).
128. It has been accepted that a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 
of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether 
the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the 
necessity to comply with international legal obligations. Article 1 makes no dis-
tinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any 
part of a Contracting Party’s “jurisdiction” from scrutiny under the Convention 
(see Bosphorus, cited above, § 153). The State is considered to retain Convention 
liability in respect of treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force of 
the Convention (ibid., § 154 and the cases cited therein). For example, in Soering 
(cited above), the obligation under Article 3 of the Convention not to surrender 
a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment was held to override the United Kingdom’s obliga-
tions under the Extradition Treaty it had concluded with the United States in 
1972.888
In simple terms, therefore, the Convention ought to have taken precedence, not only 
because of its particular importance as a human rights instrument (which in itself is a 
consideration), but also – as a matter of general international law – as an earlier bind-
ing document preventing its Parties from subsequently entering into contrary legal 
obligations. Put differently, notwithstanding the obligations arising from the poste-
rior agreement with Iraq, the United Kingdom remained responsible ratione materiae 
under Article 1 of the Convention.889
The irony of this case is that the United Kingdom Government might have won 
it on its facts: there may not have been any violation of the Convention at all. True, 
the Memorandum of Understanding on criminal suspects between the United King-
dom and Iraq, unlike a similar agreement with Afghanistan, did not explicitly pro-
hibit use of the death penalty. However, the following curious passage appears in a 
888 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, §§ 126-128.
889 Compare Matthews v. the United Kingdom (GC), no. 24833/94, § 33, ECHR 1999-I.
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Human Rights Annual Report for 2008 of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee:890
… [T]he Government states that it has received assurances [emphasis added] in 
relation to the two men from: 
President of the Iraqi High Tribunal, President Aref, that a death sentence 
would be commuted, as well as written assurances from Deputy Justice Minister 
Posho that the two detainees will be treated humanely whilst in Iraqi detention. 
We are satisfied that the Government of Iraq is aware of its earlier assurances and 
have no reason to believe that they are not being adhered to.891 
This titbit is not replicated in the Court’s judgment, which was adopted on 2 Febru-
ary 2010. The Government’s argument, as reflected in the judgment, relies on the lim-
ited use of the death penalty made by the IHT, on the various representations made 
by them to the Iraqi authorities and the president of the IHT and on the request for 
clemency submitted by the surviving relatives of one of the two victims, all of which 
reduce the likelihood of the applicants’ being sent to the gallows, but it makes no 
mention of actual ‘assurances’. Likewise, it is apparent from the partly dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Sir Nicolas Bratza (who disagrees only with the finding of the majority 
that the refusal to comply with the Rule 39 indication violated Article 34 of the Con-
vention) that the existence of ‘assurances’ was not argued by the respondent Party:
The fact that, had the United Kingdom obtained the necessary assurances from 
those authorities some four years before, the applicants could have been safely 
transferred in December 2008, while undoubtedly relevant in the context of 
the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, does not in my view affect 
the question which falls to be examined under Article 34. As to the latter point, 
while there are strong reasons to believe that the relevant assurances could have 
been obtained before the referral of the applicants’ case to the Iraqi courts, the 
lack of success of the efforts made after June 2008 would clearly suggest that 
there was no realistic prospect of obtaining such assurances or achieving a tem-
porary solution at a time when the expiry of the mandate was imminent, a point 
confirmed by the evidence of Mr Watkins before the Divisional Court and the 
Court of Appeal (…).
One is left to wonder whether the language used in the Human Rights Report was 
inaccurate or, alternatively, whether the respondent Government missed a potentially 
890 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Human Rights Annual Report for 2008, sent 
for printing on 21 July 2009 and published on 9 August 2009.
891 Statement by the United Kingdom Government, quoted by the House of Commons Foreign Af-
fairs Committee, Human Rights Annual Report for 2008 (Seventh Report of Session 2008-09), 
page 49 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/557/557.pdf ).
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winning argument. The decision in Boumediene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
suggests that the Court might well have reached a different decision under Article 3 
of the Convention had it been aware of the promise of the President of the Iraqi High 
Tribunal: ‘subsequent developments and, in particular, the assurances obtained by the 
[Bosnia-Herzegovina] authorities that the applicants would not be subjected to the 
death penalty, torture, violence or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ sufficed for the Court to find in that case that the respondent had taken 
‘all possible steps to the present date to protect the basic rights of the applicants’ and 
accordingly to declare the application inadmissible.892
The German academic Peters posits the existence, between Germany and the USA, 
of secret agreements under which the American National Security Agency is granted 
access to the personal electronic data of individuals within Germany’s jurisdiction. 
She argues that Contracting States cannot validly agree to, or turn a blind eye to, acts 
within their jurisdiction by non-Contracting States amounting to violations of rights 
guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention. Her view is that such agreements, if 
they exist, are not necessarily unlawful in international law per se but must defer to 
human rights treaties like the Convention, these constituting international law of a 
higher order. Moreover, although admittedly the fact that they are not recorded in 
the United Nations Treaty Series does not affect their validity per se as between the 
contracting Parties, ‘… their secrecy does delegitimise them and makes the argument 
that they must somehow cede to the human rights treaties more plausible’.893 Ger-
many being among the first ten States that ratified the Convention, and for which the 
Convention entered into force on 3 September 1953, it would appear more straight-
forward at this point in history to argue that any such agreements would have to defer 
to the Convention on the more basic ground that they postdate the Convention.
Several cases raising precisely the question of ‘lawfulness’ and ‘necessity in a dem-
ocratic society’ of the interception, collection and storage of data by, or on behalf 
of, a foreign intelligence service have been communicated to the Government of the 
United Kingdom. The applicants (groups of NGOs and individuals) base their com-
plaints on inter alia the absence of an adequate basis in domestic law for the receipt 
by the United Kingdom security services of foreign intercept material relating to their 
electronic communications.894
892 Boumediene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, § 67.
893 Anne Peters, Surveillance without Borders: The Unlawfulness of the NSA Panopticon, Part II, 
EJIL:Talk!, 4 November 2013, http://www.ejiltalk.org/surveillance-without-borders-the-un-
lawfulness-of-the-nsa-panopticon-part-ii/ (retrieved on 31 March 2016).
894 Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 58170/13, communicated on 7 January 
2014; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v. the United Kingdom, no. 62322/14, 
communicated on 5 January 2015; 10 Human Rights Organisations and Others v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 24960/15, communicated on 24 November 2015. See also the ensuing Chamber 
judgment, Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 
24960/15, 13 September 2018 (referred to the Grand Chamber).
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7.5 Conclusion
General treaty law can be of only limited assistance to the defence of a respondent 
Contracting State. 
The only territorial restrictions conceivable are constituted by the failure to extend 
the validity of the Convention or its Protocols to territories for whose internation-
al relations the Contracting State is responsible – that is, not applying the ‘colonial 
clause’ of Article 57.
Reservations can no longer be made now that the Convention is in force; and un-
der ordinary treaty law may not be such as to frustrate the very purpose of the Con-
vention as a treaty.
The substantive rights were first set out in the Convention text of 1950 and remain 
unchanged. The various Protocols entered into force on later dates. They take priority 
ratione temporis over any treaty obligations entered into subsequently – and treaty 
obligations so venerable that they might override the substantive provisions of the 




The questions of jurisdiction and attribution are not always distinct – especially in the 
type of situation covered by this study.
Nowhere in the Court’s case-law has the distinction been better explained than by 
Judges Spielmann and Raimondi in their joint concurring opinion in Jaloud:
3.  The concept of “attribution” is indeed to be distinguished from that of 
“jurisdiction” as the latter has been interpreted in the Court’s case-law (see, re-
cently, Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, § 74, 16 September 
2014, which essentially reproduces the explanations in the Al-Skeini judgment 
(Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, §§ 130-141, 
ECHR 2011). The concept of ‘jurisdiction’ essentially refers to the territorial 
principle, State agent authority and control, effective control over an area and 
the Convention legal space.
4.  In contrast, the concept of “attribution” essentially concerns the sensitive 
issue of the “imputability” of internationally wrongful acts. Salmon’s Dictionary 
has the following entry for the term “attribution”:
“With regard to international-law responsibility, the fact of ascribing to a 
subject of international law the acts or omissions of individuals or bodies 
under its effective authority or acting on its behalf ”. [Translation]
(Dictionnaire de droit international public, edited by Jean Salmon, Preface 
by Gilbert Guillaume, Brussels, Bruylant, 2001).895
8.2 ‘Jurisdiction’ and ‘attribution’ in the logic of the Court
8.2.1 Relationship to the general law on State responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts
As the Court stated in Catan and reiterated in Jaloud and Mozer, ‘the test for estab-
lishing the existence of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has never 
been equated with the test for establishing a State’s responsibility for an internation-
ally wrongful act under general international law’.896
A set of Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts were 
drawn up by the International Law Commission over many years as a codification of 
existing general international law on the subject of State responsibility and endorsed 
895 Jaloud, joint concurring opinions of Judges Spielmann and Raimundi.
896 Catan, § 115; Jaloud, § 154; Mozer, § 102.
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as such by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001.897 It has since then acquired 
increasing authority as an expression of customary international law on the subject.898
The first and second of these Articles read as follows:
Article 1
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsi-
bility of that State.
Article 2
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of 
an action or omission:
(a)  is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b)  constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
The logic followed by the Commission and Court, which predates the General As-
sembly’s endorsement of the ILC’s Articles, is significantly different.
Article 1 of the ILC’s Articles does not identify the state or states, or the other in-
ternational legal persons, to which international responsibility is owed, but it is clear 
from the international legal context (and indeed, on a systematic reading, from the 
Articles as a whole) that these ‘persons’ must be invested with international legal per-
sonality; they accordingly do not include individual human beings or non-govern-
mental organisations.899 Consequently, obligations to make reparation for a breach of 
an obligation may be owed to ‘another State, to several States, or to the international 
community as a whole’.900 
In contrast, Article 1 of the Convention makes it clear that the obligation to secure 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Convention and corresponding 
parts of the Protocols are owed by States to ‘everyone within their jurisdiction’. That 
begs the question who is ‘within their jurisdiction’. It is therefore a reasonable corol-
lary that the question whether ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention exists comes before any question of imputability or attribution.
8.2.2 The concepts of ‘ jurisdiction’ and ‘attribution’ in the case-law of the Court
Thus, in its admissibility decision in Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou 
the Commission established that the matters complained of came within the jurisdic-
897 A/Res/56/83. The Articles themselves are appended to that Resolution and quoted in Crawford 
(2013), pp. 712-723.
898 Crawford (2012), p. 540.
899 Crawford (2013), p. 49.
900 Article 33 § 1 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Part Two 
of these Articles, which deals with the “content of the international responsibility of a State”, is 
“without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which 
may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State” (see Article 33 § 2 of these Articles).
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tion of Turkey.901 In its report902 in Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou, adopted after 
Mrs Loizidou’s case had been disjoined from the other two, the Commission consid-
ered the issue of attribution – or to use its expression, ‘imputability’ – separately in 
the following terms:
100. The Commission notes in this connection that Turkish armed forces are 
normally stationed in uninhabited border areas. It appears that, in the inhabited 
area of Nicosia close to the site of the demonstration, Turkish Cypriot soldiers 
were on guard on 19 July 1989. Turkish armed forces, if not present in that area, 
were elsewhere in or near Nicosia (…) and could thus intervene.
101. The Commission further notes that the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces 
are under the command of a General detached from Turkey (…).
102. In the light of the above elements the Commission, recalling the tactic 
of disguise pursued in the use of camouflage uniforms by Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot soldiers (…) and noting the overall control exercised by Turkey in the 
border area (…), finds that the applicants’ arrest in the border area on 19 July 
1989 is imputable to Turkey.
In Ilaşcu and Others we find an excellent illustration from contemporary case-law of 
the Court of how the logic of the Convention bodies works in practice.903
It will be remembered that the complaint concerned the detention of persons in 
the ‘Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria’, an unrecognised entity owing its de facto 
independence from Moldova to Russian military and economic support. With regard 
to Moldova, the Court held:
The Court considers that where a Contracting State is prevented from exercising 
its authority over the whole of its territory by a constraining de facto situation, 
such as obtains when a separatist regime is set up, whether or not this is accom-
panied by military occupation by another State, it does not thereby cease to have 
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over that part of 
its territory temporarily subject to a local authority sustained by rebel forces or 
by another State.
Nevertheless, such a factual situation reduces the scope of that jurisdiction 
in that the undertaking given by the State under Article 1 must be considered 
by the Court only in the light of the Contracting State’s positive obligations 
towards persons within its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with 
all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and in-
901 Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey, DR 68, p. 216; see also 6.4.1.1 above.
902 Article 31 of the Convention (text of 1950).
903 Ilaşcu and Others, § 311. See also Catan and Others, §§ 74 and 118-122.
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ternational organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms defined in the Convention.904
Thus, Moldovan Article 1 jurisdiction over the entirety of its territory does not cease: 
Moldova retains both the right and the duty to secure to all those within the territory 
purportedly belonging to the ‘MRT’ the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of 
the Convention and the Protocols which it has ratified. With respect to Moldova, 
the Court considered the case in terms of positive obligations – which were not to be 
interpreted ‘in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden’.905 
It would obviously have been unreasonable to require Moldova to attempt to dislodge 
the Russian army from its Transdniestrian territories or even prosecute individual 
‘MRT’ officials responsible for the violations eventually found, but Moldova’s efforts 
to reassert its authority, to secure the applicants’ release – which were successful as re-
gards at least one applicant –, and to guard the applicants’ health by providing medi-
cal care in detention were found by the Court to be sufficient. However, Moldova was 
found responsible for failing to act once these efforts had ceased.906
Contrast the position with respect to the Russian Federation:
392. All of the above proves that the “MRT”, set up in 1991-92 with the support 
of the Russian Federation, vested with organs of power and its own administra-
tion, remains under the effective authority, or at the very least under the decisive 
influence, of the Russian Federation, and in any event that it survives by virtue of 
the military, economic, financial and political support given to it by the Russian 
Federation.
393. That being so, the Court considers that there is a continuous and uninter-
rupted link of responsibility on the part of the Russian Federation for the appli-
cants’ fate, as the Russian Federation’s policy of support for the regime and col-
laboration with it continued beyond 5 May 1998, and after that date the Russian 
Federation made no attempt to put an end to the applicants’ situation brought 
about by its agents, and did not act to prevent the violations allegedly commit-
ted after 5 May 1998.
Regard being had to the foregoing, it is of little consequence that since 5 May 
1998 the agents of the Russian Federation have not participated directly in the 
events complained of in the present application.
Paragraph 392 establishes the Russian Federation’s extraterritorial ‘jurisdiction’ for 
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention – understood as arising from ‘the fact of 
… control, whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a 
904 Ilaşcu and Others, § 333.
905 Ilaşcu and Others, § 332.
906 Ilaşcu and Others, §§ 339-352.
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subordinate local administration’907 – or, as in this case, both. Next, paragraph 393 
establishes attribution to the Russian Federation.
The Court’s admissibility decision in Behrami and Saramati, to which we will re-
turn below,908 to all appearances does not fit comfortably into this mould. As we shall 
see, the Court goes straight to the question of ‘attribution’ – finding that the matters 
complained of are attributable to the United Nations – and finally declines to rule 
separately on Article 1 jurisdiction.909 One may wonder however whether it would 
have served any useful purpose for the Court to go to the trouble of first establishing 
the Article 1 jurisdiction of France and Norway (presumably in terms of ‘State agent 
authority and control’), only to conclude that the matters complained of were not 
attributable to them.
It is in the interpretation of attribution that the Court is most likely to draw in-
spiration from general international law, including in particular the case-law of the 
International Court of Justice and the work of the International Law Commission, 
in particular Articles 4 – 8 of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.
8.3 Attribution of the exercise of ‘hard power’ by the Contracting State
8.3.1 Attribution of extraterritorial exercise of ‘ hard power’
In judgments postdating Ilaşcu and Others in which the question of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction came up, the Court has generally not needed to devote specific attention 
to the question of attribution. That was because the facts left little room for doubt on 
that score.
Thus, in Al-Skeini and Others, the Court finds a ‘jurisdictional link between the 
deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention’ 
established through the authority and control exercised though its troops, then goes 
on in the following paragraph to find a ‘jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1 
of the Convention between the United Kingdom and the deceased’.910 The violations 
found, it is recalled, were of Article 2 under its procedural head, so that there is no 
attribution of the actual deaths to the respondent party.
In Al-Jedda the respondent Government conceded the jurisdiction point, since the 
applicant had been detained in a British-run military prison, but tried to evade at-
tribution by arguing that the British troops had been exercising not the sovereign 
authority of the United Kingdom but the international authority of the Multina-
907 Ilaşcu and Others, § 314, citing § 52 of Loizidou (merits).
908 Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (dec.) (GC), 
nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, 2 May 2007 (“Behrami and Saramati”). See 8.4.5.2.1 below.
909 Behrami and Saramati, §§ 151-153.
910 Al-Skeini, § 149.
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tional Force acting pursuant to the binding decision of the United Nations Security 
Council. The Court disagreed:
The Court does not consider that, as a result of the authorisation contained in 
Resolution 1511, the acts of soldiers within the Multinational Force became at-
tributable to the United Nations or – more importantly, for the purposes of this 
case – ceased to be attributable to the troop-contributing nations. The Multina-
tional Force had been present in Iraq since the invasion and had been recognised 
already in Resolution 1483, which welcomed the willingness of member States 
to contribute personnel. The unified command structure over the Force, estab-
lished from the start of the invasion by the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom, was not changed as a result of Resolution 1511. Moreover, the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom, through the CPA which 
they had established at the start of the occupation, continued to exercise the 
powers of government in Iraq. Although the United States of America was re-
quested to report periodically to the Security Council about the activities of the 
Multinational Force, the United Nations did not, thereby, assume any degree 
of control over either the Force or any other of the executive functions of the 
CPA.911
The situation was distinguishable from that in Behrami and Saramati:
In the light of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the majority of the House of 
Lords that the United Nations’ role as regards security in Iraq in 2004 was quite 
different from its role as regards security in Kosovo in 1999. The comparison is 
relevant, since in its decision in Behrami and Saramati (…) the Court concluded, 
inter alia, that Mr Saramati’s detention was attributable to the United Nations 
and not to any of the respondent States. It is to be recalled that the international 
security presence in Kosovo was established by United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, in which, “determined to resolve 
the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo”, the Security Council “decide[d] 
on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international 
civil and security presences”. The Security Council therefore authorised “mem-
ber States and relevant international organisations to establish the international 
security presence in Kosovo” and directed that there should be “substantial 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation” in the Force, which “must 
be deployed under unified command and control”. In addition, Resolution 1244 
authorised the Secretary-General of the United Nations to establish an interna-
tional civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for 
Kosovo. The United Nations, through a Special Representative appointed by 
the Secretary-General in consultation with the Security Council, was to control 
911 Al-Jedda, § 80.
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the implementation of the international civil presence and coordinate closely 
with the international security presence (see Behrami and Saramati, cited above, 
§§ 3, 4 and 41). On 12 June 1999, two days after the Resolution was adopted, the 
first elements of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo.912
In Hassan the Court discussed jurisdiction at length, applying Al-Skeini, but did not 
rule separately on attribution.913 Again, this was a detention case.
In Jaloud the Court established the Article 1 jurisdiction of the Netherlands, dis-
missing the suggestion that jurisdiction belonged exclusively to the United States 
and United Kingdom concurrently as ‘occupying powers’ or to the United Kingdom 
alone as ‘lead nation’ in south-eastern Iraq, the Dutch troops being subordinate to the 
British commander.914 It then establishes attribution in the following terms:
The facts giving rise to the applicant’s complaints derive from alleged acts and 
omissions of Netherlands military personnel and investigative and judicial 
authorities. As such they are capable of giving rise to the responsibility of the 
Netherlands under the Convention.915
– superfluously, in the view of Judges Spielmann and Raimondi whom we quoted 
at the beginning of this chapter, since in their view it is a ‘non-issue’ given the terms in 
which the judgment establishes jurisdiction.
8.3.2 Attribution of exercise of ‘ hard power’ committed within the territory of a 
Contracting State
The question of attribution also arises when a Contracting State tolerates on its ter-
ritory acts contrary to the Convention committed by foreign agents. This was the 
situation in El-Masri and the four Al Nashiri and Abu-Zubaydah cases.
By 2014, when the first Al Nashiri and Abu-Zubaydah judgments were delivered, 
it was settled case-law that a State Party to the Convention must be regarded as re-
sponsible under the Convention for acts performed by foreign officials on its territory 
with the acquiescence or connivance of its authorities. In the Court’s words:
Taking into consideration all the material in its possession (…), the Court finds 
that there is abundant and coherent circumstantial evidence, which leads inevi-
tably to the following conclusions:
(a) that Poland knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on its 
territory at the material time and that, by enabling the CIA to use its airspace 
and the airport, by its complicity in disguising the movements of rendition air-
912 Behrami and Saramati, § 83.
913 Hassan, §§ 74-80.
914 Jaloud, §§ 142-152.
915 Jaloud, § 155.
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craft and by its provision of logistics and services, including the special security 
arrangements, the special procedure for landings, the transportation of the CIA 
teams with detainees on land, and the securing of the Stare Kiejkuty base for the 
CIA’s secret detention, Poland cooperated in the preparation and execution of 
the CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations on its terri-
tory;
(b) that, given that knowledge and the emerging widespread public informa-
tion about ill-treatment and abuse of detained terrorist suspects in the custody 
of the US authorities, Poland ought to have known that, by enabling the CIA 
to detain such persons on its territory, it was exposing them to a serious risk of 
treatment contrary to the Convention (see also El-Masri, cited above, §§ 217-
221).
Consequently, Poland was in a position where its responsibility for securing 
‘to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined ... in [the] 
Convention’ set forth in Article 1 was engaged in respect of the applicant at the 
material time.916
This confirms that the Court considers witting toleration by a Convention State of 
unlawful acts by a non-Convention Government as falling under the direct responsi-
bility of the Convention State – a form of complicity if one will – as is indeed logical.
Similarly, the removal of the applicants from Polish territory engaged the respon-
sibility of Poland under Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention.917 On the latter point, 
however, the Court was careful to point out, as it had in Soering, that 
While the establishment of the sending State’s responsibility inevitably involves 
an assessment of conditions in the destination country against the standards set 
out in the Convention, there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing 
the responsibility of the destination country, whether under general interna-
tional law, under the Convention or otherwise.
In so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is li-
ability incurred by the sending Contracting State by reason of its having taken 
action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to pro-
scribed ill-treatment or other violations of the Convention (…).918
This applies all the more, one might add, since the responsibility of the sending State 
flows not from an act which is in itself entirely in conformity with the Convention – 
916 Al Nashiri v. Poland, § 442-43; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, § 444-45.
917 Al Nashiri v. Poland, § 454-55; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511/13, § 454. See also 
Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, § 586, and Al Nashiri v. Romania, § 601 (same applicants, different 
respondents).
918 Al Nashiri v. Poland, § 457; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, § 454-55. See also Abu Zubaydah 
v. Lithuania, § 584, and Al Nashiri v. Romania, § 598.
245Attribution
in Soering, the extradition of a murder suspect to face trial – but from acquiescing in 
a situation that is illegal per se.
The cooperation of European Governments with the CIA rendition programme 
must rank among the darkest pages of the history of the Contracting States con-
cerned since they joined the Council of Europe family of States. While of course their 
American allies were chiefly at fault as the active perpetrators, the Contracting States 
cannot escape attribution: their responsibility under the Convention is engaged, 
whether by virtue of their active connivance of their tacit consent.919
Let Senator Marty, whom we met in 6.3 above and who documented all the rendi-
tion cases thus far mentioned, have the last word:
This situation is also due to the attitude of those European governments, which 
abandoned all control over the use of their own infrastructures they uncondi-
tionally put at the disposal of the American administration, in the wake of the 
acceptation of the implementation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty and of the 
operative measures accepted by the members of the alliance. In this way, the 
European governments effectively placed themselves in a position of reliance or 
even dependence on the good will of the American authorities.920
8.4 Involvement of agents other than organs of than the Contracting State
8.4.1 General international law
In general international law, the position that a state is responsible for the acts of enti-
ties on its behalf is currently codified in Article 8 of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibil-
ity of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which reads as follows:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out 
the conduct.
Within the terms of this provision two situations may be distinguished. The first 
is that in which the entity has been instructed to perform the acts in question. The 
second is that in which the entity is under the direction or control of the state con-
cerned.921
The first situation, in which the entity – whatever its nature – has accepted instruc-
tions to act in a particular way, will normally give rise to few difficulties. In contrast, 
919 El-Masri, § 206.
920 Third Marty report, § 14 (footnote references omitted).
921 Crawford (2012), p. 144.
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questions may arise as to the degree of direction or control required to deem the en-
tity truly subordinate, and its acts attributable to the state.
The ILC calls it ‘a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular conduct 
was or was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that the con-
duct controlled should be attributed to it.’922 Thus, in Nicaragua, the International 
Court of Justice held the United States accountable for acts of the contras ‘only in 
certain individual instances … based upon actual participation of and directions given 
by that State’; a ‘general situation of dependence and support’ would not of itself be 
sufficient.
In the Bosnian Genocide judgment, the International Court of Justice clarified this 
– and its understanding of the ILC’s Article 8 – as follows:
… it is not necessary to show that the persons who performed the acts alleged 
to have violated international law were in general in a relationship of “complete 
dependence” on the respondent State; it has to be proved that they acted in ac-
cordance with that State’s instructions or under its “effective control”. It must 
however be shown that this “effective control” was exercised, or that the State’s 
instructions were given, in respect of each operation in which the alleged viola-
tions occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the per-
sons or groups of persons having committed the violations.923
It would appear to matter little how the entity in issue sees itself. For example, the con-
tras opposing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, in issue in the Nicaragua case 
before the International Court of Justice,924 may have aspired to government status, 
but it would have been clear to them that they never achieved it. In contrast, during 
the war of 1992-1995 the Republika Srpska, in issue in the Bosnian Genocide case,925 
saw itself as an independent state, having declared independence in April 1992. So 
also does the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, cited as an example in the ILC 
Commentary itself,926 view itself as an independent state, although its statehood is 
922 ILC Commentary on the Draft Articles, Article 8, § 5.
923 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, 
§ 400.
924 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986.
925 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007.
926 ILC Commentary, Article 8, § 5 and footnote 160 (reference to §§ 52 and 56 of Loizidou (Mer-
its)).
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recognised only by Turkey.927 The entity may even be a commercial company, state-
owned or not.928
The ILC Commentary on Article 8 ends with a useful reminder:
Article 8 uses the words “person or group of persons”, reflecting the fact that 
conduct covered by the article may be that of a group lacking separate legal per-
sonality but acting on a de facto basis. Thus, while a State may authorize conduct 
by a legal entity such as a corporation, it may also deal with aggregates of indi-
viduals or groups that do not have legal personality but are nonetheless acting 
as a collective.929
8.4.2 Private agents: case-law of the Court
In its general case-law, the Court has held the use by the State of private agents to 
engage the State’s responsibility. Thus, it has held in the context of Articles 6 and 8 
of the Convention in relation to the use of covert means of criminal investigation, 
that a Contracting State could not evade its responsibility under the Convention by 
allowing investigating authorities to relinquish control of events to private agents. For 
example, in A. v. France, it held that the covert use by police officers of a private agent 
to make a recording of an incriminating statement by a criminal suspect engaged the 
responsibility of the Contracting State and violated Article 8 of the Convention.930 
It reaches similar findings in the cases of M.M. v. the Netherlands and Van Vondel v. 
the Netherlands.931 In Allan v. the United Kingdom it found a violation of Article 6 of 
the Convention in relation to the use in evidence of a statement made by a remand 
prisoner to a fellow inmate who had been instructed by the police to obtain from that 
prisoner a confession.932
It is submitted that this case-law is relevant to the use of private agents to exercise 
‘hard power’ inasmuch as it illustrates that the use of private agents cannot suffice to 
relieve a Contracting State of its responsibility under the Convention.
8.4.3 Private military security contractors
James Crawford calls the use of private military or security corporations hired by the 
state to engage in certain activities on its behalf ‘a ‘simple example’ of private persons 
927 Even to the point of entering into treaties with it, such as the treaty signed in New York on 
21  September 2011 delimiting the maritime boundary between their respective continental 
shelves. Turkish Official Gazette, 12 July 2012, no. 28351.
928 ILC Commentary on the Draft Articles, Article 5, §§ 2 and 6.
929 ILC Commentary on the Draft Articles, Article 5, § 9.
930 A. v. France, no. 14838/89, § 36, Series A no. 277-B.
931 M.M. v. the Netherlands, no. 39339/98, § 40, 8 April 2003; Van Vondel v. the Netherlands, 
no. 38258/03, § 49, 25 October 2007. The dissenting voices in the two Dutch cases – Judge Palm 
in M.M. and Judge Myjer in Van Vondel, commenting on M.M. – disagreed with the majority on 
the interpretation to be given to the facts of that case but not on the principle.
932 Allan v. the United Kingdom, no. 48539/99, § 52, ECHR 2002-IX. 
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or entities acting on the instruction of a State within the meaning of Article 8 of the 
ILC Articles.933 
Private military security contractors can offer advantages to Contracting States. 
For example, it may be more economical to outsource certain tasks to outside con-
tractors on a temporary basis rather than create and maintain the required capacity as 
part of the standing armed forces of the State.934
8.4.3.1 On land
The use of private contractors for tasks that were formerly seen as part of the tradi-
tional remit of the military is a phenomenon that has come to public notice only in 
recent years. For example, it was reported in 2007 that the Netherlands military in 
Afghanistan relied on private contractors for its catering and the supply of its rations 
and fuel; that the maintenance of military materiel was left to civilian mechanics; that 
armed Afghan contractors carried out guard duties around Dutch military bases; and 
that in training local security forces the Dutch military presence worked closely with 
a private party contracted by the American government.935
When such private contractors are entrusted with tasks that may entail the use of 
force, casualties can – and sometimes do – result, witness for example a shooting in-
cident involving an American private military contractor that took place in Baghdad 
on 16 September 2007 and led to seventeen deaths among the local population.936
Private military and security contractors are bound by the local laws precisely be-
cause they are private parties not members of any government’s armed forces. In prin-
ciple, this does not change when they are in the pay of a foreign government, as in 
Afghanistan or Iraq.
In Iraq, however, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer III, decreed that private military contractors should be ‘immune from 
Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto’, although they remained bound 
to respect Iraqi laws, including in particular those promulgated by the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority itself.937
933 Crawford (2013), p. 145.
934 AIV (Adviesraad internationale vraagstukken, Advisory Council on International Affairs,), De 
inhuur van private militaire bedrijven, een kwestie van verantwoordelijkheid (Employing private 
military companies, a question of responsibility), December 2007, pp. 12-14.
935 AIV, De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven, een kwestie van verantwoordelijkheid (Employing 
private military companies, a question of responsibility), p. 5.
936 “Blackwater incident: what happened”, BBC News, 8 December 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/7033332.stm (accessed 17 April 2017); CBS News, “Blackwater guards found guilty in Bagh-
dad mass shootings”, 23 October 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/blackwater-case-former-
guards-convicted-in-baghdad-mass-shootings (accessed 17 April 2017); The New York Times, 
“Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terms for Killing Iraqis”, 13 April 2015, https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/04/14/us/ex-blackwater-guards-sentenced-to-prison-in-2007-killings-of-iraqi-
civilians.html (accessed 17 April 2017).
937 Coalition provisional authority order number 17 (revised), 27 June 2004, section 4 (3) and (4).
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In Afghanistan, the Technical Military Agreement between ISAF/NATO and the 
interim government of Afghanistan made the Convention on the Privileges and Im-
munities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 concerning experts on mission 
applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the ISAF and supporting personnel – the latter being 
understood in practice to include private military contractors.938
It was not entirely clear in either case whether the contractors and their staff were 
subject to the jurisdiction of their sending state or their state of incorporation or 
nationality (if different).939 In terms of the Convention, however, this distinction 
would not necessarily be decisive for the question of jurisdiction within the mean-
ing of Article 1 of the Convention, which as we have seen concerns primarily the 
undertaking of the Contracting State to secure the rights and freedoms defined in the 
Convention and its Protocols (jurisdiction in terms of duty) rather than the power to 
legislate and enforce.940
As we have seen in paragraph 8.4.2 above, the Court has held in the context of 
criminal investigations that a Contracting State could not evade its responsibility 
under the Convention by allowing investigating authorities to relinquish control of 
events to private agents. Taking the reasoning further, this would mean that a State 
Party to the Convention that entrusts the use of force or coercive powers to private 
contractors would continue to be bound by its obligations under, at the very least, 
Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5. After all, on the ordinary meaning of the words, such contractors 
would surely be under the Contracting State’s ‘direction’ and ‘control’.941
The point is also made by the Dutch Government’s Advisory Council on Inter-
national Affairs that States retain the monopoly on the use of lawful force, and that 
consequently the Government remain answerable in law for the use of force on its 
behalf by private contractors on foreign soil.942
938 David Nauta, The International Responsibility of NATO and its Personnel during Military Opera-
tions: A study on international public law and international criminal law (diss. Nijmegen 2016), 
Wolf Legal Publishers, p. 32.
939 For an interpretation of the situation with respect to the Netherlands, see Adviesraad interna-
tionale vraagstukken (Advisory Council on International Affairs), De inhuur van private mili-
taire bedrijven, een kwestie van verantwoordelijkheid (Employing private military companies, a 
question of responsibility), December 2007, p. 18.
940 See 5.1 above.
941 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993 ed.) gives definitions of “direction” including 
“1. The action or function of directing; guidance, instruction; management. lME. … 3. An in-
struction on what to do, how to proceed, or where to go. Usually in pl. …” and of “control” includ-
ing “1. The act or power of directing or regulating; command, regulating influence. …”.
942 AIV, De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven, een kwestie van verantwoordelijkheid (Employing 
private military companies, a question of responsibility), p. 31. See also Ian M. Ralby, “Private 
Military Companies and the Jus and Bellum”, in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in Inter-
national Law (Mark Weller, ed.), p. 1131 at pp. 1145-46.
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This means creating an appropriate regulatory framework, accompanied by the 
necessary supervision and the threat of penal sanctions, to prevent violations of Con-
vention rights and providing access to domestic remedies.943
A joint initiative of the Swiss Federal Government and the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross led to the publication, following consultations with govern-
mental experts from countries including Convention States Parties Austria, France, 
Germany, Poland, Sweden Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Ukraine, of the 
‘Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practic-
es for States related to operations of private military and security companies during 
armed conflict’ in September 2008.944 As its name implies, it is addressed to states 
– ‘Contracting States’, meaning States that make use of private military and security 
contractors; ‘Territorial States’, meaning States on whose territory such contractors 
operate; and ‘Home States’, meaning States in which such contractors are based – set-
ting out standards for them to establish ‘effective oversight and control’. The stand-
ards it sets are derived from international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law. It is not an international treaty – it does not set binding rules – but states 
and international organisations can join as ‘participating’ states and organisations. So 
far, it has been joined by 54 states – including 34 States Parties to the Convention – 
and three international organisations.945
However, thus far it has been largely been left to the private military and security 
sector itself to regulate its conduct. An International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers, concluded on 9 November 2010, invites private security 
contractors to subscribe to basic human rights standards as regards the use of force, 
the apprehending and detention of persons, sexual abuse and exploitation, human 
trafficking and slavery and child labour. Incidents are required to be reported to the 
‘Competent Authority’ – defined as ‘any state or intergovernmental organization 
which has jurisdiction over the activities and/or persons in question’. A public list of 
943 See James Cockayne, “Private Military and Security Companies”, in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta, eds.), Oxford University 
Press 2014, p. 625, at pp. 640-643; Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror and the Framework of Inter-
national Law, pp. 111-112. See also 2.2.2 and 2.7 above.
944 Montreux Document, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf (ac-
cessed on 26 March 2017).
945 All Council of Europe States have joined except Armenia, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Malta, 
Montenegro, Moldova, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey. So have the 
European Union, the OSCE and NATO: https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-
policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/
participating-states.html (accessed on 26 March 2017). For a critical appraisal of the Montreux 
Document, see Ralby, pp. 1154 et seq.
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signatory companies is kept by the Swiss federal government.946 The lack of precise 
government regulation is not without its critics.947
In a more recent development, the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) published an industry standard – ISO 18788 – entitled ‘Management system 
for private security operations – Requirements with guidance for use’ in September 
2015. This standard
provides a business and risk management framework for organizations conduct-
ing or contracting security operations and related activities and functions while 
demonstrating:
a)  conduct of professional security operations to meet the requirements of 
clients and other stakeholders;
b)  accountability to law and respect for human rights;
c)  consistency with voluntary commitments to which it subscribes.948 
8.4.3.2 At sea
The use of private military and security contractors on board merchant ships to deter, 
and if necessary repel, attack by pirates deserves to be considered separately.
The argument has been made that States Party to the Convention are obliged to 
protect those on board ships flying their flag against any known risk of being injured, 
killed, or taken hostage by pirates. There is support in the Court’s case-law for that 
position.949 The corollary of this view is that any failure of a flag State Government to 
meet this obligation will accordingly be attributable to the flag State.
The deployment, by the flag state, of its own military forces on board ships flying 
its flag raises no problems of jurisdiction from a Convention perspective. The flag 
State has jurisdiction both because it is the flag state950 and by dint of its command 
and control of its armed forces.951 Some Governments are however baulked by the 
946 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, 9 November 2010, https://
icoca.ch/en (English) (accessed on 26 March 2017).
947 Elke Krahmann, Choice, Voice and exit: Consumer power and the self-regulation of the private 
security industry, 1 European Journal of International Security (2016) pp. 27-48.
948 International Organization for Standardization, https://www.iso.org/standard/63380.html (ac-
cessed on 27 March 2017).
949 Stefano Piedimonte Bodini, Fighting Maritime Piracy under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, (2011) 22 EJIL p. 829 at p. 839; Sofia Galani, Somali piracy and the human right of seafar-
ers, (2016) 34 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights p. 71 at p. 81. See, inter alia and mutatis 
mutandis, Osman v. the United Kingdom, no. 23452/94, § 116, Reports 1998-VIII, and Finogenov 
and Others v. Russia, nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03, § 209, ECHR 2011 (Article 2); Opuz v. Turkey, 
no. 33401/02, §§ 130 and 159, ECHR 2009; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, §§ 284 
and 319 (Articles 4 and 5); and Riera Blume v. Spain, no. 37680/97, §§ 28-35, Reports 1997-VII 
(Article 5).
950 Article 94 of UNCLOS; see also generally Douglas Guilfoyle, ”The Use Of Force Against 
Pirates”, in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Mark Weller, ed.), 
Oxford University Press 2015, p. 1057 at pp. 1067-1071.
951 See above para. 5.5.2.1; see also Guilfoyle at p. 1066.
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difficulties of deploying military forces on merchant vessels: the Dutch Minister of 
Defence, for example, has referred to ‘logistical problems, legal restrictions and risks’ 
that make such deployment impracticable.952
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) strongly discourages the carry-
ing and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship, among other 
reasons because this ‘may encourage attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an 
already dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may themselves become an 
attractive target for an attacker’.953
For merchant ships to have any protection at all, if their own crews are unable for 
whatever reason to ensure their own defence, the remaining alternative is to engage 
the services of private security providers. IMO, ‘while not endorsing the use of pri-
vately contracted armed security personnel’,954 offers guidance on the subject. IMO’s 
circular notes that 
… flag State jurisdiction and thus any laws and regulations imposed by the flag 
State concerning the use of PMSC [private maritime security companies] and 
PCASP [privately contracted armed security personnel] apply to their ships. 
Furthermore it is also important to note that port and coastal States’ laws may 
also apply to such ships.955
– which brings us back to the matters discussed in paragraphs 5.3.1 and 5.4.1 above.
8.4.4 Cyber-attacks as a new problem of attribution
Cases arising from cyber-attacks have yet to reach the Court. The best a study such 
as this can do, therefore, is chart some of the likely dangers lurking beneath these 
uncertain waters.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0, which we have encountered above, states that
Cyber operations conducted by organs of a State, or by persons or entities em-
powered by domestic law to exercise elements of governmental authority, are 
attributable to the State.956
952 AIV, Piraterijbestrijding op zee: een herijking van publieke en private verantwoordelijkheden (Com-
bating piracy at sea: a reassessment of public and private responsibilities), January 2010, p. 28.
953 IMO, “Piracy and armed robbery against ships: Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, 
shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships”, MSC/Circ.632/Rev.3, 29 May 2002, §§ 45-46.
954 IMO, “Revised interim guidance to shipowners, ship operators and shipmasters on the use of 
privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the high risk area” [sc. the waters 
off Somalia], MSC.1/Cric.1405/Rev.2, 25 May 2012, § 1.1.
955 ibid., § 1.4.
956 Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 15 (p. 87).
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That is obvious enough. This rule derives directly from Articles 4 and 5 of the Inter-
national Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. The Netherlands Royal 
Army’s Defence Cyber Command and the French ANSSI (Agence nationale de la 
sécurité des systèmes d’information) are part of the defence forces of their respective 
states and their acts are attributable to the Netherlands and France respectively.957 
The Estonian Cyber Defence Unit is part of the Estonian Defence League, a volun-
teer unit with legal status under Estonian public law that coexists with the Estonian 
Defence Forces within the Estonian Defence Organisation and is placed under the 
orders of the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces in wartime; there is little 
doubt that its acts, too, would be those of the Republic of Estonia.958
States may outsource cyber activities to private contractors, or to volunteer or-
ganisations without any official status under public law, simply because they lack the 
resources to set up agencies of their own. Again, there is little doubt that the acts of 
those contractors or organisations would be attributable to the State – at least as long 
as they were carried out on the State’s behalf. Should those contractors or organisa-
tions act ultra vires but still generally within the scope of their duties, it would still be 
necessary for the State to accept attribution. Again, this is nothing novel: we are still 
within the ordinary rules governing State responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts.959
However, experience suggests that those who carry out cyber-attacks on the assets 
and infrastructure of foreign States are likely to disguise their identities, perhaps by 
creating botnets – networks of robot devices – hacking computers of innocent third 
parties as ‘zombies’. To complicate matters further, the attackers may disguise their 
identities by impersonating others, perhaps even a foreign government or an interna-
tional organisation – ‘spoofing’.960 It may be very difficult to pin responsibility for a 
cyber-attack on any particular individual, organisation or government.
It is submitted, therefore, that Convention States bear a responsibility for prevent-
ing others from carrying out cyber-attacks from within their jurisdiction. The ‘duty 
to establish, maintain, and safeguard international telecommunication infrastructure’ 
identified by the Tallinn Manual 2.0 as its Rule 61961 does not go far enough. In the 
same way that the State is required to do all that can be reasonably expected of it to 
secure the practical and effective exercise of the right to life – and as the WannaCry 
ransomware attack has demonstrated, human life may well be endangered by cyber-
957 Tallinn Manual 2.0, ibid.
958 Tallinn Manual 2.0, ibid.; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, The Cyber 
Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League (2013), pp. 10-11.
959 Tallinn Manual 2.0, p. 90; see also Rule 17 on p. 94 and ILC Draft Articles 5 and 7 on State Re-
sponsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts; see also Michael N. Schmitt, “The Use of Cyber 
Fore and International Law”, in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law 
(Mark Weller, ed.), Oxford University Press 2015, p. 1110 at p. 1113.
960 Tallinn Manual 2.0, p. 91. Compare Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, § 57.
961 Tallinn Manual 2.0, p. 288.
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attacks962 – the State is required to put in place an appropriate legislative framework 
that enables it to take effective preventive or corrective action when the situation so 
requires. It has long been settled case-law that the failure to provide effective deter-
rence through criminal law for attacks on basic values protected by the Convention 
engages the responsibility of the Contracting State.963
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (also known as the ‘Budapest 
Convention’)964 represents an attempt to create an international framework for this 
purpose. It defines a number of computer-related crimes, some of them relevant to 
our discussion (illegal access, Article 2; illegal interception, Article 3; data interfer-
ence, Article 4; system interference, Article 5; misuse of devices, Article 6) but its 
focus is on privacy, content (forgery and fraud, child pornography, infringement of 
intellectual property rights) and civil liability rather than on the prevention or pros-
ecution of hostile acts or physical injury. Its provisions on mutual legal assistance, 
including exchange of information and extradition, add little that cannot be found in 
other instruments. Its value has been stated to be mostly symbolic.965 Even so, what 
value it has lies in requiring States party to it to enact legislation criminalising mis-
use of a type that could lead to attacks of the type here in issue.966 Its main weak-
ness is perhaps its very traditional territorial focus on domestic criminal jurisdiction: 
it enjoins States to establish such jurisdiction only over offences committed within 
their territory, on board of ships flying their flag and aircraft bearing their registra-
tion, or by their nationals if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was 
committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any 
State.967 This would appear to leave it to the individual States whether or not also to 
extend their jurisdiction over foreigners hacking computers from outside the national 
territory to set up botnets composed of ‘zombies’ that cause harm in third countries.
962 See 6.4.7 above.
963 Among other authorities, Mastromatteo v. Italy (GC), no. 37703/97, § 67, ECHR 2002-VIII; 
Osman v. the United Kingdom, § 116; Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, §§ 129-30, ECHR 2009; and 
Maiorano and Others v. Italy, no. 28634/06, § 104, 15 December 2009. Compare also X and Y v. 
the Netherlands, no. 8978/80, § 27, Series A no. 91. See also footnote 949 above.
964 23 November 2001, ETS 185.
965 Nancy E. Macron, “The Council of Europe’s Cyber Crime Treaty: An exercise in Symbolic Leg-
islation”, in International Journal of Cyber Criminology, Vol 4 Issue 1&2 (2010), pp. 699-712.
966 Compare for the Netherlands the following Articles of the Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek 
van Strafrecht): Articles 138ab (hacking another’s computer and/or using it as a “zombie”), 138b 
(distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack); 317 § 2 (ransomware attack); and 351 (inter alia, 
damaging or destroying cyber infrastructure). Section 5(2)(c)(2°) and (3°) of the Dutch Interna-
tional Crimes Act (Wet internationale misdrijven) – which provisions criminalise indiscriminate 
attacks on the civilian population and attacks on works or installations containing dangerous 
forces (dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations) if such attacks may cause the re-
lease of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population, respective-
ly, are also interesting from this perspective although their applicability is limited to international 
armed conflict.
967 Budapest Convention, Article 22 § 1.
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8.4.5 International organisations
8.4.5.1 International organisations in general
International organisations968 have existed since the nineteenth century. Govern-
ments set them up for purposes of multilateral cooperation, where a network of bi-
lateral arrangements would be impracticable or unwieldy. In recent decades they have 
proliferated, and the number of international organisations now far outstrips the 
number of states.
A useful contemporary definition of an international organisation is given by Arti-
cle 2a of the International Law Commission’s 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibil-
ity of International Organizations (hereafter DARIO):969
“international organization” means an organization established by a treaty or 
other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own interna-
tional legal personality. International organizations may include as members, in 
addition to States, other entities.
In addition to international legal personality (recognised, at very least, by its member 
states), an international organization will enjoy the powers it requires to carry out the 
tasks and duties with which it is charged by the participating states. These may be par-
ticularly far-reaching: some international organisations exercise their authority over 
individuals and some even intervene in the domestic affairs of their member states.970 
Within the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights itself provides 
an example: the Court adopts its own Rules of Court, which are binding on applicant 
and respondent parties and others (such as witnesses)971 and of course its judgments 
are recognised as binding and executable by the Contracting States.972
International organisations enjoy privileges and immunities needed for them to 
function in independence. These tend to include immunity from domestic jurisdic-
tion and execution; this is necessary in order that domestic courts not rule on the 
legality of acts of the organisations.973 Detailed and potentially far-reaching immuni-
ties are usually the object of separate agreements between the organisation and its 
host state, often referred to as ‘headquarters agreements’; an example is the headquar-
ters agreement between NATO AFSOUTH (based in Naples, Italy) and the Italian 
968 For our purposes, the expression “international organisations” refers to international intergov-
ernmental organisations (or IGOs), not non-governmental organisations or NGOs. Note that 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an NGO governed by the Swiss Civil 
Code (see Article 2 of the Statutes of the International Committee of the Red Cross).
969 Crawford (2012), pp. 166-67.
970 Crawford (2012), p. 170.
971 Article 25 (d) of the Convention.
972 Article 46 § 1 of the Convention.
973 Crawford (2012), pp. 174-76.
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Republic successfully invoked by NATO in Markovic and Others.974 Concomitantly, 
personnel of international organisations also enjoy immunity from domestic jurisdic-
tion and execution, at minimum in respect of official acts.975 Similar immunities tend 
to be recognised to state functionaries accredited to the organisation, such as Gov-
ernment representatives – usually the political decision-makers within such organisa-
tions976 – and members of parliamentary bodies.977 
The Court has had occasion to hold, in its general case-law, 
… that where States establish international organisations in order to pursue or 
strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of activities, and where they at-
tribute to these organisations certain competences and accord them immunities, 
there may be implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It would 
be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention, however, if 
the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under 
the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution. It 
should be recalled that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical 
or illusory rights, but rights that are practical and effective.978
It is clear, therefore, that Contracting States cannot simply evade their Convention 
obligations by hiding behind the separate legal personality of international organisa-
tions of which they are members.
The above quotation is taken from the Waite and Kennedy judgment, which con-
cerned the immunity of the European Space Agency from the domestic jurisdiction of 
its host states in respect of employment disputes between it and members of its staff. 
It is therefore natural that the Court should have considered the question whether 
European Space Agency staff had available to them ‘reasonable alternative means to 
protect effectively their rights under the Convention’ to be a ‘material factor’.979 How-
ever, the responsibility of Contracting States concerns not only procedural safeguards 
but also substantive guarantees.
In Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, the Court 
was called upon to define the interrelation between, on the one hand, the transfer by 
Contracting States of sovereign powers to international or supranational organisa-
tions, and on the other, their responsibility under Article 1 of the Convention for ‘all 
974 See 6.4.3.1.2 above. Other examples include the headquarters agreement between ICTY and the 
Netherlands: see Galić, § 23, and that between the Netherlands and the International Criminal 
Court: see Djokaba Lambi Longa, § 41, ECHR 2012. See also Lawson (1999), p. 288.
975 Crawford (2012), pp. 177-78.
976 For example, as members of the North Atlantic Council (Article 9 of the Washington Treaty) or 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (Article 16 of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe).
977 Crawford (2012), pp. 178-79.
978 Waite and Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-I.
979 Waite and Kennedy, § 68.
257Attribution
acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question 
was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international 
legal obligations’.980 The dispute was occasioned by a decision of the Irish Govern-
ment to impound an aircraft owned by the applicant company but leased to Yugoslav 
Airlines in pursuance of EEC Regulations themselves based on a resolution adopted 
by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter imposing sanctions on the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Here we 
have an example of ‘economic sanctions’, which, be it recalled, fall within the defini-
tion of ‘hard power’ given above no less than kinetic action.981 
The applicant company complained of a violation of its property rights, as pro-
tected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.982
The Court held as follows:
154. In reconciling both these positions and thereby establishing the extent to 
which a State’s action can be justified by its compliance with obligations flow-
ing from its membership of an international organisation to which it has trans-
ferred part of its sovereignty, the Court has recognised that absolving Contract-
ing States completely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered 
by such a transfer would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the 
Convention; the guarantees of the Convention could be limited or excluded at 
will, thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the prac-
tical and effective nature of its safeguards (see M. & Co. v. the Federal Republic 
of Germany (no. 13258/87, Commission decision of 9 February 1990, Decisions 
and Reports (DR) 64, p. 138, and Waite and Kennedy, §  67, …). The State is 
considered to retain Convention liability in respect of treaty commitments sub-
sequent to the entry into force of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Mat-
thews, cited above, §§ 29 and 32-34, and Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. 
Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, § 47, ECHR 2001-VIII).
155. In the Court’s view, State action taken in compliance with such legal ob-
ligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect 
fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the 
mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered 
at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides (see M. & Co., 
cited above, p. 145, an approach with which the parties and the European Com-
mission agreed). By “equivalent” the Court means “comparable”; any require-
ment that the organisation’s protection be “identical” could run counter to the 
interest of international cooperation pursued (…). However, any such finding of 
980 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland ([GC], no. 45036/98, § 153, 
ECHR 2005VI.
981 See 1.2.3 above.
982 Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Pieter van Dijk, Fried van 
Hoof, Arjen van Rijn, Leo Zwaak, eds.), fifth edn., Intersentia, 2018, pp. 19-20.
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equivalence could not be final and would be susceptible to review in the light of 
any relevant change in fundamental rights protection.
156. If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organisa-
tion, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the require-
ments of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obliga-
tions flowing from its membership of the organisation.
However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of 
a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was 
manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international cooperation 
would be outweighed by the Convention’s role as a ‘constitutional instrument 
of European public order’ in the field of human rights (see Loizidou v. Turkey 
(preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, pp. 27-28, 
§ 75).
The question of equivalence of the protection available arose with respect to the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, since its regulation was directly applicable in Ireland; 
the Security Council Resolution, although admittedly the ultimate justification of 
the regulation, was not directly applicable as though it were domestic law.983 In the 
event, the Court was able to find that, at a substantive level, fundamental rights were 
‘enshrined in the general principles of Community law protected by it, and that the 
Convention had a “special significance” as a source of such rights’, and that at a pro-
cedural level, supervision by the domestic courts, coupled with the availability of the 
preliminary reference procedure.984 
The Court has since restated the ‘Bosphorus presumption’, as the presumption stated 
in paragraph 156 of the judgment has come to be called, not only with respect to the 
European Union985 but also with respect to other international organisations, includ-
ing the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (‘Eurocontrol’),986 
NATO,987 the European Patent Office,988 the International Olive Oil Council,989 the 
Council of Europe,990 and – as we shall now see – the United Nations.
Lawson, writing well before the delivery of the Bosphorus judgment, suggested that 
if States of their own free choice transferred their authority in a certain area to an 
independent entity – be it an international organisation, a federal unit or an inde-
983 Bosphorus, § 145.
984 At the time, Article 177 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957); 
now Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
985 Inter alia, Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v. the Neth-
erlands (dec.), no. 13645/05, ECHR 2009; Avotiņš v. Latvia (GC), no. 17502/07, ECHR 2016, 
and Lechouritou and Others v. Germany and 26 other member States of the European Union (dec.), 
no. 37937/07, 3 April 2012.
986 Boivin v. 34 member States of the Council of Europe (dec.), no. 73250/01, ECHR 2008.
987 Gasparini v. Italy and Belgium (dec.), no. 10750/03, 12 May 2009.
988 Rambus Inc. v. Germany (dec.), no. 40382/04, 26 June 2009.
989 Now the International Olive Council. Lopez Cifuentes v. Spain, no. 18754/06, 7 July 2009.
990 Beygo v. 46 member States of the Council of Europe (dec.), no. 36099/06, 16 August 2009.
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pendent organ of the State itself – then it should follow from the very freedom of 
that choice that a State should not be able to hide behind its independence to evade 
attribution of acts violating its international legal obligations.991 The logic developed 
in the Bosphorus judgment may at first sight appear to run counter to this argument, 
in that it sets out the conditions that preclude attribution to the State; but on a sec-
ond reading, the two are compatible. The link between the two is that the States that 
are members of an international organisation to which the Bosphorus presumption is 
applicable are found to have transferred to that organisation not only the means to 
violate the Convention but also legal means, equivalent even if not identical to those 
required by the Convention, to provide redress.
Lawson also suggests that it will be permissible to attribute all acts of an interna-
tional organisation to its parent states if (a) the organisation has no international legal 
personality of its own, or (b) the organisation is set up mala fide for a purpose involv-
ing evading attribution of internationally wrongful acts of whatever description.992 
This must be correct.
8.4.5.2 The United Nations
8.4.5.2.1 Kosovo
On 9 June 1999 a ‘Military Technical Agreement’ or MTA was signed between 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the Republic of Serbia and ‘KFOR’, the 
Kosovo Force (whose establishment was in fact to be announced the following day). 
This agreement provided for the withdrawal from Kosovo of FRY troops and the 
presence of an international security force following an appropriate UN Security 
Council Resolution. The Security Council Resolution, which was to be the basis for 
both KFOR and the civilian administration, United Nations Interim Administration 
in Kosovo or UNMIK, was adopted the next day.993
Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 provided for KFOR to be es-
tablished by ‘Member States and relevant international institutions’, ‘under UN aus-
pices’, with ‘substantial NATO participation’ but under ‘unified command and con-
trol’. UNMIK was to be deployed under UN auspices; its implementation was to be 
supervised by a Special Representative to the Secretary General (‘SRSG’) to control 
its implementation. UNMIK was to coordinate closely with KFOR.
In March 2000 a group of young boys – including two sons of the applicant Beh-
rami – found some cluster bomb units. These were from cluster bombs dropped by 
NATO aircraft in 1999 during the bombing campaign and had not yet been made 
safe. The boys played with them. One of them exploded, killing one of Mr Behrami’s 
sons and maiming the other for life. The Court later found it established that re-
sponsibility for clearing up unexploded ordnance belonged with the United Nations 
991 Lawson (1999), p. 304.
992 Lawson (1999), p. 341. On the latter point, compare Article 61 of DARIO (which is rather less 
absolute in its terms).
993 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.
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Mine Action Co-ordination Centre or UNMACC, a body subordinate to UNMIK, 
although KFOR was involved as a ‘service provider’.994 At the relevant time, France 
was the ‘lead nation’ in the part of Kosovo where this unfortunate event took place. 
Before the Court, Mr Behrami and the surviving son later complained under Article 
2 of the Convention that the French KFOR troops had failed to mark or defuse the 
cluster bomb units, even though their existence and whereabouts had been known.
Mr Saramati was arrested in April 2001 on suspicion of murder and illegal posses-
sion of a weapon. Released in June 2001 after the Supreme Court allowed his appeal, 
he was rearrested in July 2001. Mr Saramati’s detention was ordered, and extended by 
the KFOR Commander (‘COMKFOR’), who initially was a Norwegian officer and 
later a French one. Mr Saramati complained under Article 5 of the Convention that 
he had been detained extra-judicially.
The Court proceeded on the finding that issuing detention orders fell within the 
security mandate of KFOR and that the supervision of de-mining (including the re-
moval of unexploded cluster bomb units) fell within the mandate of UNMIK.995
Answering the question whether France and Norway had exercised Article 1 juris-
diction at the relevant time, the Court found that Kosovo had been under the effec-
tive control of the ‘international presences which exercised the public powers nor-
mally exercised by the Government of the FRY’.996 The question was therefore ‘less 
whether the respondent States exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction in Kosovo but 
far more centrally, whether this Court is competent to examine under the Conven-
tion those States’ contribution to the civil and security presences which did exercise 
the relevant control of Kosovo’.997
As regards KFOR, the Court held as follows:
UNSC [United Nations Security Council] Resolution 1244 gave rise to the fol-
lowing chain of command in the present cases. The UNSC was to retain ulti-
mate authority and control over the security mission and it delegated to NATO 
(in consultation with non-NATO member states) the power to establish, as well 
as the operational command of, the international presence, KFOR. NATO ful-
filled its command mission via a chain of command (from the NAC [North At-
lantic Council], to SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe], to 
SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe], to CIC South [Commander 
in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe]) to COMKFOR, the commander 
of KFOR. While the MNBs [multinational brigades] were commanded by an 
officer from a lead TCN [troop contributing nation], the latter was under the 
direct command of COMKFOR. MNB action was to be taken according to an 
994 Behrami and Saramati, § 125.
995 Behrami and Saramati, § 127.
996 Behrami and Saramati, § 70.
997 Behrami and Saramati, § 71.
261Attribution
operational plan devised by NATO and operated by COMKFOR in the name 
of KFOR.998
– from which it followed that, since KFOR was exercising lawfully delegated 
Chapter VII powers of the Security Council, the matters complained of, in so far as 
blamed on KFOR, were ‘attributable’ to the United Nations.
As regards UNMIK, the Court held that, whether it depended from the Secretary 
General or the Security Council, it was a subsidiary organ of the United Nations; the 
failure to make safe the cluster bomb units was therefore, in principle, ‘attributable’ to 
the United Nations in the same sense.999 
In so finding the Court took into account the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (DARIO).1000 It 
actually stated in the decision that it was using the expression ‘attribution’ in the same 
sense as the ILC did in Article 3 of DARIO.1001
The next question was whether to apply the presumption developed by the Court 
in the Bosphorus judgment. The presumption was that action taken by a State com-
pliance with obligations flowing from its membership of an international organisa-
tion to which it had transferred part of its sovereignty was ‘justified as long as the 
relevant organisation [was] considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both 
the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, 
in a manner which [could] be considered at least equivalent to that for which the 
Convention [provided]’.1002
The United Nations was, however, an organisation to which fundamentally differ-
ent parameters applied. Pursuant to Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, the obli-
gation of the Member States to obey the orders of the Security Council prevailed over 
‘any other international agreement’.1003 Of even greater significance was the ‘impera-
tive nature of the principle [sic] aim’ of the United Nations, namely the maintenance 
of international peace and security, for which purpose the UNSC was invested with 
the primary responsibility and the corresponding power to use coercive measures un-
der Chapter VII:1004
998 Behrami and Saramati, § 135.
999 Behrami and Saramati, §§ 142-43.
1000 Report of the ILC, General Assembly Official Records, 55th session, Supplement No. 10 A/58/10 
(2003).
1001 Behrami and Saramati, § 121.
1002 Bosphorus, § 155.
1003 Behrami and Saramati, § 147.
1004 Behrami and Saramati, § 148. See also Tobias Lock, “Beyond Bosphorus: The European Court 
of Human Rights’ Case-Law on the Responsibility of Member States of International Organisa-
tions under the European Convention on Human Rights”, in Human Rights Law Review 10:3 
(2010), 529-545 at 532.
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In the present case, Chapter VII allowed the UNSC to adopt coercive measures 
in reaction to an identified conflict considered to threaten peace, namely UNSC 
Resolution 1244 establishing UNMIK and KFOR.
Since operations established by UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter are fundamental to the mission of the UN to secure interna-
tional peace and security and since they rely for their effectiveness on support 
from member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a manner which 
would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which are covered 
by UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to 
the scrutiny of the Court. To do so would be to interfere with the fulfilment of 
the UN’s key mission in this field including, as argued by certain parties, with 
the effective conduct of its operations. It would also be tantamount to impos-
ing conditions on the implementation of a UNSC Resolution which were not 
provided for in the text of the Resolution itself. This reasoning equally applies to 
voluntary acts of the respondent States such as the vote of a permanent member 
of the UNSC in favour of the relevant Chapter VII Resolution and the contri-
bution of troops to the security mission: such acts may not have amounted to 
obligations flowing from membership of the UN but they remained crucial to 
the effective fulfilment by the UNSC of its Chapter VII mandate and, conse-
quently, by the UN of its imperative peace and security aim.1005
The cases were moreover clearly distinguishable from Bosphorus. The latter case had 
concerned the seizure of an aircraft, admittedly under an EU regulation that was itself 
based on a Chapter VII resolution of the Security Council, but nonetheless directly 
by Irish domestic authorities on Irish territory. In contrast, the acts of KFOR and 
UNMIK were, as noted, those of the United Nations.1006 Accordingly, since it had 
no jurisdiction over the United Nations, the Court declared both cases inadmissible 
ratione personae.
The Behrami and Saramati precedent has been applied since then in at least two 
cases decided by a Chamber, one against Greece, the other against Germany. The only 
feature of these cases worth noting is that in the German case the Serbian Govern-
ment intervened as a third party under Article 36 of the Convention.1007
8.4.5.2.2 Cyprus buffer zone
In Stephens the applicant, who was the owner of a house situated in the United Na-
tions-controlled buffer zone in Nicosia, complained of being denied access to it. She 
was advised by the Property Officer of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cy-
1005 Behrami and Saramati, § 149.
1006 Behrami and Saramati, § 151.
1007 Kasumaj v. Greece (dec.), no. 6974/05, 5 July 2007, and Gajic v. Germany (dec.), no. 31446/02, 
28 august 2007.
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prus (UNFICYP), which had control over the buffer zone, ‘to contact the European 
Court of Human Rights to discover if it would be feasible to lodge a claim with them’.
Citing Behrami and Saramati, the Court noted that UNFICYP was a subsidiary 
organ of the UN. Its actions and inactions being therefore in principle attributable to 
the UN, it declared this complaint inadmissible ratione personae.1008
8.4.5.2.3 Iraq
In its Al-Jedda judgment, which we have come across already,1009 the Court defined 
the interrelation between the Convention and Security Council resolutions in the 
following terms:
101. Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the obliga-
tions of the members of the United Nations under the Charter shall prevail in 
the event of a conflict with obligations under any other international agreement. 
Before it can consider whether Article 103 had any application in the present 
case, the Court must determine whether there was a conflict between the Unit-
ed Kingdom’s obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1546 and its obligations under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In other words, 
the key question is whether Resolution 1546 placed the United Kingdom under 
an obligation to hold the applicant in internment.
102. In its approach to the interpretation of Resolution 1546, the Court has 
reference to the considerations set out in paragraph 76 above. In addition, the 
Court must have regard to the purposes for which the United Nations was cre-
ated. As well as the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, set 
out in the first sub-paragraph of Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
the third sub-paragraph provides that the United Nations was established to 
“achieve international cooperation in ... promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Article 24 § 2 of the Charter requires 
the Security Council, in discharging its duties with respect to its primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to “act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Against 
this background, the Court considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there 
must be a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose 
any obligation on member States to breach fundamental principles of human 
rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a United Nations Security 
Council resolution, the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which 
is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids 
any conflict of obligations. In the light of the United Nations’ important role in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected that 
clear and explicit language would be used were the Security Council to intend 
1008 Stephens v. Cyprus, Turkey and the United Nations (dec.), no. 45267/06, 11 December 2008.
1009 See, in particular, 2.4 above.
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States to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations 
under international human rights law.1010
In the particular case, the Court held as follows:
105. The Court does not consider that the language used in this Resolution 
indicates unambiguously that the Security Council intended to place member 
States within the Multinational Force under an obligation to use measures of 
indefinite internment without charge and without judicial guarantees, in breach 
of their undertakings under international human rights instruments including 
the Convention. Internment is not explicitly referred to in the Resolution. … 
Internment is listed in US Secretary of State Powell’s letter, as an example of 
the “broad range of tasks” which the Multinational Force stood ready to under-
take. In the Court’s view, the terminology of the Resolution appears to leave the 
choice of the means to achieve this end to the member States within the Multi-
national Force. Moreover, in the Preamble, the commitment of all forces to act 
in accordance with international law is noted. It is clear that the Convention 
forms part of international law, as the Court has frequently observed (…). In 
the absence of clear provision to the contrary, the presumption must be that the 
Security Council intended States within the Multinational Force to contribute 
towards the maintenance of security in Iraq while complying with their obliga-
tions under international human rights law.1011
The conclusion was that
in the absence of a binding obligation to use internment, there was no conflict 
between the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations and its obligations under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.1012
Milanovic and Hadzi-Vidanovic have understood the Court’s refusal in Al-Jedda to 
attribute the acts of American and British armed forces in Iraq to the United Nations 
as it had attributed the acts of KFOR in Behrami and Saramati as a correction of 
the latter decision. It is not. Al-Jedda itself points out that the British and American 
forces were already in theatre when the Security Council adopted its Resolution 1511; 
that resolution had not changed anything in their command structure or made them 
subsidiary to the Security Council as KFOR was. More importantly, the USA and the 
UK, through the CPA which they had established already at the start of the occupa-
tion, continued to exercise the powers of government in Iraq. The USA was requested 
to report periodically to the Security Council about the activities of the Multina-
1010 Al-Jedda, §§ 101-102.
1011 Al-Jedda, § 105.
1012 Al-Jedda, § 109.
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tional Force, but even so the United Nations did not thereby ‘assume any degree of 
control over either the Force or any other of the executive functions of the CPA’: the 
Security Council’s request to the USA was just that, a request, not an order.1013
8.4.5.2.4 Switzerland
Like Bosphorus, the cases of Nada v. Switzerland and Al-Dulimi and Montana Man-
agement v. Switzerland are examples of economic sanctions. They are moreover of 
importance in that they clarify the interrelation between Security Council resolu-
tions and the Convention.
In Nada the applicant was a dual Egyptian and Italian national resident in Cam-
pione d’Italia, a small Italian exclave surrounded by the Swiss Canton of Ticino and 
separated from the rest of Italy by Lake Lugano. To travel to the rest of Italy over land 
he needed to cross Swiss territory.1014 
In 1999, in response to the bomb attacks by Osama bin Laden and members of his 
network against the US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanza-
nia) the previous year, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted, under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Resolution 1267 (1999), providing for 
sanctions against the Taliban and created a committee to monitor the enforcement 
of that Resolution (‘the Sanctions Committee’). By Resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 De-
cember 2000, the Security Council extended the sanctions regime. It was now also 
directed against Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organisation, as well as the Tali-
ban’s senior officials and advisers. In both Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), 
the Security Council requested the Sanctions Committee to maintain a list, based on 
information provided by States and regional organisations, of individuals and entities 
associated with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The applicant was added to this list 
on 9 November 2001.
In the meantime, in 2000, the Swiss Federal Council had adopted an ordinance 
to implement the sanctions regime. By the time of the events in issue, it prohibited 
entry into and transit through Switzerland for the individuals and entities concerned 
by the sanctions regime. In October 2003 the Canton of Ticino revoked the appli-
cant’s special border-crossing permit, making it impossible for the applicant to leave 
Campione d’Italia. This prevented the applicant from obtaining medical treatment 
and from consulting his lawyers.
The Court took the view that the case concerned the national implementation of 
United Nations Security Council resolutions. The matters complained of were there-
fore attributable to Switzerland.1015
Deciding whether the travel ban had constituted a violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention, the Court distinguished the case from Al-Jedda in the following terms:
1013 Al-Jedda, § 80.
1014 There is a ferry service across the lake that joins Campione d’Italia to the opposite shore which is 
Swiss.
1015 Nada, §§ 121-22.
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… in the present case it observes that, contrary to the situation in Al-Jedda, 
where the wording of the resolution in issue did not specifically mention intern-
ment without trial, Resolution 1390 (2002) expressly required States to prevent 
the individuals on the United Nations list from entering or transiting through 
their territory. As a result, the above-mentioned presumption is rebutted in the 
present case, having regard to the clear and explicit language, imposing an obli-
gation to take measures capable of breaching human rights, that was used in that 
Resolution (see also paragraph 7 of Resolution 1267 (1999), paragraph 70 above, 
in which the Security Council was even more explicit in setting aside any other 
international obligations that might be incompatible with the Resolution).
Even so, it emerged that the Security Council resolutions did not prevent the travel 
ban from being lifted ‘where entry or transit [was] necessary for the fulfilment of a 
judicial process ...’ and urged States to take restrictive measures ‘where appropriate’. 
Taking its cue from the Kadi I judgment of the European Court of Justice,1016 the 
Court therefore found that Switzerland had not made full use of what little discretion 
it had to improve the applicant’s lot.1017
In Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland the applicants were 
identified by the Security Council as the head of finance for the Iraqi secret services 
under the regime of Saddam Hussein and a Panamanian company managed by him. 
The sanctions regime to which the applicants were subject were defined by Security 
Council Resolution 1483 – the same resolution that played such an important role in 
Al-Skeini, Al-Jedda and Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi – and after the Sanctions Commit-
tee set up to supervise the sanctions regime had placed them on the sanctions list (in 
April 2004), their assets in Switzerland were seized pursuant to an implementing or-
dinance adopted by the Federal Council. The applicants appealed to the Swiss courts, 
which verified that the applicants’ names actually appeared on the lists drawn up by 
the Sanctions Committee and that the assets concerned belonged to them, then – cit-
ing Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations and Article 30 § 1 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties – dismissed their appeals.
Before the Court, the applicants complained of a violation of their right of access 
to a court, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head.
The Court distinguished the case from Nada and Al-Jedda in that it did not con-
cern either the essence of the substantive rights affected by the impugned measures 
or the compatibility of those measures with the requirements of the Convention, but 
merely the availability of ‘appropriate judicial supervision’ meeting the standards of 
Article 6 § 1.1018 
1016 Court of Justice of the European Communities, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communi-
ties (joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 3 September 2008 (“Kadi I”).
1017 Nada, §§ 177-80.




145. The Court notes, moreover, that the inclusion of individuals and entities 
on the lists of persons subject to the sanctions imposed by the Security Council 
entails practical interferences that may be extremely serious for the Convention 
rights of those concerned. Being drawn up by bodies whose role is limited to 
the individual application of political decisions taken by the Security Council, 
these lists nevertheless reflect choices of which the consequences for the per-
sons concerned may be so weighty that they cannot be implemented without 
affording the right to appropriate review, which is all the more indispensable as 
such lists are usually compiled in circumstances of international crises and are 
based on information sources which tend not to be conducive to the safeguards 
required by such measures. In this connection, the Court would emphasise that 
the object and purpose of the Convention, a human rights treaty protecting in-
dividuals on an objective basis (see [Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], 
no. 41615/07, § 145, ECHR 2010]), require its provisions to be interpreted and 
applied in a manner which makes its requirements practical and effective (see 
[Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37]). The Court further observes 
that, the Convention being a constitutional instrument of European public or-
der (see Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, § 75, Series 
A no. 310, and Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 141), the States Parties are 
required, in that context, to ensure a level of scrutiny of Convention compliance 
which, at the very least, preserves the foundations of that public order. One of 
the fundamental components of European public order is the principle of the 
rule of law, and arbitrariness constitutes the negation of that principle. Even in 
the context of interpreting and applying domestic law, where the Court leaves 
the national authorities very wide discretion, it always does so, expressly or im-
plicitly, subject to a prohibition of arbitrariness (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], 
no. 30544/96, §§ 28-29, ECHR 1999-I, and Storck v. Germany, no. 61603/00, § 
98, ECHR 2005-V).
146. This will necessarily be true, in the implementation of a Security Council 
resolution, as regards the listing of persons on whom the impugned measures are 
imposed, at both UN and national levels. As a result, in view of the seriousness 
of the consequences for the Convention rights of those persons, where a resolu-
tion such as that in the present case, namely Resolution 1483, does not contain 
any clear or explicit wording excluding the possibility of judicial supervision of 
the measures taken for its implementation, it must always be understood as au-
thorising the courts of the respondent State to exercise sufficient scrutiny so that 
any arbitrariness can be avoided. By limiting that scrutiny to arbitrariness, the 
Court takes account of the nature and purpose of the measures provided for by 
the Resolution in question, in order to strike a fair balance between the neces-
sity of ensuring respect for human rights and the imperatives of the protection 
of international peace and security.
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147. In such cases, in the event of a dispute over a decision to add a person to the 
list or to refuse delisting, the domestic courts must be able to obtain – if need 
be by a procedure ensuring an appropriate level of confidentiality, depending 
on the circumstances – sufficiently precise information in order to exercise the 
requisite scrutiny in respect of any substantiated and tenable allegation made by 
listed persons to the effect that their listing is arbitrary. Any inability to access 
such information is therefore capable of constituting a strong indication that the 
impugned measure is arbitrary, especially if the lack of access is prolonged, thus 
continuing to hinder any judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, any State Party whose 
authorities give legal effect to the addition of a person – whether an individual 
or a legal entity – to a sanctions list, without first ensuring – or being able to en-
sure – that the listing is not arbitrary will engage its responsibility under Article 
6 of the Convention.1019
8.4.5.2.5 Conclusion: Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations
From the Al-Jedda, Nada and Al-Dulimi and Montana Management judgments we 
can conclude as follows.
Firstly, the obligations assumed by the Contracting States under Article 1 of the Con-
vention do not override Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter. Consequently, when the two are in conflict, the latter prevail. There can 
be no doubt about this: it follows clearly from Article 103 of the Charter, which pro-
vision provides that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter shall prevail. This 
rule is reinforced by Article 30 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which makes the hierarchy of treaty obligations set out in the remainder of that Arti-
cle subordinate to Article 103 of the Charter.1020
Secondly, there is a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to im-
pose any obligation on member States of the United Nations to breach fundamental 
principles of human rights. This follows from the very purpose and principles of the 
United Nations Charter itself. If a United Nations Security Council resolution is am-
biguous its terms, the Court must therefore interpret the Security Council resolution 
so as to reconcile it as far as possible with the Convention. This enabled the Court to 
hold in Al-Jedda that the relevant Security Council resolution did not compel indefi-
nite detention without the possibility of judicial review, and so to find violation of 
Article 5 of the Convention.
Thirdly, the said presumption is rebuttable – but only to the extent that the Security 
Council resolution imposes direct obligations to adopt measures incompatible with 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. Even then, the Contract-
1019 Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc., §§ 145-47.
1020 Lawson (1999), p. 148.
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ing States must nonetheless make use of what latitude remains to them to secure the 
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.
It is only fair to mention that in this matter the way forward was shown already in 
2008 by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Kadi I.1021
8.4.5.2.6 Anti-piracy operations in the Western Indian Ocean
As we have seen,1022 the Security Council gave authority to States taking part in an-
ti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia to act, making use of its powers under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It did not, however, express this authority in the 
form of a binding order.
In Hassan and Others the respondent Party, France, did not seek to deny juris-
diction on the ground that its acts were attributable to the UN and the Court did 
not examine the matter of its own motion.1023 Now that European naval forces work 
together as EUNAVFOR [European Union Naval Force] Operation Atalanta, the 
question may arise at some point whether attribution should not rather be made to 
the European Union, whether alone – in which case, in present circumstances, Ar-
ticle 1 jurisdiction cannot be an issue1024 – or together with the Member State con-
cerned.1025
8.4.5.3 International organisations: the problem of accountability
Wrongful acts of whatever description, even when attributable to international or-
ganisations, are necessarily acts or omissions of human beings. In the context of this 
study, they will often be the acts and omissions of persons exercising functions as State 
organs placed at the disposal of international organisations to act in the name of the 
latter. We have seen that attribution to international organisations may enable states 
to escape responsibility for such acts and omissions, rightly or wrongly. This may leave 
the wronged individual without any possibility to obtain redress. 
The distinct legal personality of international organisations, separate from that of 
their member states, precludes their being held to account under the Convention in 
their own right. Likewise, it protects States from being held responsible for acts at-
tributable to the international organisations of which they are members. It will not 
help applicants to cite as respondents all of the organisation’s member States, if these 
be at the same time parties to the Convention.1026
1021 See §§ 298-300 of that judgment (footnote 1016 above).
1022 See 6.4.5 above.
1023 Footnote 771 above.
1024 Footnote 618 above.
1025 Tullio Treves and Cesare Pitea, “Piracy, International Law and Human Rights”, in The Frontiers 
of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and its Challenges, Collected Courses of the Academy of Euro-
pean Law, vol. XXIV/1, pp. 89-126 at pp. 108-112.
1026 Compare Boivin v. 34 member States of the Council of Europe (dec.), no. 73250/01, ECHR 2008, 
and Beygo v. 46 member States of the Council of Europe (dec.), no. 36099/06, 16 August 2009. See 
also Lawson (1999), pp. 189-99.
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Thus, in Markovic and Others that NATO invoked the immunity of its AF-
SOUTH headquarters before the Italian domestic courts – successfully, inasmuch as 
this caused the applicants to discontinue the proceedings against that organisation; 
but the Court accepted that it would have availed the applicants nothing to pursue 
them to their conclusion.1027
In Behrami and Saramati the Court used the term ‘attribution’ in the same way as 
the ILC did in Article 3 of DARIO.1028 So it did also in Berić and Others.1029
In Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others, the Court noted the existence of a 
jurisdictional void: a claims commission was supposed to have been set up to hear 
claims against the United Nations, but it had not. This state of affairs, regrettable 
though it be, was not imputable to the Netherlands; nor was the Netherlands re-
quired by Article 6 of the Convention to step in itself.1030 Domestic law can allow the 
State to be held to account, as the Dutch courts did in domestic civil proceedings in 
the Srebrenica litigation,1031 but their jurisdiction over international organisations is 
very limited.
Commentators do not like this line of case-law. They tend to see Stichting Mothers 
of Srebrenica and Others, like Behrami and Saramati, as endorsement of a tendency 
on the part of States to use international organisations as a tool to evade accounta-
bility.1032 One pair of authors goes so far as to call the decision ‘lamentable’.1033 Yet 
such is the current state of the law. Unless one takes the view that the law itself is 
wrong, it is difficult to find that the Court is plainly in error when it applies Article 3 
of DARIO in these cases. The situation is little different from that of, for example, a 
State placing its organs at the disposal of a non-Convention State to whom the acts of 
the former would be attributable under Article 6 of the ILC’s Articles on the Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts;1034 in such a case as in the case 
1027 See 6.4.3.1.2 above; Markovic and Others, § 35.
1028 Behrami and Saramati, § 121.
1029 Berić and Others, § 28, 18 October 2007.
1030 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica, §§ 162-165. 
1031 See 6.5.2.6 above.
1032 Alexander Breitegger, “Sacrificing the Effectiveness of the European Convention on Human 
Rights on the Altar of the Effective Functioning of Peace Support Operations: A Critique of 
Behrami & Saramati and Al Jedda, International Community Law Review 11 (2009) 155-183, pas-
sim; Heike Krieger, “A Credibility Gap: The Behrami and Saramati Decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights”, Journal of International Peacekeeping 13 (2009) 159-180, passim; Marko 
Milanovic and Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, “A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict” ( January 20, 2012), 
Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law, Nigel White, Christian Hen-
derson, eds., Edward Elgar, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988915, p. 19; 
Crawford (2013), pp. 199-200; Andrew Drzemczewski, “Human Rights in Europe: An Insider’s 
Views”, [2017] E.H.R.L.R., issue 2, p. 134 at p. 143; PACE Resolution 1979 (2014), Account-
ability of international organisations for human rights violations, 31 January 2014, § 3; PACE 
Recommendation 2037 (2014), 31 January 2014, § 2.
1033 Milanovic and Hadzi-Vidanovic, loc. cit.
1034 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, Official Re-
cords of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1.
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of an international organisation, there would most likely be no access to the Court 
in Strasbourg in the event that the non-Convention State failed to meet its human 
rights obligations.1035
Although Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc.1036 must rank as one of the 
Court’s boldest attempts until now to provide judicial guarantees where there are 
none, critics of the Behrami and Saramati and Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica deci-
sions can derive little comfort from it. It is one thing to conceive of a remedy limited 
to testing the arbitrariness of continuing the domestic implementation of a sanctions 
regime targeting named individuals where such a remedy is not specifically excluded; 
it is quite another to create a judicial remedy that would allow the United Nations to 
be judged by domestic courts for the use by the Security Council of its powers under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter – which would not only override an im-
munity granted by the world’s most basic treaties1037 but would of necessity involve 
recognising a substantive right to damages, and under domestic law to boot.
DARIO has been accepted in principle by the United Nations General Assembly,1038 
but unlike the ILC Articles on State responsibility for international wrongful acts, 
not yet formally endorsed. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has 
suggested that the Council of Europe itself, ‘as an international organisation specialis-
ing in human rights’, consider how the Draft Articles might apply to it.1039
There is a real need to make provision for international organisations wielding 
power to be accountable before independent organs with jurisdictional powers.1040 
In Kosovo, this need was recognised: an UNMIK Human Rights Advisory Panel was 
set up to examine complaints from any person or group of individuals claiming to be 
the victim of a violation by UNMIK of their human rights.1041 
Although the creation of the UNMIK Human Rights Advisory Panel was a wel-
come development, it was not sufficient to solve the problem. It is known, for exam-
ple, that KFOR military and UNMIK civilian personnel including police took part 
in human trafficking and forced prostitution, or used brothels staffed by victims of 
such practices, yet no prosecutions were ever authorised by either the commander of 
KFOR or national commanders and no immunity was ever waived by the Secretary 
1035 Compare Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain (see 5.5.4 above); James Crawford, State Re-
sponsibility: The General Part, Cambridge University Press 2013, p. 134-35.
1036 See 8.4.5.2.4 above.
1037 Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations; Article II, section 2 of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 February 1946
1038 UNGA Res. 66/100, 9 December 2011, § 3.
1039 PACE Recommendation 2037 (2014), 31 January 2014, § 3.
1040 See also Heike Krieger, “A Credibility Gap: The Behrami and Saramati Decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights”, Journal of International Peacekeeping 13 (2009) 159-180, p. 180.
1041 Human Rights Review Panel, Annual Report 2016, p. 45, http://www.hrrp.eu/docs/HRRP%20
Annual%20Report%202016.pdf (accessed 15 March 2017).
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General of the United Nations.1042 Addressing different issues, the presiding member 
of that Panel, Marek Nowicki, had occasion in its final annual report to 
… highlight again with deep regret the general structural problem that exists, 
namely the lack of implementation of the Panel’s opinions, especially with re-
gard to UNMIK paying financial compensation to the complainants, as well 
as the lack of significant progress of EULEX or Kosovo law enforcement insti-
tutions’ continuing investigations regarding the Panel’s cases related to abduc-
tions, disappearances and killings’1043
– thus reflecting the inadequacy of a merely advisory body as a legal remedy, 
whether preventive, compensatory or punitive.
In the meantime EULEX has assumed executive powers. The Human Rights Advi-
sory Panel has been replaced by a Human Rights Review Panel set up to 
review complaints from any person, other than EULEX Kosovo personnel, 
claiming to be the victim of a violation of his or her human rights by EULEX 
Kosovo in the conduct of the executive mandate of EULEX Kosovo.1044
Its creation has been lauded by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope1045 even though its terms of reference, or ‘accountability concept’, remain clas-
sified.1046
The two Kosovo panels constitute a step in the right direction, however timid.1047 
As matters stand, no other international panels than these two have ever been given 
a mandate to hold international organisations operating in an executive role in a con-
flict or post-conflict peacekeeping situation accountable for alleged human rights 
violations.1048
1042 Nauta, pp. 24-29. The author was told of similar occurrences in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
his time there.
1043 Human Rights Advisory Panel, Annual Report 2015-16, pp. i-ii.
1044 Human Rights Review Panel, Annual Report 2016, p. 6, http://www.hrrp.eu/docs/HRRP%20
Annual%20Report%202016.pdf (accessed 15 March 2017).
1045 PACE Resolution 1979 (2014), Accountability of international organisations for human rights 
violations, 31 January 2014, § 5.
1046 Human Rights Review Panel, Annual Report 2016, p. 6.
1047 The system has also received lukewarm praise from the Venice Commission in its Opinion on the 
existing mechanisms to review the compatibility with human rights standards of acts of UNMIK 
and EULEX in Kosovo, Opinion no. 545 / 2009, CDL-AD(2010)051, 21 December 2010.
1048 Human Rights Review Panel, Annual Report 2016, p. 5
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8.5 Subordinate pseudo-states
In the case-law of the Court thus far, there have been two situations of what has been 
called ‘belligerent occupation’1049 in which the Court has had to consider the value of 
a judicial remedy offered by a purportedly independent state that was in fact a client 
entity of one Contracting State set up on the territory of another.
8.5.1 The ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’
In Cyprus v. Turkey the Court was faced with the question whether the remedies of-
fered by the courts of the ‘TRNC’ were to be exhausted in order to comply with 
then Article 26 of the Convention (now Article 35 § 1). The position of the Turkish 
Government, as expressed in the proceedings before the Commission (they did not 
appear before the Court), was that the ‘TRNC’ was ‘an independent State established 
by the Turkish-Cypriot community in the exercise of its right to self-determination 
and possessing exclusive control and authority over the territory north of the United 
Nations buffer-zone’. The Cypriot Government argued strongly that they were not, 
pointing to the status of the ‘TRNC’ as an entity whose lawfulness was not recog-
nised internationally except by Turkey; it followed that even Turkey did not regard 
the remedies of the ‘TRNC’ as domestic remedies of its own. Moreover, and submit-
ting that the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus was unlawful, they argued that 
the ‘TRNC’’s courts were not ‘tribunals established by law’.
The Court, ‘without in any way putting in doubt either the view adopted by the 
international community regarding the establishment of the “TRNC” (…) or the fact 
that the government of the Republic of Cyprus remains the sole legitimate govern-
ment of Cyprus’,1050 dismissed both limbs of the Cypriot Government’s arguments. 
This it did having regard to the ‘Namibia principle’:
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory 
should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived 
from international co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by 
the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the 
termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be ex-
tended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and 
marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the in-
habitants of the Territory.1051
1049 See 1.2.1 above.
1050 Cyprus v. Turkey, § 90. 
1051 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, vol. 16, 
p. 56, § 125
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After all,
Life goes on in the territory concerned for its inhabitants. That life must be made 
tolerable and be protected by the de facto authorities, including their courts; 
and, in the very interest of the inhabitants, the acts of these authorities related 
thereto cannot be simply ignored by third States or by international institutions, 
especially courts, including this one. To hold otherwise would amount to strip-
ping the inhabitants of the territory of all their rights whenever they are dis-
cussed in an international context, which would amount to depriving them even 
of the minimum standard of rights to which they are entitled.1052
Indeed,
It appears … difficult to admit that a State is made responsible for the acts oc-
curring in a territory unlawfully occupied and administered by it and to deny 
that State the opportunity to try to avoid such responsibility by correcting the 
wrongs imputable to it in its courts. To allow that opportunity to the respond-
ent State in the framework of the present application in no way amounts to an 
indirect legitimisation of a regime which is unlawful under international law.1053
In later judgments, the Court was to accept on this basis the lawfulness of the arrest of 
a Greek Cypriot by a ‘TRNC’ police officer and the trial of a Greek Cypriot – even its 
compatibility with Article 6 –by a ‘TRNC’ criminal court, it being implicit that both 
the arrest and the trial were attributable to Turkey.1054
8.5.2 The ‘Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria’
In Ilaşcu and Others and again in Mozer and Others the Court expressed itself as fol-
lows with regard to the court systems of the ‘TRNC’ and the ‘MRT’.1055
In certain circumstances, a court belonging to the judicial system of an entity 
not recognised under international law may be regarded as a tribunal “estab-
lished by law” provided that it forms part of a judicial system operating on a 
“constitutional and legal basis” reflecting a judicial tradition compatible with 
the Convention, in order to enable individuals to enjoy the Convention guaran-
tees (see, mutatis mutandis, Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 231 and 236-237).
In Ilaşcu and Others, the Court found that this was not the case:
1052 Cyprus v. Turkey, § 96. See also Fortin, pp. 294-95.
1053 Cyprus v. Turkey, § 101.
1054 Foka v. Turkey, no. 28940/95, § 83, 24 June 2008, and Protopapa v. Turkey, no. 16084/90, § 87, 24 
February 2009, respectively.
1055 Ilaşcu and Others, § 460; Mozer, § 141.
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The “Supreme Court of the MRT” which passed sentence [of death] on Mr 
Ilaşcu was set up by an entity which is illegal under international law and has not 
been recognised by the international community. That “court” belongs to a sys-
tem which can hardly be said to function on a constitutional and legal basis re-
flecting a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention. That is evidenced 
by the patently arbitrary nature of the circumstances in which the applicants 
were tried and convicted, as they described them in an account which has not 
been disputed by the other parties (…), and as described and analysed by the 
institutions of the OSCE (…)1056
Thus, it was the dysfunction of the ‘Supreme Court of the MRT’ itself which made 
it unlawful even by the relatively lenient standards of the Namibia principle as inter-
preted and applied in the ‘TRNC’ cases.
In Mozer the Court confirmed this finding in no uncertain terms:
147. In the Court’s view, it is in the first place for the Contracting Party which 
has effective control over the unrecognised entity at issue to show that its courts 
“form part of a judicial system operating on a constitutional and legal basis re-
flecting a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention” (…). As the Court 
has already established (…), in the case of the “MRT” it is Russia which has such 
effective control. To date the Russian Government have not submitted to the 
Court any information on the organisation of the “MRT” courts which would 
enable it to assess whether they fulfil the above requirement. Nor have they sub-
mitted any details of the “MRT” law which served as a basis for the applicant’s 
detention. Furthermore, the Court notes the scarcity of official sources of infor-
mation concerning the legal and court system in the “MRT”, a fact which makes 
it difficult to obtain a clear picture of the applicable laws. Consequently, the 
Court is not in a position to verify whether the “MRT courts” and their practice 
fulfil the requirements mentioned above.
148. There is also no basis for assuming that there is a system reflecting a judicial 
tradition compatible with the Convention in the region, similar to the one in 
the remainder of the Republic of Moldova (compare and contrast with the situ-
ation in Northern Cyprus, referred to in Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 231 
and 237). The division of the Moldovan and “MRT” judicial systems took place 
in 1990, well before Moldova joined the Council of Europe in 1995. Moreover, 
Moldovan law was subjected to a thorough analysis when it requested member-
ship of the Council of Europe (see Opinion No. 188 (1995) of the Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly on the application by Moldova for membership 
of the Council of Europe), with amendments proposed to ensure compatibility 
with the Convention, which Moldova finally ratified in 1997. No such analysis 
was made of the “MRT legal system”, which was thus never part of a system re-
1056 Ilaşcu and Others, §§ 436 and 461.
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flecting a judicial tradition considered compatible with Convention principles 
before the split into separate judicial systems occurred in 1990 (…).
149. The Court also considers that the conclusions reached above are reinforced 
by the circumstances in which the applicant in the present case was arrested and 
his detention was ordered and extended (see … above, especially the order for his 
detention for an undefined period of time and the examination in his absence of 
the appeal against the decision to extend that detention), as well as by the case-
law referred to by the applicant (…) and the various media reports which raise 
concerns about the independence and quality of the ‘MRT courts’ (…).1057
8.5.3 Requirements governing remedies offered by subordinate entities
We see that the judicial fora existing even in internationally unrecognised entities may 
satisfy the Court for purposes of Articles 5 and 6 and accordingly also for purposes 
of Articles 13 and 35 § 1. It is however a requirement that such fora ‘reflect a judicial 
tradition considered compatible with Convention principles’ – as in the case of the 
‘TRNC’ but not the ‘MRT’ – and meet the appropriate substantive standards. The 
latter requirement is crucial given that the domestic remedies are considered, from 
the Court’s perspective, to be remedies offered by the respondent Party – Turkey or 
Russia, respectively, in the examples cited.
As in the case of the Dayton agreement setup for Bosnia and Herzegovina how-
ever, an important feature of the solution chosen is that it is in accordance with (or at 
least, not contrary to) general international law – in this case, the advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice in the Namibia case legitimises it.
The effect of applying the Namibia principle in these situations is not only to en-
sure that judicial protection is available to all those who find themselves under the 
control of the authorities of an unrecognised entity, important though that be. It is 
also that the European Court of Human Rights is not compelled to set itself up as the 
only recognised forum capable of offering the protection which Article 1 delegates to 
the Contracting Parties.
8.5.4 Ad hoc remedy: the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’
As we have seen above, in Loizidou (merits) and Cyprus v. Turkey the Court set out 
the principle that the continued failure by the respondent to allow persons displaced 
from Northern Cyprus to regain access to their immovable property and their homes 
constituted violations of 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention, respec-
tively. Pursuant to Article 159 of the Constitution of the ‘TRNC’ – adopted in 1985 
– ownership of abandoned properties was vested in the ‘TRNC’ itself. A procedure 
was to be set up under which former owners could claim compensation.
In June 2003 the ‘Parliament of the TRNC’ rather belatedly enacted a law intend-
ed to set up such a procedure. Its adequacy as a remedy within the meaning of Article 
13 of the Convention was put to the test in a pilot case, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey.
1057 Mozer, §§ 147-149.
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The Court’s finding was brief:
As regards the application of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to the facts of the 
present case, the Court notes at the outset that the compensation offered by Law 
no. 49/2003 in respect of the purported deprivation of the applicant’s property 
is limited to damages concerning pecuniary loss for immovable property. No 
provision is made for movable property or non-pecuniary damages. Most im-
portantly, however, the terms of compensation do not allow for the possibility of 
restitution of the property withheld. Thus, although compensation is foreseen, 
this cannot in the opinion of the Court be considered as a complete system of 
redress regulating the basic aspect of the interferences complained of (see, mu-
tatis mutandis, Brumărescu v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 28342/95, 
§§  19-22, ECHR 2001-I, and Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 
50), judgment of 31 October 1995, Series A no. 330-B, pp. 58-60, §§ 34-38).
In addition the Court would make the following observations concerning the 
purported remedy.
Firstly, the Law does not address the applicant’s complaints under Article 8 
and 14 of the Convention.
Secondly, the Law is vague as to its temporal application, that is, as whether 
it has retrospective effect concerning applications filed before its enactment and 
entry into force; it merely refers to the retrospective assessment of the compen-
sation.
Finally, the composition of the compensation commission raises concerns 
since, in the light of the evidence submitted by the Cypriot Government, the 
majority of its members are living in houses owned or built on property owned 
by Greek Cypriots. In this connection, the Court observes that the respondent 
Government have not disputed the Cypriot Government’s arguments on this 
matter and have not provided any additional information in their written and 
oral submissions. Further, the Court suggests that an international composition 
would enhance the commission’s standing and credibility.1058
In its ensuing judgment on the merits, the Court restated its existing case-law and 
found violations of Articles 1 of Protocol No. 1 and 8 of the Convention, without it 
being necessary to go separately into the question of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 8. It further held, under Article 46 of the Convention, that Turkey should 
introduce a remedy that would secure
genuinely effective redress for the Convention violations identified in the in-
stant judgment in relation to the present applicant as well as in respect of all 
similar applications pending before it, in accordance with the principles for the 
1058 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (dec.), no 46347/99, 14 March 2005.
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protection of the rights laid down in Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 and in line with its admissibility decision of 14 March 2005.1059
In the meantime, in 2004, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr Kofi 
Annan, had presented a plan for the establishment of a United Cyprus Republic (‘the 
UCR’). The intention had been for this republic to include two constituent States: 
a predominantly Greek Cypriot one in the south, eventually comprising about 71% 
of the land area of Cyprus, and a predominantly Turkish Cypriot one in the north, 
comprising about 29% of the land area. Cypriots would be citizens both of the UCR 
and of the appropriate constituent State. This plan, which came to be known as the 
‘Annan plan’, provided for the settlement of outstanding property claims. Put to ref-
erenda on both sides of the border, it failed to pass: although the Turkish Cypriots 
voted largely in favour, the Greek Cypriot side overwhelmingly voted to reject it.1060
A ‘TRNC’ law intended to cure the failings identified in Xenides-Arestis entered 
into force on 22 December 2005.1061 It provided for an Immovable Property Commis-
sion before which all natural and legal persons who could prove title to immovable 
property as of 20 July 1974 (or who could prove that they were the heirs of such per-
sons), or who could prove that they had owned movable property before 13 February 
1975 and had been forced to abandon it due to conditions beyond their own volition, 
might bring claims. The law provided for a four-year window, which was later ex-
tended to six years. This Immovable Property Commission had the power to compel 
the submission of documents and the appearance of witnesses and its decisions were 
binding and executable similarly to judgments of a court. The Immovable Property 
Commission was composed of
a president, a vice-president, and minimum five, maximum seven members, 
whose qualifications are specified below, shall be established. At least two mem-
bers of the [Immovable Property] Commission to be appointed shall not be na-
tionals of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, [the] United Kingdom, 
Greece, [the] Greek Cypriot Administration or [the] Republic of Turkey. …
Moreover,
Any persons directly or indirectly deriving any benefit from immovable proper-
ties on which rights are claimed by those who had to move from the north of 
Cyprus in 1974, abandoning their properties, cannot be appointed as members 
of the [Immovable Property] Commission
1059 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (merits), no 46347/99, § 40, 22 December 2005.
1060 Demopoulos and Others, §§ 8-14.
1061 Law no. 67/2005 for the compensation, exchange and restitution of immovable properties which 
are within the scope of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the Constitution, as 
amended by Laws nos. 59/2006 and 85/2007. See Demopoulos and Others, §§ 35-37.
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The two foreign members appointed were Mr Hans-Christian Krüger, former Sec-
retary to the European Commission of Human rights and former Deputy Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe, and Mr Daniel Tarschys, a Swedish academic and 
politician and former Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
The Immovable Property Commission could order restitution of immovable prop-
erty or compensation in lieu, or propose an exchange against immovable property 
held in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus but to which a citizen of the ‘TRNC’ 
held title.
An appeal against the decision of the Immovable Property Commission lay to the 
High Administrative Court of the ‘TRNC’; an ‘applicant’ displeased with the deci-
sion of the latter could ‘apply to the European Court of Human Rights’.
It was reported in the Court’s Demopoulos and Others decision that
As of the date of the hearing in November 2009, the number of cases brought 
before the IPC stood at 433. Of these, 85 had been concluded, the vast major-
ity by means of friendly settlement. Only a handful of decisions not based on 
a settlement had been issued. In 4 cases, the IPC had ordered restitution and 
compensation; in 2 cases, exchange of property was agreed; and in 1 case the 
applicant agreed to restitution on resolution of the Cyprus problem. In more 
than 70 cases, compensation had been awarded. Some 361,493 square metres of 
property had been restituted and approximately 47 million euros paid in com-
pensation.1062
The applicants submitted that the Immovable Property Commission was not a “rem-
edy” to be exhausted for purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, both because of 
doubts as to its impartiality and effectiveness and because 
… the [Immovable Property Commission] remedy was operated by the authori-
ties of an entity widely resented and distrusted by Greek Cypriots and univer-
sally viewed (save in Turkey) as an unlawful occupier. Many property owners 
felt unable to submit to, or effectively collaborate with, an occupying power in 
such a way.1063
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus argued in addition that 
… rather than being designed to provide redress for systemic violations and rein-
force the effectiveness of the Court, it was an attempt to legitimise [the Turkish 
Government’s] unlawful mass appropriation of Greek Cypriot properties
1062 loc. cit., § 40.
1063 Demopoulos and Others, § 58.
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and that customary international law only required the applicants to exhaust Turkish 
remedies, whereas Turkey insisted that the IPC was a ‘TRNC’ remedy.1064
Addressing the argument that the ‘TRNC’ compensation law was not part of 
Turkish domestic law, the Court answered as follows:
The Court considers this to be an artificial argument. Turkey has been held 
responsible for the acts and omissions of the authorities within the “TRNC” 
entity in numerous cases – otherwise the Court would not have had the compe-
tence to examine complaints brought by applicants against the respondent State 
concerning northern Cyprus. To the extent that any domestic remedy is made 
available by acts of the “TRNC” authorities or institutions, it may be regarded 
as a “domestic remedy” or “national” remedy vis-à-vis Turkey for the purposes 
of Article 35 § 1 (see Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 101-02). It should also not 
be overlooked that Law no. 67/2005 and the IPC came into existence as the 
consequence of the Court holding in the Xenides-Arestis case (cited above) that 
Turkey had to introduce a remedy which secured the effective protection of the 
rights laid down in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in relation to the applicant as well 
as in respect of all similar applications pending before the Court. Accepting the 
functional reality of remedies is not tantamount to holding that Turkey wields 
internationally recognised sovereignty over northern Cyprus.
Answering the argument that argument that requiring exhaustion lent legitimacy to 
an illegal occupation, the Court reiterated the above-mentioned ‘Namibia principle’: 
this, in brief, provides that even if the legitimacy of the administration of a ter-
ritory is not recognised by the international community, “international law rec-
ognises the legitimacy of certain legal arrangements and transactions in such 
a situation, ... the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the 
inhabitants of the [t]erritory” (Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice in the Namibia case (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Se-
curity Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, vol. 16, p. 56, § 125).1065
and:
95. Further, the overall control exercised by Turkey over the territory of north-
ern Cyprus entails its responsibility for the policies and actions of the “TRNC” 
and that those affected by such policies or actions come within the “jurisdiction” 
of Turkey for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention with the consequence 
that Turkey is accountable for violations of Convention rights which take place 
1064 Demopoulos and Others, §§ 63 and 64.
1065 Demopoulos and Others, § 93.
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within that territory and is bound to take positive steps to protect those rights. 
It would not be consistent with such responsibility under the Convention if the 
adoption by the authorities of the “TRNC” of civil, administrative or criminal 
law measures, or their application or enforcement within that territory, were 
then to be denied any validity or regarded as having no “lawful” basis in terms 
of the Convention (see Foka v. Turkey, no. 28940/95, § 83, 24 June 2008, where 
arrest for obstruction of the applicant Greek Cypriot by a “TRNC” police of-
ficer was found to be lawful, and Protopapa v. Turkey, no. 16084/90, § 87, 24 
February 2009, where a criminal trial before a “TRNC” court was found to be 
in accordance with Article 6, there being no ground for finding that these courts 
were not independent or impartial or that they were politically motivated).
96. In the Court’s view, the key consideration is to avoid a vacuum which op-
erates to the detriment of those who live under the occupation, or those who, 
living outside, may claim to have been victims of infringements of their rights. 
Pending resolution of the international dimensions of the situation, the Court 
considers it of paramount importance that individuals continue to receive pro-
tection of their rights on the ground on a daily basis. The right of individual 
petition under the Convention is no substitute for a functioning judicial sys-
tem and framework for the enforcement of criminal and civil law. Even if the 
applicants are not living as such under the control of the “TRNC”, the Court 
considers that, if there is an effective remedy available for their complaints pro-
vided under the auspices of the respondent Government, the rule of exhaustion 
applies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. As has been consistently empha-
sised, this conclusion does not in any way put in doubt the view adopted by the 
international community regarding the establishment of the “TRNC” or the 
fact that the government of the Republic of Cyprus remains the sole legitimate 
government of Cyprus (see Foka, cited above, § 84). The Court maintains its 
opinion that allowing the respondent State to correct wrongs imputable to it 
does not amount to an indirect legitimisation of a regime unlawful under inter-
national law.
The Demopoulos and Others solution is a remedy created to address a single issue in a 
single context. That, however, does not make it unique. The same can be said about 
the ‘legge Pinto’ or Pinto law enacted by Italy to provide a remedy for violations of 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention caused by the excessive length of domestic civil pro-
ceedings.1066
Nor, as we have seen, is it unique in that it approves a legal remedy even though the 
entity that it to administer it is unrecognised except by the respondent State. 
1066 Brusco v. Italy (dec.), no. 69789/01, ECHR 2001-IX; Giacometti and 5 others v. Italy (dec.), 
no. 34939/97, ECHR 2001-XII. 
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It is the combination of these two features that makes the Demopoulos and Others 
situation unique: the single-issue remedy administered by an entity whose very exist-
ence in law is, at the very least, a bone of contention.
The Demopoulos decision has been criticised for allowing Realpolitik to triumph 
over international humanitarian law, in particular the sixth paragraph of Article 49 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention that forbids the Occupying Power to ‘deport or 
transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies’.1067 Be that 
as it may, it offers a solution of sorts – and one that leaves the choice whether to seek 
compensation in the hands of the acknowledged owners, at that. Admittedly Greek 
Cypriots might resent going before a ‘TRNC’ body, but people do not necessarily 
like to go before their own domestic courts either; as the decision noted, those who 
preferred to hold out for return of their property retained the option of doing noth-
ing and waiting for the occupation to come to an end.1068
8.5.5 Internationally imposed quasi-indigenous institutions
8.5.5.1 Western Germany
It is possible to see certain aspects of the occupation regime in Western Germany after 
World War II as a distant ancestor of the Annex 6 setup in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
which we will discuss in greater detail below.
The applicants in X v. Federal Republic of Germany were German nationals before 
the Second World War. In 1932 the first applicant emigrated to what was then Pales-
tine. The second applicant emigrated to England in 1936. The applicants had owned 
property in Wiesbaden, Germany, which was sold; they alleged, however, that the 
price had been well below market value and reduced still further by the so-called 
Flight Tax, an exit tax exacted from Jews seeking to flee Nazi persecution.
After the war Wiesbaden was in the American zone of occupation. The American 
occupying authorities enacted a law that created a presumption that property wrong-
fully taken ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, ideology or political opposition 
to National Socialism’, or from persons subject to persecution on those grounds, had 
in effect been confiscated. The presumption was rebuttable if a ‘fair purchase price’ 
had been paid or if ‘the transaction as such and with its essential terms would have 
taken place even in the absence of National Socialism’.
After the war the applicants sought monetary compensation through the German 
courts but were met with a rejection on the ground that the first applicant had already 
been living outside Germany at the time of the sale (the implication being, presum-
ably, that he had been under no constraint). Ultimately, in 1955, the case ended up 
in the Supreme Restitution Court, a body originally set up under an arrangement 
1067 Aeyal Gross,”The Righting of the Law of Occupation”, in the Frontiers of Human Rights: Ex-
traterritoriality and its Challenges (Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 
vol. XXIV/1, pp. 21-54 at p. 43.
1068 Demopoulos and Others, § 128.
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between the three Western allies (who as we have seen were at that time Occupying 
Powers in Western Germany) that had later been ratified by the Federal Republic.
Seized of the matter, the Commission came to the conclusion that the Supreme 
Restitution Court was an international court, subject neither to the jurisdiction of 
the Federal Republic of Germany nor to its sovereign power or control. True it might 
be that the Federal Republic of Germany had ratified the Convention before it rati-
fied the arrangement that set up the Supreme Restitution Court, but it had done 
so shortly before recovering full sovereignty; the international status of the Supreme 
Restitution Court therefore prevailed.1069
8.5.5.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina1070
Following a NATO-led bombing campaign and the application of intense pressure by 
major powers (the United States and Russia in particular), the General Framework 
Agreement on Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina1071 was initialled in Dayton, Ohio 
(USA) on 21 November 1995. The signatories were the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, as it existed at that time, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (the latter composed of Serbia and Montenegro). The General Framework 
Agreement will be referred to hereinafter by its more usual appellation, the Dayton 
Agreement.
Shortly afterwards, on 8 and 9 December 1995, a Peace Implementation Confer-
ence was held in London. It resulted in the establishment of a Peace Implementation 
Council (‘PIC’), its Steering Board and a High Representative as the Chair of the 
Steering Board.1072 While the PIC is composed of all the States, international organi-
sations and agencies which attended the Conference, the Steering Board members are 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission 
and Turkey (on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference). The Peace 
Implementation Council met on several occasions afterwards.
The Dayton Agreement entered into force upon signature on 14 December of the 
same year. It induced the warring factions to put a grudging end to the active hostili-
ties in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, one may hope, created a basis for lasting peace 
in the country. 
The Dayton Agreement sets up ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (generally referred to 
as ‘the State’1073 – the name ‘Republic’ having come to be associated with one of the 
1069 X v. Germany, Commission decision of 10 June 1958, no. 235/56, and Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 
25 January 1956, http://www.jta.org/1956/01/25/archive/new-supreme-restitution-court-starts-
functioning-in-germany (retrieved 12 April 2017).
1070 See generally Jessica Simor, “Tackling human rights abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Con-
vention is up to it, are its institutions?”, E.H.R.L.R. 1997, 6, 644-662.
1071 UN Document A/50/790 (General Assembly) – S/1995/999 (Security Council).
1072 UN Document S/1995/1029.
1073 The expression “the State” is often used for Bosnia and Herzegovina to disambiguate it from the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is one of the two Entities.
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former warring factions) as a continuation of the former Republic. The State is com-
posed of two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Re-
public (more commonly known as the Republika Srpska). The Federation is not so 
called because it unites Bosniak and Croat territorial entities (though it is easy to 
get that impression in practice), but because it is a ‘federation’ consisting of ten Can-
tons enjoying considerable autonomy; this federation was born of an earlier attempt 
at peace-making and nation-building, the Washington Agreement of 1 March 1994 
(signed on 18 March 1994).1074
The Agreement itself comprises a brief preamble and eleven articles. Essentially the 
signatory parties – that is to say Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia – recognise each other’s statehood and agree to conduct their 
relations in accordance with the applicable rules of international law. In addition, 
they ‘welcome and endorse’ the more detailed arrangements laid down in twelve An-
nexes (twelve, that is, taking Annexes 1-A and 1-B separately). The signatories to the 
Annexes are, in most cases, the State, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Republika Srpska.
We will examine those Annexes that are of interest to our study.
8.5.5.2.1 Military aspects: Annex 1-A
Annex 1-A, the ‘Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement’, the sig-
natories – the State and the two Entities – ‘welcome the willingness’ of the inter-
national community to send a military force. The Security Council was invited to 
adopt a resolution by which it would authorise Member States or regional organisa-
tions and arrangements to establish a multinational military Implementation Force 
(to be known as ‘IFOR’) as the successor to UNPROFOR; this force was to be led 
by NATO though it might include forces from non-NATO states.1075 The Security 
Council did so, in a Chapter VII resolution, one day after the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment entered into force.1076 IFOR existed for one year, from 20 December 1995 to 
20 December 1996.
Appended to Annex 1A were two Appendices, including one, Appendix B, which 
comprised a status of forces agreement between the State and NATO. This agree-
ment provided that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations of 13 February 1946 concerning experts on mission should apply to NATO 
IFOR personnel. Personnel enjoying privileges and immunities under this Appendix 
were to respect the laws of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina insofar as it ‘[was] 
compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate’1077 – i.e. the latter took precedence 
over local laws – and ‘under all circumstances and at all times’ were ‘subject to the 
1074 To be found on the web site of the United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/files/
file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/washagree_03011994.pdf (accessed on 1 May 
2017).
1075 Article I (1) of Annex 1-A.
1076 S/RES/1031/1995 (15 December 1995), § 14.
1077 loc. cit., § 3.
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exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements in respect of any criminal 
or disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’.1078
On 12 December 1996 the Security Council, again in a Chapter VII resolution, au-
thorised the Stabilization Force (SFOR) to be set up as the legal successor to IFOR, 
initially for eighteen months.1079 SFOR existed until 2 December 2004 when it was 
relieved by a European Union Force, known as EUFOR,1080 embarking on its ‘Opera-
tion Althea’.1081 EUFOR is still in theatre, though its strength is now reduced to little 
more than symbolic levels.
8.5.5.2.2 Civilian structure
The post-war legal civilian structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on further 
Annexes. Three of them are of particular interest here: Annex 4, Annex 6 and Annex 
10.
Annex 4
Annex 4 is the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.1082 It provides, in its first Ar-
ticle, that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues its existence as simply 
‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’. It defines the powers of the Entities, which are all those not 
expressly reserved to the State, and the composition and powers of the institutions 
of the State – principally the Presidency, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council 
of Ministers, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank, though reference is 
made to bodies and organs created under other Annexes including the Human Rights 
Commission set up by Annex 6 which we shall meet anon.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is to ‘ensure the highest level of internationally recog-
nized rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Article II (1)). More specifically, Article II 
(2) provides as follows:
International Standards. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall 
have priority over all other law.
1078 loc. cit., § 7.
1079 S/RES/1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996, § 18.
1080 S/RES/1575 (2004) of 22 November 2004, § 10. The most recent extension of EUFOR’s mandate 
at the time of writing is by S/RES/2315 (2016) of 8 November 2016, § 3.
1081 Named after Althea, the ancient Greek goddess of healing.
1082 See generally Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz, “Constitution, Ombudsperson and Human Rights 
Chamber in ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 17/3, 277-329, 
1999, pp. 277-291.
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The Constitutional Court comprises nine members, two appointed by the Republika 
Srpska and four appointed by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina1083 (in prac-
tice, two Bosniacs and two Croats). The remaining three members, who may not be 
nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of any neighbouring State (which rules out 
the former Yugoslav republics Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia), are appointed by the 
President of the European Court of Human Rights.1084
The Constitutional Court’s constitutional jurisdiction, defined in Article VI (3), 
includes disputes arising under the Constitution between the Entities or between 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and an Entity or Entities, or between institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
Its appellate jurisdiction is over issues under the Constitution arising out of a judg-
ment of any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is also empowered to give what amount to preliminary rulings on 
issues referred by any court in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning whether a 
law, on whose validity its decision depends, is compatible with this Constitu-
tion, with the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms and its Protocols, or with the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina; or con-
cerning the existence of or the scope of a general rule of public international law 
pertinent to the court’s decision.
In its various provisions defining the composition of the main political organs (the 
Parliamentary Assembly, the Presidency) the Annex 4 Constitution recognises only 
three ‘constituent peoples’: Serbs (to be elected from the Republika Srpska) and Bos-
niaks and Croats (to be elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). This 
is very much in keeping with the character of the Dayton Peace Agreement as an armi-
stice agreement intended to put an end to active hostilities as quickly as may be. It is, 
however, unfair to all those who are not, or do not wish to identify as, members of one 
of those ethnic groups – for example, persons of mixed descent (of whom there were 
large numbers before the war and many remain) and members of other ethnic groups 
(such as Jews and Roma). This state of affairs has been challenged, even before the 
European Court of Human Rights, and with success: the Court has found a violation 
of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
on account of the ineligibility of persons not counted members of the ‘constituent 
peoples’ to stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the 
Lower House of Parliament) and the Presidency,1085 or of the ineligibility of members 
1083 Article VI (1) (a).
1084 Article VI (1) (a)-(b).
1085 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (GC), nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, ECHR 2009 
(the applicants are a Rom and a Jew, respectively); Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 3681/06, 
15 December 2014 (the applicant does not declare affiliation with any of the “constituent peo-
ples”).
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of a minority constituent people within one of the Entities,1086 to be elected from that 
Entity. In the Court’s view, whatever the justification for such distinctions might have 
been at the time when the Annex 4 Constitution was adopted, it no longer existed at 
the time when the respective judgments were adopted.
The changes required by the Court’s judgments have yet to be implemented.1087 
The fear is that any changes made to the Constitution will not be limited to this fea-
ture alone and that some will propose to amend it further so as to grant the Entities 
rights even more sweeping than those they enjoy already – even the right to secede, 
which in the present redaction is excluded.1088 An external or supranational power 
with the competence to force through changes to the Constitution does not exist: re-
sponsibility lies entirely with the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves.
The Constitutional Court ruled early on that it did not itself have jurisdiction to 
change either the Dayton Agreement or the Constitution:
(...) the Constitutional Court is not competent to evaluate the constitutionality 
of the General Framework Agreement as the Constitutional Court has in fact 
been established under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to 
uphold this Constitution (...) The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
adopted as Annex IV to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and consequently there cannot be a conflict or a possibility 
for controversy between this Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.1089
It has, however, pointed the way forward:
Elements of a democratic state and society as well as underlying assumptions – 
pluralism, just procedures, peaceful relations that arise out of the Constitution 
– must serve as a guideline for further elaboration of the issue of the structure of 
BiH as a multi-national state. Territorial division (of Entities) must not serve as 
an instrument of ethnic segregation – on the contrary – it must accommodate 
ethnic groups by preserving linguistic pluralism and peace in order to contribute 
to the integration of the state and society as such. Constitutional principle of 
collective equality of constituent peoples, arising out of designation of Bosniacs, 
Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples, prohibits any special privileges for one 
or two constituent peoples, any domination in governmental structures and any 
ethnic homogenisation by segregation based on territorial separation. Despite 
the territorial division of BiH by establishment of two Entities, this territorial 
1086 Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 41939/07, 9 June 2016.
1087 Committee of Ministers resolutions CM/ResDH(2011)291, 2 December 2011; CM/Res-
DH(2012)233, 6 December 2012; and CM/ResDH(2013)259, 5 December 2013.
1088 Article III (2) (a) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1089 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U-7/97, 22 December 1997.
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division cannot serve as a constitutional legitimacy for ethnic domination, na-
tional homogenisation or the right to maintain results of ethnic cleansing. Des-
ignation of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples in the Preamble 
of the Constitution of BiH must be understood as an all-inclusive principle of 
the Constitution of BiH to which the Entities must fully adhere, pursuant to 
Article III.3 (b) of the Constitution of BiH.1090
Annex 6
Annex 6, the ‘Agreement on Human Rights’ which we mentioned earlier,1091 boldly 
states, in the first paragraph of its first article, that
The Parties shall secure to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level 
of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, includ-
ing the rights and freedoms provided in the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols and the 
other international agreements listed in the Appendix to this Annex.
To ‘assist in honoring their obligations under this Agreement’, or as a cynic might say, 
to see to it that they all kept their word, the Parties set up a Commission on Human 
Rights composed of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber. 
Both had the same basic task, which was to consider 
(a) alleged or apparent violations of human rights as provided in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and the Protocols thereto, or
(b) alleged or apparent discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, associa-
tion with a national minority, property, birth or other status arising in the enjoy-
ment of any of the rights and freedoms provided for in the international agree-
ments listed in the Appendix to this Annex.1092
– the agreements annexed including, significantly, the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the four Geneva Conven-
tions, and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with both 
of its Protocols. The Security Council, in the same resolution that authorised SFOR, 
1090 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U-5/98 (Partial Decision Part 3), 1 July 2000.
1091 See generally Manfred Nowak, “The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
adopts its First Judgments”, Human Rights Law Review 18 (1997) pp. 529-45; R. Aybay, “A New 
Institution in the Field: The Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 15/4, 529-558, and for a critical appraisal, Mehmet Semih Ge-
malmaz, “Constitution, Ombudsperson and Human Rights Chamber in ‘Bosnia and Herzego-
vina’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 17/3, 277-329, 1999, pp. 291-329.
1092 Article II (2) of Annex 6.
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called upon the State and the Parties to the Peace Agreement to cooperate with the 
Ombudsman and the Chamber.1093
The Human Rights Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber were intended, 
by Article III of Annex 6, to function as two limbs of a single body, sharing a single 
Executive Officer to manage their administration and staff. In actual fact the Com-
mission never functioned as a single organisation: early on temperamental differences 
ensured that the Ombudsman and the Chamber went their separate ways. The first 
Human Rights Ombudsman, Dr Gret Haller, styled herself Ombudsperson, and it is 
under this name that her office became known.
In both bodies the international element predominated. The Human Rights Om-
budsperson was a foreign national;1094 of the fourteen members of the Chamber, 
eight were nationals of foreign countries, making the Chamber a hybrid court, and 
six were Bosnia and Herzegovina nationals appointed by the Entities (four appointed 
by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – in practice, two Bosniaks and two 
Croats – and two appointed by the Republika Srpska).1095
Both the Office of the Ombudsperson and the Human Rights Chamber enjoyed 
support from the Strasbourg Institutions; in their first years, the Deputy Human 
Rights Ombudsperson and the head of the legal support staff of the Human Rights 
Chamber (known as the Registrar) were members of either the Secretariat of the Eu-
ropean Commission of Human Rights or the Registry of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, seconded by the Council of Europe.1096 Both bodies had a mixed staff of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens and foreign nationals, many of the latter seconded, 
or financed, by the governments of the States of which they were nationals.
The set-up was very much based on that of the European Commission and Court 
of Human Rights as it existed, at the time, under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights of 1950: the Ombudsman was to investigate alleged violations of the 
Convention and report on them, forwarding the reports to the High Representative 
or initiating proceedings in the Human Rights Chamber as the case might require.1097 
A difference from the Convention set-up was that the Chamber was to receive cases, 
not only by referral from the Ombudsperson, but also
1093 S/RES/1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996, § 10.
1094 Article IV (2) of Annex 6.
1095 For a thoughtful discussion of hybrid courts, drawing on the experience of the Human Rights 
Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, see Elizabeth M. Bruch, “Hybrid Courts: 
Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens”, 28 Boston University International Law 
Journal 1 (2010). The author was the Human Rights Chamber’s first Executive Officer.
1096 The present author among them. A member of the Registry of the European Court of Human 
Rights since 1992, he was seconded to the Human Rights Chamber in 1997-98 and again in 
2000-2001. The latter secondment was financed by the Government of the Netherlands.
1097 Article V of Annex 6.
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directly from any Party or person, non-governmental organization, or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by any Party or acting on 
behalf of alleged victims who are deceased or missing.1098
The system established under Annex 6 was intended to be in existence for only five 
years after the Agreement entered into force, after which responsibility for its contin-
ued operation would pass to the parties unless otherwise agreed. The Ombudsperson 
became a domestic institution in 2001, after a State law that so provided was signed 
into force by the High Representative (although for a time the Ombudsperson con-
tinued to be a foreign national). Shortly before 14 December 2000, the day on which 
the five-year period was set to expire, the State and the two Entities – on the prompt-
ing of, in particular, the High Representative – reached an agreement that extended 
the existence of the Human Rights Chamber until the end of 2003.1099
While they were in existence, the Ombudsperson and the Human Rights Cham-
ber were widely considered part of the international structure – as was only natural, 
considering their funding (which had to come, almost exclusively, from abroad), their 
predominantly international composition (as well as the proportion of non-Bosnia 
and Herzegovina nationals among their support staff ) and the nature of the substan-
tive law that they applied. Thus it was that in 1998 the Venice Commission, asked to 
express an opinion on whether the Chamber could be described as ‘any other court’ 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, against whose decisions it was possible to appeal to the 
Constitutional Court, found on account of the Chamber’s ‘quasi-international (sui 
generis) and provisional character’ that it was not.1100 The Constitutional Court fol-
lowed suit: when the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina attempted to challenge 
decisions of the Chamber before the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court 
held that the two jurisdictional bodies functioned in parallel.1101
In a decision echoing that of the Constitutional Court, the Human Rights Cham-
ber held that it, too, lacked competence to review the decisions of other bodies cre-
ated by the Dayton Agreement.1102
It is certain that during the years of their existence, the Ombudsperson and Human 
Rights Chamber enjoyed the confidence of the local population to a greater extent 
than domestic bodies, the latter being widely seen – so shortly after a bitter sectarian 
war – as protecting factional interests. In mid-2003 a spokesperson for Amnesty In-
1098 Article VIII of Annex 6.
1099 For more detail, see Buyse (2008), pp. 284-301.
1100 Opinion of the Venice Commission on the admissibility of appeals against the Human Rights 
Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CDL-INF (98) 18.
1101 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U-7-11/98, 26 February 1999; see also Buyse 
(2008), p. 283.
1102 Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, CH/00/4441, Merima Sijarić v. Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 6 June 2000, and CH/99/2327, Momčilo Knežević v. Republika 
Srpska, 11 October 2001; see also Buyse (2008), p. 283.
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ternational was able to state that ‘the Chamber [was] acting as a last and possibly only 
avenue of justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina’.1103
Much of their success, of the Human Rights Chamber especially, came from the 
latter’s use of its power to order binding provisional measures.1104 ‘Ethnic cleansing’, 
to use a horrid expression coined during the war years, did not cease immediately 
when the Dayton Agreement entered into force; for some time afterwards local au-
thorities in both Entities sought to consolidate the positions of one or other of the 
ethnic factions by evicting members of the other factions who had remained within 
their territories or who had returned to their original homes. The Chamber’s orders 
for provisional measures, backed up by the executive force of other elements of the 
international community, helped to put a stop to this. Gradually, as the situation nor-
malised, internally displaced persons who had taken up residence in dwellings aban-
doned by others and who were unwilling to return to their original homes sought 
provisional measures that would enable them to remain where they were; these were 
refused, an important premise of the Dayton peace process being precisely that peo-
ple should as a rule return to where they had come from.1105
In time, after Bosnia and Herzegovina had acceded to the Convention, the ques-
tion arose whether the Chamber, in particular, was ‘another procedure of interna-
tional investigation or settlement’ within the meaning of Article 35 § 2 (b) of the 
Convention. It came up in the Jeličić case – the issue being the failure by one of the 
Entities to enforce a decision of the Human Rights Chamber. 
Granted leave to intervene as a third party under Article 36 of the Convention, 
the Venice Commission submitted an amicus curiae opinion stating that proceed-
ings before the Chamber must not be considered ‘international’ within the meaning 
of Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention. They must, on the contrary, be considered 
‘domestic’ within the meaning of Article 35 § 1. The International Committee for Hu-
man Rights, a human rights NGO registered in Spain with its main office in Sarajevo 
which also intervened, stressed the transitional character of the Chamber and noted, 
among other things, that constituent units of Bosnia and Herzegovina were capable 
of being parties before it.
In its ensuing admissibility decision, the Court held that the Chamber ‘constituted 
a part, albeit a particular part, of the legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ – a 
domestic body, not an international one.1106 By this time the Chamber was safely de-
funct and it could no longer hurt its authority to deny its international status.
1103 Amnesty International UK Director Kate Allen, Amnesty International press release of 12 June 
2003, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ashdown’s proposal to abolish Human Rights Chamber leaves citi-
zens unprotected”.
1104 Eva Rieter, Preventing Irreparable Harm: Provisional Measures in International Human Rights 
Adjudication (diss. Nijmegen), Intersentia, 2010, pp. 182-188.
1105 Rieter, pp. 508-509.
1106 Jeličić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), no. 41183/02, ECHR 2005-XII.
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Annex 10
Annex 10, or Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement, con-
tains a request to the United Nations Security Council for the appointment of a High 
Representative and defines the mandate of such a functionary.
The powers and duties of the High Representative include coordinating the work 
of civilian organisations providing aid and reporting on progress in the implementa-
tion of the peace agreement. The High Representative is ‘the final authority in theat-
er’ regarding interpretation of the Dayton Agreement as regards its civilian aspects. 
It is specifically provided that the High Representative shall have no authority over 
the military.
The very day following the entry into force of the Dayton Agreement the Security 
Council adopted a resolution welcoming the conclusions of the Peace Implementa-
tion Conference held in London on 8 and 9 December 1995 (S/1995/1029), and in 
particular its decision to establish a Peace Implementation Council and its Steer-
ing Board and appointed the first High Representative, for whom the ground had 
been prepared by the Peace Implementation Conference. He was Carl Bildt, former 
prime minister of Sweden and former co-chairman of the Dayton Peace Conference 
itself.1107
On 10 December 1997, at its main meeting in Bonn, Germany, the Peace Imple-
mentation Council adopted a set of conclusions including the following;1108
XI. High Representative
1. The Council commends the efforts of the High Representative and his 
staff in pursuing the implementation of the Peace Agreement. It emphasises the 
important role of the High Representative in ensuring the creation of condi-
tions for a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and his responsibil-
ity for co-ordination of the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Council reiterates that the Steering Board of the PIC will provide the 
High Representative with political guidance on peace implementation. It will 
continue to meet monthly, inviting representatives of relevant international or-
ganisations to attend as appropriate.
2. The Council welcomes the High Representative’s agreement to continue 
reporting in accordance with Article II. 1 (f ) of Annex 10 to the Peace Agree-
ment.
The Council encourages the High Representative to report regularly on com-
pliance by individual municipalities with the provisions of the Peace Agreement.
The Council welcomes the High Representative’s intention to use his final 
authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian 
Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of 
1107 UN Security Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995, para. 26.
1108 UN document S/1997/979.
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difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the following 
issues:
a.  timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common institu-
tions;
b. interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agree-
ment, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers 
has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue con-
cerned;
c.  other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement through-
out Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of 
the common institutions. Such measures may include actions against persons 
holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good 
cause or who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal 
commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implemen-
tation.
The Security Council endorsed these conclusions on 19 December 1997.1109
Since then, successive High Representatives have made use of their ‘Bonn powers’, 
as they are referred to, to impose or strike down legislation, to promote the imple-
mentation of decisions of the Human Rights Chamber or other authorities created 
by the Dayton Agreement when the State and the Entities were conspicuously drag-
ging their feet, and to dismiss civil servants and even elected functionaries found to 
be obstructing the implementation, the letter or the spirit of the Dayton Agreement.
Thus, between June and December 2004 the then High Representative removed 
twenty-six individuals from their positions in public authority and political parties 
and barred them indefinitely from holding any such positions and standing for elec-
tion thereafter for having obstructed arrests ordered by the ICTY Prosecutor. There 
being no legal remedy of any description available to them, they applied to the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, alleging violations of Articles 6 (under its criminal 
head), 11 and 13.
The Court declared their complaint inadmissible ratione personae, the decisions in 
issue having been lawfully taken by the High Representative under powers previously 
and explicitly delegated by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter. Quoting §§ 146-149 of the Behrami and Saramati decision, it came 
to the conclusion that the same reasoning applied to ‘the acceptance of an interna-
tional civil administration in its territory by a respondent State’.1110
1109 UN Seurity Council 1144 (1997).
1110 Berić and Others, §§ 26-30. This is now standing case-law: see Kalinić and Bilbija v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (dec.), nos. 45541/04 16587/07, 13 May 2008. See also Tobias Lock, “Beyond Bos-
phorus: The European Court of Human Rights’ Case-Law on the Responsibility of Member 
States of International Organisations under the European Convention on Human Rights”, in 
Human Rights Law Review 10:3 (2010), 529-545 at 532-33.
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8.5.5.3 Kosovo
After the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia withdrew its troops from Kosovo and un-
til Kosovo declared independence in 2008, the exercise of civilian jurisdiction was 
vested by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) in an interim administra-
tion established by the Secretary General of the United Nations.1111 In his report of 
12 June 1999 the Secretary General of the United Nations announced the setting up 
of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (or UNMIK).1112 
One month later, he announced that UNMIK would be invested with ‘[a]ll legis-
lative and executive powers, including the administration of the Judiciary’.1113 This 
was in fact done by the very first UNMIK Regulation promulgated by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, in which the Special 
Representative vested these powers in himself – including the power to ‘appoint any 
person to perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judi-
ciary, or remove such person’.1114 A later UNMIK Regulation specified the law to be 
applied, which was, in order of precedence, the UNMIK regulations promulgated by 
the Special Representative and the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989 (the date 
on which Kosovo had lost its autonomy within the SFRY).1115 Moreover, in exercis-
ing their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office in 
Kosovo were to observe 
internationally recognized human rights standards, as reflected in particular in:
(a)  The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 10 December 1948;
(b)  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Protocols thereto;
(c)  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 
1966 and the Protocols thereto;
(d)  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 
16 December 1966;
(e)  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
of 21 December 1965;
(f )  The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women of 17 December 1979;
(g)  The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment of 17 December 1984; and
(h)  The International Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 December 
1989.1116
1111 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, §§ 10 and 11.
1112 S/1999/672 (Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 10 of Security Council Res-
olution 1244 (1999).
1113 S/1999/779 (Interim administration mission in Kosovo), § 35.
1114 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, Section 1.
1115 UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, Section 1(1).
1116 UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, Section 1(3).
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In 2004 the Venice Commission presented an opinion suggesting a Human Rights 
Court for Kosovo broadly based on the model of the Human Rights Chamber, but 
with an important difference:
105.  Unlike the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Human Rights Court for Kosovo should be empowered to accept applications 
lodged either by individuals or by the Ombudsperson on their behalf, with their 
agreement, concerning actions and omissions by the international authorities 
in Kosovo (when reviewing acts or omissions by UNMIK, the Chamber would 
have to sit in an exclusively international composition) and the agreement 
should therefore comprise a specific provision concerning the waiving of the im-
munity of the Special Representative and UNMIK personnel, and possibly also 
that of NATO. It would be a new phenomenon for a (quasi-) international court 
to hold jurisdiction over an international organisation to which it does not be-
long. However, the situation would be the same if the European Court were 
granted jurisdiction over UNMIK, or possibly KFOR, or for that matter once 
the European Union or European Community has acceded to the ECHR.1117
The suggestion was endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope.1118
UNMIK still exists even after Kosovo’s declaration of independence. It ‘contin-
ues to implement its mandate in a status neutral manner and operate under Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999)’.1119
The 2008 Constitution of Kosovo1120 is largely based on the Comprehensive Pro-
posal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,1121 known as the ‘Ahtisaari plan’,1122 to which 
it refers. Its Article 152 provides for Kosovo’s Constitutional Court to be composed, 
temporarily, of six members appointed by the President of the Republic (their nation-
ality is not specified) and three members, who shall be non-nationals, appointed by 
the International Civilian Representative (an official of the European Union), upon 
consultation with the President of the European Court of Human Rights.1123
1117 Venice Commission, Opinion on human rights in Kosovo: Possible establishment of review 
mechanisms, CDL-AD (2004)033, 11 October 2004, § 105.
1118 PACE Resolution 1417 (2005), Protection of Human Rights in Kosovo (25 January 2005); see 
also PACE Doc. 10393, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rappor-
teur: Mr Lloyd.
1119 https://unmik.unmissions.org/mandate (accessed 14 May 2017).
1120 http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.
pdf (accessed 14 May 2017).
1121 S/2007/168/Add.1, 26 March 2007.
1122 Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, United Nations Special Envoy for Kosovo 2005-
2007.
1123 Compare Article 6.1 of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, fn. 1121 
above.
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The Court has recognised that the Republic of Serbia exercises no effective control 
over Kosovo and that consequently applications against Serbia alleging violations of 
the Convention by the authorities of Kosovo are inadmissible ratione personae.1124
Kosovo has not yet been universally recognised as an independent State; among 
States withholding recognition one finds Council of Europe Members including 
Serbia (unsurprisingly). The Court has taken to adding a footnote in judgments and 
decisions concerning Kosovo, stating that ‘All reference to Kosovo, whether to the 
territory, institutions or population, in this text [should] be understood in full com-
pliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without preju-
dice to the status of Kosovo’.
8.6 Conclusion
Various ways are imaginable in which a Contracting State can seek to evade attribu-
tion to it of a violation of the Convention.
Setting up a subordinate pseudo-state has not proved successful in terms of escap-
ing imputability under the Convention. The ‘TRNC’ and the ‘MRT’ are cases in 
point. That said, the ‘TRNC’ experience shows that a Contracting State may actually 
acquit itself of its Convention obligations by this means. It is interesting to note a 
certain ambivalence in this context: although in at least one recent case before the 
Court the Turkish Government have no longer raised a preliminary objection of in-
admissibility ratione loci,1125 in Turkish domestic legislation and international legal 
practice they apparently continue to maintain that the ‘TRNC’ is not an authority 
subordinate to the Republic of Turkey but a ‘state’ in its own right. At all events, 
demands of accountability under the Convention and the availability of effective do-
mestic remedies have been found satisfied; thus is Turkey protected in a large measure 
against admissible applications.
As to the use of private agents, security contractors for example, it is unlikely that 
a State will escape accountability by mandating activities normally within its remit 
to them. Nonetheless, provided that proper regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
are in place and appropriate remedies exist to deal with any problems that may arise 
under the Convention this solution may be compliant.
International organisations – most notably the United Nations – may be of as-
sistance to Contracting States from the perspective of accountability before the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights. However, unless provision is made for the interna-
tional organisation itself to be held to account, the risk is that a jurisdictional vacuum 
emerges that leaves the victim of a human rights violation without any remedy; this 
1124 Azemi v. Serbia (dec.), no. 11209/09, 5 November 2013.
1125 Joannou v. Turkey, no. 53240/14, § 61, 12 December 2017; see also the Chamber judgment in 
Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, no. 36925/07, § 184, 4 April 2018 (referred to the 
Grand Chamber).
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has been rightly noted. Moreover, as the Dutch experience of litigation in the Sre-
brenica cases shows, States may yet be held accountable in their own courts under 
domestic law.
The use of internationally imposed quasi-domestic institutions offers the best pros-
pects of satisfying requirements of accountability while placing responsibility else-
where. Here we may turn to the lessons learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
There remains much to criticise about the Dayton setup for Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. In particular, it has failed to provide for a viable unitary state. There is still a per-
ceived danger even now that part of the territory – whether the Republika Srpska or 
a part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if not both – may one day try to 
take itself out of the State, perhaps to become independent in its own right, perhaps 
to join a neighbouring state.
Nevertheless, the Dayton Agreement deserves credit for being what it was intend-
ed to be: an effective armistice agreement. It put an end to what remains, for the 
present, the bloodiest conflict on European soil since the Second World War and 
enabled a return to some semblance of normality. At the same time it made it possible 
for outside forces including European States to impose their will without themselves 
being held accountable under the Convention.
We can identify the following relevant features of the arrangement:
Firstly, compliance with general international law throughout. All coercive meas-
ures were agreed by the States involved beforehand and given the seal of legality by 
the Security Council. Failing permission of a local government enjoying international 
recognition, this is the conditio sine qua non for any solution that involves the use or 
threat of force or otherwise overrides the will of the warring factions if it is to be legal 
in terms of international law.
Secondly, the assumption of responsibility by quasi-domestic institutions that were 
not, as such, subordinate to the government or governments of any one or more of 
the Contracting States. This is the conditio sine qua non for the latter to avoid having 
to assume ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, whether 
directly as Parties to the Convention (as in, for example, Cyprus v. Turkey, Ilaşcu and 
Others and Jaloud) or as ‘occupying powers’ within the meaning of Article 42 of the 
Hague Regulations (compare Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda).
A third, and extremely helpful, feature of the Dayton setup is that the substan-
tive human rights standards of the Convention were incorporated in the solution 
chosen from the outset, even though Bosnia and Herzegovina was not to become a 
Party in its own right for many years yet. Although this was not in itself determinative 
for the jurisdiction of the Convention States involved in the rebuilding of post-war 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it did enable the emergence of a Convention-based legal 
order that remains unique among newly-joined Contracting States without a strong 
indigenous human rights culture. The total number of applications lodged with the 
Court against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and put before a judicial formation, to date 
is relatively high – nearly as high as the number lodged against, for example, Austria 
and Greece, which have been Parties for decades and have more than twice as many 
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inhabitants – but the number of judgments finding at least one violation compares 
extremely favourably with both.1126 This attests to the strength of the institutions 
in place protecting human rights, even as serious problems remain. The centrifugal 
forces that still threaten to tear the country apart will have to be challenged in the 
domestic political process; in this respect, the law, even the Convention, can be of but 
little assistance.
The least satisfactory feature of the Dayton setup is that it ignored the need to hold 
the international presence itself to account, which as the Berić decision demonstrates 
remains a concern. An attempt was made to apply the lessons learned in neighbouring 
Kosovo, although with little alacrity; even so, Kosovo leads the way for the present.1127
1126 European Court of Human Rights, Overview 1959-2016, available on the Court’s internet web 
site (accessed 1 May 2017).
1127 See generally Tilmann Altwicker and Nuscha Wieczorek, “Bridging the Security Gap through 
EU Rule of Law Missions? Rule of Law Administration by EULEX”, Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law (2016), Vol. 21 No. 1, 115-133.
9 Summary and conclusions
9.1 Applicability of the Convention ratione pacis sive belli
The suggestion that the European Convention on Human Rights has no relevance 
outside peacetime can safely be laid to rest. The Convention applies to the application 
of ‘hard power’ by or on behalf of Contracting States, and it applies in situations of 
‘armed conflict’, whether international or non-international. Its drafters and signa-
tories intended it so. For proof we need look no further than the Convention itself, 
which unlike comparable human rights instruments (in particular the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) makes deliberate provision for derogation 
in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Arti-
cle 15 §§ 1 and 2). It is no coincidence either that the creation of the Convention, in 
1949-1950, was largely contemporaneous with that of the four 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions.1128
As used for the purposes of this study, the expression ‘hard power’, which we bor-
row from the language of international relations, is however not confined to armed 
conflict. 
We have seen that the Convention is applicable to situations more conventionally 
addressed in terms of law enforcement than in terms of armed conflict, such as the 
prevention and suppression of terrorist activity1129 and piracy.1130
We would argue that the Convention is applicable, potentially at least, also to cy-
ber-attacks committed by the forces of a Contracting State or with the sponsorship 
of a Contracting State, whether or not these occur within an international or non-
international conflict acknowledged as such.1131
Finally, we posit that it may be applicable to targeted assassination abroad, whether 
by the overt use of military hardware such as a drone or by stealth.1132
We include all of these situations in the understanding of ‘hard power’ adopted for 
the purposes of this study.
Substantive issues that have arisen under the Convention in connection with situa-
tions that can be considered to involve the exercise of ‘hard power’ in this sense have, 
as one would expect, concerned mainly Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of 
torture), 5 (liberty and security of person) and 8 of the Convention and 1 of Proto-
col No. 1 (in particular, the right to respect for home and the right of property).1133 
There must, however, be an effective domestic remedy before a national authority 
to entertain any claims by individuals that their rights under the Convention have 
1128 See 4.3.1 above.
1129 See 2.2.1.1 and 4.5.1.8 above.
1130 See 6.6.2 above.
1131 See 6.4.7 above.
1132 See 6.4.6 above.
1133 See 2.5 above.
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been violated. Responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms belongs primarily to 
the Contracting States; so, consequently, does the primary responsibility to set right 
whatever is amiss.
These are the parameters within which we can now attempt to answer the question 
we set at the outset: what latitude do Contracting States have to tailor their Conven-
tion obligations to the situation in which the need to exercise ‘hard power’ presents 
itself to them, and how can they go about it?1134
To do so we will go over the ‘defences’ we identified in the first chapter.1135
9.2 The first defence: no violation 
9.2.1 Denying the facts
The most obvious defence is to deny the facts complained of. This means that the 
Court will have to establish the truth of any factual allegations levelled against the 
respondent before it can address any legal issues – which means assessing evidence, 
and may involve time-consuming efforts at fact-finding.1136 The Court has however 
shown itself prepared to take a non-dogmatic approach to such matters as the distri-
bution of the burden of proof and evidentiary standards, and indeed the disparity in 
power between applicants (individuals especially) and respondent Governments dic-
tates such a course. Even so, like any other court of law in the world it must establish 
the facts to which it applies the law.1137
9.2.2 The possibilities of derogation
The possibility for Contracting States to take measures derogating from their obliga-
tions under the Convention was created specifically with ‘hard power’ situations in 
mind. However, it has until now rarely been invoked for purposes going beyond law 
enforcement.
Since waking up to the fact that human rights law is applicable even in situations in 
which international humanitarian law is also applicable, meaning that both may apply 
simultaneously, the International Court of Justice itself, and in its wake human rights 
treaty bodies, academics and practitioners, have attempted to define the interrelation 
between the two. The position that international humanitarian law applies in cases of 
armed conflict as lex specialis in relation to human rights law is logically untenable: 
the two are conceptually separate and unrelated subdivisions of international law, one 
is not lex generalis in relation to the other. So is the position that they are comple-
1134 See 1.3.1 above.
1135 See 1.3.2 above.
1136 On which subject, see, for example, International Human Rights and Fact-Finding – An analysis 
of the fact-finding missions conducted by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, 
Philip Leach, Costas Paraskeva & Gordana Uzelac, Human Rights & Social Justice Research 
Institute, London Metropolitan University, February 2009.
1137 See 2.7 above.
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mentary: it is borne out in practice, and in the case-law of the Court, that they may 
clash. As regards the Convention specifically, it is our argument that there is no need 
to define the interrelation between the two in such unhelpful terms: the Convention 
itself makes express provision for the eventuality in which international humanitarian 
law needs to be applied. In this the Convention is unique among treaties of general 
application guaranteeing classical civil and political rights.
We have seen that Article 15 of the Convention makes it possible in case of ‘war or 
other emergency threatening the life of the nation’ for the State to adapt its liabilities 
under the Convention to the possibilities which it has to meet them.
Lawful derogation under Article 15 does not affect the existence or scope of the 
State’s obligations to meet the human rights standards prescribed by the Convention: 
these continue to exist.1138
The effect of Article 15 derogation is not to limit the jurisdiction of the Court. 
A Government therefore cannot prevent the Court from reviewing acts imputable 
to the State under the Convention simply by means of a notice of derogation.1139 
The Court’s review will encompass, firstly, an examination of the matters complained 
of as if no derogation were in place. If these are incapable of leading to a finding of 
a violation, then no issue under Article 15 need arise; only if they appear not to be 
permissible under the Convention per se will the Court need to consider whether 
the derogation invoked by the respondent Government is, firstly, valid, and secondly, 
sufficient to restore to that measure its acceptability.1140
Article 15 derogation is possible only ‘[i]n time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation’. It is submitted that the expression ‘war’ should be 
construed in the same sense for present purposes as in international humanitarian 
law – that is, to mean either an international armed conflict or an armed conflict not 
of an international character between a State and a non-State actor but reaching the 
minimum intensity needed to trigger the applicability of international humanitarian 
law. For definitions it is convenient to borrow from the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Their common Article 2, first paragraph, defines international armed conflicts: these 
are ‘all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized 
by one of them’ and ‘all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance’. Not 
being dependent for its existence on the position of the parties, ‘international armed 
conflict’ is thus an autonomous concept in terms of the 1949 Geneva Convention – 
and also, we would submit, for the purpose of understanding the expression ‘war’ as 
used in Article 15 of the Convention. We read the expression to include international 
armed conflicts arising in peace operations outside the home territory of the State. 
1138 See 4.2 above.
1139 See 4.2 above.
1140 See 4.2 above.
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On that understanding, it is possible, in principle, to derogate in respect of those if 
the need should arise.1141
Non-international armed conflicts, though referred to in common Article 3 of the 
four Conventions, are better understood as having the meaning given to them by Ar-
ticle 1 of Additional Protocol II: they are such as ‘take place in the territory of a High 
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other or-
ganized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over 
a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol’.1142 Note that this definition, since it re-
quires the ‘dissident armed forces’ or other non-State armed groups to be fighting the 
armed forces of a High Contracting Party, does not encompass the eventuality of two 
or more non-State armed groups fighting each other without involvement of Govern-
ment forces; such a situation consequently cannot constitute a ‘war’ for purposes of 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights either (although it may de-
velop into an ‘emergency threatening the life of the nation’ if it cannot be contained). 
We would however submit that a Contracting State would be entitled, if necessary, to 
derogate when participating in a peace operation intervening in a non-international 
armed conflict being fought abroad.1143
While on the wording of Article 15 it is clear that for an ‘emergency’ to warrant 
derogation it must ‘threaten the life of the nation’, there is ambiguity as to whether 
that requirement also applies to ‘war’. A war fought by a State on its own territory in 
defence against a foreign aggressor would probably threaten ‘the life of the nation’ 
in any event; in such a case the question would be moot. A ‘war’ fought far from 
home, but with the prior authorisation of the Security Council of the United Na-
tions, might not threaten ‘the life of the nation’ – but it would be illogical to deny the 
applicability of Article 15 in such cases. We submit, however, that an aggressor State 
would not be entitled to rely on Article 15. We argue provisionally that the expression 
‘threatening the life of the nation’ does not qualify ‘war’ as long as the ‘war’ – under-
stood as an international armed conflict – is being fought in accordance with Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations: that is, either in pursuance of a decision 
of the Security Council (Article 42) or, pending action by the Security Council, for 
individual or collective self-defence (Article 51).1144
Recognition by a State that a situation existing within its Article 1 jurisdiction 
qualifies as a ‘non-international armed conflict’ has its own dangers, which include 
the possibility that it may amount to recognition that law enforcement is inadequate 
and the insurgents need be taken seriously as enemy combatants. That may explain 
why Contracting States have been hesitant to go that far. Nevertheless, the presence 
on the territory of an organised armed force opposed to Government power may 
1141 See 4.3.3.4.3 above.
1142 See 4.3.1 above.
1143 See 4.3.3.4.3 above.
1144 See 4.3.3 above.
303Summary and conclusions
well give rise to an ‘emergency threatening the life of the nation’; only rarely have the 
Commission and the Court not been willing to accept the judgment of the State’s 
political leadership in this regard.1145
Measures derogating from the Convention must steer clear of the ‘non-derogable 
rights’, naturally. Non-derogable rights are not defined solely by Article 15 § 2; other 
rights are non-derogable by implication, whether as a consequence of their being the 
object of an appropriate guarantee offered by other binding international instruments 
– in particular instruments of international humanitarian law – or by virtue of their 
very nature.1146
Moreover, derogating measures may go no further than ‘strictly required by the exi-
gencies of the situation’. Views can – and do – differ from case to case, and depending 
on standpoint, as to what is ‘the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion’. The words used suggest a strict necessity test; however, in practice the Court has 
shown itself more indulgent than that. The Court has until now generally accepted 
the necessity of derogating measures that were relevant to the crisis which they were 
intended to address and that were attended by appropriate safeguards both directly 
preventive of excesses and procedural.1147
Derogating measures must not be ‘inconsistent with [the State’s] other obligations 
under international law’. Neither travaux préparatoires nor case-law offer much in 
the way of guidance as to the ‘other obligations under international law’ with which 
derogating measures must remain consistent. We submit that that expression cannot 
be construed so as to import into Article 15 substantive provisions from other hu-
man rights treaties offering greater protection than the Convention itself. However, 
there is no room for discussion on the applicability in an armed conflict, be it inter-
national or non-international, of international humanitarian law. The importance of 
this statement derives from the fact that international humanitarian law admits of no 
further derogation: by its very nature, when it applies it sets the lowest permissible 
legal standard of rights protection.1148
It is a reasonable requirement that derogating measures be also of a nature to assist 
efforts towards a return to normality and therefore temporary: any other view would 
open the door to the indefinite application of derogating emergency measures. How-
ever, this is not to say that it can never be legitimate to extend notices of derogation 
repeatedly, even for a very long aggregate period; nor that such measures must be 
discontinued if the desired result is not achieved within a particular time frame.1149
As the application of Article 15 becomes a rather more common occurrence than 
has been the case previously, the dangers inherent in the hitherto lenient attitude the 
Court has adopted with regard to the applicable margin of appreciation are becom-
1145 Actually, only once, in the Greek Case. See 4.5.1.3 above.
1146 See 4.7 above.
1147 See 4.8 above.
1148 See 4.4 and 4.9 above.
1149 See 4.8 above.
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ing clearer. The Court has recognised to States a wide margin of appreciation, both as 
regards the assessment whether an ‘emergency threatening the life of the nation’ exists 
and as regards the measures ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. If it is 
an accurate observation that our continent is entering a period of prolonged instabil-
ity, then it is reasonable to expect that the executive arm of Government may on oc-
casion yield to the temptation to broaden its powers by adopting emergency measures 
even though the situation appears, to a dispassionate and disinterested observer, still 
manageable using ordinary legislation. The Court may soon have occasion to take a 
stricter view of both the threat prayed in justification by the Government and the 
need for the measures actually taken.
Despite these reservations, it is our belief that derogating from the obligations 
assumed under the Convention offers possibilities that have not yet been tested to 
their limits. Although in Hassan the Court for the first time gave an interpretation 
of Article 5 of the Convention that would obviate the need to invoke Article 15 in an 
international armed conflict, we submit that use of that Article nonetheless remains 
the preferred way for Contracting States to derogate from their obligations. Not only 
was it so intended by the drafters of the Convention, but it is the only way compatible 
with the wording of the Convention itself. We also consider that appropriate use of 
Article 15 offers Contracting States all the latitude they may need in the legitimate use 
of ‘hard power’. It does however require a formal act in the form of notification to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
9.3 The second defence: denying the jurisdiction of the Contracting State
9.3.1 Existence of Article 1 jurisdiction
9.3.1.1 Territorial jurisdiction
We have seen that there are two aspects to the concept of ‘jurisdiction’. Firstly, there 
is the state-centred concept understood in terms of legislative, executive and judicial 
power; this is the jurisdiction all States assert as a right. Secondly, and more relevantly 
for our purposes, there is the understanding of that expression from the point of view 
of the bearer of rights under the Convention, which rights the Contracting State has 
the duty under Article 1 of the Convention to protect; from the State’s perspective, 
this is jurisdiction understood as a responsibility to be borne. The two are different, 
but not separate: what links them together is that the State has both the right and 
the duty to exercise its legislative, executive and judicial powers to secure Convention 
rights.1150
The concept of jurisdiction, in both senses, is ‘primarily territorial’; indeed it is 
obvious that the jurisdiction of Contracting States is engaged on their respective Eu-
ropean land territory. However, States can enjoy jurisdiction – in the first sense – else-
where; it is therefore necessary to consider the implications for the exercise of juris-
1150 See 5.1 above.
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diction in the second sense. We address this in terms of territorial and quasi-territorial 
jurisdiction.
Applicability of the Convention to the territories for whose international relations 
a Contracting State is responsible – including territorial possessions – is not auto-
matic. Article 56 of the Convention – the ‘colonial clause’ – makes it dependent on 
a separate declaration, to be made by the mother country.1151 The Court has rejected 
an interpretation a contrario of the ‘colonial clause’ to the effect that a Contracting 
State’s Article 1 jurisdiction did not exist in relation to parts of its territory not actu-
ally under its control.1152
Treaty-based jurisdiction assimilated to territorial jurisdiction – in the first, state-
centred, sense – exists over sea and airspace to the extent that particular treaties rec-
ognise them to be under the sovereignty of States. The existence of such jurisdiction, 
we submit, entails the existence of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of 
the Convention.1153 In contrast, the exercise of national sovereignty in outer space, 
including on the moon and on other celestial bodies, is excluded.1154
Ships on the high seas are subject, in principle, to the exclusive jurisdiction of their 
flag State; other States may exercise jurisdiction over them with the permission of the 
flag State. Exceptionally, universal jurisdiction sufficient for purposes of the Conven-
tion would appear to exist under Articles 100-107 UNCLOS applied as customary 
international law in order to combat piracy.1155
States retain exclusive jurisdiction over spacecraft bearing their registration. More 
than that, States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty assume responsibility for the acts 
of their nationals, including private persons. At present spacecraft are almost with-
out exception unmanned satellites; the only manned spacecraft are the International 
Space Station and the Russian delivery vehicles by which it is supplied. The Interna-
tional Space Station is subject to a legal regime unique to it.1156
The jurisdiction of a State over ships flying its flag or aircraft or spacecraft bearing 
its registration, being exclusive and linked to nationality, is actually exercised within 
that State’s domestic limits; it is not properly ‘extra-territorial’.1157
9.3.1.2 Extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction
True extraterritorial Article 1 jurisdiction involves the exercise of State authority 
abroad. It is standard practice for States to exercise their jurisdiction over members of 
their own armed forces abroad, whether they be stationed or deployed on the terri-
1151 Equivalent clauses are to be found in the various Protocols: Article 4 of Protocol No. 1; Article 5 
of Protocol No. 4; Article 5 of Protocol No. 6; Article 6 of Protocol No. 7; Article 2 of Protocol 
No. 12 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 13.
1152 See 5.2.1 above.
1153 See 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 above.
1154 See 5.3.3 above.
1155 See 5.4.1 above.
1156 See 5.4.3 above.
1157 See 5.4 above.
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tory of a foreign State with the latter’s consent or not. An example of the former is the 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction over troops stationed abroad with the consent 
of the receiving country in application of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. 
Typically such an arrangement will also involve the exercise of jurisdiction over civil-
ian auxiliaries or dependents. An example of the deployment of troops abroad with-
out the consent of the foreign State concerned is, of course, an international armed 
conflict engaged on foreign soil, but such a situation may also arise in peacekeeping 
or peace-enforcing operations short of conflict.1158
Not every State act producing effects abroad constitutes exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. The deportation of aliens and the extradition of criminal suspects to a 
foreign country do not involve the extraterritorial exercise of territorial jurisdiction 
properly so-called. Likewise, a cross-border attack does not ipso facto constitute the 
exercise of jurisdiction extraterritorially: the Court has rejected the ‘cause-and-effect’ 
model.1159
9.3.2 Typology of Convention-relevant exercise of jurisdiction in 
‘ hard power’ situations
9.3.2.1 Intraterritorial
As regards States acting on their own territory we distinguish, firstly, those cases in 
which States acknowledge the exercise of jurisdiction from those in which States deny 
the exercise of jurisdiction.
States applying ‘hard power’ to assert or reassert their authority over parts of their 
territory where it is threatened typically acknowledge jurisdiction – indeed, the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction is precisely the purpose of their actions. Such situations raise no 
questions with regard to Article 1 jurisdiction.1160
When States cannot readily assert their jurisdiction over part of their territory, for 
example because they must overcome the resistance of a secessionist force or even 
a foreign occupier to do so, the case-law of the Court does not absolve them from 
their Convention obligations for that reason alone. The question whether they exer-
cise Article 1 jurisdiction is a question of fact, the presumption being that they do so 
throughout their territory. The presumption is rebuttable: however, so far the only 
case of a State divested of its Article 1 jurisdiction over a part of its territory occu-
pied by armed forces not under its own orders is that of Serbia in relation to Kosovo, 
where the Court accepted that there existed ‘objective limitations’ in the form of a 
United Nations administration that prevented the Contracting State from ‘securing 
the rights and freedoms’ itself.1161
For a Contracting State to tolerate or condone, let alone connive at, violations of 
the Convention committed on its soil by agents of a foreign State constitutes the 
1158 See 5.5.2 above.
1159 See 6.4.3.1 above.
1160 See 6.2.1 above.
1161 See 6.2.2.4 above.
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exercise of Article 1 jurisdiction by that Contracting State, with the consequence that 
its responsibility under the Convention is engaged.1162
9.3.2.2 Extraterritorial
Military action abroad, that is the maintenance of a military presence on territory 
over which another State claims sovereignty or kinetic military action taking place, or 
producing effects, elsewhere than on home territory may be lawful or it may not. The 
State’s responsibility under the Convention may be engaged in either case.1163
If a Contracting State acts on the territory of another Contracting State, then it 
is axiomatic that the former Contracting State assumes the Convention obligations 
of the latter: we have seen in the Cyprus-Turkey interstate case that any other view 
would create an unacceptable vacuum in human rights protection.1164 A controlling 
Contracting State cannot evade its liability under the Convention by setting up a 
pseudo-state on occupied territory, as is shown by the Court’s case-law in respect of 
the ‘TRNC’ (Northern Cyprus), the ‘MRT’ (Transdniestria), and the ‘NKR’ (Na-
gorno-Karabakh).1165
If the actions of the Contracting State take place, or the effects are felt, in a foreign 
State that is not a party to the Convention, the existence of Article 1 jurisdiction can-
not be taken for granted. The mere fact that harm is suffered, and therefore a victim 
results, is not sufficient to create jurisdiction: that much is clear from Banković.1166 
The Court has confirmed this position in further case-law, including many years after 
Banković in Al-Skeini and Jaloud.
From the Saddam Hussein admissibility decision we learn, moreover, that mere 
participation of the armed forces of a Contracting State in a coalition deployed out-
side the territory of any Contracting State and that also includes forces of a non-
Contracting State is not per se sufficient to establish Article 1 jurisdiction.1167 
Conversely, the fact of holding a person captive does suffice to produce that effect: 
this we learn from Al-Jedda and Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi.1168 So does a direct attempt 
on the life or safety of a specific individual by the overt use of military hardware, such 
as a shot fired at a targeted individual or, we would suggest, a targeted drone strike.1169 
We would further submit that the same would apply to murder by stealth1170 or to a 
cyber-attack – in the latter case, provided that it can arguably be considered to target 
individuals.1171
1162 See 6.3 above.
1163 See 6.4 above.
1164 See 6.4.1.1 above.
1165 See 6.4.2.1 - 6.4.2.3 above.
1166 See 6.4.3.1 above.
1167 See 6.5.1 above.
1168 See 6.5.2.1 above.
1169 See 6.4.6 above.
1170 See 6.4.6.3 above.
1171 See 6.4.7 above.
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The various strands are drawn together in Al-Skeini, in which two types of situa-
tions are identified that create extraterritorial Article 1 jurisdiction outside the Con-
vention legal space. The first is ‘State agent authority and control’, in the sense of 
physical power and control over the person in question; this situation exists when 
that person is arrested or detained, or falls victim to the targeted use of force.1172 The 
second is ‘effective control over an area’: this exists when, as a consequence of lawful 
or unlawful military action, a Contracting State exercises effective control of an area 
outside its national territory.1173 It matters however which type of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction exists. In the first situation, that of ‘State agent authority and control’ over 
an individual, the Contracting State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure 
to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that 
are relevant to the situation of that individual: in this sense, to use a phrase that has 
gained some notoriety, the Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored’.1174 In the 
second, that of ‘effective control over an area’, the obligation to secure the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control, whether it 
be exercised directly, through the Contracting State’s own armed forces, or through a 
subordinate local administration – even if, as may occur in the case of an occupation 
within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, it is the administration 
of the occupied State.1175
The interrelation between the defining decisions and judgments – Banković, Al-
Skeini, Al-Jedda, Jaloud, Hassan – has been much misunderstood; it can now be clari-
fied.
We submit that there is no inconsistency between Al-Skeini, Al-Jedda, Jaloud and 
Hassan on the one hand and Banković on the other. In Banković Article 1 jurisdic-
tion was not established because there was no territorial presence in Belgrade and the 
Court dismissed the ‘cause-and-effect’ interpretation of Article 1.1176 We argue that 
the distinction between Banković and the other four lies in the fact that Banković did 
not involve the assertion of ‘jurisdiction’ understood in terms of the purposive exer-
cise of power over individuals, unlike Al-Jedda and Hassan, which involved detention, 
and Al-Skeini and Jaloud, which involved the deliberate and targeted use of force.
To sum up, the Article 1 jurisdiction of a Contracting State will be established if 
that State is found to exercise ‘effective control over an area’. If a Contracting State is 
to evade Article 1 jurisdiction in connection with the extraterritorial exercise of ‘State 
agent authority and control’ over an individual, as the Court’s case-law now stands it 
will be necessary for that State to take all necessary measures to avoid all danger to 
individuals and to be prepared to prove that it has done so.
1172 See 6.5.2.3.1 above.
1173 See 6.5.2.3.2 above.
1174 See 6.5.2.3.1 above.
1175 See 6.5.2.3.2 above; see also 6.7 above.
1176 See 6.4.3.1.1 above.
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9.4 The third defence: denying the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights
If a Contracting State cannot evade accountability under the Convention by denying 
Article 1 jurisdiction, then what about contesting the jurisdiction of the Court?
The Convention permits States to make reservations at the time of ratification 
(Article 57). The validity of such reservations, however, remains for the Court to con-
sider. Thus far the Court has not accepted reservations intended generally to limit the 
applicability of the Convention itself. It has been suggested in legal literature that a 
reservation designed, to all appearances, to limit the scope of the Court’s examina-
tion of emergency measures may be invalid because it is incompatible with the system 
itself of the Convention.1177
It may be possible for a Contracting Party to invoke Article 28 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that treaties shall not bind a party 
‘in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist 
before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party’. This 
was successfully done on at least one occasion in the early days of the Convention, 
but treaty obligations that may override the substantive provisions of the Convention 
will by now be rare indeed. Instead, it is more likely that the Convention – whose key 
provisions date from 1950 – will take precedence over more recent instruments, as the 
Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi judgment demonstrates.1178
9.5 The fourth defence: denying attribution
The case-law of the Court does not follow the same logic as Article 2 of the Inter-
national Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. We have seen that the 
Court’s consistent approach is first to establish Article 1 jurisdiction, then attribu-
tion.1179 If Contracting States cannot evade the former, they may nonetheless be able 
to evade the latter.
Thus it is that, for example, Moldova is found to have Article 1 jurisdiction (as the 
territorial State) over Transdniestria, a territory over which it is unable to exercise 
authority effectively, but escapes blame for violations of the Convention for as long as 
it makes a real effort to secure Convention rights – the violations being imputable to 
the Russian Federation, which exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction in Transdniestria 
by maintaining an armed presence there and securing to that entity what viability it 
has.1180 
1177 See 7.3 above.
1178 See 7.4 above.
1179 See 8.2.1 above.
1180 See 8.2.2 above.
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Even so, the Court has held domestic remedies offered by both the ‘TRNC’ and 
the ‘MRT’ to be valid under the Convention – while stressing that these are remedies 
provided by Turkey and Russia respectively, through their subordinate entities.1181 
The Demopoulos example shows that a specialised remedy set up within the structures 
of a pseudo-state may be suitable for its parent Contracting State, if it is prepared to 
accept attribution on that basis, to discharge remedial obligations under the Conven-
tion.1182
The responsibility of Contracting States is engaged if they acquiesce or connive 
within their Article 1 jurisdiction violations of the Convention committed by foreign-
ers. We have seen that this was so in the ‘rendition’ cases, in which individuals were 
subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 3 and 5 on the territory of Contracting 
States but by agents of a State not Party to the Convention. Likewise, the Contracting 
State concerned remains responsible, under the Soering doctrine, for allowing such 
individuals to be removed to a place outside their own jurisdiction even though they 
cannot reasonably be unaware that the violations will continue.1183
We argue that a Contracting State is unlikely to escape attribution by the use of 
private military and security contractors, or by permitting their use by private parties. 
Contracting States choosing to engage the services of such contractors themselves 
remain answerable for the application of ‘hard power’ on their behalf, even by pri-
vate agents.1184 Contracting States who permit private parties to make use of privately 
contracted armed personnel – a situation that in practice is most likely to arise in 
relation to ship-owners seeking to protect their ships against pirate attack – remain 
responsible for creating and maintaining a suitable legislative framework attended by 
a suitable enforcement structure and legal remedies by virtue of their territorial or (in 
the case of the ship’s flag state) quasi-territorial jurisdiction.1185
Acting under the aegis of the United Nations would appear to offer Contracting 
States better prospects of escaping attribution. We have seen that the Court was pre-
pared to attribute to that organisation failings imputed to KFOR in Kosovo. KFOR 
was exercising lawfully delegated Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. With regard to the civilian authority established in Kosovo, UNMIK, 
the Court found that it was a subsidiary organ of the United Nations; its acts and 
omissions were therefore, in principle, ‘attributable’ to the United Nations.1186 The 
position was the same with respect to UNFICYP, which controls the buffer zone in 
Cyprus.1187
We may therefore conclude that a Contracting Party may evade attribution by 
placing its forces under the orders of the Security Council in the lawful exercise of 
1181 See 8.5.1 and 8.5.2 above.
1182 See 8.5.4 above.
1183 See 6.3 and 8.3.2 above.
1184 See 8.4.3 above.
1185 See 8.4.3.2 above.
1186 See 8.4.5.2.1 above.
1187 See 8.4.5.2.2 above.
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its powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter or of a United Nations 
subsidiary organ. It is worth noting that United Nations peace operations are ordi-
narily subsidiary organs of the United Nations.1188
In contrast, in Al-Jedda the Court refused to attribute the acts of American and 
British armed forces in Iraq to the United Nations. At no time were the forces of the 
‘occupying powers’ subsidiary to the Security Council; what was more, through the 
CPA which they had established already at the start of the occupation they exercised 
the powers of government in Iraq, reporting to the Security Council but not bound 
by its orders.1189 Although by virtue of Article 103 of the United Nations Charter a 
Security Council resolution overrides the Convention, the presumption is that the 
Security Council does not intend to impose on States obligations incompatible with 
human rights; this means that Contracting States must make use of whatever room 
for manoeuvre remains to them to avoid violating the Convention. The presumption 
is rebutted only if the Security Council resolution leaves Contracting States no other 
options whatsoever.1190
Transfer of responsibility to the United Nations does not remove the need to en-
sure accountability for human rights violations. Since the Convention cannot apply 
to the United Nations, propriety demands that alternative arrangements be set in 
place for this purpose.
Internationally imposed quasi-indigenous institutions – and here we look to the 
lessons learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina – would appear to offer the best prospects 
of satisfying requirements of accountability and placing it elsewhere. The arrange-
ment set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterised by the following features:
Firstly, general international law was complied with throughout. All coercive meas-
ures were agreed by the States involved beforehand and given the seal of legality by 
the Security Council. Failing permission of a local government enjoying international 
recognition, this is the conditio sine qua non for any solution that involves the use or 
threat of force or otherwise overrides the will of the warring factions.
Secondly, responsibility was borne by quasi-domestic institutions that were not, as 
such, subordinate to any government or group of governments of one or more Con-
tracting States. This is the conditio sine qua non for the latter to avoid having to assume 
‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.
Although it is not a conditio sine qua non for the legality of the arrangement, we 
have seen that imposing the substantive human rights standards of the Convention 
and other human rights instruments from the outset, together with an independent 
hybrid jurisdiction to enforce them, was highly beneficial in its effects. It did much to 
create awareness of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and prepare that coun-
try for joining the Council of Europe. Herein lies perhaps another lesson for the fu-
ture: the usefulness of human rights protection in state-building.
1188 See 4.3.3.4.3 above.
1189 See 8.4.5.2.3 above.
1190 See 8.4.5.2.5 above.
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9.6 Final observations
Even the Convention’s most vocal critics recognise that basic standards of humanity 
and civilization should be maintained and that it is the primary responsibility of the 
individual State to enforce them. Nevertheless, the creation of international standards 
guarded by international human rights treaty bodies has proved a useful addition to 
domestic human rights protection.
One might think that the significance of international human rights systems could 
not be greater than in regulating the use of force by State agents, especially in situa-
tions involving the use of what we have termed ‘hard power’: inevitably these pro-
vide opportunities (and sometimes the temptation) to take the use of force further 
than would be permissible or even necessary in times of tranquillity. In the European 
setting, it is therefore right and proper that the European Court of Human Rights 
should have jurisdiction to maintain the standards set by the Convention in this re-
spect.
The Court is a court of law, that is, a body vested with judicial power, offering the 
requisite guarantees of independence and impartiality and conducting its proceed-
ings in accordance with a set procedure. Nevertheless, as in all international litigation, 
the parties to proceedings under the Convention are equal only if both are States. In 
cases brought by ‘persons, non-governmental organisations or groups of individuals’ 
claiming to be victims of violations of their human rights,1191 they are not. The de-
fensive position of the respondent Contracting State, though not impregnable, is a 
strong one.
From a substantive perspective, a respondent State will generally be able to argue, 
even if all formal admissibility conditions are met, that its actions are necessitated by 
the public weal. So the Court usually finds, without even being asked: it is not for 
nothing that it declares the overwhelming majority of individual applications inad-
missible without even communicating them.
From a procedural perspective, as often as not the Contracting State holds the high 
ground in that it will be able, through its agents, to control access to vital evidence. It 
has to be recognised that good reasons may exist to keep certain information out of 
the public eye, especially in situations that may involve the use of ‘hard power’. That 
said, it is the duty of the higher authorities of a State governed by the rule of law to 
monitor the acts of their subordinates in this respect and that of the Court to be alert 
to any abuses.
The basic text, the Convention itself, offers Contracting States an advantage that 
by its nature is denied individual applicants. It lies in the possibility, in case of ‘war or 
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’, to shift the goal posts by 
making use of the possibility offered by Article 15 to limit the State’s liability. In cases 
of armed conflict, whether international or non-international, the ultimate standards 
to be maintained would be those defined by international humanitarian law.
1191 Article 34 of the Convention.
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Our argument is that the possibilities of derogation have, until now, for whatever 
reasons, been underused in situations involving the use of ‘hard power’. Derogation 
is, however, provided for by the Convention itself, and for the precise purpose of al-
lowing the Contracting States to meet situations in which they cannot reasonably be 
required to secure the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention and its Proto-
cols. Already for that reason it deserves to be considered in preference to tortuous 
solutions incompatible with the text of the Convention.
The Convention is an international legal instrument. It cannot be seen in isola-
tion from other areas of international law. For purposes of the use of ‘hard power’, 
these would include the law of the United Nations. Participating in a United Nations 
peace operation has sometimes offered Contracting States protection against claims 
under the Convention. Past practice suggests that for such as solution to work, it 
will be necessary either that the peace operation itself be a subsidiary organ of the 
United Nations – as peace operations mandated by the Security Council generally 
are – or that any empowering Security Council resolution offer the Contracting State 
no other option than to act in a manner incompatible with the Convention. In either 
case, a lacuna in human rights protection will emerge which, while the Convention 
does not require it to be filled by the Contracting State, should be filled somehow: 
the restoration of a situation of normality, in which human rights are once again se-
cured, is the very purpose of peace operations. This may be done by the creation of 
a remedy allowing claims to be brought against the subsidiary organ, or against the 
United Nations itself, or against the State for whose benefit the peace operation has 
been set up, as appropriate.
Such a course of action may involve the use of internationally imposed quasi-indig-
enous institutions. A particularly creative variant of this solution involves using such 
institutions to impose substantive human rights standards, perhaps those defined by 
the Convention itself: this serves the dual aim of furthering human rights protection 
and placing accountability for human rights violations where it belongs.
Thus we see that there is sufficient scope for Contracting States to tailor their obli-
gations and liabilities under the Convention to the exigencies of situations involving 
the need to resort to ‘hard power’, provided always that they stay within the limits 
posed by general international law in choosing their means.
In other words, under this proviso, the law of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights not only permits of finding a balance between the duty of the State, and 
hence its right, to resort to ‘hard power’ and the right of the individual, as protected 
by the Convention and its Protocols, to be shielded from its effects, but – more than 
that – leaves the State the room for manoeuvre needed to pursue its legitimate policy 
objectives.

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
‘Hard power’en het Europees Verdrag inzake de Rechten van de Mens
Hoofdstuk 1: Inleiding
Ingevolge art. 1 van het Europees Verdrag inzake de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM) is 
bescherming van de in dat Verdrag en zijn protocollen neergelegde rechten in de eer-
ste plaats de taak van de nationale overheid van de verdragsstaat. In normale omstan-
digheden kwijt de overheid zich van die taak doordat de uitvoerende macht getrouw 
de wet uitvoert: als in individuele gevallen problemen optreden, worden die voor-
gelegd aan de rechterlijke macht. Hier ligt echter ook een taak voor de krijgsmacht: 
individuele vrijheden, politieke vrijheid en de rechtsstaat kunnen niet bestaan zonder 
geloofwaardige dreiging – en zonodig daadwerkelijk gebruik – van militair geweld 
door de staat. Dit besef is het uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift.
Evenwel is de verdragsstaat ook in zijn militair handelen onderworpen aan de 
beperkingen die het EVRM stelt. Het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens 
(EHRM) heeft al meermalen schendingen van het EVRM moeten vaststellen naar 
aanleiding van militair optreden.
Voor uitoefening van fysieke (in het bijzonder militaire) macht in internationale 
betrekkingen gebruikt dit proefschrift de uitdrukking ‘hard power’. Deze uitdrukking 
– waarvoor geen equivalent in het Nederlands lijkt te bestaan – is ontleend aan de 
moderne leer van de internationale betrekkingen. Een voor dit proefschrift bruikbare 
werkdefinitie is: ten eerste, de weloverwogen projectie door een regering van macht 
buiten de grenzen van de eigen staat, ongeacht of de situatie door de betrokken rege-
ring wordt erkend als gewapend conflict; ten tweede, machtsuitoefening binnen de 
eigen grenzen, op een schaal die hetzij militaire middelen vereist, hetzij middelen die 
uitgaan boven de vereisten van normale wetshandhaving, om tegenstand te overwin-
nen, ongeacht of de situatie door de betrokken regering wordt erkend als gewapend 
conflict; en ten derde, toepassing door een regering van economische sancties in de 
internationale betrekkingen van de staat. Deze werkdefinitie dekt mede situaties die 
in termen van internationaal humanitair recht veelal eerder worden beschouwd als 
wetshandhaving dan als gewapend conflict, zoals de bestrijding van grootschalig ter-
rorisme, afscheidingsbewegingen of zeeroverij.
De onderzoeksvraag is of het EVRM zijn Verdragsluitende Staten voldoende 
ruimte laat voor het gebruik van ‘hard power’ in bovengenoemde zin. De aanname is 
dat die ruimte voldoende zal zijn indien die Staten de vrijheid behouden naar inter-
nationaal recht geoorloofde beleidsdoelen na te streven ondanks de beperkingen die 
het EVRM stelt.
Daarbij is van belang dat de opstellers van het EVRM vanaf het begin onder ogen 
hebben gezien dat het EVRM van toepassing zou moeten zijn in conflictsituaties, 
zelfs in geval van gewapend conflict. 
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Het onderzoek behelst in hoofdzaak studie van de toepasselijke jurisprudentie van 
de organen van het EVRM: de Europese Commissie voor de Rechten van de Mens 
(ECRM), die bestaan heeft tot 1999, en het EHRM. Gekozen is voor het standpunt 
van de Verdragsstaat die zich heeft te verweren voor het EHRM. 
De deelvragen zijn dan ook gesteld in termen van – ten overstaan van het EHRM 
in te roepen – ‘verweren’:
– Ten eerste, het verweer dat de vastgestelde feiten niet kunnen leiden tot vaststel-
ling van een schending van het EVRM;
– Als bijzonder subtype van dit eerste verweer: afwijking van het EVRM in geval 
van noodtoestand (art. 15 EVRM);
– Ten tweede: het verweer dat de feiten waarover geklaagd wordt niet vallen bin-
nen de rechtsmacht van de verdragsstaat, begrepen in de zin van art. 1 EVRM;
– Ten derde: het verweer dat feiten waarover geklaagd wordt buiten de bevoegd-
heid van het EHRM vallen;
– Ten vierde: het verweer dat de feiten waarover geklaagd wordt niet aan de ver-
werende verdragsstaat kunnen worden toegerekend.
Hoofdstuk 2: Materiële toepassing van het EHRM op gebruik van 
‘hard power’
De ECRM en het EHRM hebben de toepasselijke maatstaven ontwikkeld naar aan-
leiding van situaties waarmee een samenleving ook in normale tijden wordt gecon-
fronteerd. Dezelfde maatstaven gelden in beginsel voor het gebruik van ‘hard power’. 
De navolgende artikelen zijn in het bijzonder van belang.
Art. 2 EVRM
Art. 2 EVRM (recht op leven) verbiedt dodelijk geweld niet in alle gevallen. Het 
EHRM is in beginsel bereid te aanvaarden dat dodelijk geweld gerechtvaardigd is, 
mits er een behoorlijke wettelijke basis voor is, planning en uitvoering erop zijn ge-
richt het gebruik van dodelijk geweld te vermijden, de beslissing tot dodelijk geweld 
over te gaan redelijk is en het toegepaste geweld niet disproportioneel is.
Daarnaast rust op de staat de positieve verplichting het recht op leven te bescher-
men. Deze verplichting omvat, naast strafbaarstellingen vergezeld door daadwer-
kelijke handhaving, positieve maatregelen in gevallen waarin een reële individuele 
dreiging bekend is. Van de staat wordt echter niet gevergd dat hij absolute veiligheid 
garandeert: zo prevaleren soms eisen van rechtsstatelijkheid. In het bijzonder is het de 
staat niet toegestaan terrorisme te bestrijden met gebruikmaking van middelen die de 
waarden van de rechtsstaat zelf aantasten.
Nodig is ook dat elk gebruik van dodelijk geweld wordt gevolgd door behoorlijk 
onderzoek om vast te stellen of aan deze vereisten is voldaan, dit met het oog op daad-
werkelijke bescherming van het recht op leven door strafrechtelijke handhaving. Deze 
maatstaf is ontwikkeld in het verband geweldsgebruik door de burgerlijke politie, on-
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der meer bij de bestrijding van terrorisme, maar geldt ook voor uitoefening van ‘hard 
power’ door andere overheidsdienaren. Echter dient een dergelijk onderzoek ook het 
recht van nabestaanden de waarheid te kennen.
Art. 3 EVRM
Art. 3 EVRM heeft een bredere strekking dan slechts het ‘verbod van foltering’ waar-
naar de titel verwijst. Het verbiedt elk gebruik van geweld dat niet strikt noodzakelijk 
is als gevolg van het eigen gedrag van het slachtoffer zelf. Naast lichamelijk of geeste-
lijk geweld verbiedt het ook vernederende behandeling of bestraffing.
Het vermoeden dat het slachtoffer beschikt over informatie die hij of zij niet wil 
prijsgeven, vormt geen rechtvaardiging voor behandeling in strijd met dit artikel, zelfs 
niet als er mensenlevens op het spel staan.
Net als art. 2 legt art. 3 aan de staat de positieve verplichtingen op foltering en ove-
rige onmenselijke of onterende behandeling en bestraffing te voorkomen. 
Net als in het geval van art. 2 EVRM rust er op de staat een onderzoeksplicht als er 
gegronde reden is te vermoeden dat overheidsdienaren zich te buiten zijn gegaan aan 
gedrag dat strijdig is met art. 3.
Art. 5 EVRM
De noodzaak kan bestaan mensen hun vrijheid te benemen. Art. 5 stelt daaraan echter 
grenzen.
Vrijheidsbeneming in volledige afzondering is slechts bij zeer dringende noodzaak 
en voor zeer korte tijd toelaatbaar. Er moet in beginsel contact kunnen bestaan tus-
sen de gedetineerde en zijn familie of een ander steunnetwerk. Er moet rechterlijk of 
soortgelijk onafhankelijk toezicht zijn door een functionaris die invrijheidsstelling 
kan bevelen; dit helpt onder meer foltering te voorkomen, net als overigens bezoek 
van een arts of een advocaat dat doet.
Bescherming van woning en eigendom
Schendingen van het recht op eigendom, beschermd door art. 1 van het Eerste Pro-
tocol bij het EVRM, gaan in de situaties waarop dit proefschrift ziet vaak samen met 
schendingen van het recht op eerbiediging van de woning, beschermd door art. 8. Dit 
is onder meer het geval gebleken in de conflicten tussen Cyprus en Turkije, tussen 
Armenië en Azerbaijan en in het voormalig Joegoslavië.
Art. 13 EVRM
Ingevolge art. 13 EVRM heeft eenieder wiens in het EVRM vastgelegde rechten en 
vrijheden zijn geschonden recht op een daadwerkelijk rechtsmiddel voor een nati-
onale instantie. Om dit recht geldend te maken in een geval waarin ‘hard power’ is 
uitgeoefend, zal een individu voor bewijs veelal zijn aangewezen op de resultaten van 
een officieel onderzoek. De belangen gediend door de procedurele verplichtingen die 
voortvloeien uit artt. 2 en 3 gaan reeds daarom verder dan slechts de strafvordering.
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Bewijs
Volgens vaste rechtspraak van het EHRM moeten partijen hun feitelijke stellingen 
met de nodige bewijzen staven, ongeacht de context van de zaak. Echter kan het in ge-
vallen van het soort waarop dit proefschrift ziet, voor individuele verzoekers moeilijk 
blijken feiten aan te tonen. Het EHRM behoudt zich evenwel de vrije waardering van 
de bewijsmiddelen voor; dat kan betekenen dat, indien alleen de autoriteiten van de 
verwerende verdragsstaat kennis van de feiten dragen, zoals het geval kan zijn indien 
iemand in detentie wordt mishandeld of sterft, van die autoriteiten een bevredigende 
verklaring wordt verwacht.
Conclusie van dit hoofdstuk
Zelfs in normale tijden ontbreekt het gezagsdragers niet aan mogelijkheden om indi-
viduele mensenrechten te schenden. Conflictsituaties maken echter naar hun aard de 
kans op zodanige schendingen groter. Hoe dan ook, het behoort tot de plicht van de 
militair zich van de mensenrechtenverplichtingen van zijn staat bewust te zijn, aange-
zien immers zijn staat voor eventuele door hem gepleegde schendingen aansprakelijk 
zal zijn.
Hoofdstuk 3: Wisselwerking tussen het EVRM en het humanitair recht
Art. 15 EVRM verwijst naar het humanitair recht doordien het in geval van ‘oorlog’ 
voorziet in afwijkingen die echter niet in strijd mogen zijn met ‘andere verplichtingen 
die voortvloeien uit het internationale recht’. Een dergelijke verwijzing ontbreekt in 
andere mensenrechtenverdragen, waaronder in het bijzonder het Internationaal Ver-
drag inzake Burgerrechten en Politieke Rechten (IVBPR). Dit verschil kan worden 
verklaard vanuit het uitgangspunt van het IVBPR, dat – als verdrag gesloten binnen 
het kader van de Verenigde Naties – bedoeld was als onderdeel van een internatio-
naalrechtelijk systeem dat beoogde oorlog volledig te verbieden; het EVRM daaren-
tegen was geschreven met het oog op de Europese praktijk, waarin het verschijnsel 
oorlog onder ogen moest worden gezien.
Dit verschil heeft gevolgen voor de beschouwing van de wisselwerking tussen het 
humanitair recht en het mensenrechtenrecht. In het systeem van het EVRM wijst 
art. 15 in geval van ‘oorlog’ de weg naar het humanitair recht; in het IVBPR is op de 
vraag hoe de beide rechtsgebieden zich tot elkaar verhouden geen antwoord gegeven.
Lex specialis?
In zijn bekende advies over de wettigheid van dreiging of inzet van kernwapens in 
gewapend conflict het Internationaal Gerechtshof aangegeven dat het IVBPR ook 
bescherming bood in gewapend conflict, zij het dat het humanitair recht ten opzichte 
van het IVBPR als lex specialis had te gelden.
Voor de wisselwerking tussen de twee rechtsgebieden – mensenrechtenbescher-
ming en humanitair recht – is de uitdrukking lex specialis slecht gekozen. Zij ver-
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onderstelt immers dat het humanitair recht een onderdeel is van het internationaal 
mensenrechtenrecht met een apart toepassingsgebied. Dit is duidelijk niet zo: het 
humanitair recht is een afzonderlijk rechtsgebied met eigen grondslagen, geen deel-
gebied van het mensenrechtenrecht. Gepoogd is wel de beide rechtsgebieden te zien 
als elkaars complement. Dat zijn zij niet: normen behorend tot elk van beide kunnen 
niet slechts gelijktijdig van toepassing zijn maar ook botsen, in welk geval de vraag 
rijst welk rechtsgebied in een bepaald geval moet prevaleren. Bij afwezigheid van enig 
sluitend theoretisch kader is de enige werkbare oplossing te aanvaarden dat in geval 
van gewapend conflict een keuze moet worden gemaakt voor een van beide rechtsge-
bieden, hetzij het mensenrechtenrecht, hetzij – om praktische redenen – het humani-
tair recht, waarbij het tweede aan de strijdende partijen doorgaans meer vrijheid laat 
dan het eerste in het bijzonder waar het gaat om beperkingen op het recht op leven.
Rechtspraak van het EHRM
In de rechtspraak van het EHRM wordt soms het humanitair recht in beschouwing 
genomen bij het interpreteren van in het EVRM vervatte rechtswaarborgen, waaron-
der het recht op leven (art. 2), nulla poena sine lege (art. 7) en de ne bis in idem-bepa-
ling vervat in art. 4 van protocol nr. 7. 
Dit is gebeurd in het arrest Hassan v. the United Kingdom, waarin het Verdragspar-
tijen heeft toegestaan in een internationaal gewapend conflict vrijheidsbenemingen 
te toetsen aan de desbetreffende bepalingen van de Derde en Vierde Verdragen van 
Genève in plaats van aan het meer beperkende art. 5 EVRM.
Het Hassan-arrest
Dit proefschrift besteedt afzonderlijk aandacht aan het arrest Hassan v. the United 
Kingdom. Dit is tot dusver het enige geval geweest waarin het EHRM aan het huma-
nitair recht voorrang gegeven boven de eigen rechtswaarborgen van het EVRM.
De casus betrof, voorzover hier van belang, de gevangenhouding door Britse strijd-
krachten in Irak van een hooggeplaatst lid van de Baath-partij in omstandigheden die 
normaal gesproken vermoedelijk vragen zouden hebben opgeroepen in termen van 
de aansprakelijkheid van het Verenigd Koninkrijk op grond van art. 5 EVRM. Het 
EHRM erkende dat detentie op grond van het Derde dan wel het Vierde Verdrag 
van Genève niet onder een van de door art. 5 lid 1 toegestane detentiegronden viel 
te rangschikken. Niettemin kwam het op grond van het gegeven dat tot dusver geen 
enkele verdragsstaat ooit art. 15 had ingeroepen met betrekking tot militair optreden 
buiten de eigen grenzen tot de vaststelling dat in geval van internationaal gewapend 
conflict art. 5 EVRM moest worden geïnterpreteerd met inachtneming van de beide 
genoemde Geneefse Verdragen. Uitdrukkelijke afwijking van het EVRM krachtens 
art. 15 was in dergelijke gevallen dus niet nodig; een verdragsstaat mocht zich ook 
achteraf op toepasselijke bepalingen van internationaal humanitair recht beroepen.
De opvatting van de meerderheid van het EHRM in het Hassan-arrest is komen 
bloot te staan aan kritiek, niet alleen van een minderheid van de betrokken rech-
ters van het EHRM zelf (in een dissenting opinion onder leiding van rechter Robert 
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Spano) maar ook in de doctrine. De kritiek is in alle gevallen gebaseerd op het uit-
gangspunt dat de bescherming van het EVRM in geval van internationaal gewapend 
conflict op onaanvaardbare wijze wordt aangetast of zelfs tenietgedaan op een wijze 
die niet te rijmen valt met de tekst van het EVRM zelf.
Hoofdstuk 4: Afwijking in geval van noodtoestand
Algemeen
Een verdragsstaat kan zich gesteld zien voor een situatie waarin volledige naleving van 
de in het EVRM neergelegde verdragsverplichtingen niet mogelijk is. Art. 15 EVRM 
voorziet in de mogelijkheid ‘in tijd van oorlog of in geval van enig andere algemene 
noodtoestand die het bestaan van het land bedreigt’ daarvan af te wijken.
Uitgangspunt is echter dat de verdragsverplichtingen blijven bestaan. In voorko-
mend geval zal het EVRM eerst nagaan of het handelen of nalaten waarover geklaagd 
wordt, in beginsel een schending van het EVRM oplevert; indien dit het geval blijkt, 
zal het beoordelen of de afwijking geldig is en in de omstandigheden voldoende om 
te kunnen vaststellen dat het handelen of nalaten niettemin toelaatbaar is. De rechts-
macht van het EVRM, zoals gedefinieerd in art. 32 EVRM, blijft dus onaangetast; 
de mogelijkheid van afwijking ingevolge art. 15 EVRM kan dus niet door regeringen 
worden gebruikt om de bevoegdheden van het EHRM al dan niet tijdelijk buiten 
werking te stellen.
Oorlog
Voorgesteld wordt het begrip ‘oorlog’, zoals gebruikt in art. 15 EVRM, te interprete-
ren in de betekenis van ‘gewapend conflict’, al dan niet internationaal, in het inter-
nationaal humanitair recht. Aanhakend bij de vier Verdragen van Genève van 1949, 
waarbij alle staten van de wereld partij zijn, komt men dan tot de volgende definities:
Van een ‘internationaal gewapend conflict’ is sprake ‘ingeval een oorlog is verklaard 
of bij ieder ander gewapend conflict dat ontstaat tussen twee of meer der Hoge Ver-
dragsluitende Partijen, zelfs indien de oorlogstoestand door één der Partijen niet 
wordt erkend’, en tevens ‘in alle gevallen van gehele of gedeeltelijke bezetting van het 
grondgebied van een Hoge Verdragsluitende Partij, zelfs indien deze bezetting geen 
gewapende tegenstand ontmoet’ (gemeenschappelijk art. 2 van de vier Verdragen van 
Genève).
Een niet-internationaal gewapend conflict is ‘een gewapend conflict op het grond-
gebied van één der Hoge Verdragsluitende Partijen, hetwelk geen internationaal 
karakter draagt’ (gemeenschappelijk art. 3 van de vier Verdragen van Genève), niet 
zijnde ‘situaties van interne ongeregeldheden en spanningen, zoals rellen, op zichzelf 
staande en sporadisch voorkomende daden van geweld en andere handelingen van 
soortgelijke aard, die niet zijn te beschouwen als gewapende conflicten’ (art. 1 lid 2 
Tweede Aanvullend Protocol bij de Verdragen van Genève).
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Een internationaal gewapend conflict is door het EHRM aangenomen tussen Tur-
kije en Cyprus (in het arrest Varnava and Others) en in Irak (in het arrest Hassan v. 
the United Kingdom). Geen enkele EVRM-verdragsstaat heeft zich voor de toepassing 
van art. 15 EVRM ooit beroepen op het bestaan van een niet-internationaal gewapend 
conflict.
De vraag is gewettigd of de bijvoeglijke bijzin ‘die het bestaan van het land bedreigt’ 
in art. 15 lid 1 EVRM1192 niet alleen op ‘noodtoestand’ slaat, hetgeen zonder meer dui-
delijk is, maar ook op ‘oorlog’ – met andere woorden, of een oorlog het bestaan van 
het land moet bedreigen vooraleer afwijking met toepassing van art. 15 is toegestaan. 
Immers, niet elke oorlog vormt zonder meer een bedreiging voor het bestaan van het 
land; een koloniale veroveringsoorlog bijvoorbeeld doet dat niet, maar een kinetisch 
conflict op het eigen territoir (of in een overzees gebiedsdeel) van de verdragsstaat, 
indien van voldoende intensiteit, doet dat wel.
In dit proefschrift wordt het voorlopig antwoord gegeven dat, wil afwijking met 
toepassing van art. 15 EVRM geoorloofd zijn, een ‘oorlog’ het ‘voortbestaan van het 
land’ niet hoeft te bedreigen als de ‘oorlog’ wordt gevoerd met inachtneming van 
hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties; dat wil zeggen, indien 
sprake is van ‘individuele of collectieve zelfverdediging in geval van een gewapende 
aanval’ (art. 51 van het Handvest) dan wel ‘optreden door middel van lucht-, zee- of 
landstrijdkrachten’ indien de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties zulks nodig 
oordeelt ‘voor de handhaving of het herstel van de internationale vrede en veiligheid’ 
(art. 42 van het Handvest).
Noodtoestand
In de jurisprudentie van de ECRM en het EVRM is art. 15 tot dusver ter sprake ge-
komen naar aanleiding van door de betrokken regering gestelde ‘noodtoestand’. De 
ECRM en het EVRM hebben te oordelen gehad over afwijkingen door het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk in 1955 en 1956, naar aanleiding van afscheidingspogingen in Cyprus (des-
tijds een Britse kroonkolonie); door de Ierse Republiek in 1957, naar aanleiding van 
aanvallen door het zogeheten Ierse Republikeinse Leger (IRA); door Griekenland in 
1967, naar aanleiding van tegenstand tegen de staatsgreep van de Griekse kolonels; 
opnieuw door het Verenigd Koninkrijk, in 1988, in reactie op de vaststelling door het 
EHRM van een schending van art. 5 lid 3 van het EVRM aangaande de maximale 
duur van vrijheidsbeneming voordat verdachten van terroristische misdrijven moes-
ten worden voorgeleid aan een rechterlijke autoriteit (arrest Brogan and Others); door 
Turkije in 1990, naar aanleiding van geweld gepleegd door de Koerdische afschei-
dingsbeweging PKK; een derde maal door het Verenigd Koninkrijk, in 2001, nu naar 
aanleiding van de aanval door al-Qaeda op New York en Washington op 11 september 
van dat jaar; en opnieuw door Turkije, in juli 2016, naar aanleiding van de poging tot 
staatsgreep gepleegd in de nacht van 15 op 16 juli.
1192 Dit is een wat ongelukkige vertaling van ‘threatening the life of the nation’/‘menaçant la vie de la 
nation’.
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Slechts in het geval van Griekenland is niet aanvaard dat ‘het voortbestaan van 
het land’ in gevaar was. Verondersteld is in de literatuur dat wantrouwen omtrent 
de beweegredenen van de Griekse kolonels hierbij een rol zouden kunnen hebben 
gespeeld.
In het vaststellen van de noodzaak van afwijkingen ingevolge art. 15 heeft de ver-
dragsstaat een zeer ruime beoordelingsmarge (margin of appreciation). Uitgaande van 
de jurisprudentie van de ECRM en het EVRM kan in elk geval worden aangenomen 
dat een ‘noodtoestand’ een bedreiging zal vormen van het ‘voortbestaan van het land’ 
indien de ‘noodtoestand’ voortkomt uit het optreden van een gewapende groep die 
beoogt al dan niet plaatselijk bestaande bestuursstructuren van de verdragsstaat om-
ver te werpen en bereid en in staat blijkt daartoe doelmatig geweld aan te wenden. In 
dergelijke gevallen dreigt immers een niet-internationaal gewapend conflict te ont-
staan. Denkbaar is evenwel dat een ‘noodtoestand’ kan voortkomen uit een aanval 
die geen bedreiging vormt van het staatsgezag over het eigen territoir, zoals een aan-
houdende onderbreking van scheepvaart-of luchtvaartverkeer of energievoorziening 
of van communicatie (in de vorm van bijvoorbeeld een aanhoudende cyberaanval). 
Evenzo zou een zodanige ‘noodtoestand’ kunnen voortkomen uit een natuurramp, 
een onbeheersbare immigratiecrisis, een epidemie of zelfs een onbeheersbare econo-
mische of monetaire crisis. Ook een chaotische nasleep van een oorlog zou een ‘nood-
toestand’ in deze zin kunnen opleveren.
Rechten waarvan geen afwijking is toegestaan
Art. 15 lid 2 somt bepalingen van het EVRM op waarvan in geen geval mag worden 
afgeweken. 
Van art. 2 (recht op leven) mag alleen worden afgeweken in geval van dood als 
gevolg van rechtmatige oorlogshandelingen – hetgeen moet worden begrepen in de 
zin dat indien iemand als gevolg van oorlogshandelingen het leven wordt benomen, 
de rechtmatigheid van die levensbeneming moet worden beoordeeld naar de normen 
van het internationaal humanitair recht.
Van artt. 3 (verbod van foltering), 4 lid 1 (verbod van slavernij en dwangarbeid) 
en 7 (geen straf zonder wet) mag in het geheel niet worden afgeweken. Art. 4 lid 2 
voorziet in een uitzondering van het verbod van dwangarbeid voor onder meer mili-
taire dienstplicht; nu echter het EHRM in Bayatyan v. Armenia heeft vastgesteld dat 
ingevolge art. 9 (vrijheid van gedachte, geweten en godsdienst) een algemeen recht 
op dienstweigering bestaat in geval van oprechte gewetensbezwaren, moet worden 
aangenomen dat voorzover van dergelijke gewetensbezwaren sprake is, ook van art. 4 
lid 2 niet meer mag worden afgeweken.
Art. 3 van het Zesde Protocol, dat de doodstraf afschafte, liet de mogelijkheid van 
toepassing van de doodstraf toe ‘in tijd van oorlog of onmiddellijke oorlogsdreiging’; 
evenwel is sinds de inwerkingtreding van het Dertiende Protocol ook die uitzonde-
ring geschrapt. Tenslotte is het niet toegestaan af te wijken van art. 4 van het Zevende 
Protocol (recht om niet tweemaal te worden berecht of gestraft).
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In de doctrine is wel voorgesteld het discriminatieverbod van art. 14 EVRM te be-
schouwen als een recht waarvan geen afwijking krachtens art. 15 is toegestaan. In dit 
proefschrift wordt gesteld dat daartoe geen noodzaak bestaat: een onderscheid levert 
discriminatie op indien er geen ‘objectieve en redelijke rechtvaardiging’ voor bestaat, 
hetgeen logischerwijze het geval zal zijn als het niet ‘strikt vereist’ is.
Voor zover de ernst van de situatie [afwijkende] maatregelen strikt vereist
Het begrip ‘voor zover de ernst van de situatie [afwijkende] maatregelen strikt vereist’ 
(art. 15 lid 1) doet een strenge toets veronderstellen. Het EVRM blijkt nochtans be-
reid de verdragsstaat ook in de keuze van afwijkende maatregelen een zekere vrijheid 
te laten, mits er voldoende rechtswaarborgen aanwezig zijn. Het is echter ook een 
redelijke eis dat de gekozen maatregelen van dien aard zijn dat zij kunnen bijdragen 
tot een herstel van de normale toestand, en dus tijdelijk.
Niet in strijd met andere verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit het 
internationale recht
De voorwaarde dat ‘[afwijkende maatregelen] niet in strijd zijn met andere verplich-
tingen die voortvloeien uit het internationale recht’ ziet niet alleen op het Handvest 
van de Verenigde Naties, zoals hierboven reeds vermeld, maar ook op internationaal 
humanitair recht (in geval van oorlog) of op andere verdragsverplichtingen die kun-
nen gelden in geval van een ‘noodtoestand’ die niet een gewapend conflict is. Echter 
moet worden aangenomen dat deze voorwaarde niet kan worden geïnterpreteerd in 
de zin dat bepalingen in mensenrechtenverdragen die grotere bescherming bieden 
dan het EVRM door de werking van art. 15 toepasselijk worden; voorbeelden zijn het 
zelfbeschikkingsrecht van volkeren (art. 1 van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake Bur-
gerrechten en Politieke Rechten) en het recht op gescheiden opsluiting van jeugdige 
verdachten (artt. 10 leden 2 en 3 van dat Verdrag).
Formaliteiten
Art. 15 lid 3 EVRM bepaalt dat een verdragsstaat die gebruik maakt van het recht om 
af te wijken, de Secretaris-Generaal van de Raad van Europa volledig op de hoogte 
houdt van de genomen maatregelen en van de beweegredenen daarvoor. Het is geen 
vereiste dat de artikelen van het EVRM waarvan wordt afgeweken ook worden ver-
meld, al is dat vanuit het oogpunt van rechtszekerheid zeker gewenst. Evenmin is het 
een vereiste dat de noodtoestand officieel is afgekondigd.
Conclusie van dit hoofdstuk
Art. 15 EVRM behelst erkenning dat een verdragsstaat niet tot het onmogelijke is 
gehouden; dat daarom, indien de noodzaak zich voordoet, een verdragsstaat zijn 
aansprakelijkheid onder het EVRM kan aanpassen zonder buiten zijn verdragsver-
plichtingen te treden. Tot dusver echter zijn de grenzen van de mogelijkheden die het 
artikel biedt, nog niet opgezocht; in het bijzonder heeft geen verdragsstaat het ooit 
ingeroepen in verband met een ‘oorlog’.
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Hoofdstuk 5: Rechtsmacht van de verdragsstaten
In het algemeen volkenrecht is ‘rechtsmacht’ in vele opzichten een uitvloeisel van soe-
vereiniteit: het omvat in deze zin het recht en de macht eenzijdig wetgevende, uitvoe-
rende en rechtsprekende macht uit te oefenen om gedrag voor te schrijven. Daaren-
tegen nemen de verdragsstaten in art. 1 EVRM de plicht op zich rechten en vrijheden 
te verzekeren aan ‘een ieder die ressorteert onder haar rechtsmacht’; hier bepaalt het 
begrip ‘rechtsmacht’ de kring van gerechtigden jegens wie die plicht bestaat.
Deze beide begrippen van ‘rechtsmacht’ zijn aan elkaar verwant in de zin dat de 
verdragsstaat zowel het recht als de plicht heeft eenzijdig wetgevende, uitvoerende en 
rechtsprekende macht uit te oefenen om mensenrechten te verzekeren.
Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt de grenzen aan de ‘rechtsmacht’ van de verdragsstaat 
begrepen als uitoefening van soevereiniteit. Die bepaalt, voor normale gevallen, de 
grenzen aan de rechtsmacht begrepen in termen van verdragsverplichtingen.
Territoriale en quasi-territoriale rechtsmacht
‘Rechtsmacht’ is in de eerste plaats territoriaal bepaald: het lijdt geen twijfel dat het 
EVRM van toepassing is in het gehele Europese landgebied van de verdragsstaten. 
Echter ook daarbuiten vindt het EVRM toepassing.
Zo voorziet art. 56 (Territoriale werkingssfeer) in de mogelijkheid dat een staat 
door middel van kennisgeving aan de Secretaris-Generaal van de Raad van Europa 
verklaart dat het EVRM ‘van toepassing zal zijn op alle of op één of meer van de 
gebieden voor welker buitenlandse betrekkingen hij verantwoordelijk is’. Volgens de 
klassieke opvatting is deze mogelijkheid geschapen met het oog op overzeese kolo-
niën die het voor volledige toepassing van het EVRM vereiste ‘beschavingsniveau’ 
(naar toenmalige opvatting) nog niet hadden bereikt; volgens sommigen echter is dit 
artikel het gevolg van een schimmige (in het bijzonder Britse) samenzwering bedoeld 
om de bescherming van het EHRM, en in het bijzonder het individueel klachtrecht, 
aan overzeese onderdanen te onthouden. Nederland heeft destijds een verklaring op 
grond van dit artikel ingediend met betrekking tot Suriname (tot 1975 een land in het 
Koninkrijk) en de Nederlandse Antillen maar niet met betrekking tot Nederlands 
Nieuw-Guinea (tot 1962 een land in het Koninkrijk). De Nederlandse verklaring ex 
art. 56 EVRM – en dus het EVRM – geldt thans nog voor Caribisch Nederland (de 
eilanden Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba) en de landen Aruba, Curaçao en Sint Maar-
ten. Het EVRM heeft, of had, op dezelfde basis gelding voor overzeese gebiedsdelen 
en bezittingen van andere Europese verdragsstaten; het geldt niet meer voor vroegere 
koloniën die onafhankelijk zijn geworden.
De meeste verdragsstaten met een zeekust zijn partij bij het Zeerechtverdrag van 
de Verenigde Naties van 1982 en hebben met toepassing van dat verdrag hun rechts-
macht uitgebreid over zeegebieden (territoriale zee, aansluitende zone, exclusieve 
economische zone, archipelwateren, continentaal plat). Turkije is, om reden van 
een maritiem grensgeschil met Griekenland, geen partij bij dat verdrag maar maakt 
wel aanspraak op een territoriale zee. Binnen die onderscheiden zeegebieden is het 
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EVRM van toepassing voor zover het zeerecht de uitoefening toelaat van bevoegdhe-
den die voor toepassing van het EVRM nodig zijn.
Op grond van het Verdrag inzake de internationale burgerluchtvaart, ook wel Ver-
drag van Chicago, heeft elke verdragsstaat ‘volledige en uitsluitende soevereiniteit’ 
over het luchtruim boven zijn territoir, waaronder begrepen het luchtruim boven de 
territoriale zee.
De Overeenkomst ter regeling van de activiteiten van Staten op de maan en andere 
hemellichamen, ook wel het Maanverdrag, sluit nationale soevereiniteit over de maan 
en andere hemellichamen uit.
Ingevolge het Zeerechtverdrag hebben schepen de nationaliteit van de vlaggestaat 
en vallen zij onder diens rechtsmacht. Binnen de territoriale zee heeft de kuststaat be-
perkte bevoegdheden over schepen onder vreemde vlag; op volle zee kan een andere 
staat dan de vlaggestaat slechts rechtsmacht over een schip uitoefenen met toestem-
ming van de vlaggestaat of in bepaalde, bij verdrag of volkenrechtelijk gewoonterecht 
geregelde gevallen (waarbij wat de laatste categorie betreft kan worden gedacht aan 
bestrijding van zeeroverij).
Ingevolge het Verdrag van Chicago hebben luchtvaartuigen de nationaliteit van 
de staat waar zij zijn geregistreerd. Tijdens de vlucht vallen zij onder de uitsluitende 
rechtsmacht van die staat. Het EHRM heeft erkend dat de staat waar een luchtvaar-
tuig is geregistreerd rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM over dat luchtvaartuig 
heeft. Burgerluchtvaartuigen die in vreemde landen aan de grond staan, kunnen door 
de bevoegde autoriteiten van die landen worden betreden; luchtvaartuigen in staats-
dienst genieten volkenrechtelijke immuniteit. 
Ruimtevaartuigen vallen onder de rechtsmacht van de staat waar zij zijn geregis-
treerd. Verreweg de grootste categorie ruimtevaartuigen wordt gevormd door onbe-
mande satellieten; op het moment van schrijven maakt alleen Rusland nog gebruik 
van bemande ruimtevaartuigen.
Ingevolge het Verdrag inzake de beginselen waaraan de activiteiten van Staten zijn 
onderworpen bij het onderzoek en gebruik van de kosmische ruimte, met inbegrip 
van de maan en andere hemellichamen, ook wel het Ruimteverdrag, dragen verdrags-
staten internationale verantwoordelijkheid voor nationale activiteiten in de ruimte, 
ongeacht of die worden uitgevoerd door overheidsorganen of niet-gouvernementele 
actoren.
Voor het International Space Station is bij verdrag een apart regime in het leven 
geroepen; deelnemende staten oefenen rechtsmacht uit over de gedeelten die zij heb-
ben geregistreerd en over de eigen onderdanen. Europese staten nemen gezamenlijk 
deel als ‘Europese partner’ via de Europese Ruimtevaartorganisatie (European Space 
Agency, ESA).
Extraterritoriale rechtsmacht
Typische voorbeelden van extraterritoriale uitoefening van rechtsmacht zijn ambts-
handelingen van diplomatieke en consulaire vertegenwoordigers van de verdragsstaat 
in het buitenland. Evenzo is het gebruikelijk dat een staat rechtsmacht uitoefent over 
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naar het buitenland uitgezonden militairen. Een gedetailleerde regeling is gegeven 
in het Verdrag tussen de Staten die Partij zijn bij het Noord-Atlantisch Verdrag en de 
overige Staten die deelnemen aan het Partnerschap voor de Vrede nopens de rechts-
positie van hun krijgsmachten (NATO-statusverdrag), dat ook voorziet in de uitoe-
fening van rechtsmacht over de gezinsleden van uitgezonden militairen. In dergelijke 
gevallen is het de zendstaat die rechtsmacht uitoefent in de zin van art. 1 EVRM, niet 
de ontvangende staat.
Een verdragsstaat die met toestemming van een andere staat een eigen nationaal 
rechterlijk orgaan opzet op het grondgebied van een andere staat, oefent eveneens 
rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM uit. Tot dusver is het enige voorbeeld van een 
dergelijk rechterlijk orgaan het Schotse tribunaal dat in Nederland werd opgezet om 
Libische verdachten van een aanslag op een Amerikaans verkeersvliegtuig naar Schots 
recht te berechten.
Er is geen uitoefening van extraterritoriale rechtsmacht als een staat rechters ter 
beschikking stelt van een andere staat om zitting te nemen in een rechterlijk orgaan 
van die staat, zoals Frankrijk en Spanje deden aan Andorra of ook nu nog Oostenrijk 
en Zwitserland doen aan Liechtenstein. Op vergelijkbare wijze maken nationale ge-
rechten van Bosnië-Herzegovina en Kosovo gebruik van buitenlandse rechters.
Uitzetting van een vreemdeling of uitlevering van een verdachte kan ertoe leiden 
dat de betrokkene in de ontvangende staat wordt blootgesteld aan behandeling in 
strijd met artt. 2 of 3 EVRM. Ook al treedt het ongewenste gevolg op in het buiten-
land, van extraterritoriale uitoefening van rechtsmacht is in deze gevallen geen sprake. 
Rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM komt in het geding doordien de afweging 
door de uitzettende of uitleverende verdragsstaat wordt genomen.
Conclusie van dit hoofdstuk
Een verdragsstaat oefent rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM niet alleen op het ei-
gen grondgebied uit, maar ook daarbuiten, zelfs in sommige gevallen op het grondge-
bied van vreemde staten. Ook op deze plaatsen kan ‘hard power’ worden uitgeoefend.
Hoofdstuk 6: Typologie van voor het EVRM relevante uitoefening van 
rechtsmacht in ‘hard power’-situaties
In dit hoofdstuk wordt gezocht naar de grenzen van de rechtsmacht van de verdrags-
staten in gevallen van daadwerkelijke uitoefening van ‘hard power’.
Uitoefening van ‘ hard power’ door verdragsstaten op het eigen 
grondgebied
Indien een verdragsstaat ‘hard power’ op het eigen grondgebied, is er geen twijfel dat 
hij rechtsmacht uitoefent in de zin van art. 1 EVRM. Voorbeelden zijn het optreden 
van de Ierse Republiek tegen ‘gewapende groepen zich noemende het Ierse Republi-
keinse Leger (IRA)’ in de jaren ’50 van de vorige eeuw; het optreden van het Verenigd 
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Koninkrijk tegen Ierse nationalisten in Noord-Ierland en Gibraltar, maar ook tegen 
Noord-Ierse loyalisten in Noord-Ierland; Turks optreden in zuidoost Turkije tegen de 
gewapende vleugel van de Koerdische afscheidingsbeweging PKK; en Russisch mili-
tair optreden tegen opstandelingen in de noordelijke Kaukasus. In deze gevallen is 
rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM door de betrokken verdragsstaten ook zonder 
meer erkend.
Problematischer liggen gevallen waarin de verdragsstaat rechtsmacht ontkent om-
dat hij zijn gezag niet zonder meer in zijn gehele territoir kan doen gelden. De aan-
name in dergelijke gevallen is dat de verdragsstaat in beginsel rechtsmacht in de zin 
van art. 1 EVRM uitoefent. Zo werd aangenomen dat Georgië de plicht had de on-
wettige gevangenhouding van een individuele verzoeker in het zeer autonome, maar 
niet afgescheiden, Adzjarië te beëindigen (arrest Assanidze v. Georgia). Moldova is 
als territoriale staat in beginsel krachtens art. 1 EVRM aansprakelijk voor verdrags-
schendingen in het – afgescheiden, maar niet als zelfstandige staat erkende – Trans-
dnjestrië, ook al is onbestreden dat Moldova daar geen gezag kan doen gelden door de 
Russische aanwezigheid aldaar (onder meer de arresten Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova 
and Russia [GC], Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Catan and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia [GC], Mozer v. Moldova and Russia (GC)).
Het EVRM heeft echter aanvaard dat Servië geen rechtsmacht uitoefent in Kos-
ovo, nu de onafhankelijkheid van Kosovo, hoewel door Servië bestreden, wortelt in 
het internationaal recht en heeft te gelden als ‘objectieve beperking’ van het Servische 
gezag (ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Azemi v. Serbia (dec.)).
Onwettige handelingen door actoren van derde staten met instemming 
van een EVRM-verdragsstaat
Hoewel Europese staten over het algemeen binnen de grenzen van de eigen wet zijn 
gebleven bij de bestrijding van terrorisme, hebben de terroristische aanvallen van 
al-Qaeda op New York en Washington van 11 september 2001 de Verenigde Staten 
ertoe geleid verdachten van terroristische daden buiten het eigen territoir gevangen 
te houden en bloot te stellen aan behandeling die op Amerikaans territoir naar Ame-
rikaans recht niet toelaatbaar zouden zijn. Ook op het grondgebied van EVRM-ver-
dragsstaten zijn dergelijke verdachten door Amerikaanse overheidsdienaren ge-
vangen gehouden en blootgesteld aan behandeling die schending van art. 3 EVRM 
oplevert, dan wel vanuit het grondgebied van die verdragsstaten naar derde landen 
gebracht om daar aan dergelijke behandeling te worden blootgesteld. De betrokken 
verdragsstaten hebben hieraan zo niet hun medewerking dan toch tenminste hun stil-
zwijgende instemming verleend. De aansprakelijkheid krachtens art. 1 EVRM van de 
betrokken verdragsstaten wordt aangenomen niet alleen voor het handelen van hun 
eigen autoriteiten, maar ook voor dat van de Amerikaanse actoren, zelfs op vreemd 
grondgebied (arresten El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 
Al Nashiri v. Poland, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy).
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Militair optreden als uitoefening van extraterritoriale rechtsmacht
Militaire aanwezigheid op vreemd grondgebied
Het meest omstreden, voor wat betreft art. 1 EVRM, zijn die zaken geweest waar-
in een verdragsstaat hetzij militair aanwezig is geweest op grondgebied waarop een 
vreemde staat aanspraak maakt, hetzij buiten het eigen grondgebied kinetisch geweld 
heeft gebruikt.
Van rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM is sprake indien een verdragsstaat over 
een gebied buiten de eigen landsgrenzen ‘effectieve controle’ uitoefent, ongeacht of 
hij dat rechtstreeks doet met eigen militaire middelen dan wel middellijk via een on-
dergeschikte lokale overheid. Waar een verdragsstaat zodanige controle uitoefent over 
het grondgebied van een andere verdragsstaat, is de eerste verdragsstaat voor schen-
dingen van het EVRM aansprakelijk nu hij de tweede verdragsstaat belet zelf aan zijn 
verplichtingen krachtens art. 1 EVRM te voldoen; ware het anders, dan zou er een 
rechtsvacuüm ontstaan. Aldus oefent Turkije rechtsmacht uit in Noord-Cyprus (ar-
resten Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), Cyprus v. Turkey (merits) [GC]), 
de Russische Federatie in Transdnjestrië (arresten Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and 
Russia [GC], Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Catan and Others v. Moldova 
and Russia [GC], Mozer v. Moldova and Russia (GC)) en Armenië in Nagorno-Ka-
rabach (arrest Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (merits) (GC)).
Luchtaanval op vreemd grondgebied
Bij een luchtaanval op een televisiestation in Belgrado, uitgevoerd door een vliegtuig 
van de NATO, vielen doden en gewonden. Aangenomen moet worden dat gepoogd 
is het maken van slachtoffers te vermijden. Een van de gewonden en een aantal na-
bestaanden van dodelijke slachtoffers dienden een verzoekschrift bij het EHRM in, 
gericht tegen de NAVO-landen die tevens EVRM-verdragsstaat waren.
Het EHRM stelde vast dat geen verdragsstaat tot dusver kennisgeving van afwij-
king ingevolge art. 15 EVRM had gedaan en aldus blijk had gegeven militair handelen 
buiten de eigen grenzen te beschouwen als uitoefening van rechtsmacht in de zin van 
art. 1 EVRM. De vraag was derhalve of of de aanval op zichzelf voldoende was om de 
slachtoffers binnen het bereik van het EVRM te brengen. 
Het EHRM oordeelde van niet. De aanname dat eenieder die nadelige consequen-
ties ondervond van een aan een verdragsstaat toe te rekenen handeling, waar ook ter 
wereld die handeling was uitgevoerd of het gevolg ervan ondergaan, door die hande-
ling zelf binnen de rechtsmacht van de betrokken verdragsstaat werd gebracht, vond 
geen steun in de tekst van art. 1. Het EVRM was een multilateraal verdrag, bestemd 
om te gelden binnen het rechtsgebied (espace juridique) van de verdragsstaten; de Fe-
derale Republiek Joegoslavië, waarvan Belgrado destijds de hoofdstad was, viel daar 
duidelijk buiten (ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Banković and Others v. Belgium and 
Others (dec.) (GC)).
Van verschillende zijden is er kritiek op deze beslissing geuit. Sommigen zijn van 
opvatting dat het EHRM in elk geval rechtsmacht had moeten aannemen nu door 
militair optreden van verdragsstaten schade was ontstaan. Anderen menen dat het 
329Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
EHRM het schema van de artikelen inzake staatsaansprakelijkheid voor internatio-
naalrechtelijk onrechtmatige daden (Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts) van de International Law Commission had moeten volgen en eerst 
had moeten vaststellen of de aanval aan de verdragsstaten kon worden toegerekend 
alvorens de rechtmatigheid ervan te toetsen. Weer anderen beschouwen de beslissing 
als politiek van aard en reeds daarom verwerpelijk.
Dit proefschrift verdedigt de opvatting dat de Banković and Others-beslissing 
steunt op de vaststellingen dat, ten eerste, de Europese NATO-landen geen ‘effectieve 
controle’ over Belgrado uitoefenden en dat ook niet beoogden te doen, en ten twee-
de, dat zij geen wetgevende, rechtsprekende of uitvoerende macht over de onfortuin-
lijke slachtoffers hadden uitgeoefend en dit ook niet hadden beoogd – integendeel, 
juist hadden geprobeerd zulks te vermijden.
Inval in buitenlands grondgebied
In Issa and Others v. Turkey deed het EHRM de principiële uitspraak dat een ver-
dragsstaat aansprakelijk kon worden gehouden voor schendingen van verdragsrech-
ten van personen die zich weliswaar op het grondgebied van een vreemde staat bevon-
den, maar ten aanzien van wie kon worden vastgesteld dat zij zich binnen het gezag en 
de controle bevonden van personen die namens die verdragsstaat handelen (agents). 
In casu kon zulks echter niet worden vastgesteld.
Sommige schrijvers hebben deze beslissing geïnterpreteerd als zou het EHRM zich 
hebben afgewend van Banković and Others. Vastgesteld zal echter moeten worden dat 
die opvatting achterhaald is door latere jurisprudentie, die weer ondubbelzinnig de 
lijn van Banković and Others volgt.
In Isaak v. Turkey werd rechtsmacht van Turkije aangenomen naar aanleiding van 
een incident waarbij een demonstrant in de (door de Verenigde Naties gecontroleer-
de) bufferzone tussen de ‘Turkse Republiek Noord-Cyprus’ en de republiek Cyprus 
werd aangevallen en gedood door een groep die althans gedeeltelijk bestond uit Turk-
se of Turks-Cyprische militairen.
Uitoefenen van rechtsmacht in de territoriale wateren van een 
vreemde staat
In Hassan and Others v. France heeft het EHRM een resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad 
van de Verenigde Naties, genomen onder hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest van de 
Verenigde Naties, als voldoende rechtsgrondslag aanvaard voor de aanhouding van 
zeerovers in de territoriale zee van Somalië. De Franse regering heeft het bestaan van 
Franse rechtsmacht over de aangehouden zeerovers niet bestreden.
Gerichte dodelijke aanval buiten de eigen landsgrenzen
In een zaak waarin het EHRM had te oordelen over gericht geweervuur door Turk-
se of Turks-Cyprische militairen die zich binnen de grens van de ‘Turkse Republiek 
Noord-Cyprus’ bevonden, is Turkse rechtsmacht ten aanzien van de slachtoffers aan-
genomen ook al bevonden die zich aan de andere kant van de grens en dus buiten 
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het door Turkije beheerste grondgebied (Andreou v. Turkey). In een later verschenen 
arrest, waarin het EHRM niet kon vaststellen of een door Turkse of Turks-Cypri-
sche militairen gericht neergeschoten slachtoffer zich binnen de ‘Turkse Republiek 
Noord-Cyprus’ bevond of in de bufferzone, heeft het EHRM Turkse rechtsmacht 
aangenomen aangezien immers het slachtoffer in elk geval zich in de macht van die 
Turkse of Turks-Cyprische militairen had bevonden (Solomou v. Turkey).
Dit proefschrift verdedigt, gebaseerd op deze jurisprudentie, de opvatting dat een 
gerichte aanval door een verdragsstaat op een slachtoffer dat zich buiten de grenzen 
van die verdragsstaat bevindt, hoe ook uitgevoerd (bijvoorbeeld door vergiftiging 
of door middel van een onbemand vliegtuig (‘drone’)), aanleiding vormt om rechts-
macht van die verdragsstaat aan te nemen. 
Cyber-aanval
Of een cyber-aanval een zodanige aanval oplevert, is in deze visie een vraag die naar de 
feitelijke omstandigheden moet worden beantwoord. Als de aanval niet een gerichte 
aanval is die is bedoeld om slachtoffers te maken, is bij de huidige stand van de juris-
prudentie van het EHRM denkbaar dat Banković and Others zal moeten worden ge-
volgd en geen rechtsmacht van de aanvallende staat zal kunnen worden aangenomen.
Vredeshandhaving en vredesinterventies
Internationale troepenmacht in Irak
In 2004, enkele maanden nadat hij door Amerikaanse troepen was gevangengeno-
men, wendde de voormalige Iraakse leider Saddam Hussein zich tot het EHRM 
in een poging zijn overlevering aan de nieuwe Iraakse regering te voorkomen. Zijn 
klacht was gericht tegen alle Europese verdragsstaten die deelnamen aan de bezet-
ting van Irak. Het EHRM echter stelde vast dat van Europese betrokkenheid bij zijn 
gevangenneming, gevangenhouding en dreigende overdracht niet was gebleken; het 
enkele feit van deelname aan een internationale troepenmacht was niet voldoende om 
rechtsmacht van verdragsstaten aan te nemen (ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Saddam 
Hussein v. Albania and Others (dec.)).
Verenigd Koninkrijk in Irak
Het arrest Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom is op het ogenblik leidend voor 
wat betreft extraterritoriale rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM. De casus betrof 
zes Iraakse slachtoffers van Brits militair optreden in Irak. Gebaseerd op eerdere juris-
prudentie kwam het EHRM tot een als volgt samen te vatten hoofdregel:
a)  Wanneer een verdragsstaat, middels personen die namens die verdragsstaat han-
delen, over een individu controle en gezag (control and authority) uitoefent, en 
derhalve rechtsmacht, is die verdragsstaat krachtens art. 1 EVRM verplicht aan 
die individu de in de Eerste Titel van het EVRM rechten en vrijheden te verze-
keren die voor de situatie van die individu relevant zijn. (In het geval van een 
gedetineerde kan men denken aan onder meer artt. 3 en 5 lid 4). In die zin zijn 
de verdragsrechten derhalve deelbaar en aanpasbaar aan de omstandigheden van 
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het geval (‘In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided and tailo-
red”’).
b)  Er bestaat ook rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM indien als gevolg van al 
dan niet legaal militair optreden een verdragsstaat effectieve controle uitoefent 
over gebied buiten zijn landsgrenzen. De verplichting in zodanig gebied de in 
het EVRM vastgestelde rechten en plichten te verzekeren volgt uit het feit zelf 
dat die controle wordt uitgeoefend, of dat nu rechtstreeks gebeurt, door de ei-
gen strijdkrachten van de verdragsstaat, of via een ondergeschikt lokaal gezag. 
Waar feitelijk wordt vastgesteld dat dergelijke heerschappij over zodanig gebied 
bestaat, is het niet nodig te onderzoeken of de verdragsstaat de details van het 
beleid of het optreden van het ondergeschikte lokale gezag controleert. Het en-
kele gegeven dat het lokale gezag voortbestaat als gevolg van militaire en andere 
steun van de verdragsstaat houdt in dat de verdragsstaat voor diens beleid en op-
treden verantwoordelijk is. De controlerende verdragsstaat heeft krachtens art. 1 
EVRM de verantwoordelijkheid binnen het door hem gecontroleerde gebied 
de materiele rechten neergelegd in het EVRM en de door hem geratificeerde 
Protocollen in hun volle omvang te verzekeren. De primaire indicator van het 
bestaan van ‘controle over een gebied’ is de sterkte van de militaire aanwezigheid 
van de verdragsstaat in dat gebied; de mate waarin zijn militaire, economische 
en politieke steun aan het lokale gezag hem in het gebied invloed en controle 
verschaffen kan ook relevant zijn. Of een verdragsstaat buiten zijn eigen territo-
rium effectieve controle uitoefent, is een feitelijke vraag die van geval tot geval 
moet worden beantwoord.
c)  Niettemin blijft het EVRM een wetgevend verdrag van Europese openbare 
orde. Derhalve, als een verdragsstaat territoir van een andere verdragsstaat bezet, 
en daar ter plaatse dus rechtsmacht uitoefent, is het de verantwoordelijkheid van 
de bezettende verdragsstaat in het bezette gebied de in het EVRM vastgestel-
de rechten en plichten in hun volle omvang te verzekeren, eenvoudig omdat er 
anders binnen het rechtsgebied van het EVRM een vacuüm zou bestaan in de 
beschermingsomvang ervan.
Nederland in Irak
Uit Jaloud v. the Netherlands volgt dat de in Al-Skeini geformuleerde hoofdregel ook 
van toepassing is op een verdragsstaat wiens strijdkrachten aan een bezetting deelne-
men in ondergeschiktheid aan een meerdere behorend tot de strijdkrachten van een 
andere verdragsstaat.
Uitoefening van rechtsmacht op het territoir van een vreemde staat met 
diens instemming
Abdullah Öcalan, leider van de PKK, werd na zijn vlucht naar Kenya op het vliegveld 
van Nairobi door de Kenyaanse autoriteiten overgeleverd aan Turkse functionaris-
sen in een Turks vliegtuig. Turkije had rechtsmacht vanaf het moment dat Öcalan in 
het vliegtuig was aangehouden. Hoewel dit zonder Kenyaanse medewerking niet had 
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kunnen gebeuren, was de Turkse rechtsmacht territoriaal in de zin dat hij de nationa-
liteit van het vliegtuig volgde (Öcalan v. Turkey (GC)).
Van rechtstreekse uitoefening van rechtsmacht in de zin van controle over indi-
viduen was sprake in Ali Samatar and Others v. France, waar Franse troepen met de 
uitdrukkelijke toestemming van de Somalische regering op Somalisch grondgebied 
zeerovers aanhielden die een Frans schip met bemanning hadden gegijzeld. De zeero-
vers werden naar Frankrijk overgebracht om daar te worden berecht.
De status van ‘bezetter’
In Al-Skeini and Others is vastgesteld dat het Verenigd Koninkrijk, naast de Verenig-
de Staten, ‘bezetter’ in de zin van artt. 42 en 43 van het Landoorlogsreglement was 
krachtens resolutie 1483 van de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties. Evenwel is 
de status van ‘bezetter’ in deze zin niet bepalend voor rechtsmacht krachtens art. 1 
EVRM: het EHRM heeft Turkse rechtsmacht kunnen aannemen ten aanzien van 
Noord-Cyprus, en Russische ten aanzien van Transdnjestrië, zonder vast te stellen dat 
Turkije en Rusland ‘bezetters’ waren. Zo ook stond in Jaloud het gegeven dat Neder-
land geen ‘bezetter’ was er niet aan in de weg Nederlandse rechtsmacht aan te nemen.
Indien een verdragsstaat rechtsmacht uitoefent over gebied dat niet behoort tot 
het territoir van een andere verdragsstaat, zijn (op grond van de in Al-Skeini ge-
formuleerde hoofdregel, zie aldaar onder a) de door de verdragsstaat te verzekeren 
EVRM-verdragsrechten tot op zekere hoogte deelbaar en aanpasbaar aan de omstan-
digheden van het geval. Desalniettemin moet worden aangenomen dat indien een 
verdragsstaat ‘bezetter’ is in de zin van het Landoorlogsreglement, de verplichting ex 
art. 43 van het Landoorlogsreglement ‘behoudens volstrekte verhindering’ de in het 
bezette land geldende wetten te eerbiedigen wijkt voor de verdragsverplichtingen die 
voortvloeien uit het EVRM.
Conclusie van dit hoofdstuk
Rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM is in beginsel territoriaal bepaald; extrater-
ritoriaal kan rechtsmacht bestaan wanneer een verdragsstaat middels personen die 
namens die verdragsstaat handelen over een individu controle en gezag uitoefent 
(State agent authority and control) of indien als gevolg van al dan niet legaal militair 
optreden een verdragsstaat effectieve controle uitoefent over gebied buiten zijn lands-
grenzen (effective control over an area).
Een aanval buiten het grondgebied van enige verdragsstaat schept ten aanzien van 
een eventueel slachtoffer echter slechts rechtsmacht in de zin van art. 1 EVRM, als het 
gaat om gerichte geweldsuitoefening tegen personen. Aan de gevolgtrekking dat een 
eventueel toevallig slachtoffer de bescherming van het EVRM moet missen indien 
een aanval niet rechtstreeks tegen personen gericht is, valt niet te ontkomen.
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Hoofdstuk 7: Bevoegdheid van het EHRM
Ingevolge art. 32 van het EVRM heeft het EHRM zelf de competentie te beslissen of 
het bevoegd is. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt in welke gevallen de uitoefening van ‘hard 
power’ buiten de bevoegdheid van het EHRM kan worden gehouden.
Territoriale beperking
In de tekst van het EVRM geldend tot de inwerkingtreding van het Elfde Protocol 
werd voorzien in afzonderlijke aanvaarding van het individueel klachtrecht (art. 25 
(oud)) en de rechtsmacht van het EHRM (art. 46 (oud)). Turkije heeft beide aan-
vaard, maar met beperkingen van de strekking dat zodanige aanvaarding slechts zou 
gelden met betrekking tot het eigen grondgebied en derhalve niet met betrekking tot 
de ‘Turkse Republiek Noord-Cyprus’.
Deze beperkingen zijn door het EHRM niet aanvaardbaar geacht, reeds omdat 
artt. 25 (oud) en 46 (oud) niet in dergelijke beperkingen voorzagen. Bovendien zou 
de mogelijkheid van dergelijke beperkingen de ECRM en het EHRM in de uitoe-
fening van hun taken belemmeren en de effectiviteit van het EVRM zelf aantasten 
(arrest Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections)).
Deze uitspraak is thans slechts van historisch belang: aanvaarding van het indivi-
dueel klachtrecht is nu verplicht bij ratificatie van het EVRM.
Voorbehouden 
De mogelijkheid bestaat voor staten bij ondertekening of ratificatie van het EVRM 
voorbehouden te maken. Het is echter aan het EHRM de geldigheid van dergelijke 
voorbehouden te beoordelen.
Een voorbehoud van Moldova van de strekking dat het EVRM niet gold voor het 
afgescheiden gebied Transdnjestrië werd door het EHRM afgewezen als te verstrek-
kend (ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (dec.) 
[GC]), evenals een voorbehoud van Azerbaijan met betrekking tot grondgebied ‘be-
zet door de Republiek Armenië’ (ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan 
(dec.) (GC)).
Frankrijk heeft bij ratificatie een voorbehoud gemaakt van de strekking, ten eer-
ste, dat Franse wetgeving met betrekking tot het uitroepen van de staat van beleg en 
de noodtoestand geacht moest worden niet in strijd te zijn met het doel van art. 15 
EVRM, en ten tweede, dat de uitdrukking ‘voor zover de ernst van de situatie deze 
maatregelen strikt vereist’ (art. 15 lid 1 EVRM) ‘geen afbreuk zou doen aan de [grond-
wettelijke] bevoegdheden van de President van de Franse Republiek de door de situ-
atie vereiste maatregelen te nemen’. De geldigheid van dit voorbehoud wordt in de 
doctrine betwijfeld op de grond dat het beoogt het EHRM te beletten ten aanzien 
van een centrale bepaling van het EVRM zijn controlerende taak uit te voeren en dus 
in strijd komt met het systeem zelf van het EVRM.
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Conflicterende internationaalrechtelijke verplichtingen
Op grond van art. 53 van het Weens Verdragenverdrag wijkt een verdragsverplichting 
voor een regel van volkenrechtelijk dwingend recht (ius cogens). Dit proefschrift stelt 
als voorbeeld van een dergelijke regel het genocideverbod, dat tevens aan staten de 
verplichting oplegt daders van genocide uit te leveren of zelf te berechten.
Op grond van art. 28 van het Weens Verdragenverdrag wijkt een latere verdragsver-
plichting voor een eerdere. Zo kon het Verenigd Koninkrijk zich bij zijn weigering de 
Duitse oorlogsmisdadiger Rudolf Hess vrij te laten, beroepen op de overeenkomst met 
de overige geallieerde bezetters van het naoorlogse Duitsland (Frankrijk, de Sovjetu-
nie en de Verenigde Staten) op grond waarvan een beslissing veroordeelde gevangenen 
vrij te laten uit de gevangenis van Spandau door de vier geallieerden bij eenstemmig-
heid moest worden genomen; de Sovjetunie heeft steeds geweigerd in te stemmen met 
de vrijlating van Hess, ook toen hij de enige nog overgebleven gevangene was.
Toen echter het Verenigd Koninkrijk zich beriep op een afspraak om van gewelds-
misdrijven verdachte Iraakse Baath-leden ter berechting over te dragen aan Irak, met 
het risico dat zij ter dood zouden worden veroordeeld, kwam het EHRM tot de vast-
stelling dat het EVRM als ouder verdrag – en bovendien als mensenrechtenverdrag 
– voorging (arrest Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom).
Conclusie van dit hoofdstuk
De enige territoriale beperking die thans nog mogelijk is, is het niet uitbreiden van 
de territoriale rechtsmacht van de verdragsstaat met toepassing van art. 57 EVRM. 
Voorbehouden zijn niet meer mogelijk, nu het EVRM in werking is. De opsomming 
van de rechten en vrijheden neergelegd in het EVRM dateert uit 1950; de protocol-
len zijn weliswaar later in werking getreden, maar het zal moeilijk zijn conflicterende 
verdragsverplichtingen te vinden van zodanige ouderdom dat zij moeten voorgaan.
Hoofdstuk 8: Toerekening
De door het EHRM gevolgde logica
In de logica van het EVRM zoals die zich heeft ontwikkeld, gaat de vraag naar ‘rechts-
macht’ in de zin van art. 1 EVRM vóór die naar toerekening van een eventueel han-
delen of nalaten aan de verwerende verdragsstaat. Hierin verschilt de logica van het 
EVRM van die van de artikelen inzake staatsaansprakelijkheid voor internationaal-
rechtelijk onrechtmatige daden van de International Law Commission.
Dit kan ertoe leiden dat wordt vastgesteld dat een bepaalde verdragsstaat weliswaar 
‘rechtsmacht’ heeft, en dus in beginsel de verplichting de in het EVRM neergelegde 
rechten te waarborgen, maar niettemin een bepaald handelen of nalaten niet aan die 
verdragsstaat wordt toegerekend. Voorbeeld is Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Rus-
sia (GC), waarin wordt vastgesteld dat de rechtsmacht van Moldova als territoriale 
staat zich weliswaar uitstrekt over Transdnjestrië, maar niettemin (gegeven de Russi-
sche militaire overmacht ter plaatse) een schending van het EVRM niet aan Moldova 
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wordt toegerekend voor zolang als Moldova zich redelijke inspanningen getroost om 
de verdragsschendingen zoveel mogelijk teniet te doen.
Daarentegen worden – nadat is vastgesteld dat de Russische Federatie in Transdn-
jestrië rechtsmacht heeft – de vastgestelde verdragsschendingen aan die verdragsstaat 
toegerekend, nu de ‘Moldavische Republiek Transdnjestrië’, die met Russische steun 
is gesticht, zo niet onder rechtstreeks gezag van de Russische Federatie dan toch ten-
minste onder haar beslissende invloed staat en haar voortbestaan dankt aan Russische 
militaire, economische, financiële en politieke steun. Dat zo zijnde maakt het geen 
verschil dat na een bepaalde datum de Russische Federatie zich niet meer rechtstreeks 
in de feitelijke situatie van de slachtoffers van de schending heeft gemengd.
Toerekening van extraterritoriale uitoefening van ‘ hard power’
In Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom stelde de Britse regering dat de gevangenhouding 
van de betrokkene in Irak was toe te rekenen aan de multinationale troepenmacht die 
ter plaatse optrad ingevolge een bindend besluit van de Veiligheidsraad van de Ver-
enigde Naties. Het EHRM stelde vast dat het Verenigd Koninkrijk met de Verenigde 
Staten het opperbevel over die troepenmacht voerde; hoewel de Verenigde Staten ver-
slag uitbrachten aan de Veiligheidsraad, viel noch de multinationale troepenmacht, 
noch de bezettingsautoriteit in enig aspect van zijn handelen onder het gezag van de 
Verenigde Naties.
In Jaloud v. the Netherlands passeerde het EHRM het verweer dat de beklaagde 
handelwijze binnen de rechtsmacht van het Verenigd Koninkrijk viel (al dan niet ge-
zamenlijk met de Verenigde Staten) nu de Nederlandse militaire aanwezigheid on-
dergeschikt was aan een Britse commandant. Vervolgens stelde het afzonderlijk de 
toerekenbaarheid van die handelwijze aan Nederland vast.
Toerekening van uitoefening van ‘ hard power’ door vreemde staten 
binnen het grondgebied van de verdragsstaat
Indien een verdragsstaat binnen zijn grondgebied meewerkt aan handelen in strijd 
met het EVRM door een niet-verdragsstaat of dergelijk handelen oogluikend toe-
staat, is zulk handelen toerekenbaar aan de verdragsstaat.
Van zodanige toerekening is sprake in de arresten El-Masri, Al Nashiri en 
Abu-Zubaydah, ten aanzien van ernstige schendingen gepleegd door functionarissen 
in dienst van de Verenigde Staten jegens personen die werden verdacht van terroris-
tische activiteiten.
Betrokkenheid van andere organismen dan de verdragsstaat zelf
Private militaire bedrijven
Staten vertrouwen soms aan private ondernemingen taken toe die traditioneel aan de 
eigen strijdkrachten toevielen. Het is bekend dat die taken soms de uitoefening van 
geweld met zich mee kunnen brengen. Bekend is het Blackwater-incident, een schiet-
partij in Baghdad in 2007 waarbij een Amerikaans privaat militair bedrijf betrokken 
was en waarbij zeventien doden vielen onder de plaatselijke bevolking.
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In beginsel zijn dergelijke private bedrijven onderworpen aan plaatselijk recht, 
juist omdat zij private bedrijven zijn. Van deze hoofdregel kan worden afgeweken bij 
overeenkomst tussen de staat die van hun diensten gebruik maakt en de territoriale 
staat, indien die een andere is, of bij beslissing van een bezettingsautoriteit.
Het EHRM heeft in het verband van de opsporing van strafbare feiten in het com-
mune strafprocesrecht vastgesteld dat een verdragsstaat zijn aansprakelijkheid niet 
kan ontlopen door opsporingstaken toe te vertrouwen aan particulieren. Indien deze 
lijn wordt doorgetrokken naar het gebruik van private militaire bedrijven, is de ge-
volgtrekking dat de verdragsstaat die van dergelijke bedrijven gebruik maakt de ver-
antwoordelijkheid heeft te zorgen voor een wettelijk kader dat vergezeld gaat van 
behoorlijk toezicht en eventuele strafsancties om schendingen van het EVRM tegen 
te gaan en toegang te geven tot rechtsmiddelen.
Tot dusver is regelgeving op internationaal niveau beperkt gebleven tot een 
niet-bindende aanbeveling, het Montreux Document uit 2008; een ISO-norm, ISO 
18788; en zelfregulering door de bedrijfstak zelf.
Er wordt wel gesteld dat een verdragsstaat op grond van het EVRM verplicht is 
schepen onder zijn vlag te beschermen tegen de bekende gevaren van zeeroverij. De 
gevolgtrekking is dat een eventueel nalaten aan die verplichting te voldoen, aan de 
verdragsstaat is toe te rekenen.
Vanuit het oogpunt van art. 1 EVRM is het geen probleem dat een vlaggestaat ei-
gen militairen op koopvaardijschepen plaatst: de vlaggestaat heeft rechtsmacht als 
vlaggestaat en als zendstaat van de betrokken militairen.
De Internationale Maritieme Organisatie IMO heeft richtlijnen gepubliceerd voor 
het gebruik van private militaire bedrijven aan boord van koopvaardijschepen. Indien 
daartoe wordt overgegaan, hebben in beginsel de vlaggestaat en eventueel de kuststaat 
en de havenstaat rechtsmacht overeenkomstig de regels van algemeen zeerecht.
Verenigde Naties
Bij resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties (resolutie 1244 van 
10 juni 1999), vastgesteld ingevolge hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest van de Verenig-
de Naties, werd besloten tot het instellen van een bestuurslichaam (UNMIK) en een 
militaire aanwezigheid (KFOR) in Kosovo onder opzicht van de Verenigde Naties.
In 2000 werd een kind gedood en een ander voor zijn leven verminkt door de ont-
ploffing van een clusterbomeenheid. Het opruimen van onontplofte mijnen en muni-
tie viel onder de eindverantwoordelijkheid van UNMIK, hoewel KFOR bij de daad-
werkelijke ruiming was betrokken. Bij het EHRM werd geklaagd tegen Frankrijk, nu 
in het betrokken gedeelte van Kosovo KFOR opereerde onder Franse leiding. In 2001 
werd een burger gevangengenomen op bevel van de commandant van KFOR; zijn ge-
vangenhouding werd later door een opvolgende commandant verlengd. De comman-
dant van KFOR was aanvankelijk een Franse officier en later een Noorse. Geklaagd 
werd tegen Frankrijk en Noorwegen.
Het EHRM kwam tot de vaststelling dat KFOR bevoegdheden uitoefende die de 
Veiligheidsraad had gedelegeerd krachtens hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest van de 
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Verenigde Naties en dat UNMIK een hulporgaan (subsidiary body) van de Verenig-
de Naties was. In deze omstandigheden diende toerekening plaats te vinden aan de 
Verenigde Naties, niet aan de verdragsstaten Frankrijk en Noorwegen. Het EHRM 
verwees hierbij naar de ontwerptekst van de International Law Commission inzake 
de aansprakelijkheid van internationale organisaties (Draft Articles on the Responsibi-
lity of International Organisations (DARIO)) (ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Behrami 
and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (dec.) (GC)).
De reden waarom dezelfde benadering niet is gevolgd ten aanzien van Irak is dat de 
door de Verenigde Staten en het Verenigd Koninkrijk geleide bezettingsautoriteit en 
bezettingsmacht reeds ter plaatse waren op het tijdstip dat de Veiligheidsraad aan hun 
aanwezigheid zijn goedkeuring hechtte; bovendien was aan de Verenigde Staten het 
verzoek gedaan regelmatig verslag uit te brengen aan de Veiligheidsraad, maar had de 
Veiligheidsraad over de bezettingsautoriteit en de bezettingsmacht geen gezag (arrest 
Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom).
Internationaal opgelegde quasi-inheemse instellingen
Bosnië-Herzegovina
Op 21 november 1995 kwam onder zware internationale druk het Dayton-akkoord 
tot stand, waarbij een eind werd gemaakt aan de oorlog in Bosnië-Herzegovina. On-
dertekenaars waren de Republiek Bosnië-Herzegovina, de Republiek Kroatië en de 
Federale Republiek Joegoslavië (bestaande uit de voormalige Joegoslavische deelre-
publieken Servië en Montenegro). Aan het akkoord is een aantal bijlagen gehecht; 
deze bijlagen zijn apart ondertekend, in de meeste gevallen door de nieuw op te rich-
ten staat Bosnië-Herzegovina (rechtsopvolger van de Republiek Bosnië-Herzegovi-
na) en de beide ‘entiteiten’ waaruit de staat is samengesteld, de Federatie Bosnië-Her-
zegovina en de Servische Republiek (ook wel Republika Srpska). Het akkoord trad in 
werking op 20 december 1995. Enkele dagen tevoren was de Vredesimplementatieraad 
(Peace Implementation Council) opgericht, welks stuurgroep, bestaande uit Canada, 
Frankrijk, Duitsland, Italië, Japan, de Russische Federatie, de Verenigde Staten, het 
voorzitterschap van de Europese Unie en Turkije, was bestemd om politieke sturing 
te geven aan het vredesproces.
Door de bijlagen werden onder meer het Constitutionele Hof (de nieuwe grond-
wet van Bosnië-Herzegovina was een aparte bijlage van het akkoord), de Ombuds-
man voor Mensenrechten (bekend als de Ombudsperson), de Mensenrechtenkamer 
(Human Rights Chamber) en de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger (High Representative) in 
het leven geroepen.
De Ombudsman voor Mensenrechten en de Mensenrechtenkamer, beide ingesteld 
door bijlage 6 bij het Dayton-akkoord, verhielden zich tot elkaar op een wijze verge-
lijkbaar met de ECRM en het EHRM overeenkomstig het EVRM in zijn oorspron-
kelijke redactie (tekst van 1950), de Ombudsman in de rol van de ECRM en de Men-
senrechtenkamer als rechterlijk orgaan. Hun taak was de staat Bosnie-Herzegovina 
en de beide Entiteiten behulpzaam te zijn bij de nakoming van hun verplichtingen 
mensenrechten te eerbiedigen; deze verplichtingen waren gebaseerd op, in de eerste 
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plaats, de in het EVRM en zijn protocollen neergelegde rechten, en in de tweede 
plaats, discriminatie met betrekking tot rechten neergelegd in een aantal andere men-
senrechtenverdragen waaronder het Internationaal Verdrag inzake Burgerrechten en 
Politieke Rechten en het Genocideverdrag. Beide instellingen hebben bijgedragen 
aan het herscheppen van normale omstandigheden en het terugdraaien van de tijdens 
de oorlog uitgevoerde ‘etnische zuiveringen’.
De Hoge Vertegenwoordiger, wiens benoeming door partijen werd verzocht in bij-
lage 10 bij het Dayton-akkoord, had de eindverantwoordelijkheid voor de uitvoering 
van de niet-militaire aspecten van het akkoord. Hij ontving politieke sturing van de 
Stuurgroep van de Vredesimplementatieraad.
Nadat Bosnië-Herzegovina was toegetreden tot het EVRM, zijn over beslissingen 
van de Mensenrechtenkamer en de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger klachten ingediend bij 
het EHRM. 
Een klacht betreffende de Mensenrechtenkamer leidde tot de vaststelling van een 
schending die moest worden toegerekend aan Bosnië-Herzegovina zelf: de Mensen-
rechtenkamer had te gelden als orgaan van Bosnië-Herzegovina, niet als internati-
onale organisatie, met als gevolg dat haar uitspraken voor die staat bindend waren 
ook nadat hij was toegetreden tot het EVRM (ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Jeličić v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.)). Een klacht betreffende de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger 
is niet-ontvankelijk verklaard op de grond dat zijn beslissingen hadden te gelden als 
uitoefeningen van bevoegdheden die de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties met 
toepassing van hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest aan hem hadden gedelegeerd (ont-
vankelijkheidsbeslissing Berić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.)).
Kosovo
Het door de Verenigde Naties ingestelde UNMIK oefende in Kosovo wetgevende en 
uitvoerende macht uit en is tevens verantwoordelijk voor de rechtspraak ter plaatse 
totdat Kosovo in 2008 de onafhankelijkheid uitriep. Echter, zelfs na 2008 is UNMIK 
blijven bestaan.
Cyber-aanvallen als toerekeningsprobleem
Diverse verdragsstaten, waaronder Nederland, hebben in hun strijdkrachten eenhe-
den opgericht die zich bezighouden met cyber-oorlogvoering. Het lijdt geen twijfel 
dat cyber-aanvallen uitgevoerd door dergelijke eenheden zijn toe te rekenen aan de 
betrokken verdragsstaat. Evenzo zijn dergelijke aanvallen toe te rekenen aan verdrags-
staten die cyber-oorlogvoering uitbesteden aan private ondernemingen.
Evenwel leert de ervaring dat zij die cyber-aanvallen uitvoeren, veelal trachten 
hun identiteit te verbergen, bijvoorbeeld door ‘botnets’ te gebruiken (netwerken 
van gehackte computers van onschuldige derden) of zich uit te geven voor ande-
ren (‘spoofing’). Dit proefschrift verdedigt de opvatting dat gelet op de mogelijke 
gevaren van een cyber-aanval verdragsstaten op grond van het EVRM de verplich-
ting hebben te voorkomen dat anderen vanuit hun territorium dergelijke aanvallen 
uitvoeren. Bestaande internationaalrechtelijke structuren gaan niet ver genoeg. Het 
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Verdrag van Boedapest ter bestrijding van cybercriminaliteit bijvoorbeeld verbiedt 
het onderscheppen van computerdata en het misbruiken van systemen maar blijft te 
zeer gericht op privacy, inhoud van informatie en aansprakelijkheid naar burgerlijk 
recht. Het blijft een zaak voor de verdragsstaten of zij het hacken van computers door 
kwaadwillenden buiten hun landsgrenzen met het oogmerk middels botnets een cy-
beraanval te plegen op doelen in een derde land strafbaar willen stellen.
Voldoen aan verdragsverplichtingen door middel van alternatieven voor 
nationale rechtsmiddelen
Rechtsmiddel via een ondergeschikt lichaam
Het Internationaal Gerechtshof heeft aanvaard dat hoewel de Zuid-Afrikaanse bezet-
ting van Namibië onwettig was, het belang van de inwoners van dat land maakte dat 
bestuurlijke en rechterlijke beslissingen die hen raakten niet zonder meer als ongeldig 
konden worden beschouwd. 
Op basis van dit zogeheten ‘Namibië-principe’ heeft het EHRM geoordeeld dat 
een aanhouding en veroordeling door organen van de ‘Turkse Republiek Noord-Cy-
prus’ konden voldoen aan het EVRM. Dit hield geen erkenning van de ‘Turkse Repu-
bliek Noord-Cyprus’ in: de betrokken beslissingen werden toegerekend aan Turkije 
(arresten Foka v. Turkey en Protopapa v. Turkey).
Anders lag het in Transdnjestrië, waar het rechtssysteem door het EHRM werd 
beschouwd als dysfunctioneel.
Het blijkt dus dat zelfs fora van een internationaalrechtelijk onwettige entiteit een 
rechtsmiddel kunnen bieden dat voldoet aan het EVRM, op voorwaarde zij een ju-
ridische traditie weerspiegelen die verenigbaar kan worden geacht met de beginselen 
van het EVRM en voldoen aan de te stellen inhoudelijke normen. Dit proefschrift 
verdedigt de opvatting dat tevens vereist is dat de gekozen oplossing in overeenstem-
ming (althans niet in strijd) is met algemeen volkenrecht; in dit geval wordt de vereis-
te volkenrechtelijke legitimatie geboden door het bovengenoemde Namibië-principe.
Ad hoc-rechtsmiddel
In arresten als Loizidou v. Turkey (merits) en Cyprus v. Turkey heeft het EHRM 
schendingen vastgesteld van art. 8 EVRM en art. 1 Eerste Protocol doordien uit 
Noord-Cyprus verdrevenen geen toegang hadden tot hun woningen en overige on-
roerende zaken. In het arrest Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey werd er bij Turkije op aange-
drongen een passend rechtsmiddel te scheppen en werden tevens de vereisten voor 
dat rechtsmiddel gesteld.
In 2005 werd bij wet van de ‘Turkse Republiek Noord-Cyprus’ een commissie in-
gesteld waarbij eenieder die een aanspraak op een in Noord-Cyprus gelegen onroe-
rende zaak kon aantonen en kon bewijzen daarvan te zijn verdreven die aanspraak 
geldend kon maken. Daarvoor gold een termijn van vier jaar, die later verlengd werd 
tot zes jaar. Die commissie kon bij bindend besluit de teruggave van die onroerende 
zaken bevelen, dan wel schadevergoeding toekennen, of voorstellen die onroerende 
zaken te ruilen tegen onroerende zaken gelegen in de Republiek Cyprus maar waarop 
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een inwoner van de ‘Turkse Republiek Noord-Cyprus’ aanspraak had. Deze oplossing 
vond genade in de ogen van het EHRM (ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Demopoulos and 
Others v. Turkey (dec.) (GC)). 
Internationale organisaties: het aansprakelijkheidsprobleem
In de ontvankelijkheidsbeslissing Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the 
Netherlands (dec.) werd opgemerkt dat de Verenigde Naties een commissie hadden 
behoren op te richten die in voorkomend geval schadevergoeding voor mensenrech-
tenschendingen zou kunnen toewijzen tegen de Verenigde Naties zelf. Een dergelijke 
commissie was er echter niet, en het was niet de taak van Nederland in die leemte te 
voorzien.
De behoefte bestaat behoorlijk te voorzien in aansprakelijkheid voor mensenrech-
tenschendingen door internationale organisaties. Met betrekking tot Kosovo is er een 
begin van erkenning van die behoefte; de oprichting van een klachtencommissie, zij 
het dat die slechts adviserende (dus geen beslissende) bevoegdheden heeft, is een klei-
ne stap in de goede richting.
Conclusie van dit hoofdstuk
Het opzetten van een ondergeschikte pseudostaat is niet voldoende om toerekening 
van een verdragsschending te ontgaan. Niettemin blijkt uit de ervaring opgedaan 
door Turkije in Noord-Cyprus dat een verdragsstaat zich op deze wijze van zijn ver-
dragsverplichtingen kan kwijten.
Ongeveer hetzelfde geldt met betrekking tot het uitbesteden van taken aan parti-
culieren zoals bijvoorbeeld private militaire bedrijven. Een verdragsstaat zal op deze 
wijze toerekening van verdragsschendingen niet kunnen ontgaan, maar als er een vol-
doende wetgevend kader is, toezicht voldoende is geregeld en is voorzien in de nodige 
rechtsmiddelen, is het voor een verdragsstaat mogelijk aan zijn verdragsverplichtin-
gen te voldoen.
Internationale organisaties, zoals de Verenigde Naties, kunnen verdragsstaten be-
schermen tegen aanspraken op grond van het EVRM; echter ontstaat aldus een nieuw 
gevaar, te weten het ontstaan van een rechtsvacuüm waardoor voor een slachtoffer 
van een schending van zijn mensenrechten geen genoegdoening bestaat.
Internationaal opgelegde quasi-inheemse instellingen bieden de beste mogelijkhe-
den om aansprakelijkheid elders onder te brengen. In dit opzicht is lering te trekken 
uit de ervaring opgedaan in Bosnië-Herzegovina. De aldaar toegepaste oplossing ver-
toont de volgende kenmerken:
1. Naleving van het algemeen internationaal recht. Dit betekent een volkenrechte-
lijk mandaat van de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties. Bij ontbreken van 
instemming van een internationaal erkende plaatselijke regering is een dergelijk 
mandaat een conditio sine qua non voor de legitimiteit van elke geweldstoepas-
sing.
2. Aanvaarding van verantwoordelijkheid door quasi-inheemse instellingen die als 
zodanig niet ondergeschikt zijn aan de regering of regeringen van een verdrags-
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staat. Dit is een conditio sine qua non wil een betrokken verdragsstaat aan rechts-
macht in de zin van art. 1 ontkomen.
Met betrekking tot Bosnië-Herzegovina is het overigens zeer nuttig gebleken dat van-
af het begin bescherming van de in het EVRM neergelegde rechten en vrijheden on-
derdeel was van de gekozen oplossing. Dit heeft bijgedragen aan het ontstaan van een 
nieuwe, op het EHRM gebaseerde rechtsorde.
Een probleem dat in Bosnië-Herzegovina onopgelost is gebleven, is dat niet is 
voorzien in aansprakelijkheid voor mensenrechtenschendingen door de internatio-
nale aanwezigheid zelf.
Hoofdstuk 9: Slotbeschouwing en conclusie
In dit hoofdstuk wordt een poging gedaan de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden. 
Hiertoe worden de in het eerste hoofdstuk genoemde ‘verweren’ nader beschouwd.
Het eerste verweer: geen schending
De feiten ontkennen
Dit is het meest voor de hand liggende verweer. Het EHRM is echter in de praktijk 
bereid gebleken een ondogmatische houding aan te nemen ten aanzien van zaken als 
bewijslastverdeling en waardering van het bewijs; gezien de ongelijkheid die meestal 
tussen partijen bestaat, is een dergelijke houding ook geboden.
De schending ontkennen
Inmiddels is duidelijk dat de opvatting dat het EVRM buiten vredestijd geen toepas-
sing vindt, onhoudbaar is. Het EVRM is van toepassing in situaties van internationaal 
en niet-internationaal gewapend conflict en in situaties die eerder als wetshandhaving 
dienen te worden beschouwd, en naar de hier verdedigde opvatting ook op door of 
namens een verdragsstaat uitgevoerde cyberaanvallen, althans potentieel, en op ge-
richte dodelijke aanvallen buiten de eigen landsgrenzen van de verdragsstaat.
Afwijking met toepassing van art. 15 EVRM biedt een mogelijkheid om aanspra-
kelijkheid te beperken. De verdragsverplichtingen van de verdragsstaat ingevolge het 
EVRM blijven bestaan; de vraag of voldaan is aan de eisen van art. 15 EVRM komt 
slechts aan de orde als blijkt dat er in beginsel sprake is van een verdragsschending.
Voor wat betreft het begrip ‘oorlog’ verdedigt dit proefschrift de opvatting dat 
moet worden aangesloten bij het begrip ‘gewapend conflict’, al dan niet internatio-
naal, zoals gehanteerd in het internationaal humanitair recht. De eis dat een oorlog in 
deze zin ‘het bestaan van het land’ moet bedreigen wil afwijking krachtens art. 15 ge-
oorloofd zijn, geldt naar de hier voorgestane opvatting niet indien de ‘oorlog’ wordt 
gevoerd met inachtneming van hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest van de Verenigde 
Naties.
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Afwijkingen ingevolge art. 15 mogen de rechten waarvan niet mag worden afge-
weken (art. 15 lid 2) uiteraard niet aantasten. Zij mogen ook, naar de tekst van art. 15 
lid  1, niet verder gaan dan de ernst van de situatie strikt vereist; het EHRM blijkt 
echter voor wat betreft het bestaan van een ‘noodtoestand’ de verdragsstaat een aan-
zienlijke beoordelingsvrijheid te gunnen.
De eis dat afwijkende maatregelen niet in strijd mogen zijn met andere verplichtin-
gen die voortvloeien uit het internationale recht ziet op het Handvest van de Verenig-
de Naties en op internationaal humanitair recht (in geval van oorlog) of op andere 
verdragsverplichtingen die kunnen gelden in geval van een ‘noodtoestand’ die niet 
een gewapend conflict is, maar niet op mensenrechtenverdragen die verdergaande be-
scherming bieden dan het EVRM zelf.
Het is een redelijke eis dat afwijkende maatregelen naar hun aard kunnen bijdragen 
aan herstel van de normale toestand en dus tijdelijk zijn.
Het is niet mogelijk art. 15 EVRM met terugwerkende kracht in te roepen.
Het tweede verweer: rechtsmacht van de verdragsstaat ontkennen
Het begrip ‘rechtsmacht’ heeft twee aspecten. Ten eerste ziet het op het recht en de 
macht van de staat eenzijdig wetgevende, uitvoerende en rechtsprekende macht uit 
te oefenen om gedrag voor te schrijven. Ten tweede ziet het op art. 1 EVRM; hier 
bepaalt het begrip ‘rechtsmacht’ de kring van gerechtigden.
In beide aspecten is het begrip ‘rechtsmacht’ in beginsel territoriaal. Een verdrags-
staat oefent rechtsmacht uit binnen zijn eigen landsgrenzen, maar ook daarbuiten: 
in het bijzonder in quasi-territoriale zin over zeegebieden en in het boven het eigen 
land en de territoriale zee gelegen luchtruim. Tevens oefent een staat quasi-territoriale 
rechtsmacht uit over schepen onder zijn vlag en lucht- en ruimtevaartuigen die door 
die staat zijn geregistreerd.
Extraterritoriale uitoefening van rechtsmacht is uitoefening van rechtsmacht bui-
ten de eigen landsgrenzen die niet quasi-territoriaal is.
Het bestaan van rechtsmacht op grond van art. 1 EVRM kan niet worden ontkend 
op de grond dat de verdragsstaat niet in staat is die uit te oefenen, bijvoorbeeld als 
gevolg van de aanwezigheid van een vreemde gewapende macht, al kan er in dat ge-
val een objectieve belemmering bestaan voor uitoefening van zodanige rechtsmacht. 
Ook kan het bestaan van rechtsmacht niet worden ontkend indien een vreemde staat 
met medewerking of al dan niet stilzwijgende instemming van de verdragsstaat ver-
dragsschendingen pleegt.
Of een verdragsstaat door op het territoir van een vreemde staat ‘hard power’ te 
gebruiken rechtsmacht uitoefent, is niet afhankelijk van de geoorloofdheid van dat 
gebruikt van ‘hard power’. Is de vreemde staat een andere verdragsstaat, dan heeft de 
verdragsstaat die daar ‘hard power’ uitoefent, alle rechten en vrijheden te verzekeren 
die het EVRM biedt; elke andere opvatting zou leiden tot een rechtsvacuüm ten na-
dele van de individu.
Het gebruik van ‘hard power’ op het territoir van een vreemde staat die geen ver-
dragsstaat is, levert uitoefening van rechtsmacht op indien sprake is van een gerichte 
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aantasting van de veiligheid of vrijheid van een beoogd slachtoffer, of indien effectieve 
controle wordt uitgeoefend over een bepaald gebied. In het eerste geval is de verdrags-
staat gehouden aan een betrokken persoon die rechten en vrijheden te verzekeren die 
voor diens toestand relevant zijn; in het tweede geval is de verdragsstaat gehouden tot 
het verzekeren van alle rechten en vrijheden die het EVRM verzekert (met eventueel 
de mogelijkheid van afwijking krachtens art. 15 EVRM).
Het derde verweer: rechtsmacht van het EHRM ontkennen
Het is niet mogelijk met terugwerkende kracht een voorbehoud bij het EVRM te 
maken. Wel is het in beginsel mogelijk een beroep te doen op een oudere, met het 
EVRM onverenigbare, verdragsverplichting op grond van een ouder verdrag, zij het 
dat dergelijke conflicterende verdragsverplichting zeldzaam zullen zijn.
Het vierde verweer: toerekening ontkennen
Een verdragsstaat zal toerekening van een verdragsschending niet kunnen ontgaan 
door zich te beroepen op het bestaan van een pseudo-staat die in feite aan de regering 
van de verdragsstaat zelf ondergeschikt is, of door zijn handelen uit te besteden aan 
particulieren. Evenzo zal een verdragsstaat een verdragsschending worden toegere-
kend die met medewerking of instemming van die verdragsstaat wordt gepleegd door 
vreemdelingen.
Wel zal een verdragsstaat toerekening kunnen ontgaan voor zover handelingen 
kunnen worden toegerekend aan de Verenigde Naties. De ervaring in Kosovo leert 
dat dit het geval zal kunnen zijn als wordt gehandeld in opdracht van de Veiligheids-
raad van de Verenigde Naties ingevolge hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest van de Ver-
enigde Naties.
Waarschijnlijk de beste kansen om toerekening te ontlopen, bestaat uit het gebruik 
van internationaal opgelegde quasi-inheemse instellingen. Daarvoor gelden echter de 
volgende conditiones sine quibus non:
– Volledige naleving van algemeen volkenrecht; en
– Aanname van verantwoordelijkheid door quasi-inheemse instellingen die als zo-
danig niet ondergeschikt zijn aan een verdragsstaat.
Conclusie
De slotconclusie is dat het EVRM zijn Verdragsstaten voldoende ruimte laat om hun 
Verdragsverplichtingen en -aansprakelijkheden aan te passen aan de vereisten die uit-
oefening van ‘hard power’stelt, mits zij zich in de keuze van hun middelen bewegen 
binnen de grenzen van het internationale recht.
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